of a strong Allied force at Saloniki had been an enormous gain. The first official announcement of failure was made December 20, 1916, when it was announced that the British forces at Anzac and Suvla Bay had been withdrawn, and that only the minor positions near Sedd-el-Bahr were occupied. Great Britain's loss of officers and men at the Dardanelles up to December 11th was 112,921, according to an announcement made in the House of Commons by the Parliamentary Under Secretary for War. Besides these casualties the number of sick admitted to hospitals was 96,683. The decision to evacuate Gallipoli was made in the course of November by the British Government as the result of the early expressed opinion of General Monro, who had succeeded General Hamilton on October 28, 1915. General Monro found himself confronted with a serious problem in the attempt to withdraw an army of such a size from positions not more than three hundred yards from the enemy's trenches, and to embark on open beaches every part of which was within effective range of Turkish guns. Moreover, the evacuation must be done gradually, as it was impossible to move the whole army at once with such means of transportation as existed. The plan was to remove the munitions, supplies and heavy guns by instalments, working only at night, carrying off at the same time a large portion of the troops, but leaving certain picked battalions to guard the trenches. Every endeavor had to be made for concealment. The plan was splendidly successful, and the Turks apparently completely deceived. On December 20th the embarkation of the last troops at Suvla was accomplished. The operations at Anzac were conducted in the same way. Only picked battalions were left to the end, and these were carried safely off. The success of the Suvla and Anzac evacuation made the position at Cape Helles more dangerous. The Turks were on the lookout, and it seemed almost impossible that they could be again deceived. On January 7th an attack was made by the Turks upon the trenches, which was beaten back. That night more than half the troops had left the Peninsula. The next day there was a heavy storm which made embarkation difficult, but it was nevertheless accomplished. The whole evacuation was a clever and successful bit of work. G CHAPTER XXI THE GREATEST NAVAL BATTLE IN HISTORY ERMANY'S ambition for conquest at sea had been nursed and carefully fostered for twenty years. During the decade immediately preceding the declaration of war, it had embarked upon a policy of naval upbuilding that brought it into direct conflict with England's sea policy. Thereafter it became a race in naval construction, England piling up a huge debt in its determination to construct two tons of naval shipping to every one ton built by Germany. Notwithstanding Great Britain's efforts in this direction, Germany's naval experts, with the ruthless von Tirpitz at their head, maintained that, given a fair seaway with ideal weather conditions favoring the low visibility tactics of the German sea command, a victory for the Teutonic ships would follow. It was this belief that drew the ships of the German cruiser squadron and High Seas Fleet off the coast of Jutland and Horn Reef into the great battle that decided the supremacy of the sea. The 31st of May, 1916, will go down in history as the date of this titanic conflict. The British light cruiser Galatea on patrol duty near Horn Reef reported at 2.20 o'clock on the afternoon of that day, that it had sighted smoke plumes denoting the advance of enemy vessels from the direction of Helgoland Bight. Fifteen minutes later the smoke plumes were in such number and volume that the advance of a considerable force to the northward and eastward was indicated. It was reasoned by Vice-Admiral Beatty, to whom the Galatea had sent the news by radio, that the enemy in rounding Horn Reef would inevitably be brought into action. The first ships of the enemy were sighted at 3.31 o'clock. These were the battle screen of fast light cruisers. Back of these were five modern battle cruisers of the highest power and armament. The report of the battle, by an eye-witness, that was issued upon semiofficial authority of the British Government, follows: First Phase, 3.30 P. M. May 31st. Beatty's battle cruisers, consisting of the Lion, Princess Royal, Queen Mary, Tiger, Inflexible, Indomitable, Invincible, Indefatigable, and New Zealand, were on a southeasterly course, followed at about two miles distance by the four battleships of the class known as Queen Elizabeths. Enemy light cruisers were sighted and shortly afterward the head of the German battle cruiser squadron, consisting of the new cruiser Hindenburg, the Seydlitz, Derfflinger, Lützow, Moltke, and possibly the Salamis. Beatty at once began firing at a range of about 20,000 yards (twelve miles) which shortened to 16,000 yards (nine miles) as the fleets closed. The Germans could see the British distinctly outlined against the light yellow sky. The Germans, covered by a haze, could be very indistinctly made out by the British gunners. The Queen Elizabeths opened fire on one after another as they came within range. The German battle cruisers turned to port and drew away to about 20,000 yards. Second Phase, 4.40 P. M. A destroyer screen then appeared beyond the German battle cruisers. The whole German High Seas Fleet could be seen approaching on the northeastern horizon in three divisions, coming to the support of their battle cruisers. The German battle cruisers now turned right round 16 points and took station in front of the battleships of the High Fleet. Beatty, with his battle cruisers and supporting battleships, therefore, had before him the whole of the German battle fleet, and Jellicoe was still some distance away. The opposing fleets were now moving parallel to one another in opposite directions, and but for a master maneuver on the part of Beatty the British advance ships would have been cut off from Jellicoe's Grand Fleet. In order to avoid this and at the same time prepare the way so that Jellicoe might envelop his adversary, Beatty immediately also turned right around 16 points, so as to bring his ships parallel to the German battle cruisers and facing the same direction. As soon as he was around he increased to full speed to get ahead of the Germans and take up a tactical position in advance of their line. He was able to do this owing to the superior speed of the British battle cruisers. Just before the turning point was reached the Indefatigable sank, and the Queen Mary and the Invincible also were lost at the |