CH. XXIII.] WASHINGTON IN DANGER 499 for assistance, making this record worthy of note, "Governor Seymour answers the President's call handsomely;"1 but the notice to them being sudden, no efficient aid could be rendered from these quarters. Early's plan, which had been suggested or approved by Lee, comprised the release of the 17,000 prisoners at Point Lookout,2 arming them, and marching them immediately on the route to Washington, where they might be of assistance in its capture. For this object a detachment of cavalry was now on its way to Point Lookout, while Early himself, with his infantry and artillery, marched forward, and on the morning of July 11 appeared on the Seventh Street road north of Washington, before the fortifications of the city, in sight of the dome of the Capitol. Communication from Washington to the Northern cities was cut off; the excitement and alarm were great. The President, who, unmindful of personal danger, had, as usual, the night previous, ridden out to his summer residence, the Soldiers' Home, directly in the line of the advance of the enemy, was brought back to the city by the earnest insistence of the Secretary of P. M., O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. pp. 155, 157; Barnard's report cited by Humphreys, p. 245, note; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 163. 1 July 6, O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 91. 2 This point is where the Potomac empties into Chesapeake Bay. For the number of prisoners, see ibid., vol. xl. part iii. p. 143. 3 Lee wrote Davis, June 26: "Great benefit might be drawn from the release of our prisoners at Point Lookout. . . . I have understood that most of the garrison at Point Lookout was composed of negroes. I should suppose that the commander of such troops would be poor and feeble. A stubborn resistance therefore may not reasonably be expected. By taking a company of the Maryland artillery, armed as infantry, the dismounted cavalry, and their infantry organization, as many men would be supplied as transportation could be procured for. By throwing them suddenly on the beach with some concert of action among the prisoners, I think the guard might be overpowered, the prisoners liberated and organized, and marched immediately on the route to Washington."-ibid., vol. xxxvii. part i. p. 767, see p. 769; also, letter of John Tyler, July 9, ibid., vol. xl. part iii. p. 759. The reports of Lee and Early of July 14, 19 (ibid., vol. xxxvii. part i. pp. 346, 347), must be read in the light of the earlier correspondence, and allowance must be made for the tendency of the most truthful commanders to make the best of great opportunities missed. War; and Captain Fox, of the Navy Department, had, with out Lincoln's knowledge, a vessel ready to transport him from the capital, should its fall become absolutely certain.1 If Early had profited by the moment of consternation, he could have gone into Washington early on July 11, seized the money in the Treasury, the large stores of clothing, arms, and ammunition, destroyed a large amount of government property, and, while he might not have been able to hold the place, he could have escaped without harm from the veterans who were on the way to the rescue, having struck the prestige of the Union an incalculable blow. The veterans of the Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac and of the Nineteenth Corps from New Orleans saved the country from the disaster of the capture of its capital. It was, however, little to the credit of Grant that Washington should be in so imminent danger, while Richmond was in none, and that the measures for its safety should have been so tardily taken. During these days the commander seemed to be stunned. Although his despatches are frequent, and evidence good attention to business, he did not realize the danger. He was not the man of prompt decision and ready purpose who commanded at Donelson, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga; rather was he the lethargic general of Shiloh. He refused to believe, while Early was marching down the Shenandoah valley, that the self-same Confederate corps had left Petersburg.2 It was not until July 5 that he became certain of it, and even then he did not show himself complete master of the situation. Lee had in some measure reckoned on Grant's aversion to diminish his own army. "It is so repugnant to Grant's principles and practice to send troops from him," he had written Davis, "that I had hoped, before resorting to it, he would have preferred attacking me."4 But, as we have seen, Grant 1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 167. 8 Ibid., p. 60. 4 July 7, ibid., p. 593; see, also, p. 595. CH. XXIII.] WASHINGTON IN DANGER 501 was now too weak to assault the Confederates in their intrenchments, and he did not fall into the trap which had been laid for him. July 6 he sent Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps, about 5000 strong, an account of whose service has already been given, and 3000 of the cavalry corps, of whom, however, 2496 were sick, to Baltimore, deeming this reinforcement to the troops already in the field sufficient to guard against the threatened danger; indeed, he even cherished the hope that these veterans from his army, together with Hunter, might "succeed in nearly annihilating Early and Breckin-` ridge." In response to Halleck's alarming telegram the night of the 8th,2 Grant ordered, the next day, before he had heard of Wallace's defeat, the remainder of the Sixth Corps to Washington, and suggested that part of the Nineteenth Corps, then on its way from New Orleans to Fortress Monroe, should also be sent as succors to lend aid in capturing or destroying the Confederates who had invaded the North." As a later thought, he sent this word: "If the President thinks it advisable that I should go to Washington in person, I can start in an hour after receiving notice, leaving everything here on the defensive." Lincoln replied: "What I think is that you should provide to retain your hold where you are, certainly, and bring the rest with you personally, and make a vigorous effort to destroy the enemy's force in this vicinity. I think there is really a fair chance to do this if 1 July 6, O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 80. ... 2 Of 10.30 P. M. "Sigel and Couch say that scouts, prisoners, and country people confirm previous reports of the enemy's force- that is, some 20,000 or 30,000. Until more forces arrive, we have nothing to meet that number in the field, and the militia is not reliable even to hold the fortifications of Washington and Baltimore. If you propose to cut off this raid and not merely to secure our depots, we must have more forces here. Indeed, if the enemy's strength is as great as represented, it is doubtful if the militia can hold all of our defences. I do not think that we can expect much from Hunter. He is too far off and moves too slowly. I think, therefore, that very considerable reinforcements should be sent directly to this place,”. Ibid., pp. 119, 120. 3 Ibid., pp. 133, 134. 4 July 9, 6 P. M., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 134. the movement is prompt. This is what I think upon your suggestion, and is not an order."1 The President was wiser than the general. Grant, as the sequel proved, made a mistake in not proceeding immediately to Washington, and he failed to furnish satisfying reasons for not acting upon this suggestion of his own, which was so promptly accepted by the President. "Before more troops can be sent from here," he telegraphed, "Hunter will be able to join Wright [commander 6th Corps] in rear of the enemy, with at least 10,000 men, besides a force sufficient to hold Maryland Heights. I think, on reflection, it would have a bad effect for me to leave here, and with General Ord at Baltimore, and Hunter and Wright with the forces following the enemy up, could do no good. I have great faith that the enemy will never be able to get back with much of his force."2 Yet Grant had acted with sufficient promptness to save the capital, as Early, by delay, had missed a great opportunity. The Confederate commander suspected, probably, that the veterans had already arrived, for he did not seize Fort Stevens, which guarded the entrance to Washington by the Seventh Street road, and which he might have had by simply saying the word. At noon of this day (July 11), two divis 1 July 10, 2.30 P. M., O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 155. 2 Ibid., p. 156; H. Porter, Century Magazine, May, 1897, p. 99. It may be urged that it was not safe for Grant to leave City Point on even a temporary errand, for the reason that Butler, being the senior officer in rank, would then be in supreme command of the operations against Petersburg. That was indeed an additional reason for the displacement of Butler, but the Army of the Potomac being engaged in siege operations was safe certainly under the command of Meade, assisted by his accomplished chief-of-staff Humphreys and the corps commanders Hancock and Warren. John N. Frazee, Lieut.-Col. 150th Reg. Ohio N. G. (100-days men) Com'd'g Fort Stevens, reported, July 16: "The troops garrisoning the fort were composed of Company K, One Hundred and Fiftieth Regiment Ohio National Guard, 78 men, Capt. Safford; Thirteenth Michigan Battery, 79 men, Capt. Charles Dupont; 52 convalescents, commanded by Lieutenant Turner, of Company K, One Hundred and Fiftieth Regiment Ohio National Guard."- O. R., vol. xxxvii. part i. p. 247. To support the statement in the text, see the rest of his report; also Hayward's, p. 245, and A. D. |