lant, Martin Costello, a deed purporting to convey all his right, title, and interest, described as "being an undivided one-half interest" in and to the mining claims in controversy. Upon the trial the appellant objected to the introduction of the power of attorney given by Greene to English upon the ground that it was not acknowledged as required by our statute. The action of the court in overruling his objection. and admitting the power of attorney in evidence is the basis of the first error assigned by the appellant. By an act of the legislature, approved March 18, 1903, (Laws 1903, p. 56, No. 37,) it was provided "that all defective acknowledgments to conveyance of real estate heretofore made and recorded in the recorder's office of any county of this territory are hereby declared to be valid, provided said acknowledgments were valid according to the laws of the place where they were executed; provided, however, that nothing in this act shall be deemed to affect the competency of any such conveyance as evidence in any suit or other proceeding now pending in any of the courts of the territory." It will be noted that the power of attorney and the conveyances made by Greene to the grantors of appellees were prior to the date when the said act took effect. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the acknowledgment made to the power of attorney by the Massachusetts notary was valid under the laws of that state. The form of acknowledgment used by the notary appears to have been the one in use and sanctioned by the Massachusetts statutes prior to 1894. Pub. Stats. Mass. 1882, chap. 120. In that year the legislature of that state adopted another form of acknowledgment, and provided in the statute that "either the form of acknowledgment now in use in this state or the following may be used in the case of conveyances or other written instruments." Pub. Stats. Mass. 1894, chap. 253, p. 243. It further appears that by the Revised Statutes of Massachusetts which took effect in January, 1902, another form than that provided by the Statutes of 1894 was adopted, but in this revision it was provided that "any conveyance or other written instrument might be acknowledged in any form and manner theretofore lawfully used." Rev. Laws Mass. p. 1225. It appears, therefore, that the acknowledgment to the power of attorney was in accord with the laws of Massachusetts, and any defect in its form under our statutes became cured by the provisions of said act of March 18, 1903. The court found that at the time of the conveyance from Greene, by English, his attorney in fact, to the grantors of appellees, that the legal title to the mining claims was in Greene, but that Reilly, under the verbal agreement heretofore mentioned, was the equitable owner of an undivided one-half interest. Upon the trial certain letters from Greene to Reilly were admitted in evidence, over the objection of the appellant, tending to establish this equitable title in Reilly by the admissions of Greene. An examination of these letters shows that Greene did therein acknowledge Reilly's interest in the claims, and treated him as an equal owner with him in the property. They were competent as evidence to establish the ownership of an equitable interest in the claims by Reilly. It is contended by appellant that the deed from Greene, by his attorney in fact, English, to De Rhodes, was a conveyance of an undivided one-half interest, and no more, and that, notwithstanding it purported to be a conveyance of all his right, title, and interest, the qualifying words, "being an undivided one-half," limited the grant to a conveyance of a half interest only. There is abundant authority to sustain the proposition that such a conveyance is in fact a conveyance of the whole interest owned by the grantor, and that a qualifying clause of similar import to the one in question is not to be construed as limiting the general clause of the grant and of excepting from the conveyance any part of the interest held by the grantor. Wilcoxson v. Sprague, 51 Cal. 640; McLennan v. McDonnell, 78 Cal. 273, 20 Pac. 566; Hobbs v. Payson, 85 Me. 498, 27 Atl. 519. Even were this not the law, and the deed were to be construed as a conveyance of an undivided one-half interest in the mining claims by Greene, the declaration made by Greene in the deed must be construed as importing notice to subsequent purchasers that there was an undivided one-half interest outstanding, and not claimed by him. The effect of this would be to charge the appellant with notice of such outstanding interest at the time. he obtained his conveyance from Greene. He was not, therefore, an innocent purchaser, being charged with the notice of the equitable interest held by Reilly. De Cordova v. Hood, 17 Wall. 1, 21 L. Ed. 587; Brush v. Ware, 15 Pet. 93, 10 L. Ed. 672. The finding of the court that the appellees, through their conveyances from the grantees of Greene and their purchase of the equitable interest owned by Reilly, became the sole owners of the claims, is fully sustained by the proof, and we find no error in the record. The judgment of the court, based upon such finding, must be affirmed, and it is so ordered. KENT, C. J., and DAVIS, J., concur. . [Criminal No. 193. Filed March 30, 1905.] WILLIAM DAVIS, Defendant and Appellant, v. TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, Plaintiff and Respondent. 1. CRIMINAL LAW GRAND LARCENY EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY.-Evidence reviewed and held sufficient to sustain a conviction for grand larceny. APPEAL from a judgment of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in and for the County of Coconino. R. E. Sloan, Judge. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. George W. Glowner, for Appellant. J. H. Kibbey, Attorney-General, for Respondent. DOAN, J.-The appellant was convicted in the district court of Coconino County on the eighteenth day of April, 1904, of the crime of grand larceny charged to have been committed by the theft of four certain horses (described in the indictment), the property of Godfrey Sykes and Stanley Sykes. A motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence was overruled, and an appeal taken from such order and from the judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence that followed. The appellant's brief presents no assignments of error as required by the rules of this court, but the argument of counsel for appellant is based entirely upon the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict of conviction, and consists of a review of the evidence and a criticism of the witnesses who testified for the prosecution. The owner of the horses testified that they ranged on the mesa immediately north of Flagstaff, and within two miles of that town. One witness testified that on the day the defendant was arrested he saw the horses with whose theft the defendant is charged at about one o'clock in the afternoon, about a mile and a half north of town; that he recognized the horses, could identify them at the distance from which he saw them, and was well acquainted with two of the four head in question; that at the time he saw them they were being led by a man in a northerly direction-two of them were being led tied head to tail behind each other, and the other two were following loose. The two officers who arrested the defendant after dark on that night at a ranch on the mountain-side about six miles north of this place testified that he came in near the corral after dark, and tied the horses to a tree, and while attempting to catch another horse-presumably one of his own-they arrested him; that at the time of his arrest he exclaimed: "You got me just at the right time. I would not have been here tomorrow night." The officers had been sent out to arrest the defendant on an indictment for another offense. They went to this ranch for that purpose, just after dark, and shortly after their arrival the defendant came down the mountainside riding one of these horses anl leading the others. The horses, except one that was following, were all tied the head of one to the other's tail, as stockmen tie horses "head and tail" for leading purposes. After his arrest the defendant stated first that these were his horses, and afterwards that they belonged to one Bob Clauson, except the white horsethe one he was endeavoring to catch at the time of his arrest -and this he said belonged to him. The horses were identified at the trial by the owner, Godfrey Sykes, and by other witnesses who knew them. It is difficult to understand on what the appellant could base any hope of securing a reversal by an appellate court on the ground of want of evidence, after a verdict of guilty has been returned by a trial jury upon the consideration of the evidence presented in this record. The evidence is abundantly sufficient to sustain the verdict. of the jury, and the judgment of the lower court is therefore affirmed. KENT, C. J., and DAVIS, J., concur. [Criminal No. 189. Filed March 30, 1905.] E. FIGUERO, Defendant and Appellant, v. TERRITOLY OF ARIZONA, Plaintiff and Respondent. 1. APPEAL AND ERROR-CRIMINAL LAW-APPEAL NO APPEARANCE ENTERED MAY NOT BE DISMISSED. In a criminal case, where appeal has been taken, and no appearance entered by counsel for appellant, although such practice is reprehensible, the appeal may not be dismissed, but must be considered. APPEAL from a judgment of the District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for the County of Cochise. Fletcher M. Doan, Judge. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. No appearance for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent. THE COURT.-This is one of a number of criminal cases which we find before us at this term of court, where defendant's counsel in the court below have seen fit to take an appeal and cause the transcript on appeal to be prepared and certified to this court at the expense of the county upon affidavit that the defendant was unable to pay for the same, and thereafter have abandoned all further steps in the appeal, and have entered no appearance nor filed any brief in this court. Such appeal, when no grounds known to counsel exist for a reversal of the judgment, is a useless expense to the county, and can |