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power, required that it should be exercised | general effect: Degant v. Michael, 2 Ind. exclusively by Congress, the subject is as 396; State v. Pike, 15 N. H. 83; Lynch v. completely taken from the state legislatures Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583, 644; Jack v. Maras if they had been expressly forbidden to tin, 12 Wend. 311; Ex parte Hill, 38 Ala. act on it." This was said of a bankrupt 429, 450; People v. Fonda, 62 Mich. 401, 29 law of New York which assumed to dis- N. W. 26. Although it is equally true that charge the debtor from all liability for where Congress, having the power, has exdebts previously contracted, notwithstand-ercised it but incidentally, and obviously ing the Constitution had vested the power with no intention of covering the subject, in Congress of establishing uniform laws on the states may supplement its legislation the subject of bankruptcy. It was held that by regulations of their own not inconsistent the states had a right to pass bankrupt with it. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, laws until the power had been acted upon ante, 92, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92. by Congress, though the law of New York discharging the debtor from liability was held to be void as impairing the obligation of prior contracts within the meaning of the Constitution.

Bearing in mind that exclusive jurisdiction of all admiralty and maritime cases is vested by the Constitution in the Federal courts, which are thereby made judges of the scope of such jurisdiction, subject, of course, to congressional legislation, the statute of the state of Washington, in so far as it attempts to control the administration of* the maritime law by creating and superadding conditions for the benefit of a particular class of creditors, and thereby depriving the owners of vessels of defenses to which they would otherwise have been entitled, is an unlawful interference with that jurisdiction, and to that extent is unconstitutional and void.

The decree of the District Court is therefore reversed, and the case remanded to that court with directions to dismiss the libels.

In Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, 498, 24 L. ed. 547, 551, it was said that, inasmuch as interstate commerce is regulated very largely by congressional legislation, it followed that such legislation must supersede all state legislation upon the same subject, and, by necessary implication, prohibit it, except in cases where the legislation of Congress manifests an intention to leave some particular matter to be regulated by the several states, as, for instance, in the case of pilotage. Cooley v. Philadelphia Port Wardens, 12 How. 299, 13 L. ed. 996. Upon this principle it was held that a law of Louisiana excluding colored passengers from the cabin set apart for the use of whites during the passage of steamboats down the Mississippi, was a regulation of interstate commerce, and therefore unconstitutional. To the same effect is Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 16 L. ed. 243. In the subsequent cases of Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587, 33 L. ed. 784, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 801, 10 Sup. Commerce-privilege tax on sleeping car Ct. Rep. 348, and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 41 L. ed. 256, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep.

Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the result.

(189 U. S. 420) PULLMAN COMPANY, Plff. in Err

v.

WIRT ADAMS, State Revenue Agent.

companies.

1138, state laws requiring separate railway The privilege tax imposed by Miss. Code 1892, carriages for the white and colored races were sustained upon the ground that they applied only between places in the same state.

§§ 3317, 3387, on sleeping and palace car companies carrying passengers from one point to another within the state, cannot be deemed an unconstitutional regulation of commerce because of the declaration in Miss. Const. § 195, that sleeping car companies are common carriers and subject to liability as such, where such provision is regarded by the state courts as imposing no obligation on the company to transport local passengers.

[No. 138.]

Decided March 2, 1903.

In the very recent case of Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220, ante, 288, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep 288, it was held that a state law punishing presidents of banks receiving deposits of money at a time when the bank was insol. vent, and when such insolvency was known to them, was unconstitutional as applied to national banks whose operations were gov. erned exclusively by acts of Congress. Said Argued and submitted December 19, 1902. Mr. Justice Shiras: "But we are unable to perceive that Congress intended to leave the field open for the states to attempt to promote the welfare and stability of national banks by direct legislation. If they had such power it would have to be exercised and limited by their own discretion, and confusion would necessarily result from control, possessed and exercised by two independent authorities." See also Farmers' & M. Nat. Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, 23 L. ed. 196; M'Culloch v. Meryland, 4 Wheat. 425, 4 L. ed. 606.

The following cases are also to the same

ERROR to the Supreme Court of the

I state of Mississippi to review a judg

ment affirming a judgment of the trial court in favor of plaintiff in an action to recover privilege taxes from a sleeping car company. Affirmed.

757.

See same case below, 78 Miss. 814, 80 So.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. William Burry and J. S. Rus nells for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Marcellus Green, W. R. Har

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*421

per, and W. H. Potter for defendant in ergers from one point to another within the

$200

any offense against the territory of Okla- Messrs. Felix Brannigan and Assisthoma shall in all cases be taken before the ant Attorney General Pradt for United United States commissioner whose office is nearest to the place where the offense was committed, was not repealed by the general provisions of the sundry civil appropriation

bill of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat. at L. 416, chap. 301), that marshals shall take arrested persons before the commissioner nearest the place of arrest, or shall be entitled to no mileage therefor. 4. The allowance by the district judge of the account of a United States marshal is prima

facle evidence of the correctness of the mileage items of such account.

Item 2 of the third finding, namely, "traveling 1,153 miles in going to serve warrants of arrest, at 6 cents per mile, $69.18," involves the question whether travel in excess of the distance from the place of serv5. The expense of transporting a prisoner unice to the place of receiving the writs can der a warrant of commitment cannot be al- be allowed, in view of the fee bill for marlowed a United States marshal, where such shals. Rev. Stat. § 829 (U. S. Comp. Stat. prisoner escaped from the custody of his dep-1901, p. 636), provides "for travel, in going uty before he could be delivered to the pen- only, to serve any process, warrant, attachitentiary, and there is no finding of due dillment, or other writ, including writs of subgence on the part of the officer to prevent the

pœna in civil or criminal cases, 6 cents a mile, to be computed, from the place where the process is returned to the place of service." This has always been interpreted to mean by the usual traveled route (Hitch v. United States, 66 Fed. 937), the length of which is not given in the finding. The excuse for not pursuing the route in this case Decided is that it was a new and unsettled Indian country; that defendants were moving about from place to place to avoid arrest, and it was necessary to travel a circuitous route; and that, in the absence of bridges, the deputies had to find fordable places to

United States marshal for a portion of the fees claimed by him in his petition. Re-cross the river to locate the defendants. versed and remanded for further proceedings.

⚫201

arrest to the nearest circuit court commissioner, or to the office of the commissioner nearest to the place where the crimes with which the prisoners were charged were com mitted; second, whether, assuming the po

isfaction of the court." This seems to contemplate the very contingency which arose in this case, of a number of miles actually and necessarily traveled in excess of the direct route from the place where the process was returned to the place of service. It re-sition of the claimant in this particular to imburses the marshal his expenses, but denies him a profit upon them. This item must be disallowed.

be correct, as matter of law, there was sufficient evidence of the number of miles traveled to entitle him to the charge of $5,135.50. (2) Item 10. "For attendance of the By "An Act to Provide a Temporary Govmarshal at court by deputy, 20 days at $5 ernment for the Territory of Oklahoma" per day, $100." The fact that it did not (26 Stat. at L. 81, chap. 182), a certain appear whether business was transacted in portion of the Indian territory was set off court on these days, or whether the judge as a territorial government under the name was present in court, was immaterial, in of Oklahoma. By 9 the judicial power view of the fact that the court was opened of the territory was vested in certain for business by order of the judge. United courts, and the usual executive and judicial States v. Finnell, 185 U. S. 236, 46 L. ed. offices created. By § 10, "persons charged 890, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633; McMullen v. | with any offense or crime in the territory of United States, 146 U. S. 360, 36 L. ed. 1007, Oklahoma, and for whose arrest a warrant 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127. For aught that ap has been issued, may be arrested by the pears, the attendance may have been under United States marshal or any of his deputhe circumstances in which a similar charge ties, wherever found in said territory, but was allowed in United States v. Pitman, in all cases the accused shall be taken, for 147 U. S. 669, 37 L. ed. 324, 13 Sup. Ct. preliminary examination, before a United Rep. 425. Where the court is opened for States commissioner, or a justice of the business by order of the judge, it is the peace of the county, whose office is nearest duty of the marshal to attend, and there is to the place where the offense or crime was no reason why he should not receive his per committed. All offenses committed in said diem therefor as if the judge were actually territory, if committed within any organpresent. This claim is not contested by the ized county, shall be prosecuted and tried government, and should be allowed. within said county." By § 28, "the Constitution and all the laws of the United States not locally inapplicable shall, except so far as modified by this act, have the same force and effect as elsewhere within the United States."

(3) Item 12, for the transportation of prisoners arrested under warrants issued by United States commissioners, involves two questions: First, whether travel should have been charged from the place of

commitment, or taking bail for trial. Subsequently the accounting officers allowed and paid claimant of this item $27.

After suit was brought in this court, the claimant's deposition was taken in respect to this item, and he proved that, of his own knowledge, 11,433 miles were traveled in the transportation of said prisoners, deputies, and guards. As to the remainder of the travel, he could not testify of his own knowledge, because that travel had been performed by certain of his deputies who were not then in the territory, and who, he supposed, were in Alaska or the Philippine islands. The depositions of those deputies were not taken. No other evidence was offered by the claimant to establish the number of miles actually traveled than the approval of the district court for Oklahoma and his own deposition subsequently taken, as above stated. If the approval of his account by said district court is competent evidence to establish the number of miles actually traveled, this court finds the ultimate fact that he traveled 51,355 miles. If such approval of the district court is incompetent to establish the number of miles actually traveled, this court finds that the number of miles so traveled was 11,433 in the transportation of prisoners, deputies, and guards, as before set forth.

Item 16. For service of a capias and transportation (mileage) of a deputy, prisoner, and guard. The capias was issued by the clerk of the United States district court at Topeka, Kansas, on an indictment found by the grand jury at Topeka. The capias was received by the claimant in Oklahoma city and was executed by arresting the prisoner named in the capias, who was transported to the United States district court at Wichita, Kansas.

23 S. C.-32.

The claimant charged 6 cents a mile for going 62 miles, from Oklahoma city to Perry, to serve the writ, $2 for the service of the writ, and 10 cents per mile each for the deputy, prisoner, and guard for 111 miles, $33.30, from Perry, Oklahoma, to Wichita, Kansas, and one meal for the prisoner, 75 cents, making a total of $39.77.

Item 24. For actual expenses for transporting a prisoner from Springfield, Ohio, to the penitentiary at Brooklyn, New York, under a warrant of commitment. The warrant of commitment was issued at Oklahoma, and the marshal transported the prisoner on that warrant to Springfield, Ohio, where the prisoner was temporarily detained as a witness for the United States in a counterfeiting case. The prisoner having been discharged as a witness in that case at Springfield, the marshal continued his transportation from Springfield to New York city on the original warrant of commitment. The prisoner, with a deputy and guard, arrived in New York city too late for the prisoner to be received at the Brooklyn penitentiary on the day of arrival in New York, and he escaped from the custody of the deputy on the night of the same day while they were going to supper in the hotel where they were stopping. The marshal made every effort to retake the prisoner, and failed. $90.50.

Conclusion of Law.

Upon the foregoing findings of fact the court decides, as a conclusion of law, that the claim. ant recover judgment of and from the United States in the sum of one hundred and eight dollars and ninety-five cents ($108.95) on items 2 and 16 of finding 3.

All other items disallowed.

$205

This is the act upon which the claimant | who, he supposed, were in Alaska or the relies for his right to travel, while, upon Philippine islands. The depositions of the other hand, the government contends those deputies were not taken. He showed, that this act was repealed by a general act however, that his accounts had been al of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat. at L. 416, lowed by the district judge. That was suf chap. 301), making appropriations for sun- ficient to cast upon the government the burdry civil expenses for the year 1895, one of den of showing any error of fact in his acthe clauses of which, under the head of count. United States v. Jones, 134 U. S. "Judicial," provides that "it shall be the 483, 33 L. ed. 1007, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 615. duty of the marshal, his deputy or other In that case we held that the approval of officer, who may arrest a person charged the commissioner's account by a circuit with any crime or offense, to take the de- court of the United States, under the act fendant before the nearest circuit court of February 22, 1875 (18 Stat. at L. 333, commissioner, or the nearest judicial officer, chap. 95), was prima facie evidence of the having jurisdiction under existing laws, for correctness of the items of that account, a hearing, commitment, or taking bail for and, in the absence of clear and unquestiontrial; and the officer or magistrate issuing able proof of mistake on the part of the the warrant shall attach thereto a certified court, it should be conclusive. We adhere· copy of the complaint, and no to that view. It would be an insupportable mileage shall be allowed any officer violat- burden upon the officers of courts if, every ing the provisions hereof." time a question was made before the accounting officers of the Treasury of the correctness of their account, they were required to produce affirmative evidence of every item. This was evidently not contemplated by the statute. Notwithstanding this, however, there is no doubt that the account may be impeached for error of law. Mullen v. United States, 146 U. S. 360, 36 L. ed. 1007, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127. This item should have been allowed in full, less the amount paid.

Mc

The object of this statute was manifestly to amend Rev. Stat. § 829, which provided that the mileage of the marshal for transportation of prisoners should be computed from the place where the process was served to the place where it was returned. This statute provides that he shall be taken to the circuit court commissioner nearest the place of arrest, regardless of the fact by whom the warrant was issued. Inasmuch as the later act is a general one, applicable to marshals generally throughout the coun (4) Item 24, for actual expenses in try, we do not think it was intended to re-transporting a prisoner from Springfield, peal or interfere with the former act, pro- Ohio, to the penitentiary at Brooklyn, New viding specially for persons charged with York, under a warrant or commitment, is any offense or crime in the territory of the only other one contested. The prisoner Oklahoma, and that in all cases, whether with a deputy and guard arrived in New the crime was committed against the terri- York too late for the prisoner to be retory or the general government, the acceived at the Brooklyn penitentiary on the cused shall be taken before a commissioner whose office is nearest to the place where the offense or crime was committed.

The rule of statutory construction is well settled that a general act is not to be construed as applying to cases covered by a prior special act upon the same subject On this principle we held in Townsend v. Little, 109 U. S. 504, 27 L. ed. 1012, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357, that special and general statutory provisions may subsist together, the former qualifying the latter. See also Churchill v. Crease, 5 Bing. 177; Magone v. King, 2 C. C. A. 383, 1 U. S. App. 267, 51 Fed. 525, and cases cited; State v. Clarke, 25 N. J. L. 54.

same day, and that night he escaped from the custody of the deputy while they were going to supper in the hotel where they were staying.

As there is no finding, either by the district judge in approving his accounts or by the court of claims, of due diligence on the part of the officer to prevent the escape, the item was properly disallowed. The presumption is that he escaped by negligence. State v. Hunter, 94 N. C. 829; State v. Lewis, 113 N. C. 622, 18 S. E. 69; Shattuck v. State, 51 Miss. 575.

The judgment of the Court of Claims will therefore be reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

It would seem that this construction works no particular hardship upon the government, since in all cases where the criminal is unable to give bail he is required to be ultimately transported for trial to the DAVIS & FARNUM MANUFACTURING county wherein the crime was committed.

The second question connected with this item is whether the marshal produced sufficient evidence of the number of miles trav

eled. His claim was for 51,350 miles at 10 cents per mile. He was unable to prove, of his own knowledge, more than 11,433 miles. As to the remainder he could not testify of his own knowledge, because that travel had been performed by certain of his deputies who were not then in the territory, and 1 U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 717.

(189 U. S. 207)

COMPANY, Appt.,

บ.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES.

Appeal direct appeal from circuit courtequity-injunction against criminal prooeedings adequate remedy at law.

1. An appeal lles directly to the Supreme Court of the United States from a decree of a cir cult court dismissing a bill which is based, U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 642.

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