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§ 86. "Corporation."-The term "corporation," when used in this act, includes a corporation, a company, an association and a joint-stock association."

§ 87. "Person."-The term "person," when used in this act, includes an individual, a firm and a copartnership.*

3 Section 2 (c), p. 18.

4 Section 2 (d), p. 19.

"Person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution, forbidding the state to deny to any person the equal protection of the law, includes a railroad corporation. Portland R. L. & P. Co. v. Railroad Commission (Or.), 109 Pac. 273.

See 10 Cent. Dig., col. 2102, § 680; 4 Dec. Dig., p. 1786, § 210; 6 Words and Phrases, 5322-5335; 8 Words and Phrases, 7752.

Any corporation also included within the term "person." Portland, R. L. & P. Co. v. Railroad Commission (Or.), 109 Pac. 273.

A forwarding agent is a person, within the meaning of section 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act of February 2, 1887, forbidding preferences. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 220 U. S. 235, 31 Sup. Ct. 392, 55 L. ed. 448. See Export Shipping Co. v. Wabash R. Co., 14 Int. Com. Rep. 437-443.

The provisions of section 2 of the act to regulate interstate commerce were taken substantially from section 90 of the English Railway Clause Consolidation Act of 1845, known as the "Equality Clause." Texas & P. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 197, 222, 16 Sup. Ct. 661, 40 L. ed. 940, 948, 5 Int. Com. Rep. 405; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 220 U. S. 235, 253, 31 Sup. Ct. 392, 55 L. ed. 448, 457.

Certain, also, it is that, at the time of the passage of the act to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, section 90 of the English Act had been construed as embracing only circumstances concerning the carriage of the goods, and not as embracing the person of the sender; or, in other words, that the clause did not allow carriers by railroad to make a difference in rates because of differences in circumstances arising either before the service of the carrier began or after it was terminated. It was therefore the settled policy in England, at the time of the adoption of the section in this country, that the clause forbade the charging of a higher rate for the carriage of goods for one intercepting or forwarding agent than for others. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 220 U. S. 235, 253, 31 Sup. Ct. 392, 55 L. ed. 448, 457. See, also, Great Western R. Co. v. Sutton (1869), L. R. 4 H. L. 226; Evershed v. London & N. W. R. Co. (1878), L. R. 3 App.

§ 88. "Transportation of Persons."-The term "transportation of persons," when used in this act, includes every service in connection with or incidental to the safety, comfort or convenience of the person transported and the receipt, carriage and delivery of such person and his baggage."

§ 89. "Transportation of Property."-The term "transportation of property," when used in this act, includes every service in connection with or incidental to the transportation of property, including in particular its receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer, switching, carriage, ventilation, refrigeration, icing, dunnage, storage, and handling, and the transmission of credit by express corporations."

§ 90. "Street Railroads."-The term "street railroad," when used in this act, includes every railway, and each and every branch or extension thereof, by whatsoever power operated, being mainly upon, along, above or below any street, avenue, road, highway, bridge or public place within any city and county, or city or town, together with all real estate, fixtures and personal property of every kind used in connection Cas. 1029, 5 Eng. Rul. Cas. 351; Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Manchester, S. & L. R. Co. (1885), L. R. 11 App. Cas. 97.

"It cannot be doubted that this settled meaning which was affixed to the English equality clause at the time of the adoption of the act to regulate commerce applies in construing section 2 of that act; certainly to the extent that its interpretation is involved in the matter before us." Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 220 U. S. 235, 253, 31 Sup. Ct. 392, 55 L. ed. 448, 457, citing Wight v. United States, 167 U. S. 512, 17 Sup. Ct. 822, 42 L. ed. 258; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. Co., 168 U. S. 144, 18 Sup. Ct. 45, 42 L ed. 414, 423.

Section 2 (e), p. 19.

6 Section 2 (f), p. 19.

Transportation of goods over receiving and connecting lines on a through bill of lading to a point beyond the state boundary is interstate commerce and not the subject of state regulation. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. New Era Milling Co., 80 Kan. 141, 101 Pac. 1011.

therewith, owned, controlled, operated or managed for public use in the transportation of persons or property; but the term "street railroad," when used in this act, shall not include a railway constituting or used as a part of a commercial or interurban railway.'

7 Section 2 (g), p. 19.

Street railroads are included in the phrase "public utilities." See post, § 111.

"Street railroad" applies only to such roads, the rails of which are laid to conform to the grade and surface of the street, and which are otherwise constructed so that the public are not excluded from the street as a public highway, which run at a moderate rate of speed compared with commercial railroads, which do not carry freight but only passengers from one part of a thickly populated district to another in a town or city and its suburbs. Bloxham v. Consumers' Elec. Light & St. R. Co., 36 Fla. 539, 18 So. 444, 51 Am. St. Rep. 44. See post, § 92, note.

"Transportation company," as used in article XII, section 12, of the California Constitution, defining powers and duties of Board of Railroad Commissioners, does not include street railway company (Temple, J., dissenting). Board of Railroad Com. v. Market St. R. Co., 132 Cal. 677, 64 Pac. 1065.

See post, c. 7, §§ 154, 176.

Provision of Oregon Act, establishing Railroad Commission (Special Laws 1903, § 73, par. 71), authorizes a city to prescribe rates for transportation of passengers or property within its limits, and the provision (Laws 1907, p. 70, § 11) that the act regulating carriers shall not apply to transportation of passengers carried wholly within cities by state and other railroads does not prohibit Railroad Commission from regulating rates on traffic originating or extending beyond the boundary of such a city (the city of Portland). Portland R. L. & P. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 56 Or. 468, 109 Pac. 273.

As to whether statute includes a street railroad, see Kinsey v. Union Traction Co., 169 Ind. 601, 81 N. E. 922; Funk v. St. Paul City R. Co., 61 Minn. 435, 63 N. W. 1099, 52 Am. St. Rep. 608, 29 L. R. A. 208; Riley v. Galveston City R. Co., 13 Tex. Civ. App. 247, 35 S. W. 826; Sams v. St. Louis & M. River R. Co., 174 Mo. 53, 73 S. W. 686, 61 L. R. A. 475; Lincoln Street R. Co. v. McClellan, 54 Neb. 672, 74 N. W. 1074, 69 Am. St. Rep. 736; Railroad Commrs. v. Market Street R. Co., 132 Cal. 677, 64 Pac. 1065; Front Street Cable R. Co. v. Johnson (1891), 2 Wash. 112, 25 Pac. 1084, 11 L. R. A. 603; Fidelity Loan & T. Co. v. Douglas, 104 Iowa, 532, 73 N. W. 1039.

Held, not to be included within Interstate Commerce Act. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co. v. International Commerce Commission, 179 Fed. 243, citing Louisville & P. R. C. v. Louisville City R. Co., 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 175, 178; Funk v. S. Paul R. Co., 61 Minn. 435, 437, 441, 63 N. W.

§ 91. "Street Railroad Corporations."-The term "street railroad corporation," when used in this act, includes every corporation or person, their lessees, trustees, receivers or trustees appointed by any court whatsoever, owning, controlling, operating or managing any street railroad for compensation within this state.

§ 92. "Railroad."-The term "railroad," when used in this act, includes every commercial, interurban and other railway other than a street railroad, and each and every branch or extension thereof, by whatsoever power operated, together with all tracks, bridges, trestles, rights of way, subways, tunnels, stations, depots, union depots, ferries, yards, grounds, terminals, terminal facilities, structures and equipment, and all other real estate, fixtures and personal property of every kind used in connection therewith, owned, controlled, operated or managed for public use in the transportation of persons or property."

1099, 52 Am. St. Rep. 608, 29 L. R. A. 208; State v. Duluth, G. & W. Co., 76 Minn. 96, 108, 78 N. W. 1032, 57 L. R. A. 63; Manhattan & Co. v. Sioux City Cable R. Co., 68 Fed. 82, 86; Railroad Commission v. Market Street R. Co., 132 Cal. 677-679, 682, 683, 64 Pac. 1065; Gyger v. West Philadelphia R. Co., 136 Pa. 96, 108, 20 Atl. 399; State v. Grant Cain, 69 Kan. 186, 189, 190, 76 Pac. 443; Kansas City, O. P. & El. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 73 Kan. 168, 169, 173, 84 Pac. 755; Sams v. St. Louis & M. R. Co., 174 Mo. 53, 64, 69, 74–77, 81, 73 S. W. 686, 61 L. R. A. 475; Thomas & Houston El. Co. v. Simon, 20 Or. 60, 75, 25 Pac. 147, 149, 23 Am. St. Rep. 86, 10 L. R. A. 251; Front St. Cable R. Co. v. Johnson, 2 Wash. 112, 25 Pac. 1084, 11 L. R. A. 696; Riley v. Galveston City R. Co., 13 Tex. Civ. App. 247, 35 S. W. 826.

8 Section 2 (h), p. 19.

Section 2 (i), p. 19.

What embraced in term "railroad"-what transportation governed by act (Or. Laws 1907, c. 53, p. 71, § 11).

"Railroad," as used in Oregon Act (Laws 1907, p. 70, c. 53, § 11), includes all corporations which operate by electric power-any inter

§ 93. "Railroad Corporation."-The term "railroad corporation," when used in this act, includes every corporation or person, their lessees, trustees, receivers or trustees appointed by any court whatsoever,

urban railroad. Portland R. L. & P. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 56 Or. 468, 105 Pac. 709.

"Railroad," as used in the Wisconsin Act, is therein defined, and a provision that every railroad is required to furnish reasonable adequate service and facilities and that the charge made for any services rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of persons or property or for any service in connection therewith or for the receiving, switching, delivering, storing or handling of such property, shall be reasonable and just, and an unjust or unreasonable charge for such service is prohibited and declared to be unlawful. Minneapolis, St. P. & Ste. M. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 136 Wis. 146, 116 N. W. 915.

"Railroad," as generally used, applies to commercial railways engaged in the transportation of freight and passengers for long distances and, as a general rule, having steam engines for motive power and making stops at regular stations for the receipt and discharge of freight and passengers. Bloxham v. Consumers' Elec. Light Co., 36 Fla. 539, 18 So. 444, 51 Am. St. Rep. 44.

"Railroad" does not include railway. See Gyger v. West Phila. City P. Ry. Co., 136 Pa. 96, 20 Atl. 399. See Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Louisville St. R. Co., 100 Ky. 690, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 11, 39 S. W. 42; Bloxham v. Consumers' Elec. Light Co., 36 Fla. 539, 18 So. 444, 51 Am. St. Rep. 44.

"Railroad," as used in section 10, article XIII, of the California Constitution, construed not to include street railroads. S. F. & S. M. El. R. Co. v. Scott, 142 Cal. 222, 75 Pac. 575.

"Railroad" and "railway" may undoubtedly be used so as to mean a street railway, but by popular usage, when used without qualifying words, they are understood to refer to commercial railways, the word "street" being almost invariably used in connection with railway to designate a street railway. Fidelity L. & T. Co. v. Douglas, 104 Iowa, 532, 73 N. W. 1039; Funk v. St. Paul City R. Co., 61 Minn. 435, 63 N. W. 1099, 52 Am. St. Rep. 608; Sears v. Marshalltown St. R. Co., 65 Iowa, 742, 23 N. W. 150; Front St. Cable R. Co. v. Johnson, 2 Wash. 112, 25 Pac. 1084; Manhattan Trust Co. v. Sioux City Cable Co., 68 Fed. 82; Mass. L. & T. Co. v. Hamilton, 88 Fed. 588.

"Railroads," if to be extended so as to include street railroads, it is not because of the intention of those who formed and adopted the constitution to give the word that meaning, but because of the rule of law that where a provision is made by law for a certain class of subjects, and thereafter a new but similar subject is created, coming within the general description, and within the particular purpose and objeet of

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