§ 45. Legislative Powers.-The state legislature may exercise all powers not conferred upon the federal government, or which are not prohibited by the constitution.15 In the absence of congressional prohibition,1 a state may enact laws regulating matters

no practical encroachment upon the functions of another department, there is no reason why the law should not stand. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Campbell, 173 Fed. 957, 977.

15 Ruggles v. People, 91 Ill. 256.

"The legislature may legislate upon any and all subjects not prohibited by express words or by necessary implications. The courts look to the constitution to determine, not what it authorizes, but what it forbids." State ex rel. Taylor v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 76 Kan. 467, 489, 92 Pac. 606; citing Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U. S. 666, 22 L. ed. 227; State v. Forkner, 94 Iowa, 1, 62 N. W. 772, 28 L. R. A. 206.

The state legislature may properly exercise all the reserve powersthat is to say, those powers not delegated to the federal government, save only those which the people have withheld. The sole power for the regulation of commerce within the state resides in the state legislature; and this power is expressly recognized by Congress in the passage of the act regulating commerce of February 4, 1887 (1 Supp. U. S. Rev. Stats., p. 529). Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Campbell, 173 Fed. 957.

16 Congress, in its discretion, may take entire charge of the subject of the equipment, etc., of interstate cars, and establish such regulations as are necessary and proper for the protection of those engaged in interstate commerce; and where Congress fails to make any provision or regulations touching a matter, the state may properly do so in so far as the traffic is confined within its borders. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453, 31 Sup. Ct. 275, 55 L. ed. 290. See Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. ed. 238; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, 15 Sup. Ct. 802, 39 L. ed. 910; Western Union Tel Co. v. James, 162 U. S. 656, 16 Sup. Ct. 934, 40 L. ed. 1107; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 18 Sup. Ct. 289, 42 L. ed. 688; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 27, 30 Sup. Ct. 190, 54 L. ed. 366; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 23 Sup. Ct. 92, 47 L. ed. 108, 12 Am. Cr. Rep. 506; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 18 Sup. Ct. 488, 42 L. ed. 878.

As to the scope of the commerce clause of the federal constitution as affecting regulation of instrumentalities and regulating the distribution of railroad fuel cars, see Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 215 U. S. 452, 30 Sup. Ct. 155, 54 L. ed. 280. Carrier engaged in interstate commerce cannot lawfully charge, collect or receive anything except money for transportation. Louis

which are legal in their nature, which laws tend to enforce the proper performance by interstate carriers of duties arising within the state, and tending to facilitate traffic, notwithstanding the fact that such state laws may incidentally affect interstate commerce." Under the exercise of its police power, the state may reasonably regulate as to the place and manner of the delivery of merchandise, moved in the channels of interstate commerce, so long as such regulations do not interfere with such commerce.18

The power of the state to regulate and control the operation of railroads and other carriers within the state is fixed in the legislature; the extent of such control and regulation must be left to the legislature to determine, subject always to the constitutional ville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 31 Sup. Ct. 265, 55 L. ed. 297.

17 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. State, 26 Okl. 62, 107 Pac. 929. See State v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 53 Wash. 673, 102 Pac. 876.

See, also, post, § 65, this chapter. As to test whether Congress or a state can regulate commerce in question, see Independent T. L. Co. v. Lake Superior Lumber and Box Co. (Wis.), 131 N. W. 408.

Interstate railroads and employees wholly engaged in local business are not affected by an act making it unlawful for any carrier who is subject to the act to permit employees to remain on duty for longer than a prescribed period. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, 31 Sup. Ct. 621, 55 L. ed. 878.

Abrogation of fellow-servant rule as to railroad employees does not offend against the equal protection laws clause of the federal constitution because construed as applying to the foreman of a section crew charged with keeping track in repair. Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 31 Sup. Ct. 136, 55 L. ed. 78. See Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 30 Sup. Ct. 676, 54 L. ed. 921.

As to regulation by Congress of liability of connecting carriers, see Atlantic Coast L. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 31 Sup. Ct. 164, 55 L. ed. 167.

18 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. State, 26 Okl. 62, 107 Pac. 929.

guaranties for the protection of property." The constitution imposes no limitation upon the power of the legislature to enact laws. Its power is absolute and plenary,20 subject only to the restriction that the legislature shall not interfere with the plenary power of Congress.21 "The legislative power to prescribe rates which railroad companies may charge for the carriage of freight or passengers 22 exists beyond ques

19 State ex rel. Taylor v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 76 Kan. 467, 92 Pac. 606.

As to legislative control over corporations, see Current Law, vol. 1, p. 735; vol. 3, p. 893; vol. 5, p. 785; vol. 7, p. 884; vol. 9, p. 749; vol. 12, p. 1551; vol. 14, p. 1582.

As to police regulation of electric companies, see 31 L. R. A. 807. 20 See Wadsworth v. Union Pac. R. Co., 18 Colo. 600, 33 Pac. 515, 36 Am. St. Rep. 309, 23 L. R. A. 812. See Leavenworth County v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479, 12 Am. Rep. 425; Harding v. Funk, 8 Kan. 315; State ex rel. Taylor v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 76 Kan. 467, 488, 92 Pac. 606.

Authority of the state to exercise the power to regulate rates and service of railroad and other carriers is not to be restricted by mere implication from the express provision of the state constitution. See Minneapolis, St. P. & Ste. Marie R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 136 Wis. 146, 116 N. W. 915.

The legislative declaration that a law is necessary for immediate preservation of public peace, health, and safety, adding an emergency clause to put it in operation, is not refused in the courts, and is not an infringement of the above provision of the constitution. Cadderly v. Portland, 44 Or. 150, 74 Pac. 710.

21 See authorities ante, c. 2, footnote 7.

22 See 10 Cent. Dig., fol. 740, § 82; 4 Den. Dig., p. 1399, § 61.

A railroad should from the public nature of the business transacted by it and the interest which the public have in its operation, be subject, as to its said business, to state regulations, which may be exercised either directly by the legislative authority or by administrative bodies endowed with powers to that end. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155, sub nom. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Cutts, 24 L. ed. 94; Peik v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 94 U. S. 164, 24 L. ed. 97; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Ackley, 94 U. S. 179, 24 L. ed. 99; Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. Blake, 94 U. S. 180, 24 L. ed. 99; Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. 181, 24 L. ed. 102; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 526, 2 Sup. Ct. 832, 27 L. ed. 818; Stone v. Farmers'

tion, and its exercise has been uniformly upheld by the courts,23 and this power the lawmakers may delegate to a Commission, which has been frequently

Loan & T. Co., 116 U. S. 307, 6 Sup. Ct. 334, 388, 1191, 29 L. ed. 636; Stone v. Illinois C. R. Co., 116 U. S. 347, 6 Sup. Ct. 348, 29 L. ed. 650; Stone v. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co., 116 U. S. 352, 6 Sup. Ct. 349, 29 L. ed. 651; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680, 1 Inter. Com. Rep. 56, 8 Sup. Ct. 1928, 31 L. ed. 841; Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 12 Sup. Ct. 255, 35 L. ed. 1051; Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 12 Sup. Ct. 400, 36 L. ed. 176; Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co., 161 U. S. 646, 16 Sup. Ct. 705, 40 L. ed. 838; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677, 16 Sup. Ct. 714, 40 L. ed. 849; Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 21 Sup. Ct. 115, 45 L. ed. 194; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257, 22 Sup. Ct. 900, 46 L. ed. 1151; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 193 U. S. 53, 24 Sup. Ct. 396, 48 L. ed. 614; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 605, 26 Sup. Ct. 341, 50 L. ed. 596; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 203 U. S. 256, 27 Sup. Ct. 108; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Florida, 203 U. S. 261, 27 Sup. Ct. 109.

Railroads are the subject of state regulation within the state by the legislature direct, or by the legislature through a Railroad Commission. See Rio Grande So. R. Co. v. Campbell, 44 Colo. 1, 69 Pac. 986; Felt v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 48 Colo. 249, 110 Pac. 215, 1136. 23 State has power to limit railroad charges for transportation, etc., within its jurisdiction, except in those cases where it is restrained by contract or by the power of Congress to regulate foreign or interstate commerce. Stone v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 116 U. S. 307, 6 Sup. Ct. 334, 374, 1191, 29 L. ed. 636.

Power of state to regulate charges of railroads, etc., can be bargained away, if at all, by words of positive grant only, or their equivalent. Stone v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 116 U. S. 307, 6 Sup. Ct. 334, 374, 1191, 29 L. ed. 636.

As to extent of state control over railroads, see B. & O. R. Co. v. Maryland, 88 U. S. (20 Wall.) 456, 22 L. ed. 678, note.

Unjust discriminations on the part of railroads and other carriers may be regulated by the state legislature. Such corporations should not use their power to benefit particular individuals or build up particular localities by arbitrary discriminations in their favor, which must cause injury to other persons or places in rival business or occupying rival positions. Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. People ex rel. Koerner, 67 Ill. 11.

The state legislature has power to fix a maximum rate of charges by individuals or common carriers, warehousemen or other persons

done." 24 In order to authorize the exercise of this power, the nature of the contingency is immaterial, provided it be an equal and a fair one, a moral and a legal one, not opposed to sound policy, and so far connected with the object and purpose of the statute as not to be a mere idle and arbitrary one.25

The United States supreme court say: "It cannot be doubted that the making of rates for transportation by railroad companies, along public highways between points wholly within the limits of the state, is a subject primarily within the control of the state." 26 All means which are appropriate and which are plainly adaptable to the end authorized to be attained, and

or corporations exercising a calling or business public in its character or in which the public have an interest to be protected against extortion or oppression; and such regulation does not impair the obligation of the contract in the charters of the corporations regulated. Ruggles v. People, 91 Ill. 256.

All corporations are subject to legislative control under the exercise of the police power of the state. Ruggles v People, 91 Ill. 256.

24 Stone v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 116 U. S. 307, 6 Sup. Ct. 334, 29 L. ed. 636; State v. Johnson, 61 Kan. 803, 60 Pac. 1068, 49 L. R. A. 662; State ex rel. Taylor v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 76 Kan. 467, 476, 92 Pac. 606.

25 State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357.

An act of the legislature establishing a reasonable maximum rate of charge for transportation of passengers or property on railroads within the state is a valid and constitutional law. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 Ill. 361, 37 N. E. 247.

By the Illinois constitutional provision (article II, sections 12 and 15) the legislature has the right to pass a law establishing or fixing reasonable maximum rates of charge, and when it passes such an act it does not exceed the powers granted to it. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 Ill. 361, 37 N. E. 247.

Georgia Act of October 14, 1879, providing that fair or reasonable rates only shall be charged by railroads of the state does not violate the invested right of the railroad companies heretofore organized and operating in the state. Georgia R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 70 Ga. 694.

26 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. ed. 819.