under the orders and direction of the charterer as regards employment, agency, or other arrangements, and the charterer hereby agrees to indemnify the owner from all consequences or liabilities that may arise from any irregularities in ship's papers, or from the captains signing bills of lading, or otherwise complying with the charterer's directions."

The court has to consider if this language is (1) a limitation on the authority of the captain, or (2) merely a contract made by the charterer with the owner that the former will pay for supplies in the first instance, and, in case this is not done for any reason, will reimburse the owner for supplies paid for by the latter. The language of the clauses might not unreasonably bear either construction. On general principles there is much to be said in support of the contention that a clause in a charter like that above quoted, providing that the charterer shall supply the vessel with coal, is intended merely as a contract between charterer and owner, and does not limit the general authority of the master to order coal for the vessel upon the vessel's credit in a foreign port. In The Kate, above cited, the provisions of the charter were much like those in this case, and the supreme court said at page 465, 164 U. S., page 138, 17 Sup. Ct., and page 512, 41

L. Ed.:

"We are of opinion that, as the libelant knew, or, under the circumstances, is to be charged with knowledge, that the charter party under which the Kate was operated obliged the charterer to provide and pay for all the coal needed by that vessel, no lien can be asserted under the maritime law for the value of coal supplied under the order of the charterer, even if it be assumed that the libelant in fact furnished the coal upon the credit both of the charterer and of the vessel. As the charterer had agreed to provide and pay for all coal used by the vessel, he had no authority to bind the vessel for supplies furnished to it. His want of authority to charge the vessel for such an expense was known or could have been known to the libelant by the exercise of due diligence on its part. Under the circumstances, the libelant was not entitled to deliver the coal on the credit of the vessel, and its attempt to hold the vessel liable is in bad faith to the owner. The law cannot approve or encourage such an attempt to wrong the owners of the vessel. Neither reason nor public policy forbade the owner and the charterer from making the arrangement evidenced by the charter party of December 15, 1892. The master of a ship is regarded as 'the confidential servant or agent of the owners, and they are bound to the performance of all lawful contracts made by him relative to the usual employment of the ship, and the repairs and other necessaries furnished for her use. This rule is established as well upon the implied assent of the owners as with a view to the convenience of the commercial world.' The Aurora, 1 Wheat. 95, 101, 4 L. Ed. 45. "The vessel must get on,' and 'the necessities of commerce require that, when remote from the owner, he [the master] should be able to subject his owner's property to that liability, without which, it is reasonable to suppose, he will not be able to pursue his owner's interests.' The St. Jago de Cuba, 9 Wheat. 409, 416. 6 L. Ed. 122; The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 1, 13 Sup. Ct. 498, 37 L. Ed. 345. When, therefore, supplies are furnished to a vessel in a foreign port upon the order of the master, nothing else appearing, the presumption is that they were furnished on the credit of the vessel and of the owners, and an implied lien is given. But no such necessity can be suggested, and no such reasons urged, in support of an implied lien for supplies furnished to a charterer, when the libelant at the time knew, or by such diligence as good faith required could have ascertained, that the party upon whose order they were furnished was without authority from the owner to obtain supplies on the credit of the vessel, but had undertaken, as between itself and the owner, to provide and pay for all supplies required by the vessel."

There was a like charter in The Valencia, 165 U. S. 264, 17 Sup. Ct. 323, 41 L. Ed. 710, and the court said at page 270, 165 U. S., page 325, 17 Sup. Ct., and page 710, 41 L. Ed.:

"Although the libelants were not aware of the existence of the charter party under which the Valencia was employed, it must be assumed, upon the facts certified, that by reasonable diligence they could have ascertained that the New York Steamship Company did not own the vessel, but used it under a charter party providing that the charterer should pay for all needed coal. The libelants knew that the steamship company had an office in the city of New York. They did business with them at that office, and could easily have ascertained the ownership of the vessel and the relation of the steamship company to the owners. They were put upon inquiry, but they chose to shut their eyes and make no inquiry touching these matters, or in reference to the solvency or credit of that company."

See Beinecke v. The Secret (D. C.) 3 Fed. 665, quoted with approval by the supreme court in the last-named case; The Cumberland (D. C.) 30 Fed. 449, 455; The William Cook (D. C.) 12 Fed. 919; Neill v. The Francis (D. C.) 21 Fed. 921; The Solveig, 43 C. C. A. 250, 103 Fed. 322; The Stroma (D. C.) 41 Fed. 599; The Pirate (D. C.) 32 Fed. 486.

In other cases it was assumed that, if the materialmen had had knowledge of the existence of a charter like that in this case, he would have had no lien, although, as no knowledge on his part was established, the lien was allowed. The North Pacific, 40 C. C. A. 510, 100 Fed. 490; Norwegian S. S. Co. v. Washington, 6 C. C. A. 313, 57 Fed. 224; The Ellen Holgate (D. C.) 30 Fed. 125. These cases construe the language used in this charter to forbid the master to pledge the credit of the vessel for the supplies he orders. Many of these cases, and others heretofore cited, also hold that the materialman is affected by the limitations of the charter if he has notice of them. There is much authority for the proposition that this charter, if brought to the notice of the materialman, will prevent him from getting a lien. It is true that there is authority upon the other side, and that the opinions of the supreme court just cited are not quite explicit. In the City of New York, Fed. Cas. No. 2,758, the lien was upheld in the case of a charter like this. The vessel was in a really distant port, however, and was in such peril that the limitation imposed on the master's authority by the charter may have been treated as inapplicable within the intent of the parties. The opinion is short. See The Wm. Cook (D. C.) 12 Fed. 919, 920. In The Lucia B. Ives, Fed. Cas. No. 8,590, the lien was upheld, but whether in reliance on the express terms of the statute or upon a doubt as to the meaning of the charter is not clear. In The Monsoon, Fed. Cas. No. 9,716, decided by Judge Sprague, in which that distinguished judge upheld a lien upon a chartered vessel, it is doubtful if the decision was rested upon a supposed inability of the owner to limit the master's authority, or upon a construction of the charter in question. If the former, the case stands substantially alone; if the latter, it is opposed to the great weight of authority. See The H. B. Foster, 3 Ware, 165, Fed. Cas. No. 6,291; Rozo v. The Neversink, Fed. Cas. No. 12,079; The India (D. C.) 14 Fed. 476; Id. (C. C.) 16 Fed. 262. The language of some of the opinions last cited is not

clear, but the learned judges who delivered them did not mean to hold that a materialman could claim a lien for supplies furnished a vessel where he knew that the person ordering the supplies was expressly forbidden to permit the vessel to become bound for them.

That a chartered vessel is ordinarily bound for the price of supplies ordered for her use in a foreign port by the master was expressly decided in this circuit in the case of The Philadelphia, and this is the law where the charter is silent upon the subject. Where, however, the charter limitation is that found in this case, and where the coal is ordered, not in a port of distress, where it may reasonably be supposed that the further prosecution of the voyage is for the interest of the owner as well as for that of the charterer, I am of opinion that no lien exists.

Libel dismissed.

HUDSON et al. v. WOOD et al.

(Circuit Court, W. D. Kentucky. January 3, 1903.)

1 FEDERAL COURTS-PROCEEDINGS FOR ENFORCEMEnt of JudGMENT-STATUTE GIVING BENEFIT OF STATE REMEDIES.

Rev. St. § 916 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 684], which provides that a party recovering a judgment in any common-law cause in a federal court "shall be entitled to similar remedies on the same, by execution or otherwise, to reach the property of the judgment debtor, as are now provided in like causes by the laws of the state," etc., does not embrace remedies in equity by independent suit which may have been given by the statutes of a state, but is limited by the phrase "in like causes" to remedies provided in actions at law wherein judgments were recovered.

2. SAME-CREDITORS' SUIT-ENFORCEMENT OF LEGAL DEMANDS IN EQUITY.

In a creditors' suit in a federal court by a judgment creditor against the judgment defendant and another, alleged to be his debtor on a mere money demand, the question of the latter's indebtedness, if denied by him, cannot be tried, even though such procedure is authorized by a state statute, since that would deprive him of his constitutional right to a jury trial; but the complainant may, by the joinder of such defendant, obtain a discovery from him as to his indebtedness and the right to an equitable lien thereon, to become effective and to be enforced when such indebtedness shall have been established in an action at law. and also the appointment of a receiver, with authority to bring such an action.

& EQUITY-BILL FOR DISCOVERY-SUFFICIENCY.

A defendant in a creditors' suit, from whom discovery is prayed in respect to his indebtedness to the judgment debtor, cannot object to the making of such discovery because the bill waives answer under oath. 4 SAME-MULTIFARIOUSNESS.

A creditors' bill in a federal court, against judgment debtors and another who is alleged to be indebted to them on a legal demand, is multifarious, as against the latter, where it prays, not only for a discovery and for a decree adjudging a claim made by him that his indebtedness was to another than the judgment debtors to be fraudulent, but also for a personal judgment against him, as uniting equitable and legal demands, and because the latter is a demand over which the court is without jurisdiction in equity.

In Equity. On demurrer to bill.

Dodd & Dodd and Joseph Fettretch, for complainants.

Fairleigh, Straus & Eagles, Helm, Bruce & Helm, and, Humphrey, Burnett & Humphrey, for defendant Boyle.

EVANS, District Judge. In an action at law lately pending in this court the complainants, C. I. Hudson & Co., who are citizens of New York, recovered a judgment against Geo. T. Wood, George L. Bacon, and Cary H. Bacon, individuals who composed the partnership firm of Geo. T. Wood & Co., brokers doing business in Louisville, for $81,029.70, besides interest and costs, but subject to a credit of $1,071.37. Subsequently an execution of fieri facias was issued by the clerk and placed in the hands of the marshal, by whom it was returned nulla bona. Afterwards this suit in equity was instituted by the judgment creditors against Geo. T. Wood, George L. Bacon, and Cary H. Bacon, partners as Geo. T. Wood & Co., St. John Boyle, and a corporation styled Geo. T. Wood & Co., all of whom are citizens of Kentucky. The bill of complaint, after alleging the foregoing facts and stating that the members of said partnership firm—the judgment debtors-each had in his possession or under his control money or securities therefor, or other equitable interests, etc., not subject to execution, and which they refused to surrender in payment of the judgment, contains averments as follows:

"(4) Plaintiffs state that they are informed and believe and charge that the defendants George T. Wood, George L. Bacon, and Cary H. Bacon, partners as George T. Wood & Co., hold as an asset a claim against the defendant St. John Boyle for at least the sum of $81,029.70, with interest thereon from May 10, 1901, originating from the undertaking of the said St. John Boyle, as their undisclosed principal, to supply them, as his agents, with funds sufficient to pay off and discharge the said liability in favor of these plaintiffs against them; that the said indebtedness from the said George T. Wood & Co. to these plaintiffs arose and was created for the account and benefit of the said St. John Boyle as principal, in transactions wherein he employed the said George T. Wood & Co. as his agents, and that in executing his instructions and performing their duties as such agents the said George T. Wood & Co. incurred the said liability to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs state that it was the duty of the defendant St. John Boyle to supply the said George T. Wood & Co. with money sufficient to pay the said liability, and that he was and is legally bound to indemnify and pay them the amount of the said debt, interest, and costs. Plaintiffs state that they are informed, believe, and charge that the defendant St. John Boyle has undertaken, agreed, and promised to pay the said George T. Wood & Co. the money necessary to pay the said entire liability to plaintiffs, but has wholly failed and neglected to do so; that the said claim against St. John Boyle is an asset held by the said George T. Wood & Co., the proceeds of which, when and to the extent collected, should in equity and good conscience be applied on the plaintiffs' said judgment.

"(5) Plaintiffs further state that they are now informed that the defendants George T. Wood, George L. Bacon, and Cary H. Bacon, and the defendant St. John Boyle, claim that a pretended corporation was formed under the general laws of Kentucky in the early part of 1901 in the corporate name of George T. Wood & Co., and in which the defendants George T. Wood, George L. Bacon, and Cary H. Bacon were the sole incorporators, and equally interested as stockholders; that said corporation was formed to take over the assets and liabilities of the said firm of George T. Wood & Co.; and that the said defendants are now pretending that the claim asserted against the defendant St. John Boyle, in the fourth paragraph hereof, as aforesaid, is due to the said corporation of George T. Wood & Co., and not to the said firm of George T. Wood & Co. Plaintiffs state that during all the times herein before set out, and when the said indebtedness was incurred to them by George T. Wood & Co., and created by the said St. John Boyle to the said George T. Wood & Co., the business of the said George T. Wood & Co. was conducted and carried on under the firm name of George T. Wood & Co., and under the

firm name of Wood, Bacon & Co., both of which firms, as well as the said pretended corporation, was composed of the said George T. Wood, George L. Bacon, and Cary H. Bacon alone, and all of the business in which the said George T. Wood & Co. was interested was carried on in the same office, by the same parties, as proprietors, bookkeepers, and employés, and with all of the same appliances. Plaintiffs aver that they are informed, believe, and charge that the said pretended claim that the account against said St. John Boyle belonged to the said corporation of George T. Wood & Co., instead of the firm of George T. Wood & Co., is a false and fraudulent device and pretense; that neither the said firm nor the said corporation has ever paid any part of the said judgment, nor have the said corporation any title, claim, or interest against the said St. John Boyle on account of said judgment indebtedness. Plaintiffs make the said George T. Wood & Co., Incorporated, a party hereto, and call it to answer and assert any claim or equity it may have to any of the assets sought to be subjected to the payment of the plaintiffs' judgment, or be forever barred therefrom."

After other averments not material to the matters now in hand, relief is prayed in this language:

"(7) In consideration of the premises, and forasmuch as the plaintiffs are without any adequate remedy at law, and cannot have adequate relief except in a court of equity, and to that end that the defendants, George T. Wood, George L. Bacon, Cary H. Bacon, Geo. T. Wood & Co., Incorporated, and St. John Boyle, may, if they can, show why the plaintiffs should not have the relief to which they are entitled, and for which they pray, and that the said defendants shall make full disclosures and discoveries of the assets and matters herein alleged as to each of them, so that same may be subjected to the plaintiffs' judgment, and that the said defendants, according to their and each of their best knowledge, remembrance, information, and belief make full, true, direct, and perfect answers to the matters herein stated and charged against them, respectively, but not under oath, their oaths being hereby expressly waived, the plaintiffs pray as follows: (1) That the said George T. Wood, George L. Bacon, and Cary H. Bacon, and each of them, be compelled to disclose and surrender to the court herein all money and securities therefor, choses in action, and legal and equitable assets in their possession or under their control and not exempt to them by law, to the end that the same shall be applied, under proper orders of this court, to the satisfaction of plaintiffs' judgment herein, and that the net proceeds arising therefrom be turned over to plaintiffs and applied as credits on their said judgment. (2) That the plaintiffs, in the name of said George T. Wood & Co., recover of the defendant St. John Boyle the sum of $81,029.70, with interest thereon from May 10, 1901, and their taxable costs as to the said Boyle incurred and expended herein, so that the net proceeds of such recovery, when and as collected, shall be applied on said judgment against the said George T. Wood & Co., so far as may be necessary to pay the same. (3) That the defendant George T. Wood & Co., Incorporated, be adjudged to have no interest or claim in any of the aforesaid assets, or any assets discovered and disclosed herein, until the plaintiffs' said judgment, interest, and costs shall have been first satisfied. (4) That the plaintiffs may have such other and further appropriate relief in the premises as the nature of the case may demand, as equity may require, and as to this court may seem proper, to the end that may be necessary to enforce the plaintiffs' aforesaid judgment, interest, and costs."

No objection to the proceeding is taken by any of the defendants, except Boyle, who has interposed a demurrer to the bill upon three distinct grounds, to wit: (1) That this court has no jurisdiction of the alleged complaint; (2) that the bill is multifarious; and (3) that the bill does not contain any matter of equity whereon the court can ground any decree or give the complainants any relief against the defendant Boyle. The questions thus raised have been ably argued, and an effort to find a proper solution of them has required no little