gentlemen who are in control of the company, for long before the incorporation of the company, have been in full possession of all the facts. The Arizona Company knew that the Phoenix Company staked upon the ground a definite surveyed course over the disputed strip; that it purchased private lands lying on the way; that it actually crossed from the south side to the north side of the river and commenced there the construction of its roadbed. The Arizona Company cannot profess to have acquired any rights prior to the time when the Phoenix Company actually passed from the south side and began construction on the north side, nor can it profess to have been misled by the state of the records in the department of the interior. If the United States cannot and does not complain, there is no foundation for the Arizona Company to do so. Washington and I. Ry. Co. v. Cœur d'Alene Ry., supra. We conclude, therefore, that no relief should have been afforded the Arizona Company in this suit; that the only relief granted should have been by way of an order temporarily restraining the Arizona Company from interfering with the Phoenix Company in the occupancy of the strip in controversy pending the disposition of the controversy before the secretary of the interior and pending further order of the court. For these reasons, the judgment is reversed, and judgment will be entered in this court granting a temporary restraining order in favor of the appellant and against the appellee as indicated in this opinion; such order to be subject to modification or dissolution by the district court, or the judge thereof, should a change in the situation make such modification or dissolution necessary or proper. KENT, C. J., SLOAN, J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur. INDEX. ABANDONMENT. See Mines and Mining, 17. ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL. See Appeal and Error, 1. ABSTRACTS. Failure to file, ground for dismissal. See Appeal and Error, 2. ACKNOWLEDGMENT. 1. ACKNOWLEDGMENT-VALIDITY-LAWS ARIZ. 1903, P. 56, No. 37, ConSTRUED. Where a power of attorney was executed in Massachusetts in 1902, and the form of acknowledgment was sufficient under the laws of that state, the defect in form under our statutes became cured by the provisions of the act, supra. (Costello v. Graham, 257.) 2. SAME-SAME CHAPTER 120 OF THE PUBLIC STATUTES OF MASSACHUSETTS OF 1882, CHAPTER 253 (P. 243) OF THE STATUTES OF MASSACHUSETTS OF 1894, AND THE REVISED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS (P. 1225) CONSTRUED.-Where the form of acknowledgment used was sanctioned by chapter 120, supra, and in 1894 the legislature adopted another form, but provided that "either the form of acknowledgment now in use in this state or the following may be used," chapter 253, supra, and the Revised Laws of Massachusetts (p. 1225, supra) provided that "any conveyance or other written instrument might be acknowledged in any form and manner theretofore lawfully used," such form is proper. (Costello v. Graham, 257.) ACTION TO QUIET TITLE. See Mines and Mining, 20. ADVERSE. See Mines and Mining, 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9. ADVERSE POSSESSION. See Mines and Mining, 6, 7; Vendor and Purchaser, 2. AFFIRMANCE. By divided court. See Appeal and Error, 12. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. See Criminal Law, 22, 23. AMENDMENTS. When do not relate back. See Limitations, 1; Mines and Mining, 9. See Statutes, 9, 10. (451) |