duty of railway companies not only to have at their stations safe and convenient platforms for the use of passengers, but the duty also to keep all portions thereof, and all approaches thereto, to which the public do or would naturally resort, as well as all portions of their station-grounds reasonably near to the platforms, in good repair.

In the present case, there was no platform at the station, and the company's servants rendered the defendant in error no assistance in her attempt to alight from the train. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Circuit Court erred in instructing the jury "that if they believe from the evidence that at the time of the plaintiff's being injured there was no platform or other proper landing place at the train's stopping place at Quantico, and the defendant's servants did not assist the plaintiff to alight, and, for want of such assistance or landing place, and assistance in alighting, the plaintiff was injured, without fault on her part, then the jury must find for the plaintiff."

As to the second instruction, we are of opinion that there was evidence upon which to found it, and that the proposition of law therein contained, as to the neglect to light stations and platforms, is supported by abundant authority. In Reed v. Axtell and Myers, Receivers, 84 Va. p. 238 (1), this court said: "The law undoubtedly imposes upon a railroad company the duty of keeping its stations and premises in such safe condition as that the passengers, in the exercise of ordinary care, can get upon or leave the same, or go wherever they are expressly or impliedly invited to go, without injury; and this embraces suitable steps and platforms, as well as suitable lights." Kup v. Boston & Albany R. R. Co., 142 Mass. 251; 2 Wood's Railway Law, $310, and cases cited. See also Richmond & Danville R. R. Co. v. Morris, 31 Gratt. at p. 207 (2), where this court, per Burks, J., after having stated that the conductor should have cautioned the passenger not to attempt to get off until the train stopped, said:

1. Reed v. Axtell, 84 Va. 231, was an action for damages for an injury to a passenger who, while waiting at a station for a train, stepped off the platform and was injured. Plaintiff was held guilty of contributory negligence, she having left the lighted reception-room and walked upon the platform, which was unlighted, the lamp being trimmed VOL. VII-4

at the time by one of defendant's servants. Plaintiff did not inquire whether it was safe for her to so leave the reception-room.

2. Richmond & D. R. R. Co. v. Morris, 31 Gratt. (Va.) is reported in 7 Am. Neg. Cas., ante.

"The company was also in fault in not having stationary lights. * * * And this defect made it all the more incumbent on the conductor to exercise more than usual care and caution in letting off passengers." This language is peculiarly appropriate in the present case, where an unattended and encumbered female passenger was permitted to go forth from the train wholly unaided, and to grope her way in the midst of a fierce storm and intense darkness.

The position of the plaintiff in error, that the appointments at country stations are not required to be so safe and so well adapted to guard the lives and security of persons as those in cities, has not the sanction of law, reason, or justice.

4th. The fourth and last assignment of error is the refusal of the court to set aside the verdict of the jury and award a new trial. As already stated, there is in this case the unusual feature of a certificate of the evidence as well as a certificate of the facts proved. There can be no question that the certificate of facts is paramount, the rule which prevails in this court being that what the trial judge has certified to be the facts proved in the trial court are to be accepted by this court as final and conclusive, unless manifestly erroneous. Here, however, whether the facts certified or the evidence certified be considered, the result will be the same; for when, under § 3484, Code 1887, the rules governing a demurrer to evidence are applied, and all the parol evidence of the plaintiff in error that is in conflict with the evidence of the defendant in error, has been discarded, and full faith and credit is given to the evidence advanced by the defendant in error, as well as to all inferences that are fairly deducible therefrom, there can remain no question whatever that the refusal of the court below to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial was correct, and that the judgment complained of is right and must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY V. GROSECLOSE'S ADMINISTRATOR.

Supreme Court of Appeals, Virginia, July, 1891.

[Reported in 88 Va. 267.]

CHILD KILLED WHILE WAITING TO BOARD TRAIN CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE. Where a child five years of age, accompanied by its parents, was on the track waiting to board the train which its parents had boarded, but the train, with a violent and sudden jerk, started backwards and the steps of the caboose struck the child and he was thrown under the train, whereby he was so injured that he died shortly afterwards, and the evidence showed that, although the conductor knew that the party was boarding the train, he gave the signal to back the train, the facts showed culpable negligence, for which the company was liable. IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE. - - The doctrine of imputed negligence, whereby a child of tender age could not recover damages if it was negligently exposed to danger by its parent or guardian, and injured, the negligence of the parent being imputed to the child, does not prevail in Virginia.

ERROR to judgment of Circuit Court of Washington County, rendered January 21, 1890, in action of trespass on the case wherein M. L. Groseclose, administrator of Marco S. Groseclose, deceased, was plaintiff, and the Norfolk & Western Railroad Company was defendant. Verdict and judgment being for plaintiff, defendant brought the case to this court on writ of error and supersedeas. The facts appear in the opinion.

FULKERSON, PAGE & HURT, for plaintiff in error.

F. S. BLAIR and DANIEL TRIGG, for defendant in error. Lewis, P.-The action was to recover damages for the alleged negligent killing of the plaintiff's intestate, a child five years and one month of age. On the 9th of February, 1888, M. L. Groseclose, accompanied by his wife and five children, went to Meadow View, a station on the defendant's road, in Washington County, to take a train for Rural Retreat, in Wythe County. He purchased of the depot agent at Meadow View two whole tickets and two half tickets for himself and family. Of the five children. two were under five years of age; the other three were over that age, but under twelve.

Before the arrival of the train at the station, the father asked and secured the assistance of three gentlemen, who were present, to get the children on the car. The train was a local freight train, having at its rear end a caboose for passengers. Upon the

arrival of the train, and after it had stopped, the children and their adult attendants left the depot platform, and started for the train. Several passengers alighted from the caboose car, when Groseclose, the father, with one of the children, went up the steps and into the car. He was followed by a Mr. Naff, who carried another child. Following Naff was Mrs. Groseclose, but just as she had gotten up the steps, the train with a violent and sudden jerk started backwards, the steps of the caboose striking the deceased, who was standing on the ends of the ties, and throwing him under the wheels of the train, which passed over and crushed his left leg, and inflicted other injuries, which caused his death the same day.

The conductor of the train saw the party approaching the caboose, with the luggage, but paid no attention to them. In fact, he went in another direction to see, as he says, about the freight. And not only this, but he deliberately ordered a brakeman to signal the engineer to back the train, when he knew, or ought to have known, that passengers were in the act of getting on, to whom no warning whatever was given. The whistle on the engine was not sounded, nor the bell rung, and the only signal to the engineer was a slight wave of the brakeman's hand.

Under these circumstances, a clearer case of culpable negligence or the violation of the duty of a railroad company, as a part of the implied contract to carry safely, to give its passengers time to get off and on in safety, could hardly be imagined. Whart. Neg., § 648; N. & W. R. R. Co. v. Prinnell, 12 Va. L. J. 72 (1).

The company, however, contends it was negligence on the part of the parents to allow the deceased to stand at the place he was when struck, and that their contributory negligence bars a recovery. It is conceded that the deceased himself, by reason of his tender years, was non sui juris, and therefore, incapable of contributory negligence.

There was evidence for the company, on the question of the parent's negligence, tending to show that the deceased when struck was standing behind the car, between the rails, apparently attempting to climb upon the bumper. But this evidence must be rejected, because it is in conflict with the plaintiff's evidence, which shows that he was not between the rails, but was standing 1. Norfolk & W. R. R. Co. v. Prinnell (Va.), is reported in 7 Am. Neg. Cas. 12, ante.

near the car, on the ends of the ties. We say the evidence must be rejected, because as the evidence, not the facts, being certified, the case stands in this court as on a demurrer to evidence; and viewing the case in this light, the charge of contributory negligence is not sustained. But that is a wholly immaterial question in this action. When the suit is by a parent for the loss of service caused by an injury to the child, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is a good defense; but such negligence is not imputable to the child, and is consequently not to be considered, when the suit is by the child, or its personal representative. Shearm. & R. Neg., § 48a; Glassey v. Hestonville, etc., R. R. Co., 57 Pa. St. 172; Huff v. Ames, 16 Neb. 139, 49 Am. Rep. 716.

The doctrine of Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615, has been repudiated in this State, as in many other States of the Union, and the doctrine established as just stated (1). Beach, Cont.

1. Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 615, is the leading American case on the doctrine of imputed negligence, and Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt. 213, is the leading case denying that doctrine.

Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615; s. C., 13 N. Y. Com. L. (Law. ed.) 1209 (with note of conflicting cases), 34 Am. Dec. 273, is applied (imputing negligence of infant to parent) in Mangam v. Brooklyn R. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 457, affirming 36 Barb. 238. Followed as the law of New York in Mowrey v. Central City R'y Co., 66 Barb. 43, affirmed in 51 N. Y. 666, 5 Am. Neg. Cas. 178, 179. Distinguished in Thurber v. Harlem, etc.. R. Co., 60 N. Y. 326. Criticised in G. H. & H. R'y Co. v. Moore, 59 Tex. 64: S. C., 46 Am. Rep. 265; also in article in I Am. Law J. 153. Distinguished and doubted in Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt. 213; S. C., 54 Am. Dec. 67, with note. Approved with Mangam v. Brooklyn R. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 455, in Fitzgerald v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 29 Minn. 336, 43 Am. Rep. 212, with note. See also note in 5 Am. Rep. 148. The doctrine followed in Holly v. Boston Gas Light Co., 8 Gray (Mass.), 123; Callahan v. Bean, 9 Allen (Mass.), 401,

but opposed in many States. See Daley v. Norwich & W. R. R. Co., 26 Conn. 598; Robinson v. Coe, 22 Pa. St. 226; Ranch v. Lloyd, 31 Pa. St. 358, 370; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Kelly, 31 Pa. St. 372; Phila. R. R. Co. v. Spearen, 47 Pa. St. 305; Smith v. O'Connor, 48 Pa. St. 218; City of Chicago v. Mayor, etc., 18 Ill. 360, 42 Ill. 356; City v. Kirby, 8 Minn. 169; Boland v. Missouri, 36 Mo. 490; Whirley v. Wittemore, 1 Head, (Tenn.) 620. Included with note in Lawson's Lead. Com. L. Cas. Simplified, 239; 2 Thomps. Neg. 1121. Commented on in 2 Thomps. Neg. 1180, 1184, 1187. See also Ray's Neg. Imp. Duties, Pass. Carr. 731; Patterson's R'y Acc. Law, 86, 91. Applied (contributory negligence in one injured on highway) in Barker v. Savage, 45 N. Y. 191. Followed in Kennard v. Burton, 25 Me. 39; s. C., 43 Am. Dec. 249, 254, with note. Relied on with Brown v. Maxwell, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 592 (contributory negligence as bar) in New Orleans, J. & N. R. R. Co. v. Harrison, 48 Miss. 112; s. c., 12 Am. Rep. 356, 366. Cited in Finkelstein v. Crane, 2 Misc. (N. Y.) 545, 55 N. Y. St. Rep. 613, 22 N. Y. Supp. 399; Elze v. Baumann,