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of Permet dated May 27-28, did not appear once in the AFNL Council decree of October 22. Colonel General Enver Hoxha gained additional stature under this Berat decree, being designated Prime Minister as well as Minister for War and for National Defense.

The ostensible domination of this new "Democratic Government of Albania" by a man reputed to be one of the leaders of the Communist Party of Albania founded in Tirana on November 8, 1941, could not help but worry Prime Minister Churchill. His British Government already faced "confusion and disaster" in Greece, England's old ally, due in large part to lack of firmness exhibited under what Churchill so expressively described as "the general principle of slithering to the left." By November 3, 1944 it had been decided, not surprisingly, that "In the present confused situation in Albania, His Majesty's Government do not propose to recognize the Provisional Government,” i.e., the Hoxha Government. On November 21, 1944, the Department of State concurred in this decision, explaining:

The Department of State concurs in the view of the British Government that any request for recognition of the provisional government formed at Berat which may be received at this time should not be granted. The Department feels, however, that there may be a stage in the not distant future in which it may be found expedient to consider the desirability on practical grounds of establishing with such governing authority as may be in de facto control of the country such relations as would enable this Government to open an office in Tirana for the purpose of protecting American interests there and coordinating the activities of the representatives of other American agencies who may be sent to Albania. The Department will be disposed to give sympathetic consideration to a request for de jure recognition by an Albanian Government only at such time as it may be able to demonstrate that it is non-Fascist in character, that it has established its authority over the country, that it represents the will of the people and is prepared to fulfil its international obligations.

Preliminary (1945) Concerted Allied Steps toward

Recognition of the Hoxha Government

By the time (January 12, 1945) the British Government had expressed complete agreement with the American position taken in the Department of State Memorandum of November 21, 1944, both British and American de jure recognition of Hoxha's Albanian Government had been rendered more complicated. Colonel General Enver Hoxha, as "Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Government of Albania," had on December 21, 1944, sent a personal letter appealing for recognition of his Government to President Roosevelt.

Letters with an identical text were addressed to Prime Minister Churchill and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Marshal Stalin.

This tripartite appeal was repeated by publication of the text on the front page of the January 4, 1945 issue of Tirana's leading newspaper Bashkimi (The Union), Organ of the General Committee of the National Liberation Front. In his letter to President Roosevelt, written in French, Enver Hoxha termed the events at Permet and Berat the crowning achievements in Albania's five-year struggle for national liberation and then declared:

Aujourd'hui notre pays étant liberé, le Gouvernement Démocratique est le seul Gouvernement qui représente l'Albanie chez nous comme à l'étranger. En Albanie comme à l'étranger personne ne peut contester le fait de l'existence de notre gouvernement. L'autorité de notre gouvernement s'étend sur toutes les regions du pays, sur tout le peuple albanais.

In conclusion, Enver Hoxha sought recognition by Albania's three Great Allies:

Pour garder et consolider les rapports d'amitié contractés dans la lutte commune contre le fascisme, pour consolider la collaboration entre l'Albanie et les Grands Allies, j'ai l'honneur de Vous présenter l'expression de la volonté du peuple Albanais à ce que son gouvernement soit reconnu en premier lieu de la part de nos Grands Alliés Anglo-Sovieto-Americains et d'établir des relations diplomatiques entre Votre gouvernement et le notre. The official seal of the Council of Ministers appeared over the edge of the signature of Enver Hoxha.

As we discover from a Memorandum dated March 17, 1945 in the Department of State's Division of European Affairs, of which Cavendish W. Cannon was the drafter, Enver Hoxha's letter "came to the attention of the President only after his return from the Crimea Conference," which took place February 4–11, 1945. Meanwhile, the Department of State had under active consideration, a plan to send to Albania an informal and unofficial survey mission to determine when and under what conditions American representatives might be officially established in Tirana. Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew had this plan outlined in a memorandum dated January 26, 1945 in mind when cabling instructions on January 31 to the United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, Caserta, Italy.

The Colonel General was to be told: (1) his request for recognition addressed to Roosevelt had been received in Washington, but the Department of State planned no formal reply; (2) the United States Government, before according recognition to any Albanian Government, would have to be more fully informed than at present regarding the situation in Albania. According to the aforementioned Cannon Memorandum dated March 17, President Roosevelt had indicated he would like to speak to the Secretary of State about the question of recognition of the present Albanian Government, but on the recommendation of the Division of European Affairs, the

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discussion had been postponed until a report could be received on the progress made to conduct a preliminary survey of conditions in Albania.

Shortly thereafter, on March 19, a telegram was sent to Caserta over the signature of Acting Secretary Dean Acheson, providing the text of a memorandum to be prepared for delivery to Colonel General Hoxha with respect to his request for recognition. In essence it stated that the United States Government wished to become more fully informed regarding conditions and developments in Albania, and proposed to send into Albania a small group on an informal basis to obtain the necessary information upon which to base any official recognition. Any delay in working out some such arrangement would only delay the decision on official recognition by the United States Government sought by Colonel General Hoxha. The memorandum prepared in Caserta long these lines was delivered to Colonel General Hoxha on March 23, and, although he commented adversely on the fact that it was unsigned, the next day he sent a note in reply accepting the proposed mission for the purpose of "facilitating the recognition of our Democratic Government."

By April 7, 1945 detailed instructions from Secretary of State Stettinius had been prepared for Foreign Service Officer Joseph E. Jacobs, who had been chosen to head the mission. A major policy consideration was outlined:

It is our view that no one of the three principal Allied Governments should take any decisive action with regard to Albania on matters of international importance, such as recognition, boundaries, federation, alliances, et cetera, except in consultation with the other two Allied Governments.

Jacobs was instructed as to when he should make an informal call on Colonel General Enver Hoxha, and how he should conduct himself during that call:

You should leave no doubt in his mind that your presence is not to be in any way construed as representing any degree of recognition whatever and that the carrying out of your mission is a prerequisite to this Government's consideration of the question of establishing official relations, whether de facto or de jure with the existing Albanian authorities.

In accordance with these instructions, after his arrival in Tirana on May 8, 1945 with a party of eight comprising the unofficial American survey mission, Jacobs called on Colonel General Hoxha, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Government of Albania. In a telegram reporting on this call of May 9, he commented:

Hoxha strikes me as a forceful character with ambitions but suffering from effects of an inferiority complex because of his failure to win recognition.

Six days later, after acquainting himself with the findings of Brigadier D. E.

P. Hodgson, Commander of the British Military Mission to Albania, Ja

cobs reported:

Finally I feel that unless present regime falls before my report is submitted which seems highly unlikely continued failure of the United States and Great Britian to recognize will drive it completely into Yugo-Slavia-Soviet fold.

Jacobs filed a preliminary summary of the findings of his survey mission on July 1, 1945, and sent a summary report incorporating final recommendations on August 15, 1945. His principal recommendation in each instance was to the effect that recognition should be accorded the present authorities on condition that they undertake to hold elections of a free and democratic nature subject to international supervision in accordance with a joint British-Soviet-American formula; simultaneous recognition by, the three Allied Governments would follow as soon as possible. At sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in October 1945, with Jacobs present to assist, arrangements were made for concerted tripartite notification of expeditious recognition of the Hoxha Government. In this connection, the French Government was requested to postpone its recognition of the Hoxha Government until the British-Soviet-American notification had taken place..

The Tripartite Notification of Recognition,
Tirana, November 10–12, 1945

Concerted Allied action on recognition of the Hoxha Government appeared probable and imminent from Washington's viewpoint by the close of business November 8, 1945. That afternoon two telegrams were sent to Tirana to Acting Representative in Albania Harry T. Fultz. The first provided him with the text of the United States note on recognition for Colonel General Enver Hoxha; the second informed him that British and Soviet representatives in Tirana had been instructed by their respective Governments to communicate notes on recognition to Hoxha on November 10, and instructed him to deliver the note of the United States Government on that day.

On the morning of November 10, Fultz, who had received the second telegram but not the first, was compelled to improvise. Brigadier Hodgson, Fultz's British counterpart in the proposed tripartite notification procedure, informed him that Soviet representative Colonel Sokolov had already called on Hoxha at 8:00 a.m.; it was not known whether he had done so by instruction or on his own initiative. Fultz then arranged to accompany Hodgson to his meeting with Hoxha, which took place at 11:00 a.m. At that meeting Fultz handed Hoxha an informal note mentioning the con

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certed tripartite notification procedure and then explaining that the United States note on recognition had been delayed in transmission but would be delivered to Hoxha immediately upon receipt; the note would be released to the press in Washington on November 10 as scheduled, however.

Colonel General Hoxha finally received the text of the United States note, delivered by Fultz, on November 12 at 11:30 a.m. By then the Anglo-American team had been placed in an awkward position in the Albanian press. A special one-page edition of Bashkimi on November 10 contained only the unconditional Soviet note signed by Colonel Sokolov, Head of the Soviet Military Mission, and Anglo-American notes of recognition were reported to have been delayed in transit. When Bashkimi's regular four-page edition appeared November 11, separate treatment was given to the British and American notes on recognition, bringing more loss of face to the United States. The process was culminated November 17 when Bashkimi printed side by side the British note on recognition containing one condition and the American note setting forth two.

The Belated United States Note on Recognition

The pertinent paragraphs of the United States note released to the press November 10 (and published in the Department of State Bulletin November 11, 1945), were candid and unambiguous:

The Government of the United States, having considered the request of the Albanian authorities for recognition, has instructed me to inform you of its readiness to enter into diplomatic relations with the existing regime in Albania as the provisional Government of Albania.

In establishing official relations with an Albanian Government, the United States Government desires to act in conformity with the obligations and principles to which it subscribed in the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe and accordingly requests assurances that the forthcoming elections for a Constituent Assembly shall be held on a genuinely free basis, with secret ballot and without threats or intimidation; that all democratic individuals and groups in Albania shall enjoy freedom of speech and the right lawfully to present and support their candidates; and that foreign press correspondents shall be permitted to enter Albania to observe and report freely on the elections and the work of the Constituent Assembly.

The Government of the United States also desires that the Albanian authorities shall confirm that the treaties and agreements which were in force between the United States and Albania on April 7, 1939, remain valid. The United States Government, on its part, confirms the continuing validity of these instruments.

Upon receipt of the assurances requested, the Government of the United States will be prepared to proceed with the exchange of diplomatic representatives.

I have also been directed to advise you that the present proposal of the