CHAPTER I. NARRATIVE OF CIVIL AND MILITARY TRANSACTIONS. A.D. 1802. T the time of the peace of Amiens the two great belligerent powers had scarcely the means of carrying on an active warfare against each other without allies and auxiliaries on the continent, England could not hope to touch France by land; with fleets ruined or blockaded, with a navy completely disheartened, France could not expect to touch England by sea. The brilliant and romantic campaign in Egypt, which reminded the French of the old prowess of the British infantry, and which told the nations of Europe that these new Gallic armies were not invincible, allowed us to treat with a better grace and with less sacrifice of national pride than at any previous period of the war. We could also treat without any sacrifice of public faith, for the coalized powers on the Continent, who were engaged in their arduous struggle at the times when the Foxites had recommended negotiation with Bonaparte, had now yielded, for a season, to the terrible First Consul, and had sought terms for themselves without heeding us. There could indeed be little doubt but that the elements of a new coalition would soon be found, or soon be created by the ambition and oppressions of France; but for the present these elements did not exist: Austria and the other powers stood in need of repose, and to rouse them prematurely from their sleep would be to hurry them into the arena in a weak and dispirited condition. The land armies of Great Britain were scattered over the globe, to defend our vastly augmented Indian territories and colonial possessions. We had increased these forces to 168,000 men and 80,000 militia, exclusive of 130,000 sepoys in the East India Company's service, and we had besides above 120,000 volunteers in the British Islands. From the nature of our empire it was impossible ever to collect within the limits of Europe these abundant forces; yet, perhaps, a better war-ministry, and a government more disposed than that of Pitt or of Addington to rely upon "native steel and native ranks," might out of these forces, and by the proper application of wise and energetic, yet moderate and strictly constitutional, means of recruiting and augmenting them from the populations of England, Scotland, and Ireland, have given to us that distinction and preponderance as a military nation which we had enjoyed in the days of Marlborough, and which we were to possess again under Wellington before this Theban warfare could have any real end. Since the month of February, 1793, the British navy had been raised by the building of new and the capture of enemies' ships from 135 sail of the line and 133 frigates to 202 sail of the line and 277 frigates.* In the same time the navy of France had been reduced from 73 sail of the line and 67 frigates to 30 sail of the line and 35 frigates. At the time of the signing of the treaty of Amiens, counting sloops, brigs, cutters, &c., we had nearly 800 war-vessels to array against our foes. Counting armed vessels of all kinds, we had captured 298 and destroyed 55 French ships. The loss of the voluntary or forced allies of the French had been comparatively great: the Spaniards had lost, in captured and destroyed, 78 ships; the Dutch 86; and the affair of Copenhagen had inflicted a tremendous blow on the navy of the Danes. Our ships, like our land forces, were spread over the globe; but, after providing for the security of the continents and isles and archipelagoes of islands which owned our dominion, we might always confidently count on collecting in the European seas a force capable of contending with the united fleets of all the maritime powers of Europe. And what was better than numerica superiority, than the build of ships and the weigh of their metal, was the conviction which Howe, Duncan, Jervis, Nelson, and old traditions had put into the head and heart of every true British sailor, that the meteor flag of England must ever The two years of greatest increase were 1796 and 1798: in the first of these years 82 ships, measuring 64,847 tons, were added to the navy; and in the second of these years 63 ships, measuring 30,910 tons, were added.-Tables in James's Naval Hist. dad and Ceylon, which Spain and Batavia severally ceded and guaranteed to his Britannic majesty.Art. VI. The Cape of Good Hope was to remain to the Batavian Republic in full sovereignty, in the same manner as previous to the war; and the ships of every kind belonging to the other contracting parties were to be allowed to enter the port, and there purchase provisions as heretofore, without being liable to pay other imposts than such as the Batavian Republic subjected its own ships to.-Art. VII. The territories and possessions of our ally Portugal were to be maintained in their integrity, such as they were antecedent to the war; but that portion of Portuguese Guiana which had been ceded was to remain to the French Republic, and Spain was to keep the territory on the frontiers of Portugal which had been yielded to her by the treaty of Olivenza.-Art. VIII. The territories, possessions, &c. of the Sublime Porte were to be maintained in their integrity as they were before the war or the invasion of Egypt.Art. IX. A Veneto-Greek Republic, which had started up, under French care, in the Seven or Ionian Islands, on the destruction of the ancient republic of Venice, which had possessed these islands for many ages, was recognised by the con be victorious on its own proper element; that Britannia, in fact as well as in song, ruled the waves. They may have expressed the idea less rhetorically and far less frequently, but the notion was certainly as prevalent among English sailors that under Nelson and his compeers and disciples battle was only another word for victory, as it could possibly have been in the minds of the French soldiery under Napoleon Bonaparte and the best of his lieutenants. Since the commencement of hostilities in 1793, our mercantile shipping had increased nearly one-third, while that of France had been almost annihilated. Notwithstanding her vast territorial acquisitions, the permanent revenue of France was considerably less now than it had been previous to the Revolution, while our permanent revenue was nearly doubled. All is not bad even in the worst of wars; and in most wars between great and well-matched nations there will be found something good and ennobling: the present contest had breathed new energy and life into the national character, which had been left considerably depressed and degraded by the result of the American war. This improved spirit was seen in manufactures, in trade, in our distant colonies, in our home government, and perhaps, most of all, and most importantly of all, in our native lite-tracting parties.-Art. X. Malta, with its dependrature, which, as a whole, had been so long languid or inane. On the dark side of the account was to be placed the enormous increase of our national debt, which in the course of nine years had swelled from above 244,000,000l. to above 520,000,000/. funded and unfunded.* A great deal of this money had been spent abroad for coalitions and subsidies, a great deal had been wasted in crude and petty expeditions, and a still vaster amount had indisputably been allowed to be robbed by loan-jobbers, government contractors, commissioners, commissaries, and other rapacious functionaries: our army had cost us 103,212,000/., our ordnance 15,605,700/., our navy 98,729,000. One great desire of the French was gratified by England recognising their so-called Republic; and to obtain this recognition had certainly been one of the various motives which induced the First Consul to treat. All the absolute monarchies of the Continent had given this recognition long before, having been reduced to negotiate on a footing of equality with the Convention, the Directory, or the Consul. The contracting parties to the treaty of Amiens were, the king of Great Britain and Ireland on the one part; and the French Republic, his majesty of Spain and the Indies, and the Batavian Republic, on the other. The leading articles of the treaty were:-Art. III. His Britannic majesty restored to France, Spain, and Batavia all the possessions and colonies which he had occupied or conquered during the war, with the exception of Trini ent isles, Gozo and Comino, was to be restored to its old masters, the Knights of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem; the knights of the order were invited to return to La Valette, and there elect a new grand-master; any election made previous to the signing of the preliminaries of this peace was declared to be null and void. In order to the greater independence of the chapter, no individual belonging either to England or France was henceforward to be admitted into the order. A Maltese Language was to be established, into which natives of the islands should be admitted without being bound to prove their nobility; these Maltese knights were to enjoy all the privileges, distinctions, &c. of the other knights, however noble; and, at the least, one-half of the municipal, administrative, civil, judicial, and other employments were to be filled by the natives of the islands of Malta, Gozo, and Comino. The British troops were to evacuate Malta and its dependencies within three months from the exchange of the ratifications, or sooner if possible, when all was to be given up to the order, provided the new grandmaster, or commissioners duly authorized, were there to receive the surrender, and that the Neapolitan troops were arrived. The King of Naples was to be invited to send two thousand of his native troops to serve in garrison for one year after the restoration of the knights, or longer, if the Maltese force should not be at that period deemed competent by the guaranteeing powers to garrison the island. The independence and neutrality of Malta and its dependencies were proclaimed, and The Knights of Malta were divided into seven nations, which were called Langues,' or Languages,-namely, those of Provence, Auvergne, France, Italy, Aragon, Germany, and England. the independence was to be guaranteed by Great Britain, France, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Prussia. The ports were to be open to the vessels of all nations, except those belonging to the Barbary powers.-Art. XI. The French troops were to evacuate every part of the kingdom of Naples and of the Roman States, except such portions of the latter as had been annexed to the Cisalpine Republic; and the British were to evacuate all the ports and islands they had occupied in the Mediterranean or in the Adriatic.-Art. XII. The evacuations, cessions, and restitutions named in the treaty were to be made, in Europe, within one month; on the continents and seas of America and Africa, within three months; and on the continent and seas of Asia, within six months, after the exchange of the ratifications.-Art. XV. The Newfoundland fisheries were to be placed on the same footing as previously to the war.-Art. XVIII. The Prince of Orange, late Stadtholder, or the branches of the House of Nassau, were to receive equivalent compensations for the losses they could prove they had sustained, as well with respect to private property as by the change of constitution adopted in the Batavian Republic. But by a secret article appended to this XVIII.th article the Batavian Republic was exempted from finding any part of this compensation, and, as no other state or territory was pledged for it, it was pretty evident that no compensation to the House of Nassau Orange was intended.*-Art. XXII. The present treaty, done at Amiens on the 27th of March, 1802, was to be ratified within thirty days, or sooner if possible; and the ratifications were to be exchanged in due form at Paris.+ The very first use which Bonaparte made of the benefit of the suspension of hostilities at sea was to send out a formidable armament to recover, in the first place, the whole of San Domingo from the revolted or the free and independent negroes. On the 14th of December, 1801, only ten weeks and four days after the signing of the preliminaries, a great fleet and a strong land army set sail from Brest for the West Indies. The English ministry, on the solemn assurance that it had no other object in view than that which was pub During the negotiations there had been a talk of giving the family of the ex-stadtholder equivalents or compensations in some part of Germany. + Between the 1st of October, 1801, when England agreed to the preliminaries, and the 27th of March following, when the definitive treaty was signed, Bonaparte concluded a separate treaty of peace with the young Emperor Alexander of Russia. This treaty was little more than a series of secret articles, nearly every one of which be trayed the arrogance or the ambition of the two contracting parties, and their determination of setting themselves up as arbiters or dictators in all the affairs of Europe, and to every independent sovereign. In one of these secret articles the young Czar and the First Consul undertook" to preserve a just equilibrium between the Houses of Austria and Prussia." In another they agreed to come to a proper understanding "how to terminate upon amicable terms the affairs of Italy and of the Holy See." In another they agreed to act in con. cert respecting the King of Sardinia." In another article they provided for the revival of the Armed Neutrality, or for the creation of a still more formidable system to deprive England of the maritime rights she claimed: the czar and the consul, in order to restore a just equilibrium in the different parts of the world, and to ensure the liberty of the seas, binding themselves to act in concert for the attainment of those objects by all measures, whether of conciliation or vigour, mutually agreed on between them, for the good of humanity, the general repose, and the independence of governments." licly stated, agreed not to molest this armament on its passage; but, as the force was so great, and as the treaty itself was not yet signed, it was deemed advisable to watch proceedings and to reinforce our own fleet on the West Indian station; and to these ends Admiral Mitchell was dispatched with seven sail of the line. That French expedition, of which further details will be given, did not, because it could not, depart from the object laid down; and it terminated, not in any re-occupation, or aggrandizement, or seizure, but in the almost total destruction of the forces engaged in it. But a few days after its first departure from Brest, Bonaparte realized another great project, which gave him in name-what he already had in factthe presidency and actual command of all Lombardy and those other rich portions of Italy which by his last treaty with the Emperor of Germany (the treaty of Lunéville) were to constitute the independent Cisalpine Republic, to be freed alike from French and from Austrian dominion and interference. On the 11th of January, 1802, the First Consul entered Lyons in triumph, and met there a grand consulta from the Cisalpine Republic. This swarm of Italian republicans, 450 in all, this sublime deputation of nobles of ancient and historical names, of bishops and archbishops, of parish priests and other ministers, of judges and jurisconsults, of well-paid professors and pensioned literati, of national-guard officers, of officers of the Cisalpine troops of the line, of the notables of departments, and of merchants and members of the chamber of commerce, had all been drilled and instructed beforehand by M. Petiet, the minister Bonaparte had left at Milan, and for several days preceding the First Consul's arrival at Lyons they had been indoctrinated by Talleyrand.† Before crossing the Alps some of these illustrissimi were informed that Bonaparte wished to convert his temporary elective authority into a permanent and hereditary one; that, as regarded the French, some His private secretary, Bourrienne, asked Bonaparte why, isstead of calling the Italian deputies to Lyons, he did not go to Milan and meet them there?-Whether it was possible that he did not wish to revisit Italy, the first scene of his glory, and the beautiful capital of Lombardy, where he had met with so much homage?" I certainly should like that," replied the First Consul; "but the journey to Milan would occupy too much precious time. I prefer that the meeting should take place in France. My influence over the deputies will be more prompt and certain at Lyons than at Milan." +"Some went to Lyons through affection, some through force, some through ambition. High were the expectations of men in the Cisalpine Republic: in France men watched most attentively all that was doing. And yet it seemed strange that an Italian nation should go into France to settle its government and fate."-Carlo Botta, Storia d'Italia. When nations take such journeys, they are only fit for, and ought only to expect, abasement and slavery. The noble, the reverend, the learned, the poetical mandatories were indeed requested by the Milanese and the rest of the Lombards, who were becoming miserably poor under the blessed rule of the Cisalpine Republic and M. Petiet, to complain of the licence and licentiousness of the French soldiery, of the inexorable tyranny of the new government, of the crushing weight of the new taxes, which, at the least, doubled in amount those which had been paid to the House of Austria, of the progressive dilapidation of property, and of countless acts of violence and oppression; but these complaints of the suffering Lombards were drowned in the applauses and rejoicings at Lyons, and the mandatories did nothing but deliver academical orations, listen to the voice of command, and obey. "It was a fine spectacle," adds Botta, " for those who merely looked at the outside of things; but it was a sad sight for those who looked within, because it was arranged at Lyons how to extinguish by forms of law that Italian liberty which had already almost perished through abuse." caution and precaution were necessary; and that, as an excellent means of preparing the public mind in France, they must offer him a presidency or a consulship for life in Italy. The 450 deputies named a commission of thirty members, who speedily drew up a report to the First Consul of France on the state and prospects of the Cisalpine Republic, stating that, owing to the heterogeneous parts of which that new republic had been composed, there was a want of adhesion and of confidence among them; that the Cisalpina, being still only in her infancy, must require the tutelage and support of France; that there was no native Italian fit to be placed at the head of the government, and that therefore they must implore the First Consul of France, the real father and creator of the infant Italian republic, to take upon himself the chief direction of its affairs. Without attempting to play the farce of modesty, Buonaparte repaired to the hall where the Italian deputies were assembled, and delivered a speech which was little more than an echo of their own report, the said report having been but an echo of his own sentiments and wishes as made known to the Italians through Petiet, Talleyrand, and numerous other voices and agencies. He gave emphasis to the doctrine that Upper Italy could not yet be evacuated by the French armies which had liberated it: he told them that 66 they should still be protected by the strong arm of the first nation of Europe, and that, as he found no one among them who had sufficient claims to the chief magistracy, he was willing to assume the direction of their affairs, with the title of President, and to retain that office as long as circumstances should require." Through calculation the words "for life" were dropped; and he was only appointed president for ten years, especial care being, however, taken to enact and declare that at the end of that period he should be re-eligible. He was to appoint to all offices, civil or military; to have the power of peace and war; to transact all diplomatic business, &c. &c. He appointed Melzi d'Eril his vice-president, and gave his assent to a new constitution, which varied only in a few particulars from the last mockery of a constitution set up in France. The whole business was finished by the 26th of January, 1802.* It rendered the independent Cisalpine Republic a mere appendage of France; it was an infraction of the treaty of Luneville; and, if the Emperor of Germany had been in a condition to renew hostilities, the British cabinet would scarcely have carried the preliminaries of peace to a definitive treaty. The young Empe *Bourrienne, who attended the First Consul to Lyons, says, "Bonaparte, who was now ready to ascend the throne of France, wished to prepare the Italians for one day crowning him King of Italy, in imitation of Charlemagne, of whom, in anticipation, he considered himself the successor. He saw that the title of President of the Cisalpine Republic was a great advance towards the sovereignty of Lombardy, as he afterwards found that the consulate for life was a decisive step towards the throne of France. He obtained the title of President, without much difficulty, on the 26th of January. The journey to Lyons, and the conferences, were only matters of form; but high-sounding words and solemn proceedings had their effect on the public mind." ror of Russia, who had stipulated for a share in the settlement of Italy, was highly incensed; but he shrunk from the extreme measure of a rupture with Bonaparte, and was not in a state to do or attempt much except as a member of a new European coalition. Before the signatures were set to the treaty at Amiens other usurpations on the part of the First Consul, and other provocations most difficult to be endured by a proud nation, took place; but it was evident that the continental powers who had been our allies stood in need of repose, and it was determined at all hazards that England should try the not very honourable and not very safe experiment of a short peace. When the preliminaries were first announced to the imperial parliament which met in the autumn of 1801, the ex-minister Pitt assisted the Addington administration in defending what they had done and were doing. He said that, after the great coalitions had all been dissolved, nothing remained for us but to procure just and honourable conditions of peace for ourselves and the few allies who had not deserted us; that, as long as the peace was honourable, he should prefer accepting terms even short of what he thought the country entitled to, to risking the result of the negotiation by too obstinate an adherence to any particular point. On the contrary, his late colleagues Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham censured the conduct of the Addington administration as mean and pusillanimous, declared the preliminaries to be disgraceful, and a prolongation of the war, though singlehanded, and to any indefinite period, to be preferable to this insidious and insecure peace. Fox, with his party, now voted with Pitt and the Addingtons in approbation of the preliminaries; and, for some months, it was found that the minority which followed Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham in condemning the peace was even smaller than that which had sided for so many years with Mr. Fox in reprobating the war. In these first debates Lord Castlereagh expressed the decided sentiment of the majority in both Houses of parliament and in the country, when he said that this peace would at least try France, and that it was but fair to give her a trial. Some simple men and some enthusiasts there were, who fondly believed that the peace would be lasting, and that the First Consul, intent only on re-organizing France, and on seating himself on an hereditary but constitutional throne, would soon prove himself the best and surest ally of George III., the conservator of the tranquillity of the world and the promoter of all that most tended to civilize it. The number of these speculators was small; but their obstinacy or fatuity was excessively great, and not to be cured by experience or by anything which time and mortal fate could bring to bear upon the question. An opinion much more generally entertained was that, now that the Corsican consul had completely put down the French Jacobins-had scourged I them like hounds at fault-there was nothing to |