JUDICIAL AND STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF WORDS AND PHRASES SECOND SERIES VOLUME 3 LAND The primary meaning of the word "land," at common law, is "any ground, soil, See Arable Land; Cemetery Land; Claim or earth whatsoever; as meadows, pastures, Against Land; Claim upon Land; Coal woods, waters, marshes, furzes and heath." Lands; Common Lands; Contract In a more limited sense the term denotes Made Touching the Land; Crown the quantity and character of the interest or Lands; Cultivated Lands; Drainage of estate which the tenant may own in the Land; Earned Land; Granted Lands; lands. Kemp v. Goodnight, 80 N. E. 160, 161, Improved Land; Inclosed Land; Iron 168 Ind. 174. Land; Lots, Blocks, Tracts, and Parcels of Land; Mainland; Marsh Land; Mineral Land; Overflowed Lands; Public Land; Respecting Títle to Land; School Land; Shore Land; Suit for Land; Sunk Land; Swamp and Overflowed Lands; Tide Land; Timber Land; Uninclosed Lands; Unplatted Lands; Vacant Land; Wild and Forest Lands. Adjacent lands, see Adjacent. All my lands, see All. "Land," in its legal signification, has an indefinite extent upwards, so that by a conveyance of land all buildings, growing timber, and water erected and being thereupon Trustees of the Freeshall likewise pass. holders & Commonalty of Town of Brookhaven v. Smith, 90 N. Y. Supp. 646, 650, 98 App. Div. 212. It is elementary that the word "land" in its legal signification has an indefinite. extent upwards as well as downwards, and Contract for sale of land, see Contract therefore if it were possible for a man to of Sale. Improvement of land, see Improvement. Interest in land, see Interest (In Property). My land, see My. Other lands, see Other. Raw prairie land, see Raw. live in a state of nature, unconnected with other individuals, the proprietor of land would own not only the face of the earth within the boundaries of his proprietorship, but also everything under it and over it. An imaginary person living in such a state of nature would be at liberty to use his land as Right of way as land itself, see Right of he pleased to build on it to any height and to Way. See, also, Real Property. "Land" is a term used to designate all real estate, just as money is used to designate the whole volume of the medium of exchange. Montgomery County v. Cochran, 121 Fed. 17, 21, 57 C. C. A. 261. dig into it to any depth without restraint. But as man was formed for society and is incapable of living alone, organized society is essential to his well-being and happiness, and every person who enters society must give up a part of his so-called natural rights and liberty for the benefit of the community. Cochran v. Preston, 70 Atl. 113, 114, 108 "The word 'land' # * comprehends Md. 220, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1163, 129 Am. ground, soil, or earth, pastures, woods, springs, wells, lakes, ponds, and all things St. Rep. 432, 15 Ann. Cas. 1048 (citing 1 Bl. Comm. p. 125). that have become a fixed part of the soil." 3 WDS. & P.2D SER.-1 Land in its broadest signification includes not only the surface of the earth but the mines, quarries, and everything under it; and whoever has the fee in the surface presumptively owns everything of a permanent nature under or over it. Notwithstanding it is competent for the owner to convey the mines or quarries by a separate grant vesting in one person a freehold in the soil and in another a freehold in the mines or quarries and to sever the ownership of the surface from the ownership from that which is under it, there may exist a double ownership or two freeholds in the same parcel of land. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Boykin, 76 Ala. 560, 563 (citing 2 Washb. Real Prop. 375). The word "land" includes not only the soil, but everything attached to it, whether attached by the course of nature, as trees, herbage, and water, or by the hand of man, as buildings and fences. Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 93 N. W. 781, 788, 67 Neb. 325, 60 L. R. A. 889, 108 Am. St. Rep. 647 (citing McGee Irrigating Ditch Co. v. Hudson [Tex.] 22 S. W. 967). * * * * * Anderson's Law Dict. says that the word "land" comprehends all things of a permanent and substantial nature, being a word of very comprehensive significance. Act Feb. 22, 1851, pp. 64, 65, is entitled "An act for the benefit of William Jewell College. Certain lands owned by William Jewell College exempted from tax." And section 1 provides that "all the land and improvements thereon now owned by the William Jewell College and all the lands that may hereafter be granted or devised to said college, or any other institution of learning in this state, for the benefit of education, be, and the same are hereby, exempted from all taxes so long as said lands may be owned by said college." Section 2 releases from delinquent taxes the "land" belonging to the college in the counties named, and section 3 makes it a misdemeanor to willfully injure or destroy timber, etc., from any of the lands belonging to the college. The entire endowment fund of the college was in lands when the act was passed, the colleges of that time being generally endowed in land alone, and the charters of a number of colleges perpetually relieved them from taxation on all kinds of property. Held, that the word "land" as used in the act will be construed to include personalty, so that the college cannot be taxed on its endowment fund, consisting of personalty. State ex rel. Waller v. Trustees of William Jewell College, 136 S. W. 397, 399, 401, 402, 234 Mo. 299. The term "land" in statutes conferring power to condemn is to be taken in the legal sense, and includes both the soil and buildings and other structures on it and all interests therein. White v. Cincinnati, R. & M. R. R., 71 N. E. 276, 278, 34 Ind. App. 287 (quoting and adopting definition in Lewis, Em. Dom. [2d Ed.] § 285). sense, and includes both the soil and buildings and other structures on it, and any and all interests therein." In assessment of damages in proceedings for condemnation of land, the appraisers should value the land taken with the buildings on it, and it will be presumed that the buildings were included in the award. Stauffer v. Cincinnati, R. & M. R. R., 70 N. E. 543, 544, 33 Ind. App. 356 (quoting Lewis, Em. Dom. [2d Ed.] § 285; citing Brocket v. Ohio & P. R. Co., 14 Pa. 241, 53 Am. Dec. 534; State v. Reed, 38 N. H. 59; Mills, Em. Dom. §§ 49, 223). The word "land" comprehends ground, soil, or earth, pastures, woods, spring, wells, lakes, ponds, and all things which have become a fixed part of the soil. The word "tenement," in its ordinary meaning, means a "house," which is the subject of tenure, and includes, not only corporeal hereditaments, which are or may be held, but also all inheritances issuing out of any of these inheritances, or concerning or annexed to or exercised within the same, though they lie not in tenure. "Tenement" is a word of greater scope than "lands," and though, in its vulgar acceptation, is only applied to houses and other buildings, yet, in its original, proper, and legal sense, it signifies anything that may be holden, provided it be of a permanent nature, whether of a substantial and sensible, or of an unsubstantial, ideal, kind. The term "hereditaments" includes rights unconnected with land, but generally used as the widest expression for real property of all kinds, being divided into real hereditaments, which are lands and tenements, and personal hereditaments, which are rights concerning neither lands nor tenements. As so defined, neither the term "tenement" nor "hereditament" includes in law a lease of lands for years. Orchard v. Wright-DaltonBell-Anchor Store Co., 125 S. W. 486, 494, 225 Mo. 414, 20 Ann, Cas. 1072. In common speech the nonmineral portion of land, the portion which covers and envelopes the minerals, is called the "surface" of the land, and the proprietor of land who devests himself of title to the minerals which it contains is still spoken of as the owner of the fee or of the surface or of the land. Kansas Natural Gas Co. v. Board of Com'rs of Neosho County, 89 Pac. 750, 751, 75 Kan. 335. The word "land," as a conveyance, carries every kind of property, right, and appurtenance which is legally embraced in that word, but what rights go to a patentee of land depend, not upon any supposed adjudication contained in the patent, but upon the general law of the state where the land is situated. City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Farming & Milling Co., 93 Pac. 869, 871, 152 Cal. 645. A will whereby testator devised farm "The term 'land,' in statutes conferring lands to his daughters for life, remainder in power to condemn, is to be taken in the legal' fee simple to their children, and whereby he provided that they might sell their respective, the "ties, tracks, poles, rails and switches" lands, proceeds to be reinvested in "lands" as such or apart from the franchise. Los to be held for the same use, and that pur- Angeles Pac. Co. v. Hubbard, 121 Pac. 306, chaser must see that the reinvestment was 308, 17 Cal. App. 646. made before acquiring title to land devised, did not require reinvestment in farm lands, but reinvestment could be made in city real estate; the word "lands" including every form of real estate. Clay v. Bogie (Ky.) 119 S. W. 737, 738. Statutory definitions "Gen. St. 1901, § 7342, defines the word 'land' in the phrases 'real estate' and 'real property' as including lands, tenements, and hereditaments and all rights thereto and interest therein, equitable as well as legal." Clarke v. Lawrence, 88 Pac. 735, 738, 75 Kan, 26. The word "land" or "lands," as used in Code 1899, c. 13, § 17, cl. 16, relating to taxation, expressly includes lands, tenements, and hereditaments, and all rights thereto and interests therein, except chattel interests and chattels real. Harvey Coal, etc., Co. v. Dillon, 53 S. E. 928, 936, 59 W. Va. 605. Under Ky. St. 1909, § 458, providing that the words "real estate" or "land" shall be construed to mean any interest other than a chattel interest, and section 470, providing that no action shall be brought upon a contract relating to real estate unless in writing, a parol contract to board and care for the owner of a life estate in land in consideration of the use of the land is void, though board was furnished in reliance on the contract. Hampton v. Glass (Ky.) 116 S. W. 243, 244. Under the statutes declaring that the word "land," and the phrases "real estate," and "real property," shall include lands, tenements, hereditaments and all rights thereto and interests therein equitable as well as legal, and providing that lands not exempt by law shall be liable to be taken on execution, land held by an equitable title may be levied upon and sold by virtue of an execution. Poole v. French, 80 Pac. 997, 1000, 71 Kan. 391. Laws 1903, p. 376, relating to street openings, requires by section 15 that each lot, piece, or parcel of land be designated upon a diagram as a basis for assessments. Section 17 requires the amount of assessment to be set opposite each lot, piece, or parcel of land which under section 20 is made a lien upon the property assessed. These sections and sections 23 and 26, use the terms "property," "lands," and "each lot, piece or parcel of land," interchangeably. Held that, in requiring the superintendent of streets to assess the benefits from street improvements on the property of any street railroad within the assessment district, the word "property" was used in a limited sense and as referring to that species of property designated as "land," which as defined by Civ. Code, § 659, is "the solid material of the earth," and hence there was no authority for an assessment against The vendee's right to specific performance of a contract to convey land is "lands" and "real estate" within the statute definition (Rev. St. § 4971, subd. 9), as including "lands, tenements and hereditaments and all rights thereto and interests therein." The lands, on the vendee's death, descend at once, by operation of law to his children (Rev. St. § 2270, subd. 1). An administrator cannot sue to compel specific performance of a contract to convey land to his decedent, the price for which has been paid, where it does not appear that the administrator is in possession, or that the personal assets of the estate are insufficient to pay the debts. Carpenter v. Fopper, 68 N. W. 874, 94 Wis. 146. As agricultural or grazing land "Lands of the state," as used in the title of act to promote public health, etc., by draining such lands, included agricultural lands. Sisson v. Board of Sup'rs of Buena Vista County, 104 N. W. 454, 458, 128 Iowa, 442, 70 L. R. A. 440. In Rev. Civ. St. 1897, § 4218fff, prescribing the classified free school, asylum, and public lands subject to sale to actual settlers, the terms "land" and "other lands" are used in the popular sense "as not embracing town lots, but meaning agricultural or grazing lands." Conn v. Terrell, 80 S. W. 608, 609, 97 Tex. 578. Building or other structure includes all castles, houses, and other buildAccording to Blackstone, "land" legally ings, for they consist of two things-land, which is the foundation, and the structure try title disclaimed any title or interest in thereupon. Where defendant in trespass to the land, but claimed title to a house standing thereon, the plea of the three-year statute of limitations was without application; the land legally including all houses. Fidelity Cotton Oil & Fertilizer Co. v. Martin (Tex.) 136 S. W. 533. An assessment under Pub. St. 1901, c. 79, 88 4, 8, authorizing an assessment on lands receiving special benefits from the construction of a sewer, for their just share for the cost of construction and maintenance, etc., recognizes the ownership of buildings on lands of another, and buildings so situate are real estate for the purposes of assessment, and are properly assessed to the owner thereof; such buildings being "lands." Granite State Land Co. v. Town of Hampton, 79 Atl. 25, 29, 76 N. H. 1. "Under the general tax law, and by the general understanding, the term 'lands,' when used with reference to assessments for purposes of taxation, includes with the land above or under water all constructions which have been erected upon or affixed thereto." |