CH. XVII.] BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL 47 The morning of July 1 found the whole Union army posted on Malvern Hill, a strong position near the James River. By noon the Confederates appeared. Lee and Jefferson Davis were with their troops. D. H. Hill, now under Jackson's command, learned the great natural strength of Malvern Hill from a clergyman reared in the neighborhood, and going to Willis's Church to meet Lee, who, he writes, "bore grandly his terrible disappointment of the day before and made no allusion to it," imparted to the general his knowledge of the "commanding height" and "ample area" before them, and made bold to say, "If General McClellan is there in force, we had better let him alone." Longstreet laughed and retorted, "Don't get scared now that we have got him whipped." Although Lee understood McClellan well and played upon his weaknesses, he did not realize the extreme timidity of his tactics on the day of Gaines's Mill, and doubtless considered it past belief that he could have left exposed to an attack so overpowering a single corps tardily supported by one division to meet the combined forces of the Confederate army. Porter's spirited defence confirmed Lee in his error. Supposing that he had badly defeated the principal part of the Union army at Gaines's Mill, he now thought that he was pursuing shattered divisions and demoralized troops. Jackson had failed to give the crushing blow at Glendale, and while now the promise of success was not so good, yet a victorious army can do much against one in flight after a defeat. Therefore Lee resolved to attack McClellan, and the order was given that opened the battle of Malvern Hill. D. H. Hill and Magruder did the fighting on the Confederate side, but with inadequate support. Although their troops fought bravely and well, they were mowed down by the fire of the splendid artillery and the efficiently directed infantry of the Union army. On the Union side, the burden of the battle was borne by Couch of Keyes's corps and Morell2 of Porter's. 1 Hill's article, Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 391; Hill's report, O. R vol. xi. part ii. p. 628. 2 Both commanded divisions. They showed themselves able leaders, and Porter's generalship was of a high order. The Confederates were repulsed at all points with a loss double that of the Federals. Hill describes the heroic advance of nine brigades of Magruder across an open field "under the fire of field-artillery in front and the fire of the heavy ordnance of the gun-boats in the It was not war," he declares, "it was murder."1 In his report he speaks of "the blundering management of the battle." Nearly all the observers and writers agree that Lee's generalship at Malvern Hill was clearly defective. The attack is condemned and the execution of it censured. 2 McClellan was not with his fighting troops. Some think that if he had been on the field and seen with his own eyes the victory his devoted soldiers 3 had won for him, he would have held his position on Malvern Hill; an energetic general might even have taken the offensive and gained a success of moment. In the Seven Days' Battles McClellan's loss was 15,849; Lee's 20,135. McClellan with his army retired to 1 Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 394. 2 O. R., vol. xi. part ii. p. 629. 3 "The dear fellows cheer me as of old, as they march to certain death, and I feel prouder of them than ever.” — McClellan to his wife, July 1, Own Story, p. 442. Killed, Union 1734, Confederate 3286; wounded, Union 8062, Confederate 15,909; missing, Union 6053, Confederate 940.- Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 315. I have despaired at getting at the truth as to the capture of artillery. Lee in his report dated March 6, 1863, says he took 52 pieces. Hill in his undated report says 51.-O. R., vol. xi. part ii. pp. 498, 622. McClellan's statements cannot be reconciled with these nor with each other. McClellan to the President, July 2: "I have lost but one gun;" to Stanton, July 3: "Our light and heavy guns are saved with the exception of one; "address to his soldiers, July 4: "You have saved all your material, all your trains, and all your guns except a few lost in battle, taking in return guns and colors from the enemy; "to the President, July 4: "We have lost no guns except twenty-five on the field of battle."-O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 287, 291, 299; part i. p. 72. McClellan to his wife, July 2: "I have the whole army here, with all its material and guns."-Own Story, p. 442. Lee says his army took 35,000 stands of small arms, Hill 27,000; both say 10,000 prisoners were captured. My authorities for this account of the military operations after Gaines's Mill are substantially those cited in note 1 on p. 43. In addition I have CH. XVII.] PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN A FAILURE 49 Harrison's Landing. July 8 Lee fell back to the vicinity of Richmond. After seven days of constant march and fight, both armies needed rest. Their thinned ranks must be filled before active operations could be resumed. In one month, indeed, those eitizen soldiers had become veterans. The meed of victory attended the training of one army, and while defeat was the lot of the Union troops, they had not lost honor. They made an orderly retreat, and in the rear-guard fighting had more than once beaten their adversary. The Peninsular campaign was a failure, and the chief cause of its failure may be ascribed to McClellan. I have spoken of the mistakes of Lincoln and Stanton, wherein they contributed to the embarrassment of the Union army in its operations before Richmond, but it is not just to weigh their errors as heavily as we do those of the commanding general. Lincoln was a civilian called by the voice of the people to a place which on the occurrence of the war became one of unprecedented difficulty. That he would gladly have thrown all responsibility of the movement of armies on a man of military training, is shown by his whole treatment of McClellan. But McClellan was not equal to the position. of commander-in-chief, and because of his incompetence the President was forced little by little to invade his province and assume unwonted duties with a result that is not surprising. Lincoln's care to avail himself of all sources of enlightenment is shown by his night journey, June 23, on a quick special train to West Point for the purpose of consulting General Scott, who was too infirm to visit Washington.1 The traditions of the country were favorable to the occupancy of the War Department by a civilian, and Stanton brought to this office ability, energy, and honesty.2 The mistakes of used the reports of Sumner, Franklin, and Keyes; the testimony of Sumner, Keyes, and Hooker, C. W., part i.; articles of Longstreet and Franklin, Century War Book, vol. ii. 1 N. Y. Herald, Times, June 25, 26. 2 See J. C. Ropes's remarkable characterization of Stanton, Story of the Civil War, part i. p. 225. Lincoln and Stanton were those of civilians who were constrained by force of circumstances to intervene in military business, while McClellan's trade was war; and when offensive operations had to be conducted on a large scale, he showed himself to be incompetent in his trade. It is no longer necessary to bring proof, indeed it is hardly necessary even to state, that Lincoln desired sincerely and ardently the success of his general. To me it is equally clear that Stanton shared this feeling. The very nature of the case, the combination of patriotism and self-interest, must have made the Secretary eager for victories no matter by what general won. His letters, despatches, and verbal assurances are evidence either that he did all in his power to aid McClellan, consistent with what he deemed his duty elsewhere, and that he would have rejoiced with no feeling of envy at the success of the Peninsular campaign, or that he was black-hearted and treacherous, to a degree inconceivable of one trusted by the most honest and magnanimous of men, Abraham Lincoln.1 McClellan's failure was due largely to his absurd overestimate of the enemy, which unnerved him when active operations were needed. Perhaps his tactics would have been 1 See Stanton to McClellan, April 16, May 4, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 103, 134; McClellan to his wife, June 9, 12, Own Story, pp. 402, 404. Stanton wrote McClellan, June 11: "Be assured, general, that there has never been a moment when my desire has been otherwise than to aid you with my whole heart, mind, and strength, since the hour we first met; and whatever others may say for their own purposes, you have never had, and never can have, any one more truly your friend, or more anxious to support you, or more joyful than I shall be at the success which I have no doubt will soon be achieved by your arms."— O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 47. See, also, Stanton to McClellan, July 5, Marcy to McClellan, July 4, 10, part iii. pp. 294, 298, 310; Stanton to McClellan, July 5, McClellan's Own Story, p. 476; Lincoln's speech at a Union meeting Aug. 6, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 219. For McClellan's side see his letter to Stanton, July 8, and a note of the editor, ibid., pp. 477, 478. 2 McClellan seems to have accepted without question the estimates of Allan Pinkerton, the chief of his Secret Service division: these were grossly incorrect. May 3 Pinkerton estimated the Confederate strength at Yorktown under Johnston as 100,000 to 120,000. At this time it did not exceed 63,000, and was probably 10,000 less. June 26 Pinkerton reported: "The CH. XVII.] MCCLELLAN'S FAILURE 51 less timid and disjointed had he been on the field when his battles were fought, but he was persistently absent.1 At Fair summary of general estimates of the rebel army shows their forces to be at this time over 180,000 men, and the specific information already obtained warrants the belief that this number is probably considerably short of the real strength of their army.” —O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 269. Lee's force on that day was between 80,000 and 90,000. It certainly did not exceed 90,000. Pinkerton's general estimates are printed on p. 271, ibid. Most of them might have been called camp rumors. Euripides wrote: "It behoves the man Who claims the merit of an able chief, So preposterous was McClellan's estimate of his enemy, that General Palfrey writes: "It is impossible that he could have believed that the Confederates possessed such numbers." This notion has met with considerable favor, but in view of McClellan's reiterated expressions I cannot accept it. See O. R., vol. xi. part i. pp. 11, 51; part ii. p. 20; part iii. pp. 151, 188, 231, 264, 265, 266, 267, 280, 282; McClellan's Own Story, pp. 344, 363. In a discussion which followed my reading of a paper on the Peninsular Campaign, before the Massachusetts Historical Society in Jan., 1896, the question was raised: Ought the commanding general at that stage of the war to have known with some degree of accuracy the size of the opposing army? I think that may be answered in the affirmative. From the larger population of the North, and its very much greater facilities for equipping an army, the presumption ought to have been that it would have more troops in the field than the South, until at least results began to flow from the Confederate Conscription Act, passed April 16. The veteran General Wool, in command at Fortress Monroe, felt sure that McClellan outnumbered the Confederates.-O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 143, 190. A remarkable example of what might have been known is seen in the testimony of Uriah H. Painter, a correspondent of the Philadelphia Inquirer, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, July 10. Painter was with the Army of the Potomac from April 2 until about the 22d or 23d of June, and estimated that when the Confederates evacuated Yorktown, they had a force of “perhaps 50,000 to 60,000." His estimate of the number of Lee's troops, shortly before Gaines's Mill, was "about 100,000." Question. "By what means did you obtain that information, and reach that conclusion?" Answer. "By getting statements from prisoners, contrabands, and deserters, and learning about different divisions and brigades, and drawing conclusions from the mass of information collected. I have at different 1 Webb makes some excuse for McClellan in that he did not have a proper staff. -P 182. |