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resolutions some of which, while they may have no means of practical implementation, can reenforce the emotional bonds among the populist coalition and spotlight the isolated position of the United States at the same time.

The Arab countries have played upon the populist coalition to good effect for their own causes. They have identified themselves with the populist coalition, and this has allowed them to swing that coalition in back of their vendetta against Israel.

China has tried to effect a similar mobilization of the populists to its side in its conflicts with the Soviet Union but with less success than the Arabs, because the Soviet Union itself usually takes every opportunity to vote with the populist coalition.


Now I am not most concerned with the fact of international populism, which I believe is a historically inevitable reaction to the dismantling of colonial empires, to the enfranchisement of people internationally who have not had a right even to express themselves, but I am most concerned rather, with the wholly inadequate responses to it, thus far, by this country. The responses to it by this country, thus far, indicate a pessimistic attitude, a withdrawal in a sense from what is really happening in the international system.

There is an exception. Ambassador Moynihan thinks he has found an appropriate response to the third and fourth world militancy which find its most expression in U.N. forums today. Moynihan traces this militancy to the Fabian socialist ideology of former British subjects who are now leaders of some of these new states. He would do just as well to blame the militancy in the former French colonies, on the French Jacobins, and radical nationalists in Latin America on Simon Bolivar. Woodrow Wilson should also be given some of the credit for the rise of this international militancy.

Moynihan's prescription presented in the "Commentary” article of March 1975, which I am sure many of you have read, is to stop appeasing the third and fourth world ideologues, and to go into opposition.

With what? Well, with a kind of a pudding of Burkean political conservatism to counter the new Jacobins and economic liberalism, ala Adam Smith, to combat the egalitarian state socialism of the new Fabians.

If only we could overcome this U.N. crisis by debate and ideological confrontation in the General Assembly; but the U.N. crisis has its sources in the structural upheavals of world society. Perhaps we can find the guide for constructively responding to these structural upheavals which are the source of the new international populism by looking to our own domestic experience with analogous pressures. After all, instead of Jacobinism or monarchical restoration we produced Jeffersonianism. The bitter populism in the late 19th century which threatened to tear apart our civil society was supplanted by the progressivism of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Again, the New Deal was the progressive response to the great world depression of the 1930's, which otherwise might have left the society polarized, as so many societies were, between the Marxist than Leninists and the Fascists.

The essence of the American response, the American progressive response, to populist militism, has been, first, increased accountability of the priviliged and the powerful to wider public interest and institutionalization of such increased accountability. That was the first part of the American response. Second, allowing greater participation by the otherwise alienated in the processes of politics and government.


I believe that an equally progressive response to the new international populism could build on the American democratic experience. The hallmarks of such a response would be U.S. open support for strengthened norms and processes of international accountability, and support for greater participation by the developing countries in important international negotiations and institutions.

A posture of international progressivism would mean that the United States would commit itself internationally to the basic ethical principle of progressivism in our own society, to the principle that those whose action substantially effect others should accord the affected parties a role in the decision processes related to the actions. As a principle, this would obligate governments, and international institutions, to consult with those whom they effect. A fuller implementation would accord the affected parties decisionmaking weight corresponding to the degree to which they are affected. We should demand this kind of international accountability from others, too. Certainly from the OPEC nations who are not acting in a way that is accountable to those whom they affect. But we have to be willing, I suggest, to take the first steps. To demand that the OPEC countries act in accord with the principles of international accountability now that their oil pricing policies substantially effect the U.S. economy is only to invite the outraged retort of the Venezuelan President: Where were you when we were screaming about the price of your industrial exports?

Understandably, others can now accuse us of saying what is mine, what is yours is international.

Now, our present ambassador to the U.N. flails out against the tyranny of the majority; but have we, when we were in the majority, refrained from imposing our will on strongly motivated minorities?

Our top foreign policy officials worry most today about the loss of U.S. credibility. How about the credibility of the U.S. commitments to international processes of dispute resolution and peaceful change? The threats to U.S. security posed by a general deterioration of international order, by a lack of international accountability in today's world, these threats are more real and loom larger in the years ahead than any fantasy of falling dominos.

The threat to the U.N. is only a part of the general crisis in the international system. The international populists are able to exploit this crisis because of the vacuum in progressive leadership by countries like the United States.

A U.S. posture of progressive international accountability, has implications, of course, beyond the way we might conduct ourself in U.N. debates. There are numerous practical applications in a variety of fields. A few examples:

International accountability would mean that despite the sluggish pace of the negotiations on the law of the sea, the United States would refrain from unilateral extension of its coastal zone and from unilateral authorizations of its corporations to exploit the sea bed before the establishment of an international regime. The Congress, of course, must play a crucial role in resisting the pressures of special interests.

If we were serious about international accountability, if we were really as serious about world community, as Secretary Kissinger says we are, we would enter into serious negotiations to develop a comprehensive international system for protecting commodity producers and consumers from damaging fluctuations in prices. Now on the basis of Secretary Kissinger's Kansas City speech it appears that the U.S. Government is making some moves in the direction of accepting the legitimacy at least of a comprehensive negotiation on commodities.


Senator Case. In respect of Law of the Sea Conference, our Government is far ahead of American opinion. I want to say this again. Our Government, this administration, is far ahead of American opinion, which would extend American unilateral domination not only for fisheries but also for exploration of the seabed, far beyond that which our Government has been trying to work out.

So I want to indicate that I think you ought to be fair about this because you are not talking about a few selfish interests, you are talking about a generality of American opinion. I believe this very deeply because I have been subject to considerable pressure. I have tried to restrain American action in exploiting these things until we could see if we could get an international agreement.

Mr. Brown. I would like to discuss this with you further during the discussion period.

Senator CASE. The only reason I interrupted, I have to leave at 11 o'clock to go to a conference and I did want to make that point here.

Mr. Brown. May I, however, just pose a rhetorical question to you, which maybe we can pick up in the discussion, and that is how do we know what American opinion really is?

Senator CASE. You ask a politician if you want to know what American opinion is.

Mr. Brown. I understand. But it is an articulate organized opinion. Organized and articulate opinion is one kind of opinion. Opinion that is created by any consistent, new vision is another kind of opinion, and what I am suggesting here

Senator CASE. I might say that is inchoate opinion.

Mr. Brown. Yes, but who makes choate? The pressure groups, the special interests, those who represent the public?

Senator CASE. I do not disagree with you. We ought to be striving to be better. But this is not opinion now.

Mr. Brown. Granted. What we are trying to do partially today is create an understanding of why a different approach toward the

law of the sea is so essential. It is in the self-interest of some of the very groups I think are misguided in believing that a dividing up of the sea is going to be in their interest. I would

like, if we could, I am sorry that you are leaving at 11 o'clock, because that is a favorite topic of mine.

Senator Case. We have no argument about it, but I can tell you fishermen off the New Jersey coast have very clear ideas of what their interests are.

Mr. BROWN. I am sure they do.
Senator CASE. And Massachusetts.
Mr. Brown. What their perceived interests are.
Senator CASE. And Connecticut.
Senator PERCY. But not Illinois.
Mr. BROWN. And in San Diego they differ from the east coast.


If we were serious also about international accountability in the ecology field, we would take the lead in supporting obligatory international consultations by any country or corporation contemplating projects that might alter natural environments used in common with other countries. These consultations ought not simply to be between corporations and the U.S. government when the corporations want to drill for oil in the Gulf of Mexico, but they ought to be obligatory international consultations. There also should be consultations about other kinds of projects which we can talk about, future projects, such as weather modification.


With respect to multinational corporations, if we were serious about international accountability, really serious about world opinion, I believe the United States would champion international regulation of the behavior of multinationals to assure that they do not take unfair advantage of weak national governments and weak national labor movements, to balance our insistence that there be due process and just compensation by countries who take over our multinational corporation subsidiaries.

If we were taking a progressive international stance, I suggest the United States would support broadening opportunities for developing countries to participate in the decision processes of international financial institutions, of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.


What we should be particularly anxious to avoid is an emotional polarization of world society along north-south lines. This polarization is inconsistent with the sense of basic community that is the precondition for the international accountability that is needed. For the United States to fall into the trap of polarization set by demagogic populists, would be against U.S. interests and against the world interest. This is my main argument against the current sulking tone of U.S. official response to the populists, and to suggestions the United States should come out swinging against them.

Now what about the support of the American people for such a progressive internationalism? What about Senator Case's concern that you have to get domestic public opinion behind these idealistic sounding notions?

Senator Case. Take away the demagogic populists and turn them into benign populists.

Mr. Brown. How do we do that? I would suggest that we do not do it by debating with them or falling into the trap of regard ing the U.N. as a debating society. There is more to the U.N. than that.

We have to be very careful that we do not allow them to develop the U.N. forum into polarized coalitions, with the United States leading one coalition, which will be the minority coalition, and the populists leading the other. How do we do it? I think we do it by practical measures in which we identify our concerns with theirs.


Now, what about public opinion?

It is always difficult and probably wrong to look at public opinion polls as a real guide, and I do agree with the Senator that an elected official is the best judge of public opinion.

Senator CASE. He had better be.

Mr. BROWN. Yes. There is this inchoate public opinion which we were talking about; and some indications of what that might be for some of the policies that I am recommending here can be gleaned from a very interesting publication of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the Lou Harris Associates published just about a month ago. I summarized some of the results in my prepared statement, which you have. It does show quite high support for fostering international cooperation to solve common problems. The goal of strengthening the U.N., despite all of the despair, still has considerable support, rather surprising support. The pertinent figures are in my prepared presentation.

Now, of course, these polls are an insufficient guide to policy. They inadequately probe for the tough tradeoffs which are the essence of policymaking

Ask Americans whether they are in favor of interdependence and international cooperation and they will answer, “Yes.” Ask them whether they are for preserving U.S. independence, they will answer, “Yes.” The tough question involved in a lot of these fields we are talking about, is how much independence to give up in specific fields in order to respond to the needs of an interdependent world. For surely we cannot avoid the fact that by agreeing to respect and enlarge international decision processes, we are in some fields likely to limit our freedom of action, just as a complete insistence on freedom of action will tend to limit our effectiveness in international forums. But to make such tradeoffs is precisely, I would suggest, the role of statesmanshin-legislative statesmanship as well as executive.

Public opinion is inert when it comes to generating the real policy

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