A private corporation is a "person," within Rev. St. 1895, art. 3017, authorizing a recovery for death caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another person. Hugo Schmeltzer & Co. v. Paiz, 141 S. W. 518, 520,

104 Tex. 563.

A private corporation is included in Rev. St. 1895, art. 3017, which gives a right of action for death caused by the wrongful act of another "person." Williams v. Coca-Cola Co. (Tex.) 150 S. W. 759, 761.

In the absence of statutory enactment to the contrary, the name "person" in a statute includes a corporation if it falls with

in the general reason and design of the act,

both as to the benefits and restrictions of the

act. A statute that authorizes the doing of a certain act by a corporation or by its agent should be given effect by permitting the corporation to act either per se through its officer or per alium through its agent. American Soda Fountain Co. v. Stolzenbach, 68 Atl. 1078, 1083, 75 N. J. Law, 721, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 703, 127 Am. St. Rep. 822.

death, caused by the wrongful act, omission, or negligence of any person or persons, or corporation. Section 1 provides that the use of the word "person," used in the Code, "includes a corporation as well as natural persons." Held, that the personal representative of a person injured by a city sewer ditch had a cause of action against the city. City of Anniston v. Ivey, 44 South. 48, 49, 151 Ala. 392.

The word "person" in Gen. St. 1909, § 9752, providing that a person who, by himself or his servant, etc., or as the servant or agent of another, uses a false weight, or exposes for sale less than the quantity which he represents, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, etc., includes a corporation as well as a natural person. State v. Belle Springs Creamery Co., 111 Pac. 474, 477, 83 Kan. 389. The word "persons," in Mills' Ann. St. § 413, providing that any person who shall employ a child under 14 years of age in a mill shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, applies to corporations as well as to natural persons. Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People,

75 Pac. 924, 925, 32 Colo. 263, 105 Am. St. Rep. 74.

A corporation is a "person" within Laws 1896, p. 1052, c. 803, requiring registration of employing plumbers in the city of New York, and, as registration involves the holding of a certificate of competency which cannot be given to a corporation, plumbing work by a corporation is unlawful, and the price thereof cannot be recovered. Milton Schnaier & Co. v. Grigsby, 117 N. Y. Supp. 455, 457, 132 App. Div. 854; Id., 113 N. Y. Supp. 548, 61 Misc. Rep. 325.

The statutory construction law provides that the term "person" includes a corporation and joint-stock association. As used in Laws 1900, p. 699, c. 327, § 45, providing that a person engaged in the business of employing or master plumber shall submit to an examination before the examining board of plumbers as to his experience, etc., the word "person" applies to a corporation. William

stolen from the state or the Western Atlantic

Railroad Company, or fraudulently obtained from the same, may be recovered from the person perpetrating the fraud or conversion, the word "person" includes a corporation. Scofiel, etc., Co. v. State, 54 Ga. 635, 638.

A corporation is in law a "person" or entirety entirely distinct from its stockholders and officers, and it may have interests distinct from theirs, and their interests may be adverse to its interests, and knowledge on the part of the president of the corporation of a fraud committed by an entryman in procuring and commuting a homestead entry is imputed to the corporation so as to deprive it of the position of a bona fide purchaser under a conveyance from the president who had taken a deed from the patentee; the president being one of the incorporators and together with the secretary owning a large majority of the stock, being intrusted with the management and control of the corporate business, and his interest and that of the corporation being identical. J. J. McCaskill Co. v. United States. 30 Sup. Ct. 386, 391, 216 U. S. 504, 54 L. Ed. 590.

"In the statutes authorizing issuance of garnishment on the application of any 'person,' the word 'person' has been held to include all individuals, nonresidents as well as residents, corporations, and sovereignties." Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 106 N. W. 821, 828, 127 Wis. 651, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1045, 115 Am. St. Rep. 1063 (dissenting opinion by Cassoday, C. J.).

A corporation, though an artificial "person," was not embraced within the meaning of the word "person" as used in the first statute relating to foreign attachment providing that a writ of foreign attachment may issue against any person not an inhabitant of the state when certain requirements were met. Fowler v. Dickson (Del.) 74 Atl. 601, 603, 1 Boyce, 113 (citing Vogle v. New Granada Canal & Steam Nav. Co. of New York [Del.] 1 Houst. 294).

Under Code, § 48, par. 13, providing that the word "person" may be extended to bodies

A corporation is included in the word "person" as used in the criminal statutes. A corporation can be guilty of the offense of furnishing liquor to a minor. Southern Express Co. v. State, 58 S. E. 67, 69, 1 Ga. App.

Under Code, § 48, par. 13, providing that the word "person" may be extended to bodies corporate, corporations are included in the word "persons," as used in section 3465, providing that where two or more persons are bound by contract, judgment, or statute, jointly, jointly and severally, or severally only, including the parties to negotiable paper, the action thereon may at plaintiff's option be brought against any or all of them. Swartley v. Oak Leaf Creamery Co., 113 N. W. 496, 498, 135 Iowa, 573.

700.

An incorporated club is not a "person" within the meaning of the Dramshop Act. State ex inf. Hadley v. Rose Hill Pastime Athletic Club, 97 S. W. 978, 980, 121 Mo. App. 81 (citing State ex rel. Bell v. St. Louis Club, 28 S. W. 604, 125 Mo. 308, 26 L. R. A. 573).

A club incorporated under the laws of the state is a person, within Rev. Laws 1905, § 1519, providing that any person selling liquors without a license in certain quantities, to be drunk on the premises, is guilty of a misdemeanor, etc. State ex rel. Young v. Minnesota Club, 119 N. W. 494, 496, 106 Minn. 515, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1101.

Under St. 1898, § 3466, authorizing quo warranto against any "person" usurping any franchise, etc., quo warranto is appropriate to oust a corporation from exercising a franchise attempted to be conferred on it by an invalid municipal ordinance; a corporation being a "person." State v. Milwaukee Independent Telephone Co., 114 N. W. 108, 111, 133 Wis. 588.

An action by the Attorney General on behalf of the people for the forfeiture of franchises of a corporation may be brought under Code Civ. Proc. § 1948, authorizing the Attorney General to maintain an action on his own information against a "person" unlawfully exercising a franchise; the word "person" in the section when considered in the light of the history of the legislation including corporations. People v. Bleecker St. & F. F. R. Co., 125 N. Y. Supp. 1045, 1051, 140 App. Div. 611.

Under Civ. Code, § 1001, authorizing any person to acquire private property for any use specified in Code Civ. Proc. § 1238, a foreign corporation falls within the term "any person" and may condemn land for any of the purposes authorized, the right of for eign corporations to do business within the state having been recognized since 1870, and this right is not reduced by act of 1880 (St. 1880, p. 21), Civ. Code, § 407, expressly authorizing foreign corporations doing business as common carriers to exercise the right of eminent domain, the act merely increasing the powers of foreign corporations, and not purporting to reduce them. San Joaquin &

Rev. Civ. Code, § 1299, provides that sale is a contract by which, for a pecuniary consideration called a "price," one transfers to another an interest in property, so the exchange of liquors by an incorporated commercial club to its members for checks sold to them violated Rev. Pol. Code, §§ 2834, 2835, 2838, 2852, making the sale of liquor in quantities less than five gallons by any person whether as owner, clerk, agent, servant, or employé, a misdemeanor. State v. Mudie, 115 N. W. 107, 110, 22 S. D. 41.

Laws 1901, p. 19, c. 3, making it unlawful to permit minors in saloons, etc., provides (section 7) that the word "person" as used in the act shall be deemed to mean firm or corporation, as well as natural person, and the person managing the business of such firm or corporation shall be liable to the penalties prescribed by this act. Territory v. Church, 91 Pac. 720, 721, 14 N. M. 226.

Under Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, c. 131, § 1, providing that the word "person" or "persons," as well as all words referring to or importing persons, may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate as well issued to a corporation as well as an individas individuals, a dramshop license may be ual. Heidelberg Garden Co. v. People, 124 Ill. App. 331; People v. Heidelberg Garden Co., 84 N. E. 230, 333, 233 Ill. 290.

The expression "fit persons," in P. L. 1891, p. 257, relative to licensing of wholesale dealers, brewers, distillers, rectifiers, compounders, bottlers, storekeepers, and agents, is intended to apply primarily to individuals, but includes a corporation created for the purpose of engaging in the liquor business, and such corporation is a fit corporation to be licensed unless it has become

56.

Under Rev. Codes, § 16, providing that the word "person" includes a corporation as well as a natural person, section 1506, providing that it shall be unlawful for any per son to sell spirituous liquors to be drunk in or about the premises where sold without having first procured a license and given a bond, applies to corporations of all kinds, whether organized for profit or social advantages without profit. Ada County v. Boise Commercial Club, 118 Pac. 1086, 1088, 20 Idaho, 421, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 101.

Laws 1908, c. 380, making it unlawful for any "person or persons" to sell liquor without a license, and providing that the applicant for a license must declare that he is a citizen of the United States, and the application must contain a statement of the extent of his residence in the county, is not limited to natural persons, but includes a corporation, and an incorporated social club maintaining a clubhouse and selling liquor to its members is within the act. Conococheague Club of Washington County v. State, 81 Atl. 602, 606, 116 Md. 317.

A liquor merchant's license, which 25 Del. Laws, c. 125, § 8, provides may be given a "person," will not be refused to a corporation; Rev. Code 1852, amended to 1893, p. 43, c. 5, § 1, par. 10, providing the word "person" may include a corporation, and the court having for years approved applications of corporations for such licenses, and it being presumed it has passed on the question of their being entitled thereto under the statute. In re D. W. Lynch Co. (Del.) 75 Atl. 41, 1 Boyce, 104.

Under Gen. St. 1902, tit. 1, § 2712, providing that the word "person" may include a corporation, and title 16, sections 2669, 2672, and 2675, entitled "intoxicating liquors," providing for the issuance of liquor licenses to suitable persons, etc., a corporation organized to make and sell malt liquor may be licensed to sell liquors, though section 2712 of the title provides that every person convicted of a first violation of the act shall be punished by a fine, and that such person, on every subsequent conviction, may be punished by imprisonment, in addition to the fine; the word "person" in the title including corporations. Connecticut Breweries Co. v. Murphy, 70 Atl. 450, 452, 81 Conn. 145.

Local Option Law, § 18 (Laws 1905, p. 50), provides that the issuing of a license or internal revenue special tax stamp by the federal government to any person for the sale of intoxicating liquors shall be prima facie evidence that such person is selling, exchanging, or giving away intoxicating liquors. Held, that the term "person," as used,

Hence it was not error to instruct that if an internal revenue license had been issued to a certain

club, authorizing the sale of intoxicating liquor, such license was prima facie evidence that the club was engaged in selling, exchanging, or giving away intoxicating liquors, but that such finding alone would not be applicable to the defendants or either of State v. Kline, 93 Pac. 237, 242, 50

them.

Or. 426.

* * *

Local option law (Rev. St. 1909, § 7243) provides that if the majority of the votes at a local option election are against the sale of intoxicants it shall not be lawful for “any person within the limits of such county to directly or indirectly sell, give away or barter in any manner whatever" any intoxicating liquors; and section 7246 makes "any person" violating the act guilty of a misdemeanor. Held that, while a corporation could sell intoxicants in violation of the act, though it could not be punished thereunder, its agents and servants may be convicted and punished for selling for the corporation in violation of the act. State V. Robinson, 146 S. W. 456, 457, 163 Mo. App.

221.

A corporation is a "person" within the meaning of Act May 9, 1902, c. 784, § 1, 32 oleomargarine to keep certain books and Stat. 193, requiring wholesale dealers in make certain returns, and providing for punishing by fine and imprisonment "any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this section," although section 5 of the same act applies in express terms to corporations, and gives the court discretionary power to punish either by fine or imprisonment or both. United States V. Union Supply Co., 30 Sup. Ct. 15, 215 U. S. 50, 54 L. Ed. 87.

dividual, is included in the word "person," A private corporation, as well as an inas used in section 2271, Gen. St. 1901, defin85 Pac. 938, 940, 74 Kan. 180. ing the crime of libel. State v. Williams.

The word "person," in the statute punishing one who by false pretenses obtains from "any other person" any money, etc., with intent to defraud, includes a domestic corporation. State v. Briscoe (Del.) 67 Atl. 154, 156, 6 Pennewill, 401.

Under Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. 131, § 1, subd. 5, providing that the word "pesson" extends to corporations, and Cr. Code, §§ 98, 99 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. 38), punishing the obtaining or attempting to obtain money by confidence game, and declaring that an indictment which charges that accused feloniously obtained, or attempted to obtain, from a person named his money by means of a confidence game, is sufficient, an indictment charging accused with attempting to obtain money from a corporation by means

A corporation is a "person," within the meaning of Rev. St. § 4901, which imposes a penalty on "every person" who marks an unpatented article with any word importing that the same is patented for the purpose of deceiving the public, and may be convicted of such offense. London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 Fed. 506, 507, 103 C. C. A. 130. The word "persons," in Rev. St. 1899, § 2815, authorizing the courts to parole persons convicted of crime, when considered in connection with the act of 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 385), authorizing the court to permit persons convicted of crime to go at large in specified instances, does not include corporations, but is limited to natural persons. State ex rel. Howell County v. West Plains Telephone Co., 135 S. W. 20, 22, 232 Mo. 579.

Pen. Code, § 179, defines homicide as the killing of one human being by the act, procurement, or omission of another, and manslaughter is defined to be one of the different kinds of homicide. Manslaughter in the second degree is defined to be a homicide without design to effect death, committed by a person committing or attempting

to commit a trespass or other invasion of a private right not amounting to a crime, or in the heat of passion, or due to any act, procurement, or culpable negligence of any person, which does not constitute the crime of murder, or manslaughter in the first degree. The statutory construction law provides that the term "person" includes a corporation, except where the context or other provisions of law indicate otherwise. Held, that as homicide is the killing of one human being by another human being, and as manslaughter is one kind of homicide, a corporation cannot commit that crime, and that the term "person" as used in the definition of manslaughter in the second degree refers to a "natural person" only. People v. Rochester R. & Light Co., 112 N. Y. Supp. 362, 59 Misc. Rep. 347.

Consolidated School Law, § 63, provides that school district taxes shall be apportioned by the trustees upon all real estate within the district, and such property shall be assessed to the person or persons or corporation owning or possessing it, except that land lying in one body, and occupied by the same person, if assessed as one lot on the last assessment roll of the town, shall, though situated partly in two or more school districts, be taxable in that one of them in which such occupant resides. Held, that a corporation owning land in the district is not a "person," within the exception of the act, and a corporation owning a tract of land upon which were over 50 buildings used for manufacturing purposes, and which lay partly in another district, could not have it taxed in the other district because its offices were in that district. People ex rel. Fleischmann Mfg. Co. v. Marenus, 118 N. Y. Supp. 838, 839, 134 App. Div. 170.

It is a sufficient compliance with St.

1898, § 856, providing that the survey, map, and census of territory proposed to be incorporated as a village shall be left for pubof business within such territory of some lic examination at the "residence or place person residing therein," that it is left at the office of a corporation, the most frequented place in the community; there having been compliance with the provision of the statute that the notice of time and place of hearing shall state where such papers are open for examination, and it being provided by section 861 that defects not going to the groundwork of the organization shall not be deemed to invalidate the incorporation. In re Village of Biron, 131 N. W. 829, 830, 146 Wis. 444.