The word "lawful," qualifying the word fence and the damages, and, if it appears that, descriptive of the whole line of lawful heirs. the fence was sufficient, the owner of the Reilly v. Bristow, 66 Atl. 262, 264, 105 Md. stock shall be liable for the damages. Article 326. 2498 authorizes the impounding of trespass- ing stock for a second offense when the owner of the premises deems it necessary for his protection. Article 2499 exempts the stock owner from liability if the fence be insuf- ficient. Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1897, art. 4998, as amended by Acts 1901, c. 123, provides that any fence in a locality which has stat- utory restrictions upon the running at large of stock which is sufficient to keep out or- dinary stock permitted to run at large under the chapter shall be deemed a lawful fence, and requires all such fences to be four feet high. Held, that the statutes were enacted to give landowners complying with their re- quirements as to fences a special remedy for damages by trespassing stock, irrespective Under Code Civ. Proc. c. 44, providing that a corral fence exclusively for the pur- pose of inclosing stacks, if outside of any lawful inclosure, shall be sufficient and law- ful if it is not less than 15 feet distant from the stacks, is substantially built with posts not more than 8 feet distant from each other and with not less than 5 strands of barbed fence wire and not less than 5 feet high, and that any other kind of fence which is as effective for the purpose of a fence as that above prescribed is lawful and sufficient, a fence the posts of which were 17 or 18 feet apart, which approached the stacks in places within 6 feet, consisted of but 4 strands of barbed wire, and was only 46 inches high, was not a "lawful fence." Johnson v. Rick- ford, 122 N. W. 386, 389, 18 N. D. 268. Rev. St. 1899, § 1973, defining a lawful fence, and providing that unless the fence comes up to the requirements any person may have a right of action for damages re- sulting from injuries to his live stock from such illegal fence, refers to what is termed a "lawful inclosure," and does not create a liability on the railroad company for the kill- ing of live stock in collision with a train, where such stock strayed onto the right of way because of a defect in the railroad's right of way fence. Martin v. Chicago, B. The words "lawful heirs," as used in a will whereby the testator bequeathed his residuary estate to his lawful heirs, without other or further designation as to who are in- tended as his beneficiaries, and directed that the same should be equally divided among his lawful heirs, share and share alike, de- scribed all the persons who, at the time of the death of the testator, answered the de- scription of lawful heirs and were entitled to share in the residuary estate, regardless of the degree of their relationship to the tes- tator, and resort must be had to the statute in order to determine who were the legal heirs of the testator. Mooney v. Purpus, 70 N. E. 894, 895, 70 Ohio St. 57. In construing a will using the words "legal heirs" and "lawful heirs," the words "legal" and "lawful" do not modify or change the legal effect of the word "heirs." Stisser v. Stisser, 85 N. E. 240, 242, 235 Ill. 207. In common parlance, the terms "heirs at law" and "lawful heirs" are used indiscrim- inately as synonymous and convertible terms, and, whenever either is used, they invariably refer to the heirs on whom descent is cast by law, and not to an heir by adoption. The relation of an heir by adoption is an excep- tional and unusual one, and does not come within the ordinary and usual meaning of the words "lawful heirs," and those words ought not to be held ex vi termini to include an adopted heir. Hockaday v. Lynn, 98 S. W. 585, 589, 200 Mo. 456, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 117, 118 Am. St. Rep. 672, 9 Ann. Cas. 775 (citing Reinders v. Koppelman, 7 S. W. 288, 94 Mo. A devise to the testator's "lawful heirs" should be construed as referring to those who are such at the testator's death, unless a dif- ferent intent is plainly manifested by the will. Hill v. Hill, 132 N. W. 738, 739, 90 Neb. 43, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 198. A devise of land to testator's children, Devise to lawful heirs as devise to class, subject to the provision that the share of see Class. The word "lawful" before the word "heir" in a devise does not, in the absence of a contrary intent clearly indicated in the will, mean "legitimate," but means simply the person designated by law to take by de- scent. Harrell v. Hagan, 60 S. E. 909-911, 147 N. C. 111, 125 Am. St. Rep. 539. "Children" are embraced within the term "lawful heirs," but the word is not per se any child dying without issue of his body who take and hold as purchasers directly | constituted heirs. Held, that the term "lawfrom testator. Smith v. Ellington-Guy Tim- fully constituted heirs" was merely a tautober Co., 71 S. E. 445, 446, 155 N. C. 389. logical way of referring to his lawful heirs at his death; and that the grantee took a life estate, with remainder to those who should comprise the class known as the grantee's heirs at his death. Bradley v. Goff, 147 S. W. 1012, 1014, 243 Mo. 95. A testator gave his wife, for life, all of Under a will giving all the testator's land to his son for life with remainder to his "lawful heirs born of his wife," the son did not take a fee under the rule in Shelley's Case so as to give his widow a dower therein. The words "born of his wife," qualifying and explaining his "lawful heirs," | his estate, and provided that after her death confining the remainder to the children of his wife, and preventing the operation of the rule. The superadded words show that the devisor intended to make the words "lawful heirs" designatio personarum; that is, they show an intention on his part to limit the remainder over to a particular class of heirs. Thompson v. Crump, 50 S. E. 457, 138 N. C. 32, 107 Am. St. Rep. 514. it should go to his eldest daughter for life. He then declared that after the daughter's death such portion of his estate as might remain should be equally divided between his lawful heirs. Held, that the testator meant by the term "lawful heirs" those persons who at his death were entitled to inherit his intestate real estate. In re Cowley's Will, 97 N. W. 930, 931, 120 Wis. 263. LAWFUL ISSUE See Die Without Lawful Issue Surviving. Testatrix adopted defendant in 1890, but, aside from recording of the deed, no public recognition of the relationship appears, testatrix having assumed no authority over defendant who continued to reside with her The term "lawful issue" is not a techninatural parents and other relatives until her cal term, and when used in a deed does not marriage. In 1905 testatrix made a will giv- necessarily bring the deed under the rule in ing defendant, who was designated "my Shelley's Case, like the word "heirs," which young friend," $100. After various other is always a technical word, necessarily bringdispositions, the will provided that the resi-ing the deed under the rule regardless of indue of the estate should go to testatrix's tention. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 114 S. W. 673, "lawful heirs," excepting specified nephews. 676. Held, that defendant is not entitled to share under the residuary clause. Warden V. Overman, 135 N. W. 649, 652, 155 Iowa, 1. Where a testator devises a parcel of real estate to his son for life with remainder to his lawful heirs, and the son marries after the death of the testator, held, that upon the death of the son, the wife takes as heir, where there is nothing in the will tending to show that the testator used the words "law ful heirs" in a different sense from their strict technical import. Miller v. Miller, 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 451, 454. In a devise to the testator's grandson of a tract of land, and if he should die without "lawful heirs of his body" then to the testator's granddaughter, does not limit the estate of the grandson to a life estate where he had heirs of his body, but merely creates a conditional estate in the granddaughter by way of executory devise or shifting use. Sessoms v. Sessoms, 56 S. E. 687, 688, 144 N. C. 121 (citing Smith v. Brisson, 90 N. C. 284; Morrisett v. Stevens, 48 S. E. 661, 136 N. C. 160; Jones v. Ragsdale, 53 S. E. 842, 141 N. C. 200; Whitfield v. Garris, 42 S. E. 568, 131 N. C. 148, reaffirmed in 45 S. E. 904, 134 N. C. 24; criticising Bird v. Gilliam, 28 S. E. 489, 121 N. C. 328; Dawson v. Quinnerly, 24 S. E. 483, 118 N. C. 188; Thompson v. Crump, 50 S. E. 457, 138 N. C. 32, 107 Am. St. Rep. 514). A grantor executed a deed to his son, granting the property to him during his natural life, and at his death, then to his lawfully As children born in wedlock After death of testator and probate of his will, devising land in New York to B. for life, and on his death to his "lawful issue," Acts Mich. 1881, p. 48, No. 55, and Laws N. Y. 1895, p. 313, c. 531, declaring that the subsequent marriage of the parents shall legitimatize their children previously born, B. had a lawful wife, M., by whom he had were passed. Prior to either act, and while children, he had children by another woman, S., and, after enactment of the Michigan act, he, in an action in that state in which jurisdiction was not acquired of M., a resident of New York, and on grounds not recognized by the laws of New York for divorce, obtained a decree of divorce; and thereafter in Michigan there was a marriage ceremony between him and S. Subsequently, in an action in New York by M. against B. for separation, there was a decree establishing the fact that M. was still the wife of B., notwithstanding the Michigan decree. Held, that B.'s children by S. were not entitled to take under the will. Olmsted v. Olmsted, 83 N. E. 569, 190 N. Y. 458, 128 Am. St. Rep. 585. Under the rule that, where statutes can Civ. reasonably be construed to avoid conflict, at law, and section 1387, providing that every illegitimate child is an heir to the person who, in writing signed in the presence of a competent witness, acknowledges himself to be the father of such child, and in all cases is an heir of his mother, and inherits his or her estate, in whole or in part, as the case may be, in the same manner as if he had been born in lawful wedlock, will be held not to be in conflict in the case, where both the mother and child are illegitimate, on the ground that section 1387 makes the child the heir of his mother, while section 1388, taken alone, excludes him, but section 1387, which has to do solely with the right of illegitimates to inherit, will be construed as applicable only to inheritance by an illegitimate from a parent who is legitimate, or, for purposes of inheritance, the illegitimate child by reason of section 1387 is to be held to be within the terms “lawful issue," as that term is used in section 1388. In re De Cigaran's Estate, 89 Pac. 833, 835, 150 Cal. 682. Where the father of defendants at the time of their birth was the lawful husband of another woman than their mother, but thereafter, in Michigan, obtained a divorce legal in that state, though not in the state of New York, and married their mother thereby establishing their legitimacy in that state, under Act Mich. March 28, 1881 (Pub. Acts 1881, p. 48, No. 55), they are entitled in New York to take under a devise to "the lawful issue" of their father. Olmsted v. Olmsted, 102 N. Y. Supp. 1019, 1020, 118 App. Div. 69. A will, dated and which took effect in 1872, gave property in trust for the testator's son, with remainder to his "lawful issue." The primary meaning of "lawful issue" is descendants, and, in the absence of the use of the words in a will in another sense, it will be so construed. Under a residuary bequest to testator's stepmother and half-sister, in equal portions, and, in the event of either dying without issue, the share of the one so dying to the survivor, the stepmother dying before testator, he does not die intestate as to the share given, but there is an implied bequest of it to her issue. In re Disney's Will, 103 N. Y. Supp. 391, 392, 118 App. Div. 378 (quoting and adopting definition in New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele, 55 N. E. 311, 161 N. Y. 11, 76 Am. St. Rep. 238; Chwatal v. Schreiner, 43 N. E. 166, 148 N. Y. 683). Under a will, establishing a trust fund for the benefit of a daughter of the testatrix during her life, and directing that on her death the principal be paid to her then "lawful living issue," the term "lawful living issue" does not include an adopted daughter. In re Hopkins, 89 N. Y. Supp. 467, 468, 43 Misc. Rep. 464 (citing New York Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Viele, 55 N. E. 311, 161 N. Y. 11, 76 Am. St. Rep. 238). Where testator by will devised his property in trust for his wife, on her death to be divided among his lawful issue, and gave the same to the persons entitled to the other half of his residuary estate, and by a clause disposing of such half testator provided that it should go to the lawful issue of his children or to his lawful issue per stirpes and not per capita, it was the intent of the testator to limit the phrase "lawful issue" in the first clause to the lawful issue of his children, or Atl. 630, 633, 68 N. J. Eq. 27. to his lawful issue. Inglis v. McCook, 59 The son was then married and had children. After the death of his then wife, he married the mother of certain illegitimate children. Laws 1895, c. 531, providing that illegitimate "The words 'lawful issue,' when used in children whose parents had theretofore inter- a domestic will, primarily and generally married or should thereafter intermarry mean descendants. Where there is nothing should thereby become legitimatized. Held, that the illegitimate children were not entitled to share in the remainder, since, while all children, whether legitimate or not, are the "issue" of their parents, that word, when qualified by the adjective "lawful," which is the antithesis of unlawful or illegitimate, is ordinarily understood to mean those only begotten and born in lawful wedlock, and it cannot be assumed that the testator considered the contingencies of the birth of illegitimate children, the enactment of a statute by which they might be legitimatized, and the marriage of their parents. Central Trust Co. of New York v. Skillin, 138 N. Y. Supp. 884, 886, 154 App. Div. 227. As descendants The words "lawful issue, if any, of the body," mean lineal descendants, taking by right of representation per stirpes. Union Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Dudley, 72 Atl. 166, 169, 104 Me. 297. to the contrary to be found in the context of the instrument, or in extraneous facts proper to be considered, that is the sense in which they are presumed to be used. The real question ** * * is whether the testatrix used them in that sense or in some other sense. In giving construction to the words used by the testatrix in a domestic will, we cannot assume, without the clearest evidence, that she used the words 'lawful issue' in the sense they might possibly bear under the laws of a foreign country in which she died." In re Tenney, 93 N. Y. Supp. 811, 818, 104 App. Div. 290 (quoting and adopting definition in New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele, 55 N. E. 311, 161 N. Y. 19, 20, 76 Am. St. Rep. 238). Testator's will directed that his estate be divided into as many parts as he had children, the income of each part to go to a child for life, and upon the child's death the part to be divided among the "lawful issue" 1 of the child. At the time the will was exe- | carrying "lawful merchandise." Dene Shipcuted several of the testator's children were ping Co. v. Tweedie Trading Co., 143 Fed. married and had children. Held, that the 854, 855, 74 C. C. A. 606. daughters of a deceased daughter and a grandchild of such daughter took equally under the clause "lawful issue"; that phrase being equivalent to "descendants." Phelps v. Cameron, 96 N. Y. Supp. 1014, 1016, 109 App. Div. 798. Testator gave one half of his residuary estate to trustees for the use of his wife for life, and on her death to divide the same among his lawful issue, or to trustees for their use as his wife should direct by will. In default of such will, he gave the same to persons then entitled to the other half of his LAWFUL MONEY See Lawful Currency. ment charging "larceny" of certain money The term "lawful money," in an indictbeing "lawful money" of the United States, means money as commonly understood and includes bank notes. State v. Finnegean, 103 N. W. 155, 157, 127 Iowa, 286, 4 Ann. Cas. 628. "Lawful money" means money which passes from hand to hand and from person to person and circulates through the comresiduary estate, to be distributed and held money." Lawful money is that which is usumunity, and is synonymous with "current on the same trusts and in the same propor-ally used as a medium of exchange. State v. tions as were mentioned in another clause of Quackenbush, 108 N. W. 953, 955, 98 Minn. his will. Held, that the term "lawful issue" includes not only children but descendants. Inglis v. McCook, 59 Atl. 630, 635, 68 N. J. Eq. 27. Where the phrase "lawful issue" is used in a will, if it clearly appears that it was used in a particular meaning, the phrase may be restricted to children then living, or to children then living and to the representatives of any deceased child. Inglis v. McCook, 59 Atl. 630, 635, 68 N. J. Eq. 27. Testator gave property to trustees in trust, with directions to pay the net income to his three children for life; the trust to continue as long as any of the children lived. He provided that, if any of his children should die without lawful issue, the surviving children should have his share, and if any of the children should die, leaving lawful issue, the child so surviving should take the share of the income which the deceased parent would have taken, had he survived, and on the termination of the trust the property should vest in the surviving lawful issue of testator's children. Held, that words "lawful issue" meant children, and included only the lawful children of testator's children in being at the time of their death. Brisbin v. Huntington, 103 N. W. 144, 147, 128 Iowa, 166, 5 Ann. Cas. 931. As words of purchase The words "lawful issue" in a deed are words of purchase and not of limitation. Lacey v. Floyd, 87 S. W. 665, 667, 99 Tex. 112. 515. LAWFUL OBSTRUCTIONS Although the grass plats and shade trees along the sidewalk may be "obstructions," yet when ample width is left to answer the demands of travel they are obstructions that serve a useful purpose and are not inconsistent with the object for which streets are made and maintained. Like a fence, a hydrant, a hitching post, telephone or telegraph poles, they are "lawful obstructions," and a wire stretched around a grass and tree plat in a street for the protection of the plat is not such an obstruction as to render the city liable for injuries received by one who tripped and fell over such wire; the wire being in plain sight of pedestrians passing along the street. Teague v. City of Bloomington, 81 N. E. 103, 104, 40 Ind. App. 68 (citing Lostutter v. City of Aurora, 26 N. E. 184, 126 Ind. 436, 12 L. R. A. 259; City of Vincennes v. Spees, 74 N. E. 277, 35 Ind. App. 389; Weinstein v. City of Terre Haute, 46 N. E. 1004, 147 Ind. 556). LAWFUL ORDER Interstate Commerce Act, § 16, relating to the authority of a commerce commission, provides with respect to proceedings at law in a Circuit Court of the United States in case of the disregard of a "lawful order" of the commission, the finding of facts of the commission shall be prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated. The court says that the phrase "lawful order" implies more than the exercise of mere jurisdictional power or authority. "The words 'lawful order' mean an order the commission has jurisdiction to make. An order may be lawful and at the same time erroneous, so that if the commission made an order in a matter over which they had judisdiction, which was merely an error of judgment as to precisely Asphalt is "lawful merchandise" in a the degree of reparation, for instance, the charter for West Indian trade, which pro- carrier ought to make, the order would still vides that the vessel shall be employed in' be lawful." Western New York & P. R. Co. Where a deed conveyed land to the grantee and his wife and to the legitimate heirs of the grantee, and in case of no "lawful issue" then over, the words "lawful issue" mean legitimate heirs and are words of purchase. Lamb v. Medsker, 74 N. E. 1012, 1013, 35 Ind. App. 662. LAWFUL MERCHANDISE V. Penn Refining Co., Limited, of Oil City, LAWFUL POSSESSION In St. 1907, p. 999, c. 538, § 2, providing that the owner or other person in the lawful possession of land may recover damages by trespassing animals from the owner or person chargeable with the care of such animals, the words "lawful possession" mean only peaceable or quiet possession, contradistinguished from possession which is not merely constructively tortious, but actually So. Fisch v. Nice, 106 Pac. 598, 599, 12 Cal. App. 60. LAWFUL PURPOSE Under County Government Act Cal. 1897 (St. 1897, p. 458) § 25, subd. 35, authorizing a board of supervisors to grant franchises along and over the public roads and highways for all "lawful purposes," upon such terms and conditions as in their judgment may be necessary and proper, the authority of the board has relation to the purposes for which a highway is dedicated, and is limited by the uses, primary and incidental, to which under the law a highway is devoted; the "lawful purpose" must be consistent with the character and in furtherance of travel. A grant by a county board of supervisors of a franchise to erect poles and string electric wires thereon, along and over the public highway of a county for the purpose of lighting the highway, is an incident to the contemplated use of such highway, and is for a "lawful purpose," and it is immaterial that the lighting was in part used for private purposes. Gurnsey v. Northern California Power Co., 94 Pac. 858, 860, 7 Cal. App. 534. the design of the easement which the public has in and to the highways. The only right which the public has in and to the highways is to use it for the purpose of traveling over it without obstruction or interference; and County Government Act 1897 (St. 1897, the control which the board of supervisors p. 466) § 25, subd. 35, authorizes county sucan lawfully exercise must have in view the pervisors to grant franchises over the public promotion of that use, and cannot extend beroads and highways for all "lawful pur-yond whatever is necessary to facilitate poses" on such terms and conditions as, in their judgment, may be necessary and proper, and in such manner as to present the least possible obstruction and inconvenience to the traveling public. Held, that the words “lawful purposes," as so used, should be construed as limited to purposes in aid of the public's easement of travel, something which would promote the public comfort and convenience in the use of the highway; and hence such act did not authorize a county board of supervisors to grant a franchise to an electric power company to erect its power line along a highway, the title to the soil of which is not in the abutting property owners, for the primary purpose of furnishing light and power to private individuals, without rendering compensation to such abutting Gurnsey V. Northern California Power Co., 117 Pac. 906, 909, 160 Cal. 699, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185. owners. The payment of a debt by a county which the Legislature has authorized is a "lawful purpose," for the issuing of bonds as authorized by County Law, § 12 (Laws 1892, p. 1746, c. 686), giving to boards of supervisors the power to borrow money on the credit of the county. County of Ontario v. Shepard, 91 N. Y. Supp. 611, 614, 100 App. Div. 200. A "lawful purpose" which will excuse one for carrying a concealed weapon is "a lawful purpose that was specific, and, in a sense, temporary. For example, if a person should buy a deadly weapon at a store, and put it in his pocket for the purpose of taking it home; or if a person should find a deadly weapon, and place it in his pocket for the purpose of keeping it only till he could restore it to the owner, or make some other disposition of it-such person would not be carrying a deadly weapon concealed within the meaning of said act." State v. Iannucci (Del.) 55 Atl. 336, 337, 4 Pennewill, 193. The words "lawful purposes," in the New York statute providing that no corporation shall issue either stock or bonds except for money, labor, or property actually received for the use and lawful purposes of such corporation, are general in character, but would seem to mean such property as Would be germane to, or connected with, the business purposes of the corporation, as defined in its charter or articles of incorporation. Corporate bonds cannot be issued for the consideration of a note which is never collected. In re Waterloo Organ Co., 134 Fed. 341, 343, 67 C. C. A. 255. LAWFUL REASONS See Good and Lawful Reasons. Where a bank which paid money into the state treasury as taxes, supposing that it had the right to do so, in lieu of county and city taxes, delayed for more than two years to make application to the auditor to issue his warrant for the repayment of the money, relying upon a decision of the Court of Appeals to the effect that such payments by other banks similarly situated were proper, it lost the right to demand such a warrant, though that decision was overruled after the lapse of the two years, as the decision was not a "lawful restraint," within Ky. St. § 2544, providing that, in all cases where the doing of an act necessary to save any right |