CH. XXIII.] SHERMAN AND THOMAS 455 boldly."1 Thomas had no liking for such a method of operation, deeming it a useless sacrifice of men, and, after giving Sherman the information that he had called for that afternoon, added: "We have already lost heavily to-day without gaining any material advantage; one or two more such assaults would use up this army. Sherman replied: "Our loss is small compared with some of those East. It should not in the least discourage us. At times assaults are necessary and inevitable." In a later communication he asked, "Are you willing to risk the move on Fulton, cutting loose from our railroad?" Thomas answered quickly, "If with the greater part of the army, I think it decidedly better than butting against breastworks twelve feet thick and strongly abatised."2 Sherman then made a flank movement, causing Johnston to relax his hold of Kenesaw. July 4 he had "a noisy but not a desperate battle; " and still pushing the Confederates, he compelled them, by July 9, to retreat across the Chattahoochee River, leaving him in full possession of its north and west banks, and in sight of Atlanta. The loss of the Union army during the months of May and June was 16,800; that of the Confederate 14,500.4 The allusion to the correspondence between Sherman and Thomas the day of the Battle of Kenesaw Mountain affords an inkling of the difference between their characters and their modes of operation. June 18 Sherman wrote Grant: "My chief source of trouble is with the Army of the Cumberland, which is dreadfully slow. A fresh furrow in a ploughed field will stop the whole column, and all begin to intrench. I have again and again tried to impress on Thomas that we must assail and not defend; we are the offensive, and yet it 1 O. R., vol. xxxviii. part iv. p. 69. See his earlier defence, cited by Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 24. 2 This correspondence is June 27, O. R., vol. xxxviii. part iv. pp. 610, 611, 612. Sherman's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 66. Ibid., pp. 47, 63; Johnston's Narrative, pp. 325, 576. seems that the whole Army of the Cumberland is so habituated to be on the defensive that, from its commander down to the lowest private, I cannot get it out of their heads." On proposing the movement to Fulton, he relates, “General Thomas, as usual, shook his head."2 On the other hand, the officers of the Army of the Cumberland for the most part believed that Sherman's restlessness and impetuosity, which had got them into trouble at Kenesaw, would have led them to other disasters had he not been restrained by the discretion and prudence of Thomas. In this controversy the layman may not venture a decision, and since the campaign was successful to the point which the story has reached, and eminently so to the end of it, he would like to believe that the differing gifts of Sherman and Thomas wrought together to advantage, and that they accomplished in their union, jarring though it was at times, what neither one alone would have done so completely and so well.3 Not alone with military campaigns has the story of 1864 to occupy itself: it must take into account the political campaign, the nomination and the election of a President. The important question was whether Lincoln should succeed himself, and this could not be kept in abeyance even during the preceding year. He was, in a measure, held responsible for the military failures of the summer of 1862, for the disaster of Fredericksburg in December, for that of Chancellorsville in May, 1863, with the result that many came to doubt whether he had the requisite ability and decision to carry on the great undertaking. But he came in for a share of the glory of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, and from that time forward his political position became greatly strengthened. Yet 1 O. R., vol. xxxviii. part iv. p. 507. 2 Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 61. My authorities for this account are the reports and correspondence in O. R., vol. xxxviii. parts i. and iv.; J. D. Cox, Atlanta; Sherman's Memoirs, vol. ii.; Johnston's Narrative; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix.; Century War Book, vol. iv.; Life of Thomas, Van Horne. CH. XXIII.] CHASE'S DESIRE FOR THE PRESIDENCY 457 the disaffection had been strong enough to seek a head, and had found it in Chase, whose craving for the presidency was exceedingly strong. Theoretically, he might seem a formidable candidate. He was the representative of the radical Republicans, and was regarded by them as the counterpoise of Lincoln, who had gone too slow to suit them in his blows against slavery, and was now arousing their antagonism in his policy for the reconstruction of the Union. Chase had made a success of his management of the Treasury, and was in character and ability fit for the office of President. The opponents of Lincoln made an adroit use of the custom then long prevalent of limiting the occupation of the White House to four years: since Jackson was re-elected, in 1832, no man had been chosen for a second term. Van Buren had, indeed, received the nomination for it, but had been beaten at the polls; and since then Presidents in office had been candidates for renomination, but none had even been renominated by their party conventions. This had seemed to become a settled practice. In August, 1863, Chase declared that he was not anxious for the presidency, and that if the currents of popular sentiment turned towards him he would not take the office unless it came to him without any pledge in relation to appointments. But the desire feeding on itself increased. He listened eagerly to the men who solicited him, and he was sought, writes one of his biographers, "less by strong men and by good men than by weak men and by bad men. It needs no acute judgment to detect the lurking ambition in his letter of apparent self-effacement to his son-in-law, exGovernor Sprague. "If I were controlled by mere personal sentiments," he wrote, "I should prefer the re-election of Mr. Lincoln to that of any other man. But I doubt the expediency of re-electing anybody, and I think a man of differing qualities from those the President has will be needed for the next four years. I am not anxious to be regarded as that man; and I am quite willing to leave that question to 1 Warden, p. 530; see, also, pp. 533, 536. the decision of those who agree in thinking that some such man should be chosen."1 During the month of January, 1864, a committee of senators, representatives, and citizens was formed with the avowed object of securing the nomination of Chase. Some of them had interviews with him; and he, after exhibiting the usual and feigned coyness of presidential candidates, consented to allow the submission of his name "to the consideration of the people." He desired the support of Ohio, but if “a majority of our friends" should "indicate a preference for another," he would cheerfully acquiesce in their decision." His private correspondence at this time is pervaded with anxiety for the nomination, and makes one think that he was, with a certain dignity and in his own manner, working hard for it, while he disclaimed everything of the sort. "Some friends are sanguine that my name will receive favorable consideration from the people in connection with the presidency," he wrote. "I tell them that I can take no part in anything they may propose to do, except by trying to merit confidence where I am." "So far as the presidency is concerned," are his words, two days later, "I must leave that wholly to the people."4 The committee, that has just been referred to, issued a circular, signed by Senator Pomeroy, of Kansas, its chairman, which was circulated widely by mail, the pith of which was that radical ideas, the policy of a vigorous prosecution of the war, and the safety of the country would be subserved better by the choice of Chase for President than by that of Lincoln.5 By the first of February, however, Chase learned that there was little probability of his receiving the support of his own State, and he prepared his mind to submit with as much 1 Nov. 26, 1863, Schuckers, p. 494. 8 Jan. 26, 1864, ibid., p. 563. 2 Warden, pp. 560, 573. 5 The circular is dated Feb. 1864. -Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia, 1864, p. 783; Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 319; Pomeroy's remarks, Senate, March 10, Globe, p. 1025. 6 Warden, p. 568. CH. XXIII.] LINCOLN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS CHASE 456 cheerfulness as possible to the almost certain choice of his chief. "The signs of the times," he wrote, "seem to indicate the renomination of Mr. Lincoln. His personal popularity is great and deserved. If to his kindliness of spirit and good sense he joined strong will and energetic action, there would be little left to wish for in him." But the committee, he continued, "think there will be a change in the current, which, so far as it is not spontaneous, is chiefly managed by the Blairs."1 February 20 the Pomeroy circular was printed in the Washington Constitutional Union,2 and called forth a letter from Chase to the President, in which he made a frank avowal of his connection with the Pomeroy committee in respect to his candidacy for President, saying in it, "I have thought this explanation due to you as well as to myself. If there is anything in my action or position which, in your judgment, will prejudice the public interest under my charge, I beg of you to say so. I do not wish to administer the Treasury Department one day without your entire confidence."3 Lincoln had long known of Chase's striving for the presidency, and while it may have disturbed him at times, the attitude of his mind towards it after he had back of him Gettysburg and Vicksburg was expressed in his remark in October, 1863, to his private secretary. "I have determined," he said, "to shut my eyes, so far as possible, to everything of the sort. Mr. Chase makes a good Secretary, and I shall keep him where he is. If he becomes President, all right. I hope we may never have a worse man. I have observed, with regret, his plan of strengthening himself. Whenever he sees that an important matter is troubling me, if I am compelled to decide in a way to give offence to a man of some influence, he always ranges himself in opposition to me, and persuades the victim that he has been hardly dealt 1 Feb. 2, Warden, p. 569. The Blairs were Francis P. Sr.; Montgomery, the Postmaster-General; Francis P. Jr. 2 See Warden, p. 573. 8 Feb. 22, Warden, p. 574; see Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 321. 4 See McClure, Lincoln and Men of War Times, p. 120 et seq. |