The The many particulars was not prescribed. How and in what manner the wharf was to be built was not pointed out. That, rebuilt, was to be as good as new. The new was to be of the best workmanship. This is quite indefinite and authorizes not only, but requires a great amount of care and direction on the part of the company. The submission of the whole work to the direction of the company's engineer is evidence, although not conclusive, that the company retain the management and control. reservation of authority is both comprehensive and minute. company have the general control, and it may prescribe where each pile shall go, where each plank shall be laid, where each stringer shall be put down, where each nail shall be driven. All the details are to be completed under their orders and according to their direction. The contractor undertakes in general terms to do the work well. The company reserve the power not only to direct what shall be done, but how it shall be done. This is an important test of liability. Kelly v. Mayor, 11 N. Y. 432. Camp v. The Wardens, 7 La. Ann. 322, was a case arising in Louisiana and very much like the present in its facts. The owners were there held liable. All the authorities are cited and commented upon by the court, both of the common and the civil law. The civil law, it was said, held the same rules on this subject as the common law. Pothier on Obligations, § 121, 453; Droit Civil, de Touillier, Book 2, tit. 8, § 284, vol. 2. In Painter v. Mayor, 46 Penn. 213, Strong, J., holds the defendant not to be liable, and says, “The defendants have no control over the men employed by the contractors or over the contractors themselves. They could not dismiss them or direct The cases are reviewed and the rule laid down as it the work." is herein above stated. Knight v. Fox, 1 Eng. Law and Equity, 477, (1) and Steel v. 1. The facts in Knight v. Fox, 5 Exch. 721, 14 Jur. 963, 20 L. J. Exch. 9. were as follows: A railway company entered into a contract with A. to construct a branch line; who contracted with B. to erect a tubular bridge, parcel of the works. B. had a surveyor, C., whom he paid by a salary of £250 a year to attend to his general business; and after obtaining a contract for the bridge, contracted with C. to provide the necessary scaffolding, for which he was to receive £40, irrespective of his salary, B. to furnish the requisite materials, including lights. One of the poles of the scaffold rested on a highway, and owing to the want of sufficient light to warn the passers-by, D. stumbled over the pole, and was injured; subsequently additional lights were placed on the spot, and B. paid for them. Held, that B. was not liable, and that D.'s remedy lay against C. Southeastern R. R. Co., 32 Eng. Law and Equity 366, (1) are The first contains nothing in hostility to In Steel v. Southeastern Railroad Co., it cited by the defendant. the suggestion made. authority to the was held that the company was not liable for any injury done by the contractor, and the contract contained an company to superintend and direct the work. The case shows that the act which caused the injury was committed in violation. of their orders. They expressly forbad the digging of a certain channel. It was dug in violation of this direction, and for the damage resulting therefrom, the court held them not to be liable. This order to the contrary does not necessarily exempt the principal, but it is a circumstance of weight. Pack v. Mayor, 8 N. Y. 222; see also Storrs v. City of Utica, 17 N. Y. 104; Higgins v. The Watervliet Turnpike Co., 46 N. Y. 23; Robbins v. Chicago, 4 Wallace, 679. It is said that by the act of the General Assembly, passed January 21st, 1870, the liability of this corporation is defined in a number of cases. The second section of the act declares "that the said corporation, its officers, or employees, shall not, in any case, be liable for any debts contracted or liabilities incurred by any person or persons who shall have contracted, or who shall contract with it, to construct any portion of its road, buildings, or appurtenances, or its rolling stock, or to furnish any materials or labor to be used for such construction, or for its maintenance or operation. Nor shall said company, its officers, or employees, be liable for any injury to person or property, or loss of life, which shall be caused by any act or omission of any person or persons so contracting with it, or any of his or their employees or agents." This was doubtless intended as a declaration of the rights of the company convenient to be embodied in its charter, and is in affirmance of the existing law. It contains two general principles: Ist, that the corporation shall not be liable for the debts to third. parties of those contracting to construct its road or to furnish materials therefor. It would not be upon general principles of law. The statement, in fact, confers no exemption. 2d, that it shall not be liable for injury to person or property caused by 1. In Steel v. South Eastern R'y Co., 16 C. B. 550, it was held, that where work is done for a company under a contract, parol or otherwise, the company is not responsible for injury re sulting to a third person from the negligent manner of doing the work, though the company employs their own surveyor to superintend it, and to direct what shall be done. the acts of such contractors or their servants. In each of these instances the exemption is in the case of contractors who are themselves the principals, not when they are the agents or servants of the company. In each case there could be no liability at common law had the statute not been passed. We think that, upon general principles of law, the company in this case are responsible for the negligence of Carvin, and that this statute does not alter its position. It would seem that, prior to the passage of the act authorizing the defendants to occupy and possess the wharf, it had been open to the public, free to the passage of all, at their pleasure to come and go. The judge charged, in substance, that this right of passage to the public continued until some notice should be given to those accustomed to use it that their rights had ended. This principle is one of quite general application. A railroad or steamboat company, by the departure and arrival of their conveyances, give an invitation to all who desire to approach their boats or cars to pass over their wharf or platform. One accustomed so to pass cannot be deemed a trespasser in repeating his act after a new station or landing has been adopted and the cars or boats have ceased to use the old one. To exclude the passer's right so as to make him in fault, and to prevent his recovery for an injury sustained by leaving the place in a bad condition, notice must have been given of its changed character, and that the rights of passers are terminated. This principle is so familiar, and exists in so many forms, that it is unnecessary to elaborate it. 2 Addison on Torts, 141; Corby v. Hill, 4 Common Bench, N. S. 556. (1) Upon the whole record we are all of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed. 1. The facts in Corby v. Hill, 4 C. B. N. S. 556, 4 Jur. N. S. 512, 27 L. J. C. P. 218, were as follows: An owner of land having a private road for the use of persons coming to his house, gave permission to A. who was engaged in building on the land, to place materials upon the road. A. availed himself of this permission by placing a quantity of slates there in such a manner that B., in using the road, sustained damage. Held, that A. was liable. Held, also, that the declaration was not objectionable for not averring that the obstruction was placed on the road without permission; inasmuch as such an allegation, if traversed, would have presented an immaterial issue. UNION PACKET COMPANY v. CLOUGH (1). Supreme Court, United States, October Term, 1874. MARRIED WOMEN [Reported in 20 Wall. 528.] WITNESS STATUTE. The competency of a married woman to testify, in an action by her husband and herself, for injuries to her person, on behalf of plaintiffs, is governed by the law of the State relating to competency of witnesses. SAME. — In Wisconsin, a married woman may, in such an action, be examined as a witness for the plaintiffs. HUSBAND AND WIFE - COHABITATION — EVIDENCE. Where the marriage of plaintiffs was proved it is not competent for defendant to introduce evidence to prove that plaintiffs were not living together, the action being for injuries to the wife, and the question of cohabitation had nothing to do with right of recovery, nor could it be offered in mitigation of damages. INJURED WHILE BOARDING BOAT — RELEASE. - Where plaintiff's wife was injured while boarding defendant's boat, the fact that she demanded that she should not pay fare in consequence of the injury, her going on the boat, and the captain permitting her to do so, did not amount to a release of her right of action unless she so understood it. RES GESTÆ — Statements made by the captain of a boat two days after the occurrence of an injury to a passenger are not part of the res gesta. EVIDENCE - PRACTICE. A party who complains of the rejection of evidence must show that he was injured by the rejection, and his bill of exceptions must make it appear that if it had been admitted it might have led the jury to a different verdict. ERROR to the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. "In January, 1870, Carlos Clough and Sarah, his wife, in right of the wife, sued the Union Packet Company, in an action on the case to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the wife in consequence of alleged negligence of the company's servants. The declaration was in the regular common-law form. Plea: The general issue. "The company, at the time of the injury, was owner of a steamboat employed by it in carrying passengers and freight on the Mississippi river, between St. Paul, in the State of Minnesota, and St. Louis, in the State of Missouri. During the passage downward, the boat arrived at Read's Landing, in Minnesota, at 1. Cited in Alabama Gt. So. R. Co. v. Hawk, 72 Ala. 112, 2 Am. Neg. Cas. IO, 17. about two o'clock on the afternoon of September 30th, 1869, where she stopped to receive passengers. At that place Mrs. Clough (who was about to go to Davenport, in Iowa, at which place the boat was in the habit of touching), in attempting to go on board, fell from the gangway provided for entrance to the boat, and received the injury for which the suit was brought. Whether the company was guilty of negligence in having failed to provide a proper gangway, or in having failed to keep it in position, was, of course, an important question in the case, and on the trial the deposition of Mrs. Clough was admitted in support of her claim. Exception was taken to its admission. "Whether this exception could be sustained depended upon certain statutes of the United States and of Wisconsin. "Thus, an act of Congress of July 6, 1862 (12 Stat. at Large, 588), enacts that "The laws of the State in which the court shall be held shall be the rules of decision as to the competency of witnesses in the courts of the United States, in trials at common law, in equity, and admiralty.' "And a statute of Wisconsin, passed in 1863 (Taylor's Statutes, 1599, §73), enacts that — "A party to a civil action or proceeding may be examined as a witness in his or her behalf, on the trial, except at actions in which the opposite party sues, or defends as administrator, or legal representative of any deceased person. And in case of an action for damages for personal injury to a married woman this section shall be so construed as to allow such married woman to be a witness on her own behalf in the same manner as if she were not married. "Another statute, also passed in 1868 (Taylor's Statutes, 1600, 54), enacts that "A party to any civil action or special proceeding in any and all courts, and before any and all tribunals, and before any and all officers acting judicially, may be examined as a witness in his own behalf, or in behalf of any other party, in the same manner and subject to the same rules of examination as any other witness.' "After direct testimony had been given by Mrs. Clough that the plaintiffs were married on the 24th day of December, 1845, the defendants proposed to prove by other witnesses that the plaintiffs had not lived together and cohabited as husband and |