had been no change of sovereignty, would have become perfect or could have been made perfect if the proper steps had been taken. The words "legitimate titles" mean titles that are comprehended in the term "grants," and since the term "grants," as employed in treaties, embraces all character of titles, equitable or legal, it reflects the sense and meaning in which the term "legitimate titles" was intended to be employed. State v. Russell, 85 S. W. 288, 293, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 13; Haynes v. State (Tex.) 85 S. W. 1029, 1039. LEGITIMATION While "adoption," properly considered, refers to persons who are strangers in blood, "legitimation" refers to persons where the blood relation exists. The verb "adopts," in Wilson's Rev. & Ann. St. 1903, c. 59, art. 2, § 36, providing that the father of an illegitimate child, by acknowledging it as his own, etc., thereby "adopts" it as such, is used in the sense of "legitimates." Allison v. Bryan, 97 Pac. 282, 283, 21 Okl. 557, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 931, 17 Ann. Cas. 468 (quoting Blythe v. Ayres, 31 Pac. 915, 96 Cal. 532, 19 L. R. A. 40, and citing Bouvier, Black, Anderson, and Rapalje Law Dictionaries). LEMON As fruit, see Fruit. As goods, wares, and merchandise, see LEND-LENT See More or Less; Not Less Than. In an action under Laws 1907, p. 495, c. 254, defining the liabilities of railroads for injuries to employés, for the death of a brakeman, the use of the words "less or greater," instead of the statutory words "slighter or greater," in determining decedent's negligence as a contributing cause in comparison with that attributable to the railroad, was not erroneous, as the word "less" conveyed See Money Lent; Money Loaned and In- the idea conveyed by the word "slighter" as vested. Rev. St. c. 48, § 64, providing that premiums for building association loans shall consist of a percentage charged on the amount lent in addition to interest, and section 65, providing that the monthly interest shall not be at a greater rate than 6 per cent. per annum, mean by the words "loan" and "lent" the whole sum contracted for, not the sum actually advanced. Tibbetts v. Deering Loan & Building Ass'n, 72 Atl. 162, 165, 104 Me. 404. As give Under Revisal 1905, § 1578, converting estates tail into estates in fee simple, a will whereby the testator "lends" land to his grandson and his lawful heirs of the body forever conveys an estate in fee simple. Sessoms v. Sessoms, 56 S. E. 687, 688, 144 N. C. 121 (citing Cox v. Marks, 27 N. C. 361; King v. Utley, 85 N. C. 59; Edgerton v. Aycock, 31 S. E. 382, 123 N. C. 134; Hinson v. Pickett [S. C.] 1 Hill Eq. 35). A clause of a will bequeathed two separate parcels of land to the daughter of the testator, and, on her death, to her heirs and to her issue if living in fee simple, otherwise, "all the real estate loaned her to be divided between" certain persons. There was no used in the statute. Boucher v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co., 123 N. W. 913, 914, 141 Wis. 160. LESS NOTE Where a will gave a legacy, less a note held by the testator against the legatee, interest was properly charged on the note up to the time of the probate of the will, Rev. Codes, § 4770, requiring the language of a will to be given its ordinary meaning, and the words "less a note" would, in ordinary busi ness transactions, refer to the debt as a whole, and not the sum mentioned as the principal only. In re Beck's Estate, 121 Pac. 784, 789, 44 Mont. 561. LESSENED CAPACITY In a personal injury action, an instruction that the jury, in assessing damages, might consider the bodily and mental pain endured by the injured party, loss of time, and inability to work and earn money, and her diminished capacity for labor, etc., was not erroneous as permitting double damages for the same cause; "inability to work" meaning the total suspension of the power to work, and "diminished capacity to labor" meaning lessening, without totally destroying, the power to labor, and "inability" meaning without ability, and "lessened capacity" meaning that partial ability remains. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Maxwell (Tex.) 128 S. W. 160, 166. LESSER OFFENSE Under a count of a presentment for selling liquor without a license, in violation of Acts 1899, c. 161, § 1, to constitute which offense a single sale is sufficient, defendant cannot, there being no evidence of any specific sale, so as to authorize a conviction of the offense charged, be convicted of violation of Acts 1909, c. 479, § 16, making it an offense to exercise the privilege of retail liquor dealer without first paying the taxes prescribed for exercise thereof, though he has a United States revenue license to retail liquor, made by the act (page 1743) prima facie evidence that he is in the retail liquor business; the offense denounced by the act of 1909, though having a lighter punishment prescribed, not being a lesser offense than, and included in, the offense denounced by the act of 1899, within Shannon's Code, §§ 7085, 7195, permitting, on an indictment for an offense admitting, or consisting, of different degrees, a conviction of a lower degree of the offense than that charged, or of any offense necessarily included in that charged. Brinkley v. State, 145 S. W. 161, 162, 125 Tenn. 445. The term "let" is usually applied to leases and conveyances of real estate and contains the idea of a grant, and when the parties have used it as the operative word applied to a transfer of timber rights and contracts passing such interest for 91 years and more, by fair interpretation and considerA petition in summary proceedings for ing the nature of the interest, the parties the possession of land, alleging that the pe-lantic & N. C. R. Co. v. Atlantic & N. C. could only have intended an assignment. At LESSEE titioner is the "lessee" and landlord thereof, is not a sufficient compliance with Code Civ. Proc. § 2235, requiring the petition to state the interest of the petitioner in the premises. The statement that the petitioner was the "lessee" and "landlord" is the assertion mere ly of an interest and not a description of such interest. Ferber v. Apfel, 99 N. Y. Supp. 215, 216, 113 App. Div. 720 (citing Kazis v. Loft, 80 N. Y. Supp. 1015, 81 App. Div. 636; Loft v. Kaziz, 84 N. Y. Supp. 228; Engle, Heller Co. v. Henry Elias Brewing Co., 75 N. Y. Supp. 1080, 37 Misc. Rep. 480; Potter v. New York Baptist Mission Society, 52 N. Y. Supp. 294, 23 Misc. Rep. 671; Ross v. Same, 52 N. Y. Supp. 303, 23 Misc. Rep. 683; Cram v. Dietrich, 78 N. Y. Supp. 948, 38 Misc. Rep. 790). Co., 61 S. E. 185, 190, 147 N. C. 368, 23 L. As allow or permit Where defendant, who had an option to purchase certain property, represented to plaintiff that they were to be "let in on the ground floor" with certain specified exceptions, it meant that they were to come into the purchase upon the same terms and conditions that he had made with the holder of the property, save as particularly specified. Kroll v. Coach, 78 Pac. 397, 399, 45 Or. 459. As demise, grant, or lease The term "let" contemplates the relation of landlord and tenant. It is defined as "to A covenant to pay to the lessees and give leave to; to permit; to grant the use of their assigns, on the termination of the lease, realty for a compensation correlative to a compensation for buildings and improve- hire; to lease or hire out for compensation.” ments put on the demised land during the Land, into possession of which one enters unterm of the lease was not to be restricted to der a contract to purchase, is not "let" to buildings put on the land by the lessees, but him, within a statute making it forcible dewould include buildings put on it by subten-tainer to willfully hold over without force ants or assigns of the lessees. If the opposite were the true construction of the word "lessees" in this covenant, the covenant in the earlier part of the lease that the said "lessees" shall have a right of way, and the covenant to "warrant and defend," would have to be restricted in the same way. Hollywood v. First Parish in Brockton, 78 N. E. 124, 125, 192 Mass. 269. after the termination of the time for which the property was "let" after demand for posFrancis v. Holmes, 118 S. W. 881, 883, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 608. session. "The mere use of the words 'lease' and 'let,' in a contract of letting, does not necessarily create a lease as distinguished from a license;" but an instrument by which one contracted to let and another to take the ex clusive right to maintain stands for the sale | definition in Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. of candies at a race park, also a storeroom [78 U. S.] 516, 20 L. Ed. 33). under the tracks providing the period of “letting" and the amount and times of payment of rent, is a lease and not a license. man v. Atlantic Amusement Co., 119 N. Y. Supp. 222, 223, 65 Misc. Rep. 25. LET FOR HIRE Mehl As used in an ordinance providing for the payment of a license by owners of vehicles used or let for hire, the term "letting for hire" was intended to apply to cases where persons, the hirers, took temporary possession of the wagon and team. Swetman v. City of Covington (Ky.) 82 S. W. 386. LETTING See Public Letting; Subletting. LETTER A license to keep a dramshop is not a "letter patent," which can be tested or vacated by quo warranto. Hargett v. Bell, 46 S. E. 749, 750, 134 N. C. 394. LETTERS TESTAMENTARY See Entitled to Letters Testamentary. "Letters testamentary" are of two kinds, "domiciliary letters" and "ancillary letters"; the first being issued at the place of the testator's domicile, and the latter at some place, other than domicile, where personalty of the testator is found. Such letters depend upon the situs of such personalty, and do not authorize the administrator or representative to perform any act or to reduce to possession personalty not within territorial authority of the court where issued. Lockwood v. Unit See Not to the Letter; Threatening Let- ed States Steel Corporation, 138 N. Y. Supp. ter. As memorandum See Memorandum. As public document See Public Document. As solicitation See Solicit. LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION See Ancillary Letters; Domiciliary ters. LETTERS OF CREDIT 725, 727, 153 App. Div. 655. LEVEE "Levees" keep out the water. Mound City Land & Stock Co. v. Miller, 70 S. W. 721, 724, 170 Mo. 240, 60 L. R. A. 190, 94 Am. St. Rep. 727. "A levee' is a space adjacent to a navigable water where vessels may approach and Let-land to unload and receive passengers and freight, and where articles of freight may be left for loading on the vessels, or after they have been unloaded until they can be taken away." Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. People ex rel. Dailey, 78 N. E. 790, 793, 222 Ill. 427 (quoting and adopting definition in Farnham, Water & Water Rights, § 145a). A "letter of credit" is a letter containing a general or special request to pay the bearer or person named money, or sell him some commodity on credit, or give him something of value, and look to the writer of the letter for recompense, and which partakes of the nature of a negotiable instrument. Liggett v. Levy, 136 S. W. 299, 301, 233 Mo. 590, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 70. LETTERS PATENT "Letters patent' are not to be regarded as monopolies, created by the executive authority at the expense and to the prejudice of all the community except the persons therein named as patentees, but as public franchises granted to the inventors of new and useful improvements for the purpose of securing to them as such inventors, for the limited term therein mentioned, the exclusive right to make and use, and vend to others to be used, their own inventions, as tending to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, and as matter of compensation to the inventors for their labor, toil, and expense in making the inventions and reducing the same to practice for the public benefit, as contemplated by the Constitution and sanctioned by the laws of Congress." Monaghan v. City of Indianapolis, 76 N. E. 424, 425, 37 Ind. App. 280 (quoting and adopting The word "levee," as used in the West and South, means a landing place for vessels for the delivery of merchandise, and, as incident thereto, for the temporary storage of the merchandise. In other words, a public landing. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 81 N. E. 983, 989, 76 Ohio St. 481. That a tract of land bordering a river was designated as a steamboat landing on a plat and was dedicated to public use shows it to be a "levee." Betcher v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 124 N. W. 1096, 1097, 110 Minn. 228. Where a strip of land lying along the margin of a navigable stream was included in the plat of a city and dedicated to the public by the use of the word "levee" written thereon, and several streets opened upon this tract, and many lots had no other means of ingress and egress, except over and along it, its dedication included its use as a street, as well as a landing place for boats. McAlpine v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 75 Pac. 73, 74, 68 Kan. 207, 64 L. R. A. 85, 1 Ann. Cas. 452. A "levee" is a landing place for vessels, | LEVY (Of Taxes) or a dyke or breakwater. Sanborn v. Van Duyne, 96 N. W. 41, 44, 90 Minn. 215. As street See Street. LEVEE BOARD "Levy" is defined as "the amount accruing from a tax or execution." State ex rel. Ledwith v. Brian, 120 N. W. 916, 917, 84 Neb. 30. "Levy" is used variously, but, as applied to the determination of the amount or rate to As municipal corporation, see Municipal be charged, it is a legislative function, to be Corporation. LEVEE DISTRICT As citizen, see Citizen. exercised only by the state, or some infe- As municipal corporation, see Municipal County, 103 Pac. 126, 127, 80 Kan. 641. LEVEE DISTRICT DIRECTOR As county officer, see County Officer. LEVEE TAX A tax levied by a sanitary district organized under Act July 1, 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 289), is not a "levee tax" within Act July 1, 1909 (Laws 1909, p. 323), providing for a reduction in taxes, excepting "levee taxes," etc. People ex rel. Sanders v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 94 N. E. 14, 15, 248 Ill. 417; Same v. Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co., 94 N. E. 16, 249 Ill. 175. LEVEL The word "levy," as applied to taxation, is given a variety of meanings, among which are: "To impose or assess"; "to impose, assess and collect under authority of law"; "to raise or collect by assessment"; "to charge a sum of money already ascertained against a person or property subject to the charge"; "to determine by vote the amount of tax to be raised"; "to fix the rate at which property is to be taxed." Gray v. Board of Sche Inspectors of Peoria, 83 N. E. 95, 98, 231 Ill. 63. The word "levy," as used in constitutional and statutory provisions that the county commissioners shall levy a tax in their respective counties for the support of public schools, and that county boards shall levy an annual tax on all the property in their respective counties, to be collected at the same time and by the same officers as other taxes, excludes from the act of levying any The duty to levy signification of creation. imposed on the board is therefore purely ministerial, and only imports that it should take such action as would result in the tax being placed on the auditor's books. The boards have no power to do anything more or less than require that the tax be entered. Dickson v. Burckmyer, 46 S. E. 343, 346, 67 There is a distinction between the words "aim," "point," and "level." "Aim" expresses more than the other two words inasmuch as it denotes a direction towards some minute point in an object, and the others imply direction towards the whole objects themselves. We aim at a bird; we point a cannon against a wall; we level a cannon at a wall. Pointing is of course used with most propriety with reference to instruments that have points. It is likewise a less decisive action than either aiming or leveling. A stick or finger may be pointed at a person merely out of derision; but a blow is "leveled" or aimed with an expressed intent of committing an "Levied," with reference to taxes, means act of violence. Livingston v. State, 65 S. E. the extension of a tax against taxable prop812, 6 Ga. App. 805 (quoting Crabbe's Eng-erty, since a tax cannot be said to be levied lish Synonyms). until it has been so extended. Pettibone v. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 74 N. E. 387, 392, 215 Ill. 304. LEVEL RATE PREMIUM S. C. 526. A tax cannot be said to be "levied" when A "level rate premium policy" is a policy on which the regular annual renewal premi- it is only estimated, and the time for levying ums provided are to be kept down to a level, it has not arrived. The limitation on the or are to be brought down to the level of the premiums charged for the first year's insur-power of the county board to contract for bridge building to cost a sum not greater ance by the application of the profits earned than the amount of money on hand in the on the policy. Ijams v. Providental Sav. county bridge fund derived from a levy of Life Assur. Soc. of New York, 84 S. W. 51, 60, previous years and two-thirds of the levy of the current year gives no authority to the board to take into account the levy of the current calendar year prior to the making of such levy. Until this is made, there is no levy of the current year. Clark v. Lancaster County, 96 N. W. 593, 599, 69 Neb. 717. 185 Mo. 466. LEVER See Cut-Off Lever. LEVY All levies, see All. "Three things are essential to a 'tax,' as that term is understood by our Constitu * book and collecting them. Union Trust Co. of Maryland v. State, 81 Atl. 873, 874, 116 Md. 368. By section 16 of P. L. 1903, p. 789, the commissioners are required each year to cause a tax to be "levied and assessed," etc., and to certify to the tax assessor, taxing board, or taxing officer the amount of tax required to be levied, assessed, and raised, and the said assessors, etc., shall assess said sums so directed to be assessed and certified upon all the persons and property liable, and the said tax shall be levied, assessed, and collected by the same officers, etc., and the tax so levied upon real estate shall be a lien thereon. Held, that throughout the section the word "levy" is used as referring to the administrative functions of taxation and not to the legislative function, the differences between which are pointed out in the case of Township of Bernards v. Allen, 61 N. J. Law, 228, at page 238, 39 Atl. 716, at page 719, also referred to in the dissenting opinion, 61 N. J. Law, 692, 41 Atl. 250; one of the judges using the phrase "levying taxes" as descriptive of the legislative function, while the other used it as referring to the administrative process of collecting the taxes. Van Cleve v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Com'rs, 58 Atl. 571, 586, 71 N. J. Law, 183. tion: First, the ascertainment of a sum certain, or that can be rendered certain, to be imposed on the collective body of taxpayers; second, a legal imposition of that sum as an obligation on the collective body of taxpayers; third, an apportionment of such sum among individual taxpayers so as to ascertain the part or share that each should bear. The first two acts above described, namely, the ascertainment of a sum to be imposed on the collective body of taxpayers and its imposition by a legislative declaration to that effect, are essentially legislative acts or acts proper directly to the lawmaking function of the government. The third act, namely, the apportionment of the whole sum imposed by way of tax on the collective body of taxpayers upon the separate individuals composing that body, is usually an administrative act performed under specific statutory directions, ascertaining the mode and time of its performance. * * The word 'levy' is indifferently employed, as commonly used, to express either one of these processes separately or both collectively. A tax is said to be levied when the amount or rate to be imposed is fixed by law, for what is wanting to complete such levy is supplied by the standing tax laws, and consists in a course of administrative action. When the levying of a tax Provisions in the body of an act conferis spoken of as a legislative act, it is common-ring on parochial and municipal corporations ly understood to describe such action on the power to levy license taxes was within the part of the Legislature as would, with stand-title of the act "to levy, enforce, and collect ing tax laws, complete the legislative authori- a license tax." Mayor and Council of Alexty requisite to enable the administrative de-andria v. White, 15 South. 15, 16, 46 La. partment to distribute and collect the tax. * In other words, the tax directed to be levied must be so far imposed, in order to comply with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, that no further legislation will be necessary to enable its collection." Rice v. Shealy, 50 S. E. 868, 870, 71 S. C. 161 (quoting and adopting definition in Morton v. Comptroller General, 4 S. C. 430, 453). Ann. 449. As all necessary proceedings A city ordinance authorizing the issuance of bonds dated in 1910 and payable in 1930, which provides that "there is hereby levied" on the taxable property of the city a specified sum, of which a certain amount is to pay the principal of the bonds and the balance to pay interest, of which sum a specified The power of the state tax commissioner amount shall be collected each year to and conferred by Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. including 1930, the amount collected each 81, § 150, requiring the commissioner to levy year over that required for interest to contaxes on shares of corporate stock and to stitute a sinking fund to the principal, complace a valuation on corporate stock for pur-plies with Laws 1907, c. 235, and Const. art. poses of assessment, is not affected by Laws 1906, c. 404, amending article 81, § 22, and fixing a tax for each $100 for a specified purpose, and directing the Comptroller to levy the taxes on corporate stock, since the function of the Comptroller, under the act of 1906, is a purely ministerial act fully performed when he enters on his books the number of shares of stock liable to taxation, the corporation the stock of which is taxed, the rate of taxation, and extends the amount of the tax, and since the word "levy" as applied to taxes means in some cases to raise and exact by authority of government the amount of a tax to be raised, and in other cases the word is used with reference to the mere ministerial act of entering the taxes on the tax 11, § 3, requiring cities issuing bonds, to provide before, or at the time of doing so, for the collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to pay the interest as it falls due and to discharge the principal within 20 years, since "levy" in tax matters has various meanings dependent on the context, and in this instance includes everything necessary to the collection of the tax. Borner v. City of Prescott, 136 N. W. 552, 554, 150 Wis. 197. Assess distinguished Assessment as including, see Assess. To "assess" a tax is to adjudge and determine what proportion of his property the taxpayer shall contribute to the public. To "levy" a tax is to make a record of this de |