the rights of property, and was an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution. In discussing questions involved, Mr. Justice White said: "The elementary proposition that railroads, from the public nature of the business by them carried on and the interest which the public have in their operation, are subject, as to their state business, to state regulation, which may be exerted either directly by the legislative authority, or by administrative bodies endowed with power to that end, and is not and could not be successfully questioned in view of the long line of authorities sustaining that doctrine.'' 66

§ 60. Oklahoma.-The Oklahoma Corporation Commission Act does not extend the authority of

66 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. North Carolina Corporation Commission, 206 U. S. 1, 27 Sup. Ct. 585, 51 L. ed. 938, citing Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155, sub nom. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Cutts, 24 L. ed. 94; Peik v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 94 U. S. 164, 24 L. ed. 97; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Ackley, 94 U. S. 179, 24 L. ed. 99; Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. Blake, 94 U. S. 181, 24 L. ed. 102; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 536, 2 Sup. Ct. 832, 27 L. ed. 816; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 541, 2 Sup. Ct. 839, 27 L. ed. 818; Stone v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co., 116 U. S. 307, 6 Sup. Ct. 334, 388, 1191, 29 L. ed. 636; Stone v. Illinois C. R. Co., 116 U. S. 347, 6 Sup. Ct. 348, 29 L. ed. 650; Stone v. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co., 116 U. S. 352, 6 Sup. Ct. 349, 391, 29 L. ed. 651; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680, 31 L. ed. 841, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 56, 8 Sup. Ct. 1028; Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 12 Sup. Ct. 255, 35 L. ed. 1051; Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 12 Sup. Ct. 400, 36 L. ed. 176; Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co., 161 U. S. 646, 665, 16 Sup. Ct. 705, 40 L. ed. 838, 844; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677, 695, 16 Sup. Ct. 714, 40 L. ed. 849, 857; Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 21 Sup. Ct. 115, 45 L. ed. 194; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257, 22 Sup. Ct. 900, 46 L. ed. 1151; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 193 U. S. 53, 24 Sup. Ct. 396, 48 L. ed. 614; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 26 Sup. Ct. 341, 50 L. ed. 596, 605; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 203 U. S. 256, 27 Sup. Ct. 108, 51 L. ed. 174; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Florida, 203 U. S. 261, 27 Sup. Ct. 109, 51 L. ed. 175.

the Commission beyond the matters and bounds fixed by article IX, section 18, of the state constitution, nor alter, amend, revise, or repeal any section of the constitution from sections 18 to 34, inclusive, but is merely supplementary to section 18, and provides a remedy for the enforcement and protection of certain rights thereby secured, and by legislative construction defines those rights so that their exact limits may be known."7

§ 61.

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Oregon.-The Oregon Railroad Com mission Act, providing for filling the offices by election in joint session, has been held not to be violative of the provisions of the state constitution." The pur67 Missouri, O. & G. R. Co. v. State (Okl.), 119 Pac. 117. "Public facilities" or "public conveniences," as used in article IX, section 18, of the Oklahoma Constitution, construed to include union passenger depots. Examine "Constitutional Law," Cent. Dig., §§ 14, 15; Dec. Dig., § 20; also, 6 Words and Phrases, 5780; 2 Words and Phrases, 1556-1558; 3 Words and Phrases, 2637.

68 Or. Laws, 1907, c. 53.

69 Briggs v. McBride, 17 Or. 648, 21 Pac. 878; Eddy v. Kincaid, 28 Or. 557, 41 Pac. 157; State v. Compson, 34 Or. 27, 54 Pac. 349.

Oregon Railroad Commission Act (Laws 1907, c. 52) was closely modeled upon the Wisconsin Railroad Commission Act (Wisconsin Laws 1905, c. 362), as amended by Laws of 1905, Special Session, cc. 13, 17, and is similar in many of its general provisions and in much of its language to the Railroad Commission Act of Ohio and Nevada. The Federal Act regulating commerce with its amendment and supplementary acts is also closely followed by this statute. Some of the sections are modeled upon the Iowa, Minnesota and Texas statutes.

The Interstate Commerce Act above referred to is that of February 14, 1887 (24 Stats. at Large, 379, 1 Supp. Rev. Stats. U. S. 529), as amended by acts of March 2, 1889 (25 Stats. at Large, 855, 1 Supp. Rev. Stats. U. S. 684), and by act of February 14, 1891 (26 Stats. at Large, 743, 1 Supp. Rev. Stats. U. S. 891), and by act of February 8, 1895 (28 Stats. at Large, 643, 2 Supp. Rev. Stats. U. S. 369), and by act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stats. at Large, 584).

The Oregon Act (Laws 1907, p. 75, § 23) is not inimical either to the fundamental law of the state or to the commerce laws of the federal constitution. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Campbell, 173 Fed. 957.

Section 27 of the Oregon Act, establishing an Interstate Commerce Commission (Stats. 1907, p. 75), being void because in conflict with

pose of the Oregon Act, as indicated by sections 11, 18 and 20, on the part of the legislature, was to limit the scope of the exercise of the Commission's power as to commerce within the state; and it is manifest the legislature did not intend to regulate interstate traffic, in violation of the commerce clause of the federal con

the commerce clause of the federal constitution, does not render the entire act void, as the remainder of the act may stand as valid and operative without the provisions of that section. So. Pac. Co. v. Campbell, 189 Fed. 696.

Federal Constitution, Amendment 14, section 1, is not violated by the Oregon Railroad Commission Act. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Campbell, 173 Fed. 957; Portland, R. L. & P. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 56 Or. 469, 105 Pac. 709, 109 Pac. 273.

Federal Constitution, article I, section 8, is not invaded by the Railroad Commission Act of Oregon. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Campbell, 173 Fed. 957.

The power of the Oregon Railroad Commission to fix rates under statute of February 18, 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 67), was attacked by bill for preliminary injunction preventing the putting in force of rates fixed by the Commission. The allegations of the bill were to the effect that the Railroad Commission Act of Oregon and the order of the Commission, made in pursuance thereof, fixing the rates complained of, were an invasion of the exclusive right of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and also on the ground that the rates so fixed and established were unreasonable and unjust, and that the complainant was practically inhibited from having the question as to whether the rates were in fact unreasonable and unjust adjudicated in a tribunal of justice by reason of the supposed drastic penalty imposed for an attempt to obtain such an adjudication. This was held to present a federal question, and gave the circuit court jurisdiction, whether the complainant's positions were maintainable in fact or not; because the federal questions remain, and afford a basis for interposition by the federal courts. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Campbell, 173 Fed. 957, 966.

In this case three federal and two state questions were presented under the federal and state constitutions in which the validity of the order of the Railroad Commission was attacked.

I. Federal Question.-First: That the order, if effective, regulates interstate commerce.

Second: That by reason of the exorbitant and drastic penalties imposed by the act for the violation of any order adopted by the Railroad Commission, such act in practical effect deprives the complainant

70

stitution. Under the act the Commission is charged with many duties that are not executive, but purely administrative or ministerial. It must inquire into the management of the business of railroads, and shall keep itself informed as to the manner and method in which the same is conducted (section 39 of the act); it shall require annual reports (section 40); it may require a uniform system of accounting (section 43); it may require a list of passes to be furnished (section 45), and it shall make report to the governor annually, and recommend such legislation as may be deemed important (section 46). All these things would seem to be merely administrative. Others would seem to be more nearly executive, as, for instance, the Commission is empowered to make complaint before the Interstate Commerce Commission, with a view to rectifying excessive or discriminatory rates and charges (section 47). And it shall inquire into any neglect or violation of the laws of the state by any railroad corporation doing business therein. It is also made its duty to enforce the provisions of the act as well as all other laws relating to railroads (section 57). But the Commission is no exception to the creation of administrative officers and Boards of Com

of the equal protection of the law, and subjecting property to be taken without due process of law.

Third: That the other effect of the order, if operative, would be to prevent the complainant from making fair net earnings, and would thus deprive the complainant of its property without due process of law. II. State Questions.-First: Whether the rates established by the order of the Commission were reasonable.

Second: Whether the Oregon legislative assembly by such act confers upon the Railroad Commission legislative, executive and judicial functions, in violation of the provisions of the state constitution.

The courts say: "If any of these questions be answered in the affirmative, the work of the Railroad Commission must fail in its purpose." And in an exhaustive and well-reasoned opinion, answer them all in the negative. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Campbell, 173 Fed. 957. 70 Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Campbell, 173 Fed. 980.

mission, charged with like and kindred duties. The legislature has created a Board of Railroad Commissioners, a Board of Fish Commissioners, a Board of Agriculture and Insurance Commissioners (the Secretary of State being made ex-officio of such Commission), a Food and Dairy Commission, and a Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Inspector of Factory and Workshops. It is especially made the duty of this latter officer to cause to be enforced all the laws regulating the employment of children, minors and women,-a function executive in its character, for the executive department is charged with the duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed. But all these boards and officers, in the general scope of their powers, are charged with administrative rather than executive duties. Such is the character of the Railroad Commission Act, so that the situation comes to this: The legislature has delegated to the Commission the duty of fixing rates, which it does not add to legislative action, but as an auxiliary to the exercise of legislative functions, which the authorities all sanction as falling within the legislative power. There can be no valid objection to conferring such authority upon an administrative board. The board thereafter administers the law as devised. Certainly such a regulation does not clothe an officer or officers in one department with official duties pertaining to those of another department. Nor does it commingle the appropriate functions of the several departments of government."

§ 62. Texas. The Texas Railroad Commission Act empowers the Commission to classify and fix rates of compensation for carriage of freight, upon giving appropriate notice to the railroad company affected; it being further provided that, when a rail

71 Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Campbell, 173 Fed. 957, 970.