To constitute a publication respecting a person libelous per se, it must reflect on the character of such person by bringing him into ridicule, hatred, or contempt, or affect him injuriously in his trade or profession, and a statement in a newspaper concerning a woman that she had hysterics, the same not containing any imputation upon her as an individual or in respect to her profession, is not, though untrue, per se libelous, and cannot be ground of recovery of damages in the absence of proof of special damage. Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 95 N. E. 735, 737, 84 Ohio St. 118, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 978.

A publication is "libelous per se" where it has a tendency to injure a person in his business or occupation or exposes him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or disgrace. Bergstrom v. Ridgway-Thayer Co., 103 N. Y. Supp. 1093, 1094, 53 Misc. Rep. 95.

A written or printed publication, false, defamatory, and tending to expose one to ridicule or contempt, or to render him odious, or injure him in his business or calling or in his social standing, is a libel. Register Newspaper Co. v. Worten, 111 S. W. 693, 697. A writing is libelous if it subjects the person referred to to odium or ridicule, or tends to subject him to obloquy. Kentucky Journal Pub. Co. v. Brock, 131 S. W. 1, 140 Ky. 373.

The test whether a newspaper article is "libelous per se" is whether to the mind of an intelligent man, the tenor of the article and the language used naturally import a criminal or disgraceful charge. It is libelous per se to charge a person with but a single commission of an act, if the act itself amounts to or imports moral delinquency or disreputable conduct. Church v. Tribune Ass'n, 119 N. Y. Supp. 885, 886, 135 App. Div. 30.

An article designed and calculated to exhibit plaintiff as a shallow, ridiculous, and contemptible person, dishonest and undeserving of confidence, is libelous per se. Morse v. Times-Republican Printing Co., 100 N. W. 867, 869, 124 Iowa, 707.

A written or printed statement or article published of or concerning another, which is false, and tends to injure his reputation and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, scorn, obloquy, or shame, is "libelous per se." Woolworth v. Star Co., 90 N. Y. Supp. 147, 148, 97 App. Div. 525 (citing Triggs v. Sun Printing & Publishing Co., 71 N. E. 739, 742, 179 N. Y. 144, 153, 66 L. R. A. 612, 103 Am. St. Rep. 841, 1 Ann. Cas. 326.

To call a white man a negro is a "libel," since it tends to interfere with his social relation with his fellow white men. Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S. E. 637, 639, 71 S. C. 112, 4 Ann. Cas. 685.

Statutory definitions

The California statute (Civ. Code, § 45) defines "libel" which may be the subject of a civil action for damages as a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or has a tendency to injure him in his occupation. Under this definition, malice is not an ingredient of a cause of action for a civil libel, and a recovery of full and compensatory damages may be had, though absence of malice is proved. Another provision (Pen. Code, § 248) defines "libel," the basis of a criminal prosecution, to consist of a malicious defamation, expressed either by writing, printing, signs, pictures, or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation, or publish the natural or alleged defects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. While malice is an essential element of the offense of libel so defined, prima facie proof of such malice is made by evidence that an injurious publication concerning another has been made without justifiable motive, whereupon the law presumes malice sufficient to support a criminal charge, as provided by section 250. Davis v. Hearst, 116 Pac. 530, 531, 160 Cal. 143.

The Idaho statute (Rev. St. 1887, § 6737) defines "libel" as a malicious defamation, expressed either by writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation, or publish the natural or alleged defects, of one who is alive, and thereby to expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. It is sufficient that the defamation tends to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation, and thereby to expose such person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. To constitute libel, it is not necessary that the alleged libelous matter charge the person named with a crime. State v. Sheridan, 93 Pac. 656, 657, 14 Idaho, 222, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 497.

Under the Colorado Statute (Mills' Ann.

St. § 1313), defining "libel" as a malicious defamation expressed either by printing, or by signs, or pictures, or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation, or publish the natural defects of

one who is alive, and thereby to expose him or her to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, a publication to be libelous must be malicious. Rocky Mountain News Printing Co. v. Fridborn, 104 Pac. 956, 958, 46 Colo. 440, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 891.

The Georgia Statute defines "libel" as a false and malicious defamation of another,

error to leave to the jury the question whether it was libelous, as there was no ambiguity in the language. State v. Cooper, 116 N. W. 691, 692, 138 Iowa, 516.

Cr. Code, § 177 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. 38), defines libel as a malicious defamation, expressed either by printing or by signs or pictures, tending to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation, or publish the natural defects of one who is alive and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or financial injury. A newspaper article published by accused charging prosecutor with improper and dishonest actions as state's attorney, and with having prostituted his office for private interests and political purposes, and that he was in collusion with violators of the liquor law, that he was actuated by improper motives with reference to an alleged bridge trust, and that there was no doubt but that such trust had "proven a fat goose to some one," that there was also good ground to suspect something dishonest and crooked in the matter, and that it was not prosecutor's purpose to enforce the law, was libelous per se. People v. Strauch, 93 N. E. 126, 130, 247 Ill. 220.

At common law any publication is a "libel" which degrades and injures another

The Kansas statute (section 2271, Gen. St. 1901) defines a "libel" as a malicious def

printing, writing, sign, picture, representation, or effigy, tending to provoke him to wrath or expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public confidence and social intercourse, or any malicious defamation made public as aforesaid, designed to blacken and vilify the memory of one who is dead, and tending to scandalize or provoke his surviving relatives and friends. To say of a man that he is a eunuch is actionable per se. Eckert v. Van Pelt, 76 Pac. 909, 910, 69 Kan. 357, 66 L. R. A. 266.

It is libelous per se to write of a clergyman, an applicant for a pulpit, "I would not have anything to do with him or touch him with a ten-foot pole," if the words would expose the person written of to hatred or contempt, or injury to his business or occupation sota statute (Rev. Laws 1905, § 4916). Cole v. Millspaugh, 126 N. W. 626, 111 Minn. 159, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 152, 137 Am. St. Rep. 546, 20 Ann. Cas. 717.

within the definition of "libel" in the Minne

The Missouri statute (Rev. St. 1899, § 2259) defining libel as a malicious defamation

of a person made public by any printing,

him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred, writing, sign, picture, etc., tending to provoke contempt, and ridicule, etc., and section 2260

Id., 90 N. E. 339, 45 Ind. App. 712.

The Iowa statute (Code, § 5086), defines libel as the malicious defamation of a person, made public by any printing, etc., tending to provoke hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefit of public confidence and social intercourse. In a criminal prosecution for libel, the information alleged that defendant charged the prosecutor with scheming to disbar certain attorneys, because they acted as attorneys for a temperance organization, and that he was guilty of grossly unprofessional conduct by testifying as a witness while acting as prosecutor in the disbarment cases, and that the prosecution | was an attempt to cover the record of prose cutor as county attorney for unprofessional conduct before the grand jury, and that he attempted to falsify the court record in the disbarment proceedings, and suppressed certain affidavits in the investigation, which charges defendant published in a temperance paper edited by him. Held, that the publication charged was libelous per se, and it was

meanor, made all classes of libels misdemeanors and actionable per se, but did not make

publications libelous that were not so at common law. Kenworthy v. Journal Co., 93 S. W. 882, 885, 117 Mo. App. 327. Under the statute of this state (Rev. St. 1899, §§ 2260, 2863; Ann. St. 1906, pp. 1426, 1637), declaring that one publishing a libel shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and providing that it is actionable to publish falsely that any person has been guilty of adultery, it is libel to allege in a circular printed and published that one has committed adultery. State v. Santhuff, 110 S. W. 624, 626, 131 Mo. App. 620. The statute of this state (Rev. St. 1909, § 4818) defining a libel as the malicious defamation of a person by printing so as to expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, though a part of the Criminal Code, is applicable to civil actions, and, under it, a newspaper article stating that plaintiff was served with a summons in an alleged fraudulent cattle transaction, and that he had taken advantage of the bankruptcy law to escape liability, is libelous per se. Sotham v. Drovers' Telegram Co., 144 S. W. 428, 431, 239 Mo. 606. Under this statute the publication, without consent, of the picture of a

Under the Montana statute defining "libel" as a false and unprivileged publication in writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation, the existence of malice is not a necessary ingredient to entitle plaintiff to recover. Paxton v. Woodward, 78 Pac. 215, 217, 31 Mont. 195, 107 Am. St. Rep. 416, 3 Ann. Cas. 546.

The Penal Law of New York (Consol. Laws, c. 40) § 1346, provides that an indictment for a libel contained in a newspaper published in the state against a resident thereof may be found in the county where the paper was published or in the county where the person libeled resided when the offense was committed, and section 1347 provides that in libel against a nonresident the indictment shall be found and the trial had at the place where the paper containing the libel purports on its face to be published, or, if no county is indicated thereon, in any county where the paper is circulated. Code Cr. Proc. § 138, contained substantially similar provisions relating to the place of indictment and trial where the person libeled is a resident and nonresident. Penal Law, § 1340, defines libel as a malicious publication by writing, printing, etc., which exposes any living person to contempt, etc. Held, that the purpose of sections 1346 and 1347 was to designate the place of indictment and trial, and not to define libel; and hence do not limit the operation of section 1340 by excluding books or writings other than newspapers, and, under the latter section, as well as at common law, one could be prosecuted for a libel published in a book in this state, though committed against a nonresident. People v. Fornaro, 119 N. Y. Supp. 746, 748, 65 Misc. Rep. 457.

The North Dakota statute (Rev. Codes 1899, § 2715) defines "libel" as "a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." If the language of an alleged libel is fairly susceptible of a construction which renders it defamatory, the complaint states a cause of action. It is not necessary to render the words defamatory and action

The statute (Rev. Codes 1905, § 8877) defines "criminal libel" as "the malicious defamation of a person made public by any printing, writing, sign, picture, reputation or effigy tending to expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public confidence or social intercourse. And the following section provides that: "Every person who makes or composes, dictates or procures the same to be done or who willfully publishes or circulates such libel or in any way knowingly or willfully aids or assists in making, publishing or circulating the same is guilty of a felony." The gist of the crime is the malicious defamation of a person made public in one or more of the modes prescribed and tending to expose such person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, etc. State v. Tolley, 136 N. W. 784, 785, 23 N. D. 284.

It is not necessary, in order to render a publication libelous, that it should charge any crime or public offense, inasmuch as the South Dakota statute (Civ. Code, § 29) defines "libel" as a false and unprivileged publication, by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation. Barron v. Smith, 101 N. W. 1105, 1106, 19 S. D. 50; Nichols v. Smith, 102 N. W. 1135, 19 S. D. 159.

The Texas statute (Acts 1901, p. 30, c. 26) defining a "libel" as a defamation tending to blacken the memory of the dead or to injure the living, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or financial injury, or to impeach his honesty and integrity, etc., includes any case which, in the absence of statute, was libelous at common law, and a publication directly impeaching one's integrity and truthfulness is libelous per se. Fleming v. Mattinson, 114 S. W. 650, 652, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 476. In view of this statute, words libelous per se and from the publication of which damages are implied as a matter of law are such words as tend to expose one to public hatred or disgrace or vilify him Allen v. Earnest (Tex.) 145 S. W. 1101, 1103. or injure his character.

Under Pen. Code, art. 721, declaring that he is guilty of "libel" who, with intent to injure, makes, publishes, or circulates any malicious statement affecting the reputation of another as to any matter or thing pointed out in the chapter, and article 727 declaring that the written, printed, or published statement, to come within the definition of “libel,” must convey the idea that the person to whom it refers has been guilty of some penal offense, etc., it was held that an indictment

938, 58 Tex. Cr. R. 141.

The Texas statute (Rev. Civ. St. 1911, art. 5595), defining a libel as a defamation expressed in printing or writing tending to injure the reputation of a person and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to impeach his honesty, integrity, or virtue, modifies the common-law rule as to libel and slander, and a publication is libelous whether it is libelous per se or not; it being sufficient if it can be shown by innuendo that the matter imputed had the tendency described in the statute and had reference to the plaintiff. Guisti v. Galveston Tribune, 150 S. W. 874, 876, 105 Tex. 197.

A "libel," as defined by the Washington statute, is the defamation of a person made public by any words, printing, writing, sign, picture, representation, or effigy tending to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public confidence and social intercourse, or any defamation, made public as aforesaid, designed to blacken and vilify the memory of one who is dead, and tending to scandalize or provoke his surviving relatives or friends. Reynolds v. Holland, 90 Pac. 648, 650, 46 Wash. 537; Chambers v. Leiser, 86 Pac. 627, 628, 43 Wash. 285, 10 Ann. Cas. 270; State v. Mays, 107 Pac. 363, 365, 57 Wash. 540. And where a newspaper published an article stating that plaintiff's father had been charged with using the mails to defraud in selling land, and would be arrested, giving the details of the fraudulent operations, and published a photograph of the members of his family, including plaintiff, his young daughter, the publication of plaintiff's photograph in connection with the article concerning her father was not a "libel," within this statute. Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 117 Pac. 594, 596, 64 Wash. 691, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 595. As this statute does not expressly make malice an ingredient of libel, a publication which tends to expose a person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule is libelous, without regard to the existence of actual malice. Byrne v. Funk, 80 Pac. 772, 774, 38 Wash. 506, 3 Ann. Cas. 647. And so, where there has been an unwarranted publication in a newspaper of a list of conditional sales made by a retail dealer taken from memoranda legally filed by him with the county auditor, the dealer to charge a criminal libel under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2424, defining libel as a

of a charge of incapacity, dishonesty or insolvency. To publish concerning a lawyer that he was thrown into jail by a magistrate without a chance to tell his side of the case on the complaint of a woman for whom he had collected a debt, and from which amount of money collected he had deducted only the legal percentage for collection, was not "libelous," since the only fair import was that the lawyer was wrongfully thrown into jail which could not reflect upon his previous conduct, capacity, or character and did not tend to injure him in his profession. Hughes v. New York Evening Post, 100 N. Y. Supp. 982, 984, 115 App. Div. 611.

In

Any written words are "libelous" which in any manner are prejudicial to another in the way of his employment or trade. a publication referring to plaintiff twice as a detective, and stating that, when plaintiff was attacked by robbers, he showed great cowardice and attempted to hide under the seat of the vehicle, the tendency of the words was to hold him up to scorn as a detective, and was "libelous." Holland v. Flick, 61 Atl. 828, 829, 212 Pa. 201.

Construction of language

The fact that an alleged libelous article uses a slang word upon which its libelous character depends does not render the article any the less libelous, provided the word used has a well-recognized meaning, or by the article itself is given a meaning which conveys to the reader the understanding that the word is used so as to impeach the honesty or reputation of the person named and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. State v. Sheridan, 93 Pac. 656, 657, 14 Idaho, 222, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 497.

In a published statement, referring to plaintiff, a candidate for public office, that "no man in the community has any interest in seeing the county disgraced by sending a 'social leper' to speak and act for her in public councils," the term "social leper" may mean that his moral traits of character are such as to require his banishment from society, and, if there is an inducement and innuendo, which, fairly interpreted, would meaning, may be give this "libelous." Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158, 193, 31 Am. Rep. 757.

Defendant wrote and published a letter to the mayor of New York, stating that defendant had written a letter to the Governor