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In re City of New York, 76 N. E. 18, 19, 183 not only the land itself, but all buildings and N. Y. 245. other articles and structures and superstructures erected on or under the same, where a turnpike company did not own the fee in the land, but owned a continuing easement therein for the maintenance of the pike during the life of the company's franchise, such easement, together with the corporation's tangible property, consisting of bridges, culverts, ditches, prepared roadbeds, and structures on the soil, were taxable to it as land. In re President, etc., of Albany & B. Turnpike Road, 87 N. Y. Supp. 1104, 1105, 94 App.

Where one making an excavation in a lot negligently left it exposed to inclement weather for an unreasonable length of time without putting in foundation walls, thereby causing injury to a building on an adjoining lot by the caving in of the ground, he is liable to the adjoining owner for the injury to the building, though Rev. Civ. Code, & 291, providing that each coterminous owner is entitled to the lateral support which his land received from the adjoining land, subject to the right of the adjoining owner to make proper excavations on using ordinary .care, and taking reasonable precautions to sustain the land, and giving previous reasonable notice to the other of his intention to make the excavations, and section 187, defining "land" as the solid material of the earth, whatever may be its ingredients, give only the right to damages for injuries to the land itself, and not to buildings placed thereon. Hannicker v. Lepper, 107 N. W. 202, 203, 20 S. D. 371, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 243, 129 Am. St. Rep. 938.

Div. 509.

Franchise of corporation

Under Tax Law, § 2, subd. 3, defining the terms "land," "real estate," and "real property" to include land, underground railroads, including the valuation of franchises to construct and operate the same, and defining a "special franchise" to include the value of the tangible property of a corporation situated in or under or above any street, a corporation owning special franchises to operate an underground railroad under city streets owns special franchises subject to taxation,

Easements and incorporeal heredita- though only so small a part of the railroad ments

is constructed and in operation as is insufficient to meet operating expenses, taxes, and interest, and the franchises, if possessing a value, are taxable, though they are not used. People ex rel. Hudson & M. R. Co. v. State Board of Tax Com'rs, 127 N. Y. Supp. 918, 143 App. Div. 26.

Laws 1896, p. 796, c. 908, as amended by Laws 1899, p. 1589, c. 712, § 2, subd. 3, defines the terms "lands," "real property," and "real estate" as including, besides the tan

The word "land," as used in Code 1904, § 1105f (3-6), authorizing the condemnation of lands or any interest or estate therein, includes easements, and other incorporeal hereditaments, and all rights thereto and interest therein, and is synonymous with the terms "real estate" and "real property." Swann v. Washington Southern R. Co., 61 S. E. 750, 751, 108 Va. 282 (quoting 2 Bouv. Law Dict. 306). In an eminent domain statute which au-gible property enumerated, the value of all thorizes certain classes of public service corporations to condemn land for their use, the word "land" is comprehensive, and includes any interest in land, and under it an easement or right of way may be condemned. Pacific Postal-Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Oregon & C. R. Co., 163 Fed. 967, 969.

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The word "land," as used in the Eminent Domain Act, is capable of including easements in its signification. McEwan v. Pennsylvania, N. J. & N. Y. R. Co., 60 Atl. 1130, 1131, 72 N. J. Law, 419.

The word "lands" is not coextensive with the words "tenements and hereditaments," and does not comprehend incorporeal hereditaments. In re Handley's Estate, 57 Atl. 755, 757, 208 Pa. 388 (citing 2 Jarm. Wills, 382).

Under Laws 1896, p. 796, c. 908, § 2, as amended by Laws 1899, p. 1589, c. 712, providing that the term "land" shall include,

franchises, rights, authority or permission to construct, maintain, or operate in, under, above, upon, or through any streets, highways, or public places, mains, pipes, etc. The term "real property" for the purposes of taxation seems to be limited to such intangible rights or franchises as relate to public streets or highways and to exclude by interference such as relate to public waters.

People ex rel. Edison Electric Illuminating ments, 110 N. Y. Supp. 833, 58 Misc. Rep. 249.

Co. v. Commissioners of Taxes & Assess

The tax law (Laws 1881, c. 293), defining the terms, "land," "real estate," and "real property" as including "all surface, underground or elevated railroads," and the value of all franchises to construct or operate railroads, in, under, above or through streets, is not limited to street surface railroads only, but includes long distance surface steam railroads, and hence a franchise granted by the state to a steam surface railroad for its road in, under, above, or through streets is property, and a special franchise, and taxable. People ex rel. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Woodbury, 133 N. Y. Supp. 135, 139, 74 Misc. Rep. 130, 145.

Growing grain

Growing crops of grain are fructus industriales, and Civ. Code, §§ 186-188, defining "land" as the solid material of the earth, whether soil, rock, or other substance, exclude growing grain, and only include such growing things as are annexed to the earth by roots, such as are deemed fructus naturales. Bjornson v. Rostad (S. D.) 137 N. W. 567, 570.

Highway, street, or right of way

Rem. & Bal. Code, § 8739, authorizes any railroad corporation to enter upon any of the state school lands to locate its road. Section 8740 authorizes every railroad corporation to "appropriate" by condemnation any land or interest therein, and any rights of way for tunnels beneath the surface, including state

etc.

Mine

The word "lands," as used in a statute governing descent and distribution, which provides that a surviving spouse shall be entitled to an estate for life in the lands of an intestate leaving issue, remainder to such issue, includes a mine open at the time of the vesting of the life estate, and such mine is, under the statute, inherited as lands by the life tenant. Lone Acre Oil Co. v. Swayne (Tex.) 78 S. W. 380, 383.

The term "land," as used in statutory enactments, means and includes mines and mining claims. Bradford v. Morrison, 29 Sup. Ct. 349, 351, 212 U. S. 389, 53 L. Ed. 564 (quoting and adopting definitions in Rev. St. Ariz. pars. 2708, 2948). Minerals

"Land" includes coal and minerals in

Pa. 145.

Under Code, c. 2, § 5, subsec. 10, providing that "land" includes lands, tenements, and hereditaments and all rights thereto and interest therein other than a chattel interest therein, where on a bill filed by a vendor for a specific performance, it was decreed that the land be sold, and the entire acreage was sold and conveyed without restriction or reservation, the conveyance carried title to the coal and minerals beneath the surface of the land. Steinman v. Vicars, 39 S. E. 227, 229, 99 Va. 595.

A bill may be maintained to quiet the title to coal and other minerals under and on a tract of land; the minerals being "land" within Code 1896, § 809, providing that when any person is in peaceable possession of lands, whether actual or constructive, claiming to own the same, and his title thereto or to any part thereof is denied or disputed, he may maintain a suit in equity to settle the title and to clear up all doubts and disputes concerning it. Gulf Coal & Coke Co. v. Alabama Coal & Coke Co., 40 South. 397, 398, 145 Ala. 228.

school lands, tide lands, etc., necessary for the place. Huss v. Jacobs, 59 Atl. 991, 994, 210 line of the road, provided that, if the bed of such railway is upon a state or county road, the corporation shall be responsible for the cost of relocating the road appropriated. Section 8738 permits any corporation to change the grade or location of its "road or canal" in order to avoid dangerous or deficient curves, Section 5717, provides that "when it shall be necessary in the location of any road herein mentioned to appropriate any part of any public road, street or alley," etc., the county court may, except within the limits of a municipal corporation, agree with the corporation upon the conditions upon which it may be appropriated, and, if the parties cannot agree, the corporation may appropriate so much thereof as may be necessary in the location of the road. Section 5718 provides that whenever a private corporation is authorized to appropriate any public highway, etc., as mentioned in the last section, if it be within any town, incorporated or not, the corporation shall locate its road upon the particular street, etc., designated by the local authorities; but if they refuse to make such designation the corporation may make such appropriation without reference thereto. Section 5719 provides that when a public highway, etc., is taken by agreement, the corporation may place tollgates thereon with the consent of the local authorities, but shall not when the highway is appropriated without agreement. Section 8737 authorizes every railroad corporation to construct its railway across, along, or upon any stream, plank road, turnpike, etc., paying any damages caused thereby. Held, that a railway company could not acquire by eminent domain as against the public the exclusive right to use one-half of a street for a double-track railway; the term "land," as used in sections 8739 and 8740, not including land already devoted to a public use, such as a street. State ex rel. B. Schade Brewing Co. v. Superior Court of Spokane County, 113 Pac. 576, 578, 62 Wash. 96.

Petroleum, oil, and natural gas are included in the comprehensive idea which the law attaches to the word "land" and are a part of the soil in which they are found. A lease of land for the purpose of mining coal or extracting oil or natural gas from the soil or rock is in effect a grant of the corpus of the land. Haskell v. Sutton, 44 S. E. 533, 536, 53 W. Va. 206.

“‘Oil,' before its extraction, is a mineral, and is a part of the 'land.'" Swayne v. Lone Acre Oil Co., 86 S. W. 740, 742, 98 Tex. 597, 69 L. R. A. 986, 8 Ann. Cas. 1117; Isom v. Rex Crude Oil Co., 82 Pac. 317, 318, 147 Cal. 659.

Pontoon

A pontoon floating upon the water of a navigable stream, between high and low water mark, though fastened to the shore by a

cable, is not "land," and an action for an injury to a person thereon by a moving vessel is within the admiralty jurisdiction. The Mackinaw, 165 Fed. 351, 352.

Premises synonymous

Premises as including land, see Premises. The Liquor Tax Law (Laws 1897, p. 225, c. 312, § 24, subd. 1), prior to the amendment made by Laws 1905, p. 145, c. 104, made it unlawful to traffic in liquor within one-half mile of the building and "premises," of any state hospital, and the amendment added the words "or lands" after the word "premises." On a petition for the cancellation of a liquor tax certificate, it was stipulated that defendant, prior to the amendment, had been legally selling liquor at the place in question. Held, that "lands" was synonymous with "premises," and in view of the stipulation there could be no cancellation of the certificate, whether defendant was carrying on his business within one-half mile of lands owned and used by a state hospital and contiguous to it, or within one-half mile of the buildings, or not. The terms "premises" and "lands" are synonymous, and, if there is any distinction between the words, it is that the word "premises" is more inclusive. According to Bouv. Law Dict. and Worcest. Dict. the word "premises" is defined as "lands and tenements." According to Cent. Dict., it is defined as "lands and houses or tenements." According to Stand. Dict., it is defined as "land or lands; land with its appurtenances." In re Cullinan, 99 N. Y. Supp. 374, 375, 113 App. Div. 485.

As property

See Private Property; Property. Proceeds of sale

Act of Separation from Massachusetts (Rev. St. 1883, p. 1005) § 1, par. 7, exempting from taxation "lands" theretofore granted to any religious society, etc., while the same continue to be owned by such society, does not exempt a fund created from the proceeds of a sale of such lands. Inhabitants of Gorham v. Trustees of Ministerial Fund in First Parish in Gorham in Cumberland County, 82 Atl. 290, 292, 109 Me. 22.

Real estate and real property synony

mous

The word "land," as used in Code 1904, § 1105 (3-6), authorizing the condemnation of lands or any in trust or estate therein, is synonymous with "real estate" and "real property." Swan v. Washington Southern R. Co., 61 S. E. 750, 751, 108 Va. 282. As security

"Land" covered by water within the public domain of the United States is as much a part thereof as the dry land. Kean v. Calumet Canal & Improvement Co., 23 Sup. Ct. 651, 659, 190 U. S. 452, 47 L. Ed. 1134.

The owner of the bank of a navigable stream owns to the center of the stream, unless the ownership of the bank and the bed of the stream has been separated, subject only to governmental and public rights; and the bed of a navigable stream is "land." Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co. v. Telulah Paper Co., 122 N. W. 1062, 1065, 140 Wis.

417.

Timber

The word "lands," in Const. 1890, § 211, prohibiting the sale of school lands, includes the soil only, and not timber growing thereon; and hence Code 1906, § 4702, is not unconstitutional because it authorizes a sale of such timber. L. N. Dantzler Lumber Co. v. State, 53 South. 1, 2, 97 Miss. 355.

Town lots or blocks

Where a party contracts for the purchase of a threshing outfit, unless he shall go to Oklahoma and buy land, the word "land" is broad enough to include a piece of real property described as a block in a town site. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Mickley, 83 Pac. 970, 72 Kan. 372.

Trees

At common law, "land" embraces, not only the soil, but its natural products, such as trees, growing upon and affixed to it. L. N. Dantzler Lumber Co. v. State, 53 South. 1, 2, 97 Miss. 355.

Trees standing on land are a part of the "land," the title to which can be passed by a statutory deed. Morgan v. Pott, 101 S. W. 717, 719, 124 Mo. App. 371.

Water and water power

"Land" includes the water upon it, and, when the fee to land is acquired by condemnation, everything which is comprehended in the term "land," including water, vests in the expropriator. Philadelphia Trust, Safe Deposit & Ins. Co. v. Borough of Merchantville, 69 Atl. 729, 730, 74 N. J. Eq. 330.

Under Gen. St. 1902, § 2321, which provides for the taxation of land owned or taken by a municipal corporation for the creation or furnishing of a supply of water, if the inhabitants of the town in which it is situated do not have the use and do actually use such water supply on the same terms as the inhabitants of the municipal corporation, in which case the property shall be exempt, a dam located on such land is not an item subject to taxation separate from the The word "lands" includes the beds of land, and should have been included in an nonnavigable lakes and streams, and lands item of the assessment denominated "land are none the less land for being covered with used in connection with reservoir." City of water. State v. Jones, 122 N. W. 241, 243, | Norwalk v. Town of New Canaan, 81 Atl. 143 Iowa, 398.

See Security. Submerged land

1027, 1029, 85 Conn. 119.

The Flowage Act (Laws 1868, c. 20, § 1; | LAND FOR HOLDING WATER Pub. St. 1901, c. 142, § 12) provides that any corporation authorized by charter may erect and maintain on its land a water mill or dam to back the flowage of water for the development of power and section 13 provides that if land is overflowed or otherwise injured by the use of such dam, and such injury is not within 30 days after due notice satisfactorily adjusted, petition may be brought to the superior court to have the damage assessed. Held, upon petition to assess damages for the flowing out or taking of the head or falls of a stream located upon petitioner's land, which had been neither utilized nor developed, that the term "land" in the act was not used in a narrow or restricted sense to apply only to land as distinguished from water, but to land with all the incidents of full ownership; that the damage or "injury" intended by the act was such as resulted from depriving the landowner of the ability to use his land to the best advantage in view of its location and natural adaptability; and that a limitation of the use of undeveloped water power was an injury to land, for which compensation must be made. Swain v. Pemigewasset Power Co., 85 Atl. 288, 289, 76 N. H. 498.

The words "land for holding such water," in St. 1883, p. 469, c. 177, creating a water company to supply the inhabitants of a town with water, and authorizing the company to take and hold water of designated streams and all lands "necessary for holding and preserving such water," mean land for a reservoir. Dorr v. Inhabitants of Sharon, 84 N. E. 446, 449, 198 Mass. 240. LAND JOBBER

LAND ACTUALLY USED

See Actually Used.

LAND CERTIFICATE

As chattel, see Chattel.

A man who occasionally buys and sells land cannot be said to be a land jobber or a dealer in lands; but, if a man makes a particular business of buying and selling land to obtain profit, he is properly designated as a "land jobber" or dealer in land. Vanderbilt University v. Cheney, 94 S. W. 90, 92, 116 Tenn, 259.

LAND SUITABLE FOR CULTIVATION
See Suitable for Cultivation.
LAND, TIMBER, AND

RIGHTS

TIMBER

timber

The term "land, timber and rights," as used in a lease of a railroad, etc., specifying that plaintiff demised, let, etc., to defendant for 91 years, all land, timber, and timber rights, etc., included all the standing timber. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co. v. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co., 61 S. E. 185, 190, 147 N. C. 368, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 223, 125 Am. St. Rep.

As personal property, see Personal Prop- 550, 15 Ann. Cas. 363. erty.

A "land certificate" is the obligation of the government entitling the owner to secure the designated quantity of land by following the requirements of the law. Waterman v. Charlton, 120 S. W. 171, 172, 102 Tex. 510. LAND DAMAGES

Compensation for land taken under the power of eminent domain, and for the buildings on it, is technically "land damages." The building is technically not only a part of the land, but is technically land; and an action for compensation for land taken under the power of eminent domain, and buildings which are upon that land, is as matter of technical law and ordinary parlance, spoken of as an action for "land damages." In an award of special commissioners to assess damages for land taken to widen a street under a railroad's track directing that the town should pay the entire expense of land damage occasioned by the taking of land and property, the term "land damages" was not limited to the value of the land taken apart from the erection thereon, and hence, where the land taken supported one of the abutments of the railroad bridge, the railroad was entitled to damages for the taking of the abutment as well as the land. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Blackstone, 69 N. E. 315, 316, 184 Mass. 491.

LAND TITLED

Const. art. 14, § 2, provides that all general land certificates shall be located, surveyed, or patented only on vacant and unappropriated public domain, and not on any "land titled" or equitably owned under color of title from the sovereignty of the state, evidence of the appropriation of which is on the county record or in the general land office, or when the appropriation is evidenced by the occupation of the owner or of some person holding for him. Held, that where it was not claimed that certificates by which land was surveyed under a railroad grant were improperly issued, and the descriptions in the patents in express terms covered the land described in a subsequent patent to K., it being necessary to resort to evidence aliunde to show that the railroad patents did not convey the state's title to the land in controversy, it was "land titled," within such constitutional provision. McLennan v. Fisher (Tex.) 130 S. W. 598, 599.

LAND TO LAND

Fishing for menhaden with purse or drag seines, in a bay on our coast not having an entrance over three nautical miles in width between headlands on the main, or between the mainland and an island, or between islands, is prohibited by chapter 261, Pub. Laws 1885, defining the width of such

entrance, or any part thereof, to such prohibited waters, measured from "land to land." McClain v. Tillson, 19 Atl. 457, 458, 82 Me. 281.

LAND VALUABLE FOR MINERALS

"Lands valuable for minerals" in the law means all lands chiefly valuable for any of the mineral deposits treated in the legislation relating to mining claims, rather than lands chiefly valuable for agricultural purposes. Webb v. American Asphaltum Min. Co., 157 Fed. 203, 205, 84 C. C. A. 651.

Under Rev. St. U. S. §§ 2318, 2319, reserving from sale lands valuable for minerals, and opening for exploration and purchase all valuable mineral deposits in the lands of the United States, to render lands valuable for minerals there must be minerals in such quantities as to justify effort to extract them; but it is not necessary that minerals of sufficient amount to allow immediate profitable working be shown to exist, but it is enough if the vein or deposit has a present or prospective commercial value. Madison v. Octave Oil Co., 99 Pac. 176, 178,

154 Cal. 768. LANDED

Plaintiff, cotton company, delivered cotton to a compress company and subsequently delivered the warehouse receipts of that company to a railway company and received in exchange bills of lading. The cotton company shipped the cotton over the railway line to a purchaser under a contract requiring that the cotton should be delivered in good condition to the purchaser's mills "landed," and drafts for the purchase price with bills of lading attached were drawn by the cotton company on the purchaser and honored before the cotton was delivered at its destination. Held, that "landed" meant that the cotton company was responsible for the entire shipment of cotton and for damages to it until delivered at the point of destination, and therefore the right of recovery for damages to the cotton resulting from exposure to the weather while in the possession of the compress company was in the cotton company, although it had not been called on to repay any of the purchase price. Southern Ry. Co. v. Jones Cotton Co., 52 South. 899, 900, 167 Ala. 575.

LANDED PROPERTY

In an act annexing certain territory to a city, providing that the rates of taxation on all "landed property" so annexed shall not exceed a certain rate, the phrase "landed property," as used in the act, meant rural, unimproved land, as distinguished from real estate compactly built on, as in a city. Mayor, etc., of City of Baltimore v. Rosenthal, 62 Atl. 579, 581, 102 Md. 298 (citing Sindall v. City of Baltimore, 49 Atl. 647, 93 Md. 533).

The term "landed property" is defined by Acts 1902, p. 199, c. 130, as "real estate, whether in fee simple or leasehold, and whether improved or unimproved." Joesting v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 55 Atl: 456, 457, 97 Md. 589.

Annexation Act, § 19 (Acts 1888, p. 127, c. 98), declared that until 1900 the rate of taxation on all "landed property" in certain territory annexed to Baltimore should not exceed the rate for Baltimore county, and that after 1900 the county rate should not be increased for city purposes on "landed property" within the territory until avenues, streets, or alleys shall have been opened or constructed through the same, nor until there shall be on every block of ground so to be formed six dwellings or storehouses ready for occupation. Acts 1902, p. 199, c. 130, § 4a, defined "landed property" to mean real estate, whether improved or unimproved and until avenues, streets, or alleys shall have been opened, constructed, and improved, shall be construed to mean until avenues, streets, or alleys shall have been opened, graded, curbed, and otherwise improved to full width by some substantial material. Held, that property within the territory annexed to the city by the act of 1888 situated in a block bounded by improved streets, though not containing six dwellings or storehouses, was not "landed property" within such act. Hiss v. City of Baltimore, 64 Atl. 52, 103 Md. 620.

Acts 1888, p. 127, c. 98, § 19, relating to the annexation of a certain tract to Baltimore, provided that until 1900 the tax rate upon all "landed property" and taxable personal property in the tract should not exceed the rate of Baltimore county for 1887, and that after 1900 the rate should be the same as for the rest of the city of Baltimore, provided that the increased rate should not take effect until avenues, streets, or alleys should be opened through the property, and at least six dwellings or storehouses be ready for occupation upon each block of ground so to be formed. Acts 1902, p. 199, c. 130, provided that the term "landed property" in the act of 1888 should mean real estate whether in fee simple or leasehold; that the provision as to the opening of avenues, etc., should mean avenues, etc., opened, graded, curbed, and otherwise improved from curb to curb by pavement or other substantial material, and that the term "block of ground" should mean an area not exceeding 200,000 superficial square feet bounded on all sides by intersecting avenues, streets, or alleys, graded, curbed and otherwise improved from curb to curb, by pavement or other substantial material. A triangular block, being part of the tract annexed by the act of 1888, contained 1,000,000 superficial square feet, bounded on one side by 3034 feet of a road, part of which was curbed and macadamized, the rest cov

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