ants were made parties, was a "personal ac- | for business purposes, are not "baggage" tion," and not one against the deposit, so when put by the agent into his trunk, and, in that it could be brought against all of defendants in the county within which any of them resided, under Code, § 3501, requiring personal actions to be brought in a county in which some of defendants actually reside. Kean v. Rogers (Iowa) 118 N. W. 515, 517. PERSONAL AILMENT Confinement in childbirth is not a "personal ailment" within the meaning of such a provision in a contract of insurance. Rasicot v. Royal Neighbors of America, 108 Pac. 1048, 1053, 18 Idaho, 85, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 433, 138 Am. St. Rep. 180. PERSONAL AND LAWFUL HEIR Where a testator to prevent any trouble about the property which he might leave to his heirs at his death gave his wife a life estate in all his real and personal property, with power to dispose of any portion of the personalty that should suit her convenience, the residuary clause reading, "The balance of all my estate, both personal and real, I give and bequeath to my dear children," naming them, "and to their personal and lawful heirs, share and share alike," the words "personal and lawful heirs" are not equivalent to "heirs of the body begotten," so that the testator's children would only take a life estate, such words no more indicating the bodies out of which the heirs shall issue than if the word "personal" had been omitted, but that the testator intended to give the children named in the residuary clause an estate in fee in the real estate. Webbe v. Webbe, 84 N. E. 1054, 1056, 234 Ill. 442, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1079. PERSONAL BAGGAGE See, also, Personal Luggage. The personal baggage of a passenger includes jewelry carried for his personal use, but not that carried for sale or for the use of another. Brick v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 58 S. E. 1073, 1074, 145 N. C. 203, 122 Am. St. Rep. 440, 13 Ann. Cas. 328. the absence of a consent or custom of the railroad to accept such papers as "baggage," no damages can be recovered for their loss or for delay in their shipment and delivery. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Georgia Home Ins. Co., 37 South. 500, 85 Miss. 7, 67 L. R. A. 646, 107 Am. St. Rep. 265. Merchandise for sale is not within the usual definition of "personal baggage," nor within Rev. St. § 2799, relating to the duty of persons arriving in the United States to declare their personal baggage. United States v. One Trunk, 175 Fed. 1012, 1015. There seems to be no good reason why an article for use at the end of the journey, or for the use of the traveler's wife, child, should not fall within the definition of the or other member of his immediate family, term "personal baggage." Kansas City South88 Ark. 189, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 850 (citing 3 ern Ry. Co. v. Skinner, 113 S. W. 1019, 1020, Hutch, on Carr. § 1246; Withey v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 104 N. W. 773, 141 Mich. 412, 1 L. R. A. [N. S.] 352, 113 Am. St. Rep. 533, 7 Ann. Cas. 57). A carrier need not carry goods, articles, furniture, etc., or anything not fairly to be regarded as "personal baggage" reasonably required for the convenience and comfort of the passenger, as baggage, and may refuse to carry such articles except as freight. Under the customary methods for carrying freight, stage costumes, scenery, etc., making up the paraphernalia of a traveling theatrical company do not constitute the personal baggage which a carrier impliedly contracts to carry without additional compensation, and along with the passenger. Saunders v. Southern R. Co., 128 Fed. 15, 20, 21, 62 C. C. A. 523 (citing and adopting Oakes v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 26 Pac. 230, 20 Or. 392, 12 L. R. A. 318, 23 Am. St. Rep. 126; 3 Thomp. Neg. § 3417). PERSONAL CHATTEL See Chattels Personal. PERSONAL COMMUNICATION The term "personal baggage" means whatever the passenger takes with him for his personal use or convenience, according to the habits or wants of the particular class to which he belongs, either with reference to the immediate necessities or to the ultimate purposes of the journey. This includes not only all articles of apparel, whether for use or ornament, but also the gun case, or fishing apparatus of the sportsman; the easel of the artist on a sketching tour or the books of the student or other articles of an analogous character, the use of which is personal to the traveler, and the taking of which has arisen from the fact of his journeying. Memoranda and papers in the possession of an agent, but relating exclusively to the business of his principal, and carried by him solely 104 Wis. 603. A statute prohibiting testimony of a party in respect to any transaction or commu. nication "by him personally" with a deceased person does not forbid testimony of transactions or communications between deceased and third persons in the witness' presence if the witness did not participate therein and they were not affected by his presence. Unless the transactions or communications are personal and had with the deceased by the party either literally or in practical effect as by participating in or influencing them, they do not fall under the prohibition of the statute. Wollman v. Ruehle, 80 N. W. 919, 920, The word "personally," in St. 1893, 8 other simply from seeing and hearing him; 4212 (Wilson's Rev. & Ann. St. 1903, § 4509), especially as considered apart from the inproviding that no party shall be allowed to herent probability or lack of probability of testify in his own behalf in respect to any the particular thing he has testified to, and transaction or communication had personally apart from the corroboration or refutation by such party with a deceased person, etc., which his testimony has received during the is not limited to conversations had with a de- progress of the trial. Western & A. R. Co. ceased, but includes any transaction or com- v. Henderson, 65 S. E. 48, 50, 6 Ga. App. munication had with a deceased person in- 385. dividually. Conklin v. Yates, 83 Pac. 910, 912, 16 Okl. 266. In an action by an administrator to recover money lent to defendant by decedent, testimony by defendant that money for payment of the debt was inclosed in an envelope, taken to the post office, and that certain steps were there taken to have the postmaster register the letter and send it to decedent in a distant state, and also that in due time defendant received a writing acknowledging re PERSONAL CREDIT Negotiable Instruments Law (Laws 1897, p. 722, c. 612, § 20), requires that an instrument to be negotiable must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money, and section 22 defines an unconditional promise as therein used as: "An unqualified promise or order to pay is unconditional within the meaning of this act, though coupled with: (1) An indication of a particular fund out of which reimbursement is to be made, in a particular account to be debited with the amount; or (2) a statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument. But an order or promise to pay out of a particular fund is not unconditional." It was claimed that the statute was but ceipt of the money, which writing was identified and introduced in evidence was not incompetent, under Code Civ. Proc. § 320 (Gen. St. 1909, § 5914), providing that no party shall testify in his own behalf in respect to any transaction or communication had personally by him with a decedent, where the a codification of the former law, and that it adverse party is the administrator of such was always the rule that it was essential to decedent; witness' acts not constituting a negotiability that the "general credit" of the personal transaction or communication. Bry-maker be pledged to the obligation, the court an v. Palmer, 111 Pac. 443, 444, 83 Kan. 298, 21 Ann. Cas. 1214. says: "Many decisions and text-books are cited in support of this contention; and it must be conceded that they contain general broad statements of the rule and definitions tending to sustain it. The facts upon which the adjudications were had, however, were not analogous to those now before the court; and it will, we think, be found in all of them that the expressions 'general credit' and 'personal credit' were used, not as indicating that the entire general or personal credit of the maker must be pledged to the obligation, but rather to show that general or personal credit must be pledged, as contradistinguish Under Code, § 4604, prohibiting testimony of an interested witness concerning personal transactions or communications with a deceased person in an action against her administrator, evidence by plaintiff, in an action to establish a note signed by his father and stepmother as a claim against the latter estate, that he gave the father an order to obtain the note from the party in whose custody it was, and that he afterwards saw it in his father's possession, and evidence of the father to the same effect, was admissible, since such evidence does not constitute "per-ed from limiting the liability to a particular sonal transactions" or "personal communications." Curd v. Wisser, 95 N. W. 266, 267, 120 Iowa, 743 (citing Gable v. Hainer, 49 N. W. 1024, 83 Iowa, 457; Dysart v. Furrow, 57 N. W. 644, 90 Iowa, 59; McElhenney v. Hendricks, 48 N. W. 1056, 82 Iowa, 657; Walkley v. Clarke, 78 N. W. 70, 107 Iowa, 451). PERSONAL CREDIBILITY or specific fund, which would make the ob- The expression "personal credibility," as used in Civ. Code, § 5146, which provides that in determining where the preponderance of evidence lies the personal credibility of witnesses may be considered so far as the same legitimately appears from the trial, means that which would lead the jury to believe or disbelieve what the witness had said by reason of his appearance before them, his manner of conducting himself in their presence, his manner of testifying, and those other nu- Merchandise for sale is not within the merous and largely indescribable things usual definition of "personal effects," nor which make one man believe or disbelieve an- within Customs Administrative Act June 10, "The words 'personal effects' in a will, when not restricted by the context, mean everything embraced within the description 'personal property.' Gallagher v. McKeague, 103 N. W. 233, 234, 125 Wis. 116, 110 Am. St. Rep. 821. 1890, c. 407, § 4, 26 Stat. 131, providing that, | brought before an inferior tribunal in New except in case of "personal effects," no importation of any merchandise shall be entered without invoice. United States v. One Trunk, 175 Fed. 1012, 1015. PERSONAL ESTATE See Visible Personal Estate. Any personal estate, see Any. PERSONAL EXEMPTION York a few months ago, directly involved the consideration of the right of circulating portraits; and the question whether our law will recognize and protect the right to privacy in this and in other respects must soon come before our courts for consideration. Of the desirability—indeed, of the necessityof some such protection, there can, it is believed, be no doubt the press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of prothe resource of the idle and of the vicious, priety and of decency. Gossip is no longer but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry, as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual re "Personal exemptions" from taxation are "such as have been by legislative enactment granted either directly to persons or corporations that are named in the acts thus granting them or granted to such persons or corporations as may comply with the require-lations are spread broadcast in the columns ments of such legislative enactment, and thus bring themselves within the granting clause thereof, and by so doing make themselves the beneficiaries of such granting clause." Grand Canyon R. Co. v. Treat, 95 Pac. 187, 189, 12 Ariz. 69. PERSONAL FREIGHT A contract to carry the "personal freight" of certain parties between designated points free of charge means freight owned by them individually, and is not too indefinite to be executed. Hurley v. Big Sandy & C. Ry. Co., 125 S. W. 302, 304, 137 Ky. 216. PERSONAL HEIR See Personal and Lawful Heir. PERSONAL IMMUNITY The theory that every one has a right to privacy, and that the same is a personal right, growing out of the inviolability of the person, defined by Judge Cooley, in his work on Torts (2d Ed. p. 29), as: 'Personal Immunity.' The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity, to be let alone." And that a person is entitled to relief at law or in equity for an invasion of the same is generally understood to have been first publicly advanced in an article entitled "The Right to Privacy," published in 4 Harv. Law Rev. 193 (December, 1890), wherein some of the necessities for invoking such relief are set out as follows: "Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right to be let alone.' Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops.' For years there has been a feeling that the law must afford some remedy for the unauthorized circulation of portraits of private persons, and the evil of the invasion of privacy by the newspapers, long keenly felt, has been but recently discussed by an able writer. The alleged facts of a somewhat notorious case, of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gosSip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle. The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. Nor is the harm wrought by such invasions confined to the suffering of those who may be made the subjects of journalistic or other enterprise. In this, as in other branches of commerce, the supply creates the demand." This right to be let alone does entitle to relief one whose picture has without his permission been printed in a mercantile advertisement, the right going only so far as to protect the individual from bodily injury. Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 Atl. 97, 99, 100, 30 R. I. 13, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991, 136 Am. St. Rep. 928, 18 Ann. Cas. 1006. PERSONAL INCONVENIENCE "Personal inconvenience" resulting from physical disability belongs to the same class as pain and suffering. In an action by a married woman for personal injuries, plaintiff may recover damages for physical or personal inconvenience resulting from the injury. In an action against a street railway for injuries received by plaintiff through stepping on an electrified metal plate on defendant's car, allegations in the petition that as a result of the injuries plaintiff's lower limbs were partially paralyzed, her nervous system injured and diseased, and she suffered severe pains, etc., and that as a result of the injury she was for a considerable period of time confined to her bed and was unable to perform her household duties, etc., were broad enough to include damages on account of physical inconvenience. McRae v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 102 S. W. 1032, 1035, 125 Mo. App. 562. PERSONAL INDIGNITY Personal indignities rendering life burdensome, which are made a ground for divorce by the statute, include conduct short of actual personal violence, or such conduct as renders further cohabitation dangerous or unsafe. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 100 Pac. 321, 323, 52 Wash. 160. PERSONAL INJURY damages for a personal injury. Section 3343, subd. 9, provides that a personal injury includes libel or other actionable injury to the person either of the plaintiff or of another. Held, that an injury inflicted through the negligence of defendant's servant is a personal injury within section 3343. Ossmann v. Crowley, 92 N. Y. Supp. 29, 30, 101 App. Div. 597 (citing Lasche v. Dearing, 53 N. Y. Supp. 58, 23 Misc. Rep. 722; Davids See Permanent Personal Injury; Serious v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 93 N. Y. Supp. Bodily Harm or Injury. 285, 104 App. Div. 23). Right of action for as chose in action, see Chose in Action. An injury to a person within the meaning of the law does not necessarily involve any element of personal contact with the person complaining of the injury. Riddle v. MacFadden, 94 N. E. 644, 645, 201 N. Y. 215. An action by a husband for the loss of services of his wife resulting from injuries through the alleged negligence of defendant is an "action for injuries to the person" within the statute of limitations. Mulvey v. City of Boston, 83 N. E. 402, 403, 197 Mass. 178, 14 Ann. Cas. 349. Code Civ. Proc. § 549, authorizes the arrest of defendant in an action for damages for "personal injury." By section 3343, subd. 9, "personal injury" is stated to include, among other things, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or "other actionable injury" to the person. Held, that the words "other actionable injury" to the person mean other like to assault, or in an action in which defendant was himself at fault, and hence the statute does not authorize the arrest of defendant in an action for negligence or assault where the act causing the injury was that of his servant, but which is imputed to be his act, though not authorized by him. Davids v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 92 N. Y. Supp. 220, 45 Misc. Rep. 208. Decedent Estate Law (Consol. Laws The damages for failure to deliver a telegram, or delay in delivering it, are not "injuries to the person," within the meaning of Ky. St. 1903, § 2515, prescribing limita-1909, c. 13), § 120, provides that for wrongs tions of one year in actions against corpo-done to the property, rights, or interests of rations for injuries to the person. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Witt (Ky.) 110 S. another, for which an action might be main W. 889, 890. An "injury to the person," as used in Rev. St. 1898, § 4222, subd. 5, requiring service of notice within one year in an action to recover damages for such an injury, does not include a father's loss of service and expenses of medical attendance and nursing resulting from an injury sustained by a minor son. Wysocki v. Wisconsin Lake Ice & Cartage Co., 101 N. W. 707, 708, 125 Wis. 638. Supplement of March 24, 1896, to the statute of limitations (P. L. p. 119), providing that action for "injuries to persons' shall be brought within two years," applies only to actions for personal injuries, and hence not to an action to recover for injury to a vessel caused by a negligent collision. Dailey v. Kiernan, 67 Atl. 1027, 1028, 75 N. J. Law, 275. In prosecution of a husband for knowingly persuading his wife to go from one state to another with intent that she should practice prostitution in violation of the white slave act (Act Cong. June 25, 1910, c. 395, § 3, 36 Stat. 825), prohibiting white slave traffic, such offense was in the nature of a "personal injury" to her person so as to entitle her to testify against her husband. United States v. Rispoli, 189 Fed. 271, 272. Code Civ. Proc. § 549, declares that a defendant may be arrested in an action for tained against the wrongdoer, an action may be brought after the injured person's death by his executors, etc., but that such section shall not extend to an action for personal injuries, as such action is defined in Code Civ. Proc. § 3343, except that the right of action for injuries resulting in death is not affected. Code Civ. Proc. § 3343, subd. 9, provides: "Personal injury' includes libel, slander, criminal conversation, seduction and malicious prosecution," etc. Held that, the right of privacy being in its nature personal, an action for violation thereof through the unauthorized use of plaintiff's name and picture, brought under Civil Rights Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 6) §§ 50, 51, does not survive plaintiff's death. Wyatt v. Hall's Portrait Studio, 128 N. Y. Supp. 247, 248, 71 Misc. Rep. 199. Alienation of affections Injury to a wife by the alienation of her husband's affections resulting in mental suffering, ill-health and the destruction of her home, is within Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 550, 551, excepting from the operation of a discharge in bankruptcy judgments in actions for willful and malicious "injuries to the person." Leicester v. Hoadley, 71 Pac. 318, 319, 320, 66 Kan. 172, 65 L. R. A. 523. The phrase "injury to the person," as used in Gen. Laws 1896, c. 260, § 10, providing that no person who shall be committed on execution in any action for malicious injury to the person, health, or reputation of another shall be deemed within the meaning of section 1 of the act, authorizing persons imprisoned for debt to apply to be admitted to take the poor debtor's oath, includes an action for alienation of the affection of a wife, the gist of the action being depriving him of companionship and a wounding of his feelings. Taylor v. Bliss, 57 Atl. 939, 940, 26 R. I. 16. An action for alienating a wife's affections, for enticing her away, and for criminal conversation is in effect an action upon the case and barred only after six years; it is not an action for injury to the person and barred after two years under section 3 of the Statute of Limitations as amended in 1896 (P. L. 1896, p. 119; 3 Comp. St. 1910, p. 3164). Crane v. Ketcham, 84 Atl. 1052, 1053, 83 N. J. Law, 327. Breach of marriage promise A "personal injury," as defined by Code Civ. Proc. § 3343, subd. 9, includes libel, slander, criminal conversation, seduction, and malicious prosecution; also an assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other action able injury to the person either of the plain tiff or another. An action for breach of promise to marry, though seduction is alleged as the ground of damage, is not an action for a personal injury within section $73, providing that in actions for personal injuries the defendant may have an order for physical examination. Pitt v. Dunlap, 105 N. Y. Supp. 816, 847, 54 Misc. Rep. 115. Death The words "personal injuries," as used in Laws 1886, c. 572, p. 801, relating to actions against municipal corporations for damages for personal injuries, includes injuries resulting in death. Crapo v. City of Syracuse, 90 N. Y. Supp. 553, 555, 98 App. Div. 376; Id., 76 N. E. 465, 466, 183 N. Y. 395. In view of Kirby's Dig. § 6288, providing that for wrongs done to the person or property of another an action may be maintained against the wrongdoers, the expression "injury to the person" is confined to injury or damage of a physical nature and no other, and will not include the injuries suffered by a husband arising out of the killing of his wife. Billingsley v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 107 S. W. 173, 174, 84 Ark. 617, 120 Am. St. Rep. 95. Laws 1853, p. 97, entitled "An act requiring compensation for causing death from wrongful act, neglect or default," provides that, when the death of the person is caused by wrongful act, such as would have en titled the party injured to maintain an action in respect thereof if death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages resulting to a widow and next of kin from such death. Held, that an action for wrongful death under such act was not an action for "personal injuries" within Laws 1905, p. 111, entitled "An act concerning suits at law for personal injuries and against cities, villages and towns," requiring as a condition to the maintenance thereof that the specified notice shall be served on the defendant, and hence the service of such notice was not a necessary element of a cause of action by plaintiff against a city for the wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent. Prouty v. City of Chicago, 95 N. E. 147, 148, 250 Ill. 222. Deceit In view of Code Civ. Proc. § 3343, subd. 9, defining a "personal injury" as an actual injury to the person, an action for deceit is not for a personal injury, within section 1910, providing that any claim or demand can be transferred except where it is to recover damages for a personal injury or for breach of promise to marry. Keeler v. Dunham, 99 N. Y. Supp. 669, 671, 114 App. Div. 94. False imprisonment the person and is embraced within the pro"False imprisonment" is an injury to vision of the Code authorizing the plaintiff to unite in the same complaint two or more causes of action for personal injuries. Paul V. Ford, 102 N. Y. Supp. 359, 361, 117 App. Div. 151 (quoting De Wolfe v. Abraham, 45 N. E. 455, 151 N. Y. 187). Where plaintiff sued for false imprisonment, in that he was arrested as a witness train, a prayer that it was the duty of the and taken by an officer from defendant's carrier to use all reasonable care to protect plaintiff from "personal injury" and insult was not objectionable as abstract, since the false arrest and imprisonment constituted a "personal injury"; such term being defined to include libel, slander, criminal conversation, seduction, malicious prosecution, assault and battery, false imprisonment, and other actionable injuries to the person. New York, P. & N. R. Co. v. Waldron, 82 Atl. 709, 714, 116 Md. 441, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 502 (citing 6 Words and Phrases, p. 5341). Libel or slander juries into two classes, viz., injuries to the Code Civ. Proc. 1895, § 3476, divides intion 3477 declares that injury to property person and injuries to the property, and secis a deprivation of the owner of the benefit thereof by taking, withholding, deteriorating, or destroying it, and section 3478 provides that every other injury is an "injury to the person." Held that, under Code Civ. Proc. 1895, § 66, providing that justices of the peace shall have civil jurisdiction in actions for damages for "injury to the person" if the damages claimed do not exceed $300, prior to its amendment by Laws 1907, p. |