"As to the mere effect of the accident itself, no valid objection can be founded upon that simply, for, if the party by the contract has become in equity the owner of the premises, they are his to all intents and purposes. They are vendible as his; chargeable as his; capable of being encumbered as his; they may be devised as his; they may be assets and they would descend to his heir." 1 But where there is a delay in getting the title in such shape as to become marketable, and the improvements are destroyed by fire before the vendor is in a position to convey the legal title, and before the vendee obtains possession, the loss is that of the vendor.2]

important maxim is

§ 85. [Equity Aids the that "equity aids the vigilant, and not those who sleep on their rights." The policy of the law, as well as equity, is that when one has a claim or demand he ought to prosecute it within a reasonable time, while the facts are yet fresh in the minds of his adversary and the witnesses and may be produced before the court. It would be a great hardship upon the defendant, and inequitable for the plaintiff to claim that he was over-reached and unduly influenced to enter into an unconscionable trade, and wait for years afterwards to make known his claim, and probably when those who knew the real facts have since died. It sometimes happens that one has been defrauded and the real facts are not apparent to him for years afterwards, then he has a reasonable time from the discovery of the fraud to bring his action; but not where he knew of the alleged fraud and acquiesced in the wrongful conduct of another and deliberately refused to assert his rights until sometime afterwards when he sustained an injury. Delay in the asser

1 Paine v. Meller, 16 Ves. Jr. 349; Sewell v. Underhill, 197 N. Y. 168 111 N. Y. Supp. 85, 127 App. Div. 92, 90 N. E. 430; Clinton v. Hope, 45 N. Y. 454; Goldman v. Rosenberg, 116 N. Y. 78, 22 N. E. 259; McKetchnie v. Sterling, 48 Barb. 330; Powell v. Dayton etc. R. Co., 12 Oreg. 488, 8 Pac. 544; Thompson v. Norton, 14 Ind. 187; Brewer v. Herbert, 30 Md. 301; Walker v. Owen, 79 Mo. 563; Woodward v. McCollum, 16 N. Dak. 42, 111 N. W. 623; Marion v. Wolcott, 68 N. J. Eq. 20, 59 Atl. 242; Martin v. Carver, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 56, 1 S. W. 199; Marks v. Tichenor, 85 Ky. 536, 4 S. W. 225; Manning v. North British etc. Ins. Co., 123 Mo. App. 456, 99 S. W. 1095; Dunn v. Yakish, 10 Okla. 388, 61 Pac. 926.

2 Good v. Jarrard, 93 S. C. 229, 76 S. E. 698; Hawkes v. Kehoe, 193 Mass. 419, 79 N. E. 766, 10 L. R. A. (N.S.) 129, 9 Ann. Cas. 1053; Wells v. Calnan, 107 Mass. 514, 9 Am. Rep. 65; Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S. E. 796, 50 L. R. A. 680, 78 Am. St. Rep. 207; Gould v. Murch, 70 Me. 288; Wilson v. Clark, 60 N. H. 352; Kares v. Covell, 180 Mass. 206, 62 N. E. 244.

tion of a right, unless satisfactorily explained, even where it does not constitute a positive statutory bar, operates in equity as an evidence of assent, acquiescence, or waiver; and especially is such the case in suits to set aside transactions on account of fraud or infancy. Laches and neglect are always discountenanced by a court of equity. A Court of Equity, which is never active in relief against stale demands, will always refuse relief where the party has slept upon his rights and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call into activity this court but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence; where these are wanting, the court is passive and does nothing.1]

§ 86. [In Whose Favor the Maxim Lies.-One who by his own fraud has led another to his injury, cannot complain of the want of promptness of plaintiff in discovering the fraud and proceeding to rescind, since it was the defendant's concealment in violation of his duty to him and his interests which prevented the plaintiff from knowing the actual conditions at the time of the transaction. Equity rewards the diligent, but this has no application to the diligent in concealment and deceit.2 Nor is one entitled to the aid of the court where that aid becomes necessary by his own fault.3]

§ 87. [Treatment of Statute of Limitations in Equity Practice. — Courts of Equity, although not in all cases bound by the Statute of Limitations, unless expressly brought within its provisions, have nevertheless acted in this respect in analogy to Courts of Law, and given effect to the statute in all cases of concurrent jurisdiction; and it may be said that in such cases a Court of Equity will no more disregard the statute than will a Court of Law. Courts of Equity act not so much in analogy as in obedience to statutes of limitation of legal actions, because, where the legal remedy is barred, the spirit of the statute bars the equitable remedy also. Statutes of limitation do obtain in a Court of Equity, and to the extent to which they so obtain a Court of Equity has no discretion to dispense with them, but is bound by them. True, it is said that a Court of Equity acts by analogy to these statutes; but this

1 Bill v. Schilling, 39 W. Va. 108, 19 S. E. 514; Jones v. Rush, 156 Mo. 364, 57 S. W. 118; Holsberry v. Harris, 56 W. Va. 320, 49 S. E. 404; Citizens National Bank v. Judy, 146 Ind. 322, 43 N. E. 259; Moore v. Moore, 30 S. E. 535, 103 Ga. 517; Dell School v. Peirce, 163 N. C. 424, 79 S. E. 687.

2 Mabry v. Randolph, 7 Cal. App. 421, 94 Pac. 403; United States Trust Co. v. David, 36 App. D. C. 555.

3 Thompson v. Lindsay, 242 Mo. 56, 145 S. W. 472.

must mean that a Court of Equity is bound so to act, whenever a proper case arises.1]

§ 88. [Equity Looks to the Substance Rather than the Form. Relief is had under this equitable doctrine very frequently in actions where the maxim that equity regards that as done which ought to be done, the relief under each maxim usually being co-extensive and similar to that sought under the other doctrine. In the construction of contracts the law looks to the agreement of the parties as it appears upon the face of the paper itself, and the action will stand or fall upon the strength or weakness of the written instrument. But the policy of equity is that where the weak has been oppressed by the strong, where a learned man has acquired an advantage over an ignorant man who had reposed trust in him, and who had believed that he would be fairly treated; where the parties are ignorant as to the law, and the purpose is to convey property as a security for debt, but in fact a deed was executed, equity in these and other such cases goes further into the transactions and dealings than to examine into the rights of the parties as they appear from written instruments, but looks into the substance of the agreement itself, and where one has been oppressed, not by his own fault, but by an inequitable advantage obtained by the other, its relief will be given. It is well established that, in a suit in equity between parties, in which fraud, oppression, and undue influence are charged, the court is not concluded by that which appears on the face of the papers, but may institute an inquiry into the real facts of the transactions.2]

1 Moore v. Moore, 103 Ga. 517, 30 S. E. 535.

2 Wagg v. Herbert, 19 Okla. 525, 92 Pac. 250, 251 U. S. 546, 54 L. Ed. 321, 30 S. Ct. Rep. 218; Frazier v. Frazier, 129 N. C. 30, 39 S. E. 634; Floars v. Ins. Co., 144 N. C. 232, 56 S. E. 915; Sikes v. Ins. Co., 144 N. C. 626, 57 S. E. 391; Sykes v. Ins. Co., 148 N. C. 20, 61 S. E. 610; Stroud v. Ins. Co., 148 N. C. 55, 61 S. E. 626.

Where a corporation was forbidden to acquire land for certain purposes, and land was bought for that purpose and title taken in the name of a trustee, original grantors are entitled to possession upon the doctrine that equity looks to the substance rather than the form. Walker v. Taylor, 252 Ill. 424, 96 N. E. 1055.

A mortgagor verbally agreed to extend the time for redemption, so that he might sell, and where the owner of the equity was induced to rely upon the representations of the creditor until the period of redemption has expired, a Court of Equity will grant relief. Ogden v. Stevens, 241 Ill. 556, 89 N. E. 741.

The doctrine means that equity goes behind the form of a transaction in order to give effect to the intention of the parties either to aid an act abortive at law because formally defective, or to impose a liability as

$88 a. [The Doctrine Applied to Trusts. Sometimes it is of advantage to both parties that the title be taken in the name of some other person, merely as a conduit, and where this has been done, and the transfer of the title is thus taken for a legitimate purpose, the law raises a resulting trust, and he, in whose name the title has been taken, acquires no title or estate in the land, but an equity to call for execution of resulting trust by conveying the legal title. And where in the division of the ancestor's estate a portion was allotted to the husband, when the inheritance came to the wife through her father, her heirs are entitled to the land and may call upon their father for a conveyance of the title.2]

§ 89. [The Doctrine Applied to Contracts of Insurance.-With the various clauses and conditions in policies of insurance, to some of which there is no explanation, a great hardship would be worked upon an innocent beneficiary, were it not for the application of the doctrine. When insurance has been procured by the wife, upon the life of her husband, and the premiums have been saved and paid by her out of her own property, and she requested against an evasion by a formal concealment of its true character. Proebstel v. Trout, 60 Oreg. 145, 118 Pac. 551; McCord v. Bright, 44 Ind. App. 275, 87 N. E. 654; Mangold v. Bacon, 237 Mo. 496, 141 S. W. 650; Zeiser v. Cohn, 207 N. Y. 407, 101 N. E. 184, 129 N. Y. Supp. 625, 144 App. Div. 825; Fenton v. Tri-State Land Co., 89 Neb. 479, 131 N. W. 1038; Wood v. Pehrsson, 21 N. Dak. 357, 130 N .W. 1010; Standorf v. Shickley, 16 N. Dak. 73, 111 N. W. 622, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 869; In re Ledrich, 68 Hun, 396, 22 N. Y. Supp. 978; Keokuk Elec. Co. v. Weismann, 146 Iowa 679, 126 N. W. 60; Chicago etc. Traction Co. v. Chicago, 199 Ill. 579, 65 N. E. 488; Bride v. Baker, 37 App. D. C. 231; Moring v. Privott, 146 N. C. 558, 60 S. E. 509.

1 Latta v. Electric Co., 146 N. C. 296, 59 S. E. 1028; Russell v. Wade, 146 N. C. 121, 59 S. E. 345.

2 Sprinkle v. Spainhour, 149 N. C. 226, 62 S. E. 910.

Where wife mortgaged her land to secure debt of her husband, she is entitled to have mortgage cancelled if debt is not paid by her husband when debt matures, if she is simply a surety and not a principal debtor, upon the doctrine that equity searches the conscience, and looks through to the substance of things. Elkins v. Bank of Henry, 180 Ala. 18, 60 So. 96.

In a sale of a stock of goods, the seller agreed not to engage in that line of business in that city for a space of ten years. In a year after the contract was made, he opened up with a similar line of goods in the same city, and traded in his wife's name. The seller was enjoined from conducting the store, for Courts of Equity look to the substance and effect of transactions involved in controversy, and will not be deceived by mere words or forms, when the conduct of the parties contradicts the forms and words used as a cover to their transactions. Thompson v. Andrus, 73 Mich. 552, 41 N. W. 683; Newago Mfg. Co. v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 64 Mich. 114, 30 N. W. 910; Johnson v. United etc. Rys. of St. Louis, 243 Mo. 278, 152 S. W. 370.

that the proceeds be made payable to her, when in fact, under a clause in the policy, it would be payable to the general creditors of the husband, equity looks to the substance of the original contract and will decree the benefits from the policy to belong to her.1] § 90. [Equity Acts In Personam Rather Than In Rem. - As changes in practice and procedure are constantly being made, and new wrongs are being committed, equity likewise adjusts itself to meet the exigencies of the occasions as they arise and when an apparently new wrong has been committed, she affords a remedy if the law does not. Equity will not suffer an act to be done, or a contract to be performed in violation of law, or where it is against public policy, and allow the doer, upon a purely technical ground, to recover. Where a court declares a contract illegal and enjoins its execution, no rights against the party in whose favor the decree is made can be founded on an execution of that contract, unless the parties before or after such execution take such steps as are equivalent to the making of a new contract upon a new and lawful consideration. So that, where a city entered into an illegal contract with one to pave certain of its streets, and the contractor knew that the contract under which he claimed to be working was against public policy and void, and pending the final determination of the case upon appeal, he completed the work under the contract, he was in just such a position as if the contract had never existed. As to the property-owner, the contractor was a wrong-doer placing improvements upon plaintiff's property against the will of the latter and in spite of opposition. Under such circumstances there is no rule of equity which recognizes the defendant's right to compensation. In the early stages of equity jurisprudence decrees were enforced only in personam. This rule has long since given way to the paramount rule that equity may in all cases so frame its decrees as to make them effective to do equity, and now the forms of equitable relief are as various as the transactions investigated and regulated in equity.2] $91. [To What Extent Courts of One State May Enforce Conveyance of Lands in Another State. This proposition involves an intricate question which has been before the courts frequently, and the weight of authority, announced by the most respectable courts, seems to be that if in an action to enforce the alleged

1 Weckerly v. Taylor, 77 Neb. 886, 110 N. W. 738.

2 McMillan v. Paving Co., 151 Wis. 48, 138 N. W. 94; Smith v. Northwestern Natl. Life Ins. Co., 123 Wis. 586, 102 N. W. 57; Ward v. Billups, 76 Tex. 466, 13 S. W. 308; Rowell v. Rowell, 122 Wis. 1, 99 N. W. 473.