"Each town and district in the Colony is by some late regulations permitted to send one representative to the General Court, if such town or district consists of thirty freeholders and other inhabitants qualified to elect; if of one hundred and twenty, to send two. No town is permitted to send more than two, except the town of Boston, which may send four. There are some towns and districts in the Colony in which there are between thirty and forty freeholders, and other inhabitants qualified to elect, only; there are others besides Boston in which there are more than five hundred. The first of these may send one representative; the latter can send only two. If these towns as to property are to each other in the same respective proportion, is it not clear to a mathematical demonstration that the same number of inhabitants of equal property in the one town have but an eighth part of the weight in representation with the other?and with what colorable pretext? we would decently inquire." 1

Under the pressure of this powerful state paper the obnoxious law was repealed, and one "providing for a more equal representation" substituted; but the evil was only partially remedied. Then followed an unsuccessful effort to make a Constitution in 1777-8, which failed partly through dissatisfaction with its disposal of this very question. The County of Essex was again heard in another document, now known as the "Essex Result," and among the most able and instructive in our history, from which I take the following important words.

"The rights of representation should be so equally and impartially distributed, that the representatives should have the same views and interests with the people at large. They

1. From the original MS. in the Massachusetts Archives, Vol. 156.

should think, feel, and act like them, and, in fine, should be an exact miniature of their constituents. They should be, if we may use the expression, the whole body politic, with all its property, rights, and privileges reduced to a smaller scale, every part being diminished in just proportion. To pursue the metaphor, if, in adjusting the representation of freemen, any ten are reduced into one, all the other tens should be alike reduced; or, if any hundred should be reduced to one, all the other hundreds should have just the same reduction.” 1

Mark well these words. Here is the Rule of Three, for the first time in history, applied to representation. This, Sir, is not the English system. I call it, with pride, the American system.

In another place the document proceeds as follows.

"The rights of representation should also be held sacred and inviolable, and for this purpose representation should be fixed upon known and easy principles; and the Constitution should make provision that recourse should constantly be had to those principles within a very small period of years, to rectify the errors that will creep in through lapse of time or alteration of situations." 2

Then, distinctly, it proposes a system of districts, in words which I quote.

"In forming the first body of legislators, let regard be had only to the representation of persons, not of property. This body we call the House of Representatives. Ascertain the number of representatives. It ought not to be so large as will

1 Result of the Convention of Delegates holden at Ipswich, in the County of Essex, who were deputed to take into Consideration the Constitution and Form of Government proposed by the Convention of the State of Massachusetts Bay, (Newburyport, 1778,) pp. 29, 30. See also Memoir of Theophilus Parsons, by his Son, Appendix, pp. 359-402, where this remarkable paper will be found.

2 Result, p. 33.

induce an enormous expense to Government, nor too unwieldy to deliberate with coolness and attention, nor so small as to be unacquainted with the situation and circumstances of the State. One hundred will be large enough, and perhaps it may be too large. We are persuaded that any number of men exceeding that cannot do business with such expedition and propriety as a smaller number could. However, let that at present be considered as the number. Let us have the number of freemen in the several counties in the State, and let these representatives be apportioned among the respective counties in proportion to their number of freemen. As we have the number of freemen in the county, and the number of county representatives, by dividing the greater by the less we have the number of freemen entitled to send one representative. Then add as many adjoining towns together as contain that number of freemen, or as near as may be, and let those towns form one district, and proceed in this manner through the county.'

MR. HALLETT, for Wilbraham (interrupting). Will the gentleman state who was the author of that Essex paper? MR. SUMNER. Theophilus Parsons is the reputed author of the document known as the "Essex Result."

MR. HALLETT. Yes, Sir, it was Theophilus Parsons who was the author of that, and John Lowell of the other; and good old Tory doctrines they are.

MR. SUMNER. If these be Tory doctrines, I must think well of Toryism.

Sir, notwithstanding these appeals, sustained with unsurpassed ability, the American system failed to be adopted in the Constitution of 1780. The anomalous. English system was still continued; but, as if to cover the departure from principle, it was twice declared that

1 Result, pp. 49 – 51.

the representation of the people should be "founded upon the principle of equality." This declaration still continues as our guide, while the irregular operation of the existing system, with its inequalities and large numbers, is a beacon of warning.

Following closely upon these efforts in Massachusetts, this principle found an illustrious advocate in Thomas Jefferson. In his "Notes on Virginia," written in 1781, he sharply exposes the inequalities of representation;1 and a short time afterwards, when the victory at Yorktown had rescued Virginia from invasion and secured the independence of the United Colonies, he prepared the draught of a Constitution for his native State, which, disowning the English system, and recognizing the very principle that had failed in Massachusetts, expressly provided that "the number of delegates which each county may send shall be in proportion to the number of its qualified electors; and the whole number of delegates for the State shall be so proportioned to the whole number of qualified electors in it, that they shall never exceed three hundred nor be fewer than one hundred. . . . . If any county be reduced in its qualified electors below the number authorized to send one delegate, let it be annexed to some adjoining county." 2 This proposition, which is substantially the Rule of Three, did not find favor in Virginia, which State, like Massachusetts, was not yet prepared for such a charter of electoral equality; but it still stands as a monument at once of its author and of the true system of representation.

The American system, though first showing itself in 1 Query XIII.

2 Notes on Virginia, Appendix, No. II.: Works, Vol. VIII., p. 443.

Massachusetts and Virginia, found its earliest practical exemplification a few years later in the Constitution of the United States. By the Articles of Confederation each State was entitled to send to Congress not less than two nor more than seven representatives, and in the determination of questions each State had one vote only. This plan was rejected by the framers of the new Constitution, and another was adopted, till then untried in the history of the world. It was declared that “representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union according to their respective numbers"; not according to property, not according to territory, not according to any corporate rights, but according to their respective numbers. And this system has continued down to our day, and will continue immortal as the Union itself. Here is the Rule of Three actually incorporated into the Representative System of the United States.

An attempt has been made to render this system odious, or at least questionable, by charging upon it something of the excesses of the great French Revolution. Even if this rule had prevailed at that time in France, it would be bold to charge upon it any such consequences. But it is a mistake to suppose that it was then adopted in that country. The republican Constitution of 1791 was not founded upon numbers only, but upon numbers, territory, and taxation combined, — a mixed system, which excluded the true idea of personal equality. At the peaceful, almost bloodless, Revolution of 1848, under the lead of Lamartine, a National Assembly was convened on the simple basis of population, and one representative was allowed for every

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