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Mr. BUCKLEY. I think you put your finger right on the problem, Senator. It is perfectly comprehensible to anyone to say we must subordinate all other matters to that of maintaining the peace. This makes sense eren to morally evangelistic people. It does not make sense to say, although we are subordinating all other policies to the achievement of peace, we are also willing to endorse a corruption of the vocabulary by which freedom is pursued. Under the circumstances, either the U.N., our delegates, ought to be free to reply vigorously to the Soviet Union when the matter of human rights is raised, or we ought to decline to participate in those discussions at all, which at least would symbolize our refusal to cooperate in travesty in which we are now engaged, where we are allowed to talk only about the violation of human rights in South Africa, Israel, and while I was there, Portugal. Senator PERCY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark. Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.


The first question to Professor Dallin. Do you believe that the Soviet boycott of the Security Council in the early 1950's proved to be in the national interest of the Soviet Union?

Mr. DALLIN. No, sir, I don't believe it did. In fact the Soviet Union abandoned it ultimately. The price it paid when its representative was absent when the decision was taken on intervention in Korea, in June 1950, and as a result the Soviet Union was not able to exercise its veto. Hence, to boycott is to abandon the U.N. to the other side, and I think the Soviet Union has learned that.

Senator CLARK. Ambassador Goldberg has suggested that we should advise the members of the United Nations that if Israel is suspended from the General Assembly the United States would voluntarily suspend itself from the Assembly.

Do you see any comparisons between those two actions—is there any thing to be learned from the Soviet mistake, or are the two unrelated ?

Mr. DALLIN. I think the situation would be different in the sense that we are dealing with the General Assembly rather than the Security Council in this instauce. I think that a threat of American withdrawal or temporary absence could be effective under certain circumstances. I would think if used frequently it would obviously lose an awful lot of its potential impact. I think it should be reserved for very extreme instances. By and large, it seems to me, the experience is that it's far better to stay right in there and if necessary to argue it out and, if necessary, learn to lose on some occasions. I think there are probably extreme issues: if it came to the expulsion of Israel, I think this is something that would need to be considered seriously. I think it's ultimately a question of tactics and not principle, but it is something I believe should be considered.

Senator CLARK. Another question for you first and then Mr. Buckley.


Many of the witnesses that have been here in the last several days have recommended that the United Nations become more of a central forum for the conduct of American foreign policy, that we go through the United Nations more often. Chairman Fulbright testified that he thought we should have been going through the U.N. much more with regard to the Middle East situation, and he mentioned some other examples. Senator Symington, who with Senator Percy was at the U.N. last year, recommended that we operate more through the U.N. A good many of the witnesses have said the same thing.

Do you agree? Do you think we use the U.N. too much or too little as a forum for our foreign policy?

Mr. DALLIN. Well, in terms of the relationship with the Soviet Union, which is my primary area of acquaintance, I would say that there is not an awful lot more that can be done through the U.N. I believe the U.N. is fairly secondary as an arena. As far as other areas are concerned, I believe it is quite possible to step up American involvement if it is presented on the basis of reciprocity. If the Soviet Union were to channel more of its economic and technical assistance to other areas through the U.N., the United States should be seriously prepared to consider doing the same.

Senator CLARK. Why couldn't we do it in any case, through the World Bank and other multilateral programs, even if the U.S.S.R. doesn't?

Mr. DALLIN. Certainly it is desirable in itself. The unfortunate fact, as you know, is that both sides, all sides, use assistance of all forms for political purposes, an objective that would be lost by channelling it through the U.N.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Buckley.


Mr. BUCKLEY. Well, sir, I think that our participation in the General Assembly ought to be limited to participation in the debate. We should never vote in the General Assembly because by voting we implicitly grant a certain authority to majority. Which we ought not to do for reasons practical and ethical. Under the circumstances, that I think is the crucial and easiest reform that might be made. Always debate, always exchange information, entering into the spirit of the thing but never vote.

Senator CLARK. Do you agree with Harlan Cleveland's article in the New York Times a couple of weeks ago when he talked about this problem?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I didn't see it,

Senator CLARK. He talked a good deal about the same question saying we ought to work for consensus in the General Assembly rather than having votes.

Mr. BUCKLEY. That seems to me to make sense. As regards to using the mechanical facilities of the U.N. I am very much in favor of it.

We have to recognize that they usually don't work if they run up against political questions.

For instance, the antihijacking covenant failed in the U.N. because we couldn't get the Third World on account of the Israeli question to


cooperate. So we went to Japan and did one covering these nations and went to Canada and one covering this hemisphere and we got about 85 percent of the countries in the world involved on the basis of bilateral exertion. But I think to the extent that the U.N. adapts itself for the purpose of common good we should go ahead and use it, but we should be very, very cautious, I think, about implicitly endorsing the General Assembly as a moral legislative authority.


Senator CLARK. Do you feel, Mr. Buckley, that the action taken by the General Assembly, in suspending South Africa was a violation of the Charter ?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Oh, clearly it was a violation of the Charter because only the Security Council can expel a member, and this was a de facto expulsion. Of what use is your General Assembly if you are not allowed to speak? Granted every time they spoke everybody left the room and granted nobody listens to anything in the General Assembly, but still there is that formalistic right.

Senator CLARK. Sounds a little like the Senate.

Tell me, do you believe the implementation of the Byrd amendment was a violation of the Charter?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I certainly do not, and I think that Dean Acheson's brief on the subject remains definitive.

Senator CLARK. You feel that was perfectly consistent with our staying in the U.N.?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Yes, I do.

Senator CLARK. And you would recommend, would you, to the Congress that that position be maintained !

Mr. BUCKLEY. I would with this qualification. It seems to be plain whatever is going on in Rhodesia is not a threat to the world peace, and, therefore, did not legitimately call up the sanctions that were imposed by the Security Council. At the same time I recognize that we in our dealings with Great Britain attempt to make common cause, and if I were myself a senator I would take the qualification in mind in deciding for or against the Byrd amendment, but I would not be governed exclusively and appeal to the fidelity to the Security Council resolution which in my judgment was based on an entirely illusory threat to the peace of the world.

Senator CLARK. Let me ask you one more question, then ask Professor Dallin to comment on it as well. I think my time will be up



As you look, Mr. Buckley, toward the next session of the General Assembly, do you think that our Government should be prepared with any positive proposals with regard to the world economic situation or Southern Africa, for example What could we do of a positive nature, in your judgment, that would be beneficial to our interests and perhaps those of the world in the General Assembly?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I should think what Senator Percy and I probably would agree to call the Moynihan approach is very definitely in order. It is an approach that is best described as saying that the United States has not only the right but duty to argue its own ideals and its own self-interest. The notion that we entered the U.N. in order to facilitate the redirection of wealth is something of which too many of our authors have encouraged without by any means a clear plebiscite. In this incidentally we would find ourselves making common cause with Soviet Union, which is always thought it hilarious that anybody should go to the U.N. for the purpose of sharing Soviet wealth.

Senator CLARK. You would not make my specific economic proposals or proposals regarding South Africa in the next session; you don't have any particular proposals to make ?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I think, Senator, there are really ultra vires because the U.N. has no economic authority.

Senator CLARK. Except to pass resolutions.

Mr. BUCKLEY. They can pass resolutions, but those resolutions ought to be labeled as being as empty as in fact they are. A grand resolution to the effect that United States ought to give away a third of its grain harvest, at no cost, to countries that are short of grain is meaningless and ought not to be encouraged. To the extent that our delegates have even doubled it by suggesting that these resolutions have force, then I think you are correct, if I understand you, that they should instantly bring the U.N. back to reality on the question.

Senator CLARK. Professor Dallin.

Mr. DALLIN. I believe the United States should be selective about the issues about which its delegation chooses to speak out, as Mr. Buckley referred to a moment ago. I think there are cases certainly where principles, even on details, need to be affirmed, say, if the U.N. book store does not keep a Solzhenitsyn book as a matter of censorship, obviously this is the kind of detail that need not be tolerated.

On the other hand, we know from the reaction to Soviet and Chinese speeches how easy it is to antagonize other countries and often quite unnecessarily, by loud language that serves no purpose other than to satisfy one's own ego and one's audience back home. That is not effective in persuading others, which after all is the primary purpose of operating at the U.N.

I think we should have no illusions that on human rights the U.N. has not done much and will not do much. I think the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a good and worthy document to have. In fact, even dissidents within the Soviet Union do appeal to it, refer to it in some of their own statements. But just as I think, most people in this country would not want the U.N. to intervene to repair real or imaginary abuses of human rights, so other countries, too, can be expected to take such a position, and I believe that it is futile to expect great success.

It seems to me also that, either we accept the U.N. as an institution or we don't, and we don't play games like participating but not voting, not voting when we expect to lose. When somebody else does that kind of thing we react to it most negatively. Unfortunately when it comes to positive proposals, I think most of those that I could think of as desirable would clearly not be acceptable by the majority of the U.N. at the present time. Therefore, I am not the best person to suggest any concrete measures.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will not ask any questions now.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Baker, do you want to ask some questions?


Senator BAKER. One or two general questions, if I may. I apologize to the witnesses for not being here at the beginning of their testimony. But even so I can't resist the temptation to ask you questions, even though general, that may already have been put.

I recall that when the Charter was first published, it was loudly proclaimed as an instrument for preserving the peace. It was clear to me, however, that the institutional arrangement was not calculated to preserve the peace, because there was no authority, there were no armed forces, there was not the might with which the peace could be kept. Rather it was a consortium authority to keep the peace.

I wonder if either or both of you can tell me whether you agree with that concept or not, and what effect, if any, America's unfolding new foreign policy, referred to today as detente, has had on that concept?

Mr. DALLIN. Yes; I think I would agree that that is generally correct. The U.N. can act in defense of peace or to secure peace when the major powers are in agreement. Even then, of course, there has been considerable difficulty in agreeing, as in the case of the Congo or Middle East, who should control peacekeeping forces, and the Soviet Union has been most adamant that the Security Council should have operational control-in other words, that the Soviet Union should be in a position to interpose a veto at any time it doesn't like the use of such forces—not the Secretary General as had previously been tried.

That of course limits the possible activity of such peacekeeping forces, and, when it comes to conflict among the major powers, the U.N. is powerless other than as intermediary or broker. Of course it was not intended to resolve that kind of conflict to begin with; it began with the assumption of agreement among the permanent members.

Senator BAKER. That is not quite the question.

What I am trying to say is that in the absence of a peacekeeping force on a permanent basis, the only authority for peacekeeping that the U.N. has, is the agreement of the major powers of the world. Today our effort at détente involves primarily the Soviet Union and infrequently at least the People's Republic of China. To what extent has that short-circuited the original U.N. peacekeeping concept and put something else in its place?

Mr. DALLIN. I believe it has not fundamentally changed the situation in which the U.N. has not had any permanent peacekeeping forces except in those special occasions where the powers have agreed on it. Détente may have facilitated that it has the present Middle Eastern arrangement in October-November 1973: at least that is the Soviet claim. They claim that it would have been harder to have arrived at that solution in the days of the cold war. Perhaps so. It does make a slight Soviet departure with regard to peacekeeping forces, but, fundamentally, I think, you are entirely correct, sir.

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