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The lesson, of course, is that sound economic relationships tend to create sound political relations as well.

This is not to say that our policy in Europe has been a thorough-going success in every respect. But it has at least worked well enough in Europe to serve as a contrast with our policies in Asia. The attempt to fill the power vacuum of IndoChina after the departure of the French in the mid-fifties has led in a straight line to the most serious disasters in the history of United States foreign policy.

By and large, the theory of security through a balance of power, whatever its prominence in history going all the way back to the ancient Greeks, has become obsolete in the modern world. The theory had its natural setting in constricted areas, but it tends to lose workability in direct ratio to the distance from the center. No națion has the capacity—and this applies as much to the Soviet Union as it does to the United States—to undertake and maintain economic, political, and military commitments on a world scale.

The third assumption, closely related to the second, was that the United States could advance its security by building twin regional anchors of military security through NATO and SEATO. Neither arrangement gave us what we were looking for. Whatever NATO may have done for the European nations themselves, it has had little to offer the United States at times of its own critical need. NATO did not spring into action on the side of the United States during the two major Berlin crises, nor did the U.S. receive physical or moral support from our NATO allies during the Cuban missile crisis. SEATO was not an operational fact of any benefit to the United States during the Vietnam War. The historical record with respect to NATO and SEATO would have to be that our expectations were far higher than the prospects warranted or that the course of events endorsed.

The fourth assumption was that we could find security by staying ahead in the arms race. The United States and the Soviet Union ten years ago passed the point at which they could annihilate one another. The explosive power of our bombs and the versatility of the delivery system have reached their apex, but there has been no corresponding increase in security for either party. Indeed, there is less security for both parties in view of all the possibilities of accident or miscalculation that could come into play in time of crisis. Retaliatory power as a deterrent to surprise works only when one is dealing with enemies who can be trusted not to panic in crisis situations. The very existence of saturation supplies of atomic weapons sets a stage for irrational action at times of extreme tension.

In any event, sceurity is no longer proportionate to power in the modern world. Sockpiling additional power is not likely to be more meaningful than filling the kitchen, the living room and all the bedrooms with cordwood after the woodshed and barn are overflowing in order to guard against running out of firewood.

The attempt to justify the nuclear arms race in terms of safety through reciprocal terror has to contend with the rapid spread of fissionable materials throughout the world. Scientific and technological means for processing these fissionable materials for explosive purposes are no longer matters of great mystery. There is now á real danger of nuclear blackmail by governments that fall into the bands of men who may confuse reckless use of power with the need to be decisive.

From the beginning of the nuclear age, it was clear that true security for the United States, or for anyone else, depends on the control of force rather than on the pursuit of force or the accumulation of force. But adequate controls have yet to be established. Most dangerous of all to the American people is the myth that atomic supremacy is somehow an assurance of security.

Meanwhile, the connection between a widening arms race and the worsening of the American economy is becoming more pronounced. It is impossible to spend almost $300 billion in a decade for military expenditures-a substantial part of it outside the United States-without creating a powerful momentum for inflation. The shortages created by spending of this size, to say nothing of the outfiow of dollars for maintaining military establishments in many parts of the world, contribute mightily to the erosion of the currency. Whatever other measures may be taken to combat inflation, it is doubtful that any fundamental change in the cheapening of the dollar will come about unless a genuine basis for national security is achieved that makes it unnecessary to spend in the order of $100 billion a year for military purposes.

The fifth assumption that figured in our foreign policy strategy since the end of the Second World War was that we needed an undercover organization to compete with Soviet secret police on the level of plot-and-counterplot. The general theory was that covert activities were a cheap way of fighting a war. This theory, like so many of the others, has been demolished in Indo-China. The

American people have had to pay a very high price for the abortive coup against Souvanna Phouma in Laos in the winter of 1959–60. They have had to pay an' even higher price for the overthrow of the Sihanouk government in Cambodia in 1970. And the highest price of all we paid was in Vietnam. The original decision to call off the nationwide elections for the purpose of unifying the country, as called for in the Geneva Treaty of 1954, gave way to other costly decisions. : The assassination of President Diem and the attempt to steer successive governments without adequate respect for the need of a popular consensus are not unrelated to the eventual loss of 56,000 American lives, to say nothing of our final humiliation in the ultimate disaster.

In any event, the activities of an American agency in subversive activities against other governments is probably unconstitutional. The traditional position of the United States has been to advance the principle of self-determination in the world. We subvert our own traditions and institutions when we act against that principle in the world, even when the form of government is not to our liking

Having gone through a great many unworkable assumptions on the quest for security-trying to be a policeman and a peacemaker to the world, maintaining a balance of power, building anchors of security through NATO and SEATO, staying ahead in the arms race, fighting undercover wars--perhaps the time has come for the United States to pursue the possibilities of peace through world order.

The United Nations has never been a serious factor in the foreign policy of any of the major nations, the United States and Soviet Union included. There is a tendency to regard it as a necessary evil or to use it only when everything else has failed, as in the case of the Middle East crisis of 1973. But the notion of world order as the basic requirement of world peace has yet to be defined as the central objective in the foreign policy of the great nations.

Why world order? What other approach is likely to be effective at a time when the principal problems of the world are beyond the reach of any nation to solve by or for itself? The arms race, world environmental deterioration, overcrowding, famine, depletion of resources, the struggle for control of the wealth of the seabed-all these are oblems that call for a world response. Since the problems are interconnected, the world agencies that will have to deal with them will have to be part of an organic whole. This is the direction that world order will have to take.

The obligations of individual nations will have to be carefully defined, with strict provison for due process. In general, world order requires codification of standards, monitoring facilities, an enforcement mechanism, and balance of powers. This sequence applies equally to the common security function, the environmental function, the fertilizer-and-food function, the resources function, the seabed function.

The ability of the United Nations to carry out the principal function assigned to it in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations—namely preventing the scourge of war-is severely limited. At some point soon it is going to be necessary to reconsider the nature of the U.N. as well as the obligations of the individual nations to it.

When that reconsideration takes place, and it appears likely that such reconsideration may not be far off, two main theories about the U.N. will be debated.

One theory is that the U.N. must be a reflection of the world as it is; that is, it can only represent a mirror to the existing realities. This theory is the one that has governed the affairs of the U.N. since it was founded.

The second theory is that the U.N. has to transcend the limitations of its members; which is to say, it must have the effective means of responsible governance in those matters concerned with common dangers and common needs.

It is this second theory that needs to be explored and developed—through the United Nations if possible, apart from the United Nations if necessary.

In short, a new effort must be made in the direction of workable world order. The aim must be effective governance in the world arena.

The essential parts are peace-making, peace-keeping, economic and social development, protection of the natural environment and of the earth's resources.

The full integration of the World Court into the development of a law capability would appear to be an essential feature of a fully functioning world order.

I have the honor to represent an organization that sees relevance and advantage in the application of federalism to world order. Such federalism recognizes the right of a nation to minister to its own institutions and to maintain its sovereignty in domestic matters. It also recognizes the need for effective authority in those respects in which nations engage in traffic with one another, especially on the level of competitive security.

In the absence of an institutionalized peace, the prospect is world anarchy. We live at a time when national governments, in their dealings with one another, have to be governed themselves in certain respects. The closer the United States, in its own foreign policy, can come to advancing this concept, the closer we ourselves will come to defining a genuine basis for our own security.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Next we will hear Mr. Alvin Toffler, author of "Future Shock.”


Mr. TOFFLER. Mr. Chairman, I am an author and social critic and I am not an expert on international affairs. I am not a specialist on the problems of the United Nations, and I was, therefore, surprised to be invited here but I must say I am delighted, because I believe that the Government all too often ignores the views of nonexperts. The outsider or nonspecialist often sees problems quite differently than those who spend their entire careers dealing with them, and I think this difference in perception can be stimulating and fruitful.

But because I have not devoted my life to international affairs, and because I have not had very close direct connections with these problems, I say what I have to say with a degree of tentativity which is not customary for me. Even if I put them in forceful terms, take them as tentative, nevertheless.

Senator CASE. You did not ask for a comment. [Laughter.] Senator Case. I think you speak for all of your colleagues at that table right there.


Mr. TOFFLER. I obviously share a broad spectrum of agreement with the other gentlemen at this table on the need for some alternative to international anarchy. And I think we probably would all agree on a few central goals that really ought to be at the heart of American foreign policy. I can summarize those in three items.

The planet is in need of ecological rebalancing. There is a danger that we will destroy the biosphere that supports us and, therefore, it is in the interest of all nations to do something about altering the way we deal with the environment.

The second goal needs to be economic rebalancing. The disparity between the rich and poor has reached the point at which it threatens everyone.

The third goal ought to be, it seems to me, the containment of conflict.

All of these have been stated here before in better and more detailed ways, and there is no need for me to elaborate on them now.

I also think that what Dr. Brown referred to as "progressive internationalism” is basically the right attitude with which to confront the problems around us.


But, having said that, I also have certain problems and hesitations. First, I think the projection of American experience either from the 1780's or from the progressive era or from any other era of American history onto the world scale, on to the global screen, is a cultural mistake. Analogies based on U.S. experience in U.S. history are not readily applicable to the world, to a world as diverse and conflict-filled

as our own.

We are dealing with a world filled with people whose cultures are different from our own, and who have different views of reality. Those have to be respected. The notion that our history provides a model for everyone else ought to be reexamined. The American Revolution took place 200 years ago. It should not be a model for any

other society as we approach the year 2000.

Secondly, we need some form of world order. But to assume that a world order needs to take the form of world government” or some sort of “United States of the world” or some "federal model” based on our contemporary notions of federalism, is another notion that ought to be examined more carefully. It suggests that the way you get "order" is through the creation of a centralized power. The reverse may also be true. We need to reexamine our faith in centralization.

Similarly, our historic belief in the importance of economic integration has led to the notion that "interdependence” is always, under all circumstances, a good idea. This idea is particularly popular among internationalists. Unfortunately, I think that is also a dangerous misconception.

Anybody who analyzes an adaptive system, whether it is a machine system or a biological system, will find not only interdependence of the parts, but also the capability of those parts to separate or decouple from one another when necessary-to become independent under certain conditions. I believe we have reached the stage of overintegration or overinterdependence in the world economy with the result that we have all become too vulnerable to each others mistakes.

When we build ourselves an ocean liner, we build separate airtight compartments into it, so that, if one springs a leak, the whole ship does not sink.

I think such “fail-safe” principles need to be looked at in connection with the problems of world order as well, and that we need to think in terms of the creation not of a single center, or a single world government that will some day govern the nations of the world, but rather in terms of self-regulatory network of transnational institutions, multiple institutions, a polycentric system. Such a transnational network can provide a higher degree of stability for the planet than the centralized model based on a single international governmental organization. The goal of the U.N. is not and should not be to evolve into a world government.


Today it is only possible to understand the problems of the U.N. if we see them in relationship to the much larger social transformations taking place on the planet. There would be no crisis, I think, in the U.N. today, or in the U.S. relationship to the U.N., if there were not a general crisis in industrial societies. We must understand this general crisis.

Industrial societies have not always existed. Our industrial civilization is only about 200 or 300 years old. It sprang from the Industrial Revolution at different times and in different places. But all industrial societies share certain fundamental characteristics. They are based on mass production and mass distribution. They all develop mass education systems, mass media. They are all part of an integrated money system. I'hey all develop a materialistic value system. They all, by and large, rely on the nuclear family system. And they are all dependent upon fossil fuels.

Moreover--and, as we shall see, this is crucial to the U.N.—they are all based on the nation-state and on bureaucratic forms of organization. In short, industrial societies are made up of certain common parts and processes. They form a system.

What is happening today is the crackup of this system. When I say that the system is breaking up, I am not talking about the capitalist system or the socialist or Communist system, but the larger system that includes both—the industrial system.

This breakdown is evident not just in terms of energy and resource dislocations or in dislocations and upheavals in technology. It is also evident in the breakdown of the nuclear family system, in changes in the value system in the society, and many other upsets and malfunctions.

The wild oscillation of the global economy is also related to this overall historic breakdown of the industrial system, the general crisis of industrialism.

Senator SYMINGTON. Excuse me. You are reading from notes. I have no copy. I am very interested. You say it is not a breakdown in capitalism, it is a breakdown in the industrial system?

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you expand on that?

Mr. TOFFLER. Yes. I think that industrial societies, whether they are capitalist or Communist or any intermediate form, all make use of certain fundamental technologies and social procedures. As a result, the guy who gets up in the morning and goes to work in the factory in Kiev is not that different from the guy who gets up and goes to work in the factory in Detroit or Pittsburgh. Their daily routines and experiences are not so different.

Certainly, there are profound political, cultural, and historic differences, and certainly we would rather live here, and they might or might not prefer to live there—but these underlying life-support systems of all industrial societies are basically the same. For example, none of them could function without mass education or mass communications. They all, regardless of whether they are capitalist or Communist, rely on a certain form of family structure. They all share the assumption that economic growth or economic development is the primary aim of the society and of the individual. by and large. They all develop similar internal procedures. They all organize huge bureaucracies--pyramidal hierarchies. That is the dominant form of human organizing in all industrial societies, whether the United States or the Soviet Union.

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