government, but affected the department of Foreign Affairs less perhaps than any other, since Earl Russell was a rival leader of the Liberal party and had been talked of for Prime Minister at the time the Queen sent for Palmerston. Many other things go to show that Russell considered himself supreme as Foreign Secretary. Perhaps the main duty of an English Prime Minister, next to upholding the honor of his country, is to retain his majority in the House of Commons. Palmerston had alienated the radicals, chief of whom were Cobden and Bright, and as a set-off had won golden opinions from the conservatives, who displayed little anxiety to turn him out of office. The radicals were on the side of the North through thick and thin, while many of the conservatives sympathized with the South. Lending countenance to the Southern cause was therefore the better method of keeping his majority,2 and to do this Palmerston would, in John Bright's opinion, stick at nothing, not even war. He deemed the feeling of the North towards England unreasonable, and such was his real or affected indignation at General Butler's notorious woman order that he wrote Adams a private and

1 Life of Palmerston, Ashley, vol. ii. p. 205.

2 Adams wrote Seward August 8: "Lord Palmerston has been steadily laboring to counterbalance the loss experienced on the liberal side by corresponding gains from the opposition. . . . That the American difficulties have materially contributed to this result, cannot be doubted. The fact that many of the leading liberals are the declared friends of the United States is a decided disadvantage in the contest now going on. The predominating passion here is the desire for the ultimate subdivision of America into many separate States which will neutralize each other. This is most visible among the conservative class of the aristocracy, who dread the growth of liberal opinions and who habitually regard America as the nursery of them. The practical effect upon our interests is rather disadvantageous, as it renders our enemies frank and bold, whilst it makes our friends conscious of the labor of working against the stream and therefore hesitating and timid in our defence. The indications of this are constantly visible in Parliament."-State Dept. Archives, MS.

8 Adams's Diary, entry July 4.

4 Letter to Gladstone, April 29, Ashley's Palmerston, vol. ii. p. 224.

When New Orleans was taken Butler was made commanding general, The women of the city continually insulted the Union officers and soldiers

CH. XVII.]

ENGLISH OPINION

93

confidential note which the minister considered offensive and insolent in tone and an insult to his country.1 It must be remembered that while Adams was trying to stop the Alabama the English public and officials were pondering the news of the Union reverses before Richmond. The reports, which were indeed gloomy enough, were exaggerated, until one day in July there was exultation in London and Liverpool over a telegram which said that McClellan's army had surrendered, or at all events was on the point of capitulation.2 Confidence in the Confederates' ultimate success was general, and undoubtedly contributed to the laxity of the English officials in their performance of the duties imposed on them by neutrality. We may be sure that if McClellan had taken

66

For example: one woman deliberately spat in the face of an officer in full uniform as he was on his way to church; a woman emptied from a balcony a vessel of dirty water on Admiral Farragut and Colonel Deming in full uniform as they were walking along one of the principal streets. Butler gives other instances: these were the most pronounced insults. He thereupon issued an order, May 15, that if any female should insult in any manner a Union officer or soldier, "she should be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation." This order caused a cry of rage in the English press and House of Commons. The strongest expression that I have found is from the Saturday Review of June 14, Unless the author of this infamous proclamation is promptly recalled, let us hear no more of 'the ties which bind us to our transatlantic kinsmen.' No Englishmen ought to own as kinsmen men who attempt to protect themselves from a handful of women by official and authoritative threats of rape. The bloodiest savages could do nothing crueler - the most loathsome Yahoo of fiction could do nothing filthier." The English did not understand American soldiers. All evidence which I have found sustains Butler's statement that there was no case of abuse of the order by a Northern soldier. The insults ceased. See Butler's Book, p. 414 et seq.

It is probable that this order was the main cause of Butler's removal from the command of New Orleans. It grievously incensed the ladies of this city, many of whom were of French extraction. Their bitterness made itself felt in the remonstrances of Mercier, the French Minister at WashingThe removal of Butler emanated from Seward. A partial support for this statement will be found in Butler's Book, p. 533; Life of Seward, vol. iii. p. 139.

ton.

1 Adams's Diary, entry June 10; see letter from Louis Blanc, London, June 19, Letters on England, vol. ii. p. 68.

2 Times and Daily News, July 19; letter from Louis Blanc, London, July 21, Letters on England, vol. ii. p. 100.

Richmond in June, the Alabama would not have escaped in July.

The Alabama left Liverpool without guns or munitions of war of any kind; these as well as coal were brought to her at the Azores by two British vessels which sailed from England about the middle of August.1

However unfriendly the action of England was in the case of the Alabama, it must be borne in mind that the fault was one of omission. The British government, unlike the Emperor of the French, was during the whole war innocent of any overt acts of unkindness. The Queen's speech at the prorogation of Parliament, August 7, declared that her Majesty had still determined to take no part in the contest on the American continent.2

Again, though the dominant sentiment of England toward the North is to be deplored and the want of due diligence in the performance of her duties as a neutral is unquestioned, her atonement has been ample. English books, magazines, and newspapers are full of sincere admissions that the public opinion of the country took a wrong direction. In the treaty of Washington3 the regret which Great Britain expresses at the escape of the Confederate cruisers is all that can be asked in the way of moral reparation from a high-spirited people conscious of their strength. As far as pecuniary damages

1 Part i. p. 38; part ii. p. 191.

2 Hansard, 1209; see the correspondence between James M. Mason, the Confederate envoy, and Earl Russell from July 17 to August 2, Life of J. Davis by his wife, vol. ii. p. 332 et seq. Lord Ranelagh, who had had a talk with the Emperor Louis Napoleon, thus wrote the Earl of Malmesbury, August 30: "I was very much struck by a conversation about America, for in the most open manner after dinner he said he was quite ready to recognize the South, but Palmerston would not do so, and he could not unless Palmerston did. The result of this (pretended ?) frankness is that Slidell in Paris tells every one that England is the cause of the South not being recognized. He abuses England, and says we are their enemy; in fact, we are in the happy position of being hated by both North and South." Memoirs of an ex-Minister, vol. ii. p. 277.

8 Made in 1871 and provided for the Arbitration of Geneva.

The award of the Geneva Tribunal of Arbitration for damages done by the Florida, Alabama, their tenders, and the Shenandoah was a gross sum

CH. XVII.]

MCCLELLAN

95

were concerned, the terms submitting the dispute to arbitration made absolutely sure our case, which was already very strong. That the score has been wiped out should be recognized at the bar of history and in the court of honor.

We must now return to McClellan and the Army of the Potomac, whom we left, after their masterly retreat, in camp at Harrison's Landing on the James River. "I need 50,000 more men," he telegraphed July 1, "and with them I will retrieve our fortunes." Already this request had been in some measure anticipated by the President; 5000 of McDowell's corps had been sent to him, Burnside at New Berne, N. C., was directed to send all reinforcements possible, and Halleck was asked for a detachment of 25,000 troops from the Western army.2 Halleck protested that so material a reduction of his force would necessitate the surrender of territory already acquired, and the postponement of the projected expedition to Chattanooga.3 The President, who was earnest for the relief of the Unionists of East Tennessee, replied that he need not send a man if it would weaken or delay this expedition or endanger any important point now held. Within two days Lincoln informed McClellan that Halleck could spare no troops, and that it would be impossible to send him promptly 50,000 or any considerable force. "Save the army, material and personal," he added, "and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The Governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of 300,000, which I accept." 5 The events of the "Seven Days" had not diminished his confidence in his general. "I am satisfied,"

of $15,500,000 in gold as the indemnity to be paid by Great Britain to the United States.

1 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 281.

2 Ibid., pp. 271, 281. These orders and this request are of June 28, the day of the receipt of the demoralized despatch of McClellan from Savage's Station, and of Lincoln's benignant reply, ante.

3 July 1, ibid., p. 285.

July 2, ibid., p. 286.

5 Ibid., pp. 286, 291.

he said in a despatch, "that yourself, officers, and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it." In the mean time McClellan had raised his demand for reinforcements to 100,000, to insure the capture of Richmond and the bringing of the war to an end. This new demand did not affect the kindly feeling of the President and the Secretary of War, who ordered reinforcements to him from Burnside, from Hunter, and from Washington, while the President begged Halleck for 10,000 infantry. Nothing could have been warmer than Stanton's expression of confidence and assurance of support. But something occurred about this time (what it was I have not been able to ascertain) which shook the unreserved trust of Lincoln and Stanton in McClellan. "The private and very confidential letter" of Seward to Weed, of July 7, reflects some change of feeling on the part of the administration, and is all the more remarkable inasmuch as Seward was the constant friend of McClellan. "Notwithstanding," he wrote, "the light thrown upon the position of our army on the James River, most painful doubts come up from there now, upon the question whether it can, in any case, however reinforced, make a successful or hopeful attack upon Richmond. If that is impossible, reinforcements sent there will only aggravate the impotence of its position. Meantime the suggestion comes up, of course, that the insurgents, holding McClellan in his present position with a small force, will immediately organize a new and vigorous campaign against Washington." "" 4

1 July 3, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 291. 2 Ibid., pp. 291, 294, 298.

3"Be assured that you shall have the support of this department and the government as cordially and faithfully as was ever rendered by man to man." Stanton to McClellan, July 5, ibid., p. 298. "Also there is no cause in my heart or conduct for the cloud that wicked men have raised between us for their own base and selfish purposes. No man had ever a truer friend than I have been to you and shall continue to be.". McClel lan's Own Story, p. 476. See McClellan's reply, ibid., p. 477.

4 Seward's Life, vol. iii. p. 114.