felt, and the advance thus made on his part, are entertained and met by the British government in a fia ilar fpirit.

You have been informed by Mr. Graham of what paffed in my late absence from the city, in an interview between Mr. Baker and him, in confequence of a dispatch from the Britifh government to Mr. Fofter, received at Halifax. juft before he sailed for England. and tranfmitted by him to Mr. Baker, relating to a propofed fufpenfion or repeal of the British orders in council. You will have feen by the note forwarded to you by Mr. Graham, of Mr. Baker's communication to him, that Mr. Foster bad authorised him to state, that the commanders of the British forces at Halifax would agree to a suspension, after a day to be fixed, of the condemnation of prizes to await the decision of both governments, without however preventing captures on either side. It appears also, that Mr. Foster had promised to communicate with Sir George Prevost, and to advise him to propose to cur government an armistice.

Sir George Prevost has since proposed to General Dearborn, at the suggestion of Mr. Foster, a suspension of offensive operations by land, in a letter which was transmitted by the General to the Secretary at war. A provisional agreement was entered into between General Dearborn and Col. Baynes, the British Adjutant General, bearer of General Prevost's letter, that neither party should act offensively, before the decision of our government should be taken on the subject.

Since my return to Washington, the document alluded to in Mr. Foster's dispatch, as finally decided on by the British government, has been handed to me by Mr. Baker, with a remark that its authenticity might be relied on. Mr. Baker added, that it was not improbable that the admiral at Halifax might agree likewise to a suspension of captures, though he did not profess or appear to be acquainted with his sentiments on that point.

On full consideration of all the circumstances which merit at. tention, the president regrets that it is not in his power to accede to the proposed arrangement. The following are among the principal reasons which have produced this decision.

1. The President has no power to suspend judicial proceedîngs on prizes. A capture, if lawful, vests a right over which he has no controul. Nor could he prevent captures otherwise than by an indiscriminate recall of the commissions granted to our privateers, which he could not justify under existing circum

stances.

2. The proposition is not made by the British government, nor is there any certainty that it would be approved by it. The proposed arrangement, if acceded to, might not be observed by the Bish officers themselves, if their government, in consequence of the war, should give them instructions of a different

character, even if they were given without a knowledge of the

arrangement.

3. No security is given, or proposed, as to the Indians, nor could any be relied on. They have engaged in the war on the side of the British government, and are now prosecuting it with vigor, in their usual savage mode. They can only be restrained by force, when once let loose, and that force has already been. ordered out for the purpose.

4. The proposition is not reciprocal; because it restrains the United States from acting where their power is greatest, and leaves Great Britain at liberty, and gives her time to augment her forces in our neighborhood.

5. That as a principal object of the war is to obtain redress against the British practice of impreffment, an agreement to fufpend hoftilities even before the Britifh government is heard from on that fubject, might be confidered a relinquifhment of that claim.

6. It is the more objectionable, and of the lefs importance, in confideration of the instructions heretofore given you, which, if met by the British government, may have already produced the fame refult in a greater extent and more fatisfactory form.

I might add, that the declaration itfelf is objectionable in many refpects, particularly the following:

1. Because it afferts a right in the British government to ref tore the orders in council or any part thereof, to their full effect on a principle of retaliation on France under circumstances of which fhe alone is to judge; a right which this government cannot admit, efpecially in the extent heretofore claimed, and acted on by the British government.

2. That the repeal is founded exclufively on the French decree of 28th April, 1811, by which the repeal of the decrees of Berlin and Milan, announced on the 5th August, 1810, to take effect on the 1ft of November of that year, at which time their operation actually ceafed, is difregarded, as are the claims of the United States arifing from the repeal on that day, even according to the British pledge.

3. That even if the United States had no right to claim the repeal of the British orders in council prior to the French decree of the 28th of April, 1811, nor before the notification of that decree to the British government on the 20th of May, of the prefent year, the British repeal ought to have borne dlate from that day, and been subject to none of the limitations attached to it.

These remarks on the declaration of the prince regent, which are not purfued with rigor, nor in the full extent which they might be, are applicable to it, in relation to the ftate of things which exifted before the determination of the United States to refift the aggreffions of the British government by war. By that determination the relations between the two countries VOL. II-No. 2.

DOCUMENTS.

have been altogether changed, and it is only by a termination of the war, or by measures leading to it by confent of both governments, that its calamities can be clofed or mitigated. It is not now a question whether the declaration of the Prince Regent is fuch as ought to have produced a repeal of the non-importation act, had war not been declared; becaufe by the dec laration of war, that question is fuperfeded, and the non-importation act having been continued in force by congrefs, and be. come a measure of war, and among the most efficient, it is no longer fubject to the control of the executive in the fenfe, and for the purpose for which it was adopted.

The declaration, however, of the Prince Regent, will not be without effect. By repealing the orders in council without reviving the blockade of May, 1806, or any other illegal blockade, as is underflood to be the cafe, it removes a great obftacie to an accommodation. The prefident confiders it an indication of a difpofition in the British government to accommodate the differences which fubfift between the countries, and I am inftructed to affure you, that if fuch difpofition really exifts, and is perfevered in, and is extended to other objects, especially the important one of impressment, a durable and happy peace and reconciliation cannot fail to refult from it."

Mr. Ruffell to the Secretary of State, inclofing a correspondence with Lord Caftlereagh, on the subject of anArmistice..

SIR,

Mr. Russell to Mr. Monroe.

London, September 1, 1812.

You will perceive by the inclofed copies of notes which have paffed between Lord Caftlereagh and me, that the moderate and equitable terms proposed for a fufpenfion of hoftilities, have been rejected, and that it is my intention to return immediately to the United States.

My continuance here, after it has been fo broadly intimated to me by his lordfhip that I am no longer acknowledged in my diplomatic capacity, and after a knowledge that instructions are given to the British admiral to negociate an arrangement on the other fide of the Atlantic, would, in my view of the fubject, not only be ufelefs but improper.

It is probable, however, that the veffel in which I propose to embark, will not take her departure before the 15th or 20th of this month.

I have the honor to be, with great confideration, Sir, your af fured and obedient fervant,

(Signed)

James Monroe, esq. &c.

JONA. RUSSELL.

Mr. Russell to Lord Castlereagh.

London, 24th August, 1812.

MY LORD, It is only neceffary, I truft, to call the attention of your lord-. fhip to a review of the conduct of the government of the United States, to prove incontrovertibly its unceafing anxiety to maintain the relations of peace and friendship with Great Britain. Its patience in fuffering the many wrongs which it has received, and its perfeverance in endeavoring by amicable means to obtain redrefs, are known to the world. Defpairing, at length, of receiving this redrefs from the juftice of the British government, to which it had so often applied in vain, and feeling that a further forbearance would be a virtual surrender of interests and rights effential to the prosperity and independence of the nation, confided to its protection, it has been compelled to discharge its high duty by an appeal to arms. While, however, it regards this courfe as the only one which remained for it to purfue with a hope of preferving any portion of that kind of character which conftitures the vital ftrength of every nation, yet it is ftill willing to give another proof of the fpirit which has uniformly diftinguifhed its proceedings, by feeking to an eft, on terms conIt has, fiftent with juftice and honor, the calamities of war. therefore, authorized me to ftipulate with his Britanic majesty's tion of 60 days after the fignature of the inftrument proving government an armiftice, to commence at or before the expirafor it, on condition that the orders in council be repealed, anu no illegal blockades be fubftituted to them, and that orders be immediately given to difcontinue the impreffment of perfons from American veffels, and to restore the citizens of the United States already impreffed; it being moreover well understood that the British government will affent to enter into definitive arrangements, as foon as may be, on thefe and every other dif. ference, by a treaty to be concluded either at London or Wafh ington, as, on an impartial confideration of exifting circumftances. fhall be deemed moft expedient.

As an inducement to Great Britain to discontinue the practice of impreffment from American veffels, I am authorized to give affurance that a law fhall be paffed (to be reciprocal) to prohibit the employment of British feamen in the public or commercial fervice of the United States.

It is fincerely believed that fuch an arrangement would prove more efficacious in fecuring to Great Britain her feamen than the practice of impreffment, fo derogatory to the fovereign attributes of the United States, and fo incompatible with the perfonal rights of their citizens.

Your lordship will not be furprised that I have prefented the revocation of the orders in council as a preliminary to the fufpention of hoftilities, when it is confidered that the act of the

British government of the 23d of June laft, ordaining that revocation, is predicated on conditions, the performance of which is rendered impracticable by the change which is fince known to have occurred in the relations between the two countries. It cannot now be expected that the government of the United States will, immediately on due notice of that act, revoke, or caufe to be revoked, its acts, excluding from the waters and harbors of the United States all British armed veffels, and interdicting commercial intercourfe with Great Britain. Such a procedure would neceffarily involve confequences too unreafonable and extravagant to be, for a moment, prefumed. The order in council of the 23d of June laft will, therefore, according to its own terms, be null and of no effect, and a new act of the British government, adapted to exifting circumftances, is obviously required for the effectual repeal of the orders in council, of which the United States complain.

The government of the United States confiders indemnity for injuries received under the orders in council, and other edicts, violating the rights of the American nation, to be incident to their repeal, and it believes that fatisfactory provision will be made in the definitive treaty, to be hereafter negociated, for this purpose.

The conditions now offered to the British government for the termination of the war by an armiftice, as above flated, are fo moderate and juft in themselves, and fo entirely confiftent with its intereft and honor, that a confident hope is indulged, that it will not hefitate to accept them. In fo doing, it will abandon no right, it will facrifice no intereft; it will abftain only from violating the rights of the United States, and, in return, it will reftore peace with the power, from whom, in a friendly commercial intercourfe, fo many advantages are to be derived.

Your lordfhip is undoubtedly aware of the ferious difficulties with which a profecution of the war, even for a fhort period, muft neceffarily embarrafs all future attempts at accommodation. Paffions exafperated by injuries-alliances or conquefts on terms which forbid their abandonment, will inevitably hereafter embitter and protract a conteft which might now be fo eafily and happily terminated.

Deeply impreffed with thefe truths, I cannot but perfuade myfelf that his royal highnefs, the prince regent, will take into his early confideration the propofitions, herein made on behalf of the United States, and decide on them in a spirit of conciliation and juftice.

I have the honor to be, with high confideration, my lord, your lordship's most obedient le vant,

(Signed)

JONATHAN RUSSELL.