1853, he spoke as follows: "The tendency of commercial and political events invites the United States to assume and exercise a paramount influence in the affairs of the nations situated in this hemisphere; that is, to become and remain a great Western continental power, balancing itself against the possible combinations of Europe. The advance of the country toward that position constitutes what, in the language of many, is called progress,' and the position itself is what, by the same class, is called 'manifest destiny.'

When Cass moved a resolution affirming the Monroe doctrine with regard to Cuba, Seward supported it, together with another resolution perfectly consistent with it, of which he said: "It is not well expressed; but it implies the same policy in regard to Canada which the main resolutions assert concerning Cuba." Nor is this the limit of his ambition. "You are already," he says to his countrymen, “the great continental power of America. But does that content you? I trust it does not. You want the commerce of the world, which is the empire of the world."+

When Kossuth was received in the Senate, he was introduced by Mr. Seward, whose European policy is as definite and about as respectable as his American. Speaking of Hungary, he writes, in December 1851: "I trust that some measure may be adopted by the government which, while it will not at all hazard the peace or prosperity of the country, may serve to promote a cause that appeals so strongly to our interests and our sympathies, viz. the establishment of republicanism, in the countries prepared for it, in Europe."§ And again, two days later: "Every nation may, and every nation ought, to make its position distinctly known in every case of conflict between despots and States struggling for the inalienable and indefeasible rights of independence and self-government, that when despots combine, free States may lawfully unite."

It is as impossible to sympathise on religious grounds with the categorical prohibition of slavery as, on political grounds, with the opinions of the abolitionists. In this, as in all other things, they exhibit the same abstract, ideal absolutism, which is equally hostile with the Catholic and with the English spirit. Their democratic system poisons every thing it touches. All constitutional questions are referred to the one fundamental principle of popular sovereignty, without consideration of policy or expediency. In the Massachusetts convention of 1853, it was argued by one of the most famous Americans, that the election of the judiciary * Works, iii. 606. † Ibid. 609. § Ibid. 505.

Ibid. 618.

could not be discussed on the grounds of its influence on the administration of justice, as it was clearly consonant with the constitutional theory. "What greater right," says the NorthAmerican Review (lxxxvi. 477), "has government to deprive the people of their representation in the executive and judicial, than in the legislative department?" In claiming absolute freedom, they have created absolute power, whilst we have inherited from the middle ages the notion that both liberty and authority must be subject to limits and conditions. The same intolerance of restraints and obligations, the same aversion to recognise the existence of popular duty, and of the divine right which is its correlative, disturb their notions of government and of freedom. The influence of these habits of abstract reasoning, to which we owe the revolution in Europe, is to make all things questions of principle and of abstract law. A principle is always appealed to in all cases, either of interest or necessity, and the consequence is, that a false and arbitrary political system produces a false and arbitrary code of ethics, and the theory of abolition is as erroneous as the theory of freedom.

Very different is the mode in which the Church labours to reform mankind by assimilating realities with ideals, and accommodating herself to times and circumstances. Her system of Christian liberty is essentially incompatible with slavery; and the power of masters over their slaves was one of the bulwarks of corruption and vice which most seriously impeded her progress. Yet the Apostles never condemned slavery even within the Christian fold. The sort of civil liberty which came with Christianity into the world, and was one of her postulates, did not require the abolition of slavery. If men were free by virtue of their being formed after the image of God, the proportion in which they realised that image would be the measure of their freedom. Accordingly, St. Paul prescribed to the Christian slave to remain content with his condition.*

We have gone at inordinate length into the causes and peculiarities of the revolution in the United States, because of the constant analogy they present to the theories and the events which are at the same time disturbing Europe. It is too late to touch upon more than one further point, which is extremely suggestive. The Secession movement was not provoked merely by the alarm of the slave-owners for their property, when the election of Lincoln sent down

* 1 Cor. vii. 21. The opposite interpretation, common among Protestant commentators, is inconsistent with the verses 20 and 24, and with the tradition of the Greek Fathers.

the price of slaves from twenty-five to fifty per cent, but by the political danger of Northern preponderance; and the mean whites of the Southern States are just as eager for separation as those who have property in slaves. For they fear lest the republicans, in carrying emancipation, should abolish the barriers which separate the Negroes from their own caste. At the same time, the slaves show no disposition to help the republicans, and be raised to the level of the whites. There is a just reason for this fear, which lies in the simple fact that the United States are a republic. The population of a republic must be homogeneous. Civil equality must be founded on social equality, and on national and physiological unity. This has been the strength of the American republic. Pure democracy is that form of government in which the community is sovereign, in which, therefore, the State is most nearly identified with society. But society exists for the protection of interests; the State for the realisation of right-concilia cœtusque hominum jure sociati, quæ civitates appellantur.* The State sets up a moral, objective law, and pursues a common object distinct from the ends and purposes of society. This is essentially repugnant to democracy, which recognises only the interests and rights of the community, and is therefore inconsistent with the consolidation of authority which is implied in the notion of the State. It resists the development of the social into the moral community. If, therefore, a democracy includes persons with separate interests or an inferior nature, it tyrannises over them. There is no mediator between the part and the whole; there is no room, therefore, for differences of class, of wealth, of race; equality is necessary to the liberty which is sought by a pure democracy.

Where society is constituted without equality of condition or unity of race, where there are different classes and national varieties, they require a protector in a form of government which shall be distinct from and superior to every class, and not the instrument of one of them, in an authority representing the State, not any portion of society. This can be supplied only by monarchy; and in this sense it is fair to say that constitutional government, that is, the authority of law as distinguished from interest, can exist only under a king. This is also the reason why even absolute monarchies have been better governors of dependencies than popular governments. In one case they are governed for the benefit of a ruling class; in the other, there is no ruling class, and

*Cicero, Somnium Scipionis, 3.

they are governed in the name of the State. Rome under the Republic and under the Empire is the most striking instance of this contrast. But the tyranny of republics is greatest when differences of races are combined with distinctions of class. Hence South America was a flourishing and prosperous country so long as the Spanish crown served as moderator between the various races, and is still prosperous where monarchy has been retained; whilst the establishment of republics in countries with classes divided by blood has led to hopeless misery and disorder, and constant recourse to dictatorships as a refuge from anarchy and tyranny. Democracy inevitably takes the tone of the lower portions of society, and, if there are great diversities, degrades the higher. Slavery is the only protection that has ever been known against this tendency, and it is so far true that slavery is essential to democracy. For where there are great incongruities in the constitution of society, if the Americans were to admit the Indians, the Chinese, the Negroes, to the rights to which they are justly jealous of admitting European emigrants, the country would be thrown into disorder, and if not, would be degraded to the level of the barbarous races. Accordingly, the Know-nothings rose up as the reaction of the democratic principle against the influx of an alien population. The Red Indian is gradually retreating before the pioneer, and will perish before many generations, or dwindle away in the desert. The Chinese in California inspire great alarm for the same reason, and plans have been proposed of shipping them all off again. This is a good argument too, in the interest of all parties, against the emancipation of the blacks.

This necessity for social equality and national unity has been felt in all democracies where the mass as a unit governs itself. Above all, it is felt as a necessity in France, since the downfall of the old society, and the recognition, under republic, charter, and despotism, of the sovereignty of the people. Those principles with which France revolutionises Europe are perfectly right in her own case. They are detestable in other countries where they cause revolutions, but they are a true and just consequence of the French Revolution. Men easily lose sight of the substance in the form, and suppose that because France is not a republic she is not a democracy, and that her principles therefore will apply elsewhere. This is the reason of the power of the national principle in Europe. It is essential as a consequence of equality to the notion of the people as the source of power. Where there is an aristocracy it has generally more sympathy and connection with foreign aristocracies than with the rest of the nation. The bonds of

class are stronger than those of nationality. A democracy, in abolishing classes, renders national unity imperative.

These are some of the political lessons we have learnt from the consideration of the vast process of which we are witnessing the consummation. We may consult the history of the American Union to understand the true theory of republicanism, and the danger of mistaking it. It is simply the spurious democracy of the French Revolution that has destroyed the Union, by disintegrating the remnants of English traditions and institutions. All the great controversies on the embargo, restriction, internal improvement, the Bank-Charter Act, the formation of new States, the acquisition of new territory, abolition—are phases of this mighty change, steps in the passage from à constitution framed on an English model to a system imitating that of France. The secession of the Southern States-pregnant with infinite consequences to the African race, by altering the condition of slavery, to America by awakening an intenser thirst for conquest, to Europe by its reaction on European democracy, to England, above all, by threatening for a moment one of the pillars of her social existence, but still more by the enormous augmentation of her power, on which the United States were always a most formidable restraint—is chiefly important in a political light as a protest and reaction against revolutionary doctrines, and as a move in the opposite direction to that which prevails in Europe.

DR. WARD'S PHILOSOPHY.*

THE late theological lecturer at St. Edmund's commences his course, not with God, but with human nature, not because he fails to found moral obligation on the Divine nature and attributes, but because, after this foundation has been once assumed, the discussion of human nature can be conducted independently to the end. The trifling inconvenience of the assumption may be well pardoned in a teacher who feels a special predilection and vocation to the moral and anthropological side of theology.

The present volume contains the philosophical introduction to the theological course, and only treats of those truths which, though they may be enforced by revelation, are de

* On Nature and Grace. A Theological Treatise. Book I.: Philosophical Introduction. By W. G. Ward, Ph. D. London: Burns and Lambert.