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allowed against the estate of Sumner W. Matteson, deceased.

Subsequently the cause was taken to the United States circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit, where, on October 17, 1900, the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, on authority of the case of Security Trust Co. v.*Dent, reported in 43 C. C. A. 594, 104 Fed. 380.

Whereupon a writ of certiorari was prayed for and allowed, and the cause was brought to this court.

Messrs. Edmund S. Durment and Albert R. Moore for petitioner.

Messrs. Edward C. Stringer and MoNeil V. Seymour for respondent.

Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion of the court:

This was a suit brought in January, 1897, in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Minnesota, by the Black River National Bank of Lowville, incorporated under the national banking laws of the United States, and doing business in the county of Lewis and state of New York, against the Security Trust Company of St. Paul, Minnesota, as administrator of the estate of Sumner W. Matteson, deceased, Beeking to recover the sum of $5,000 and interest thereon, due on certain promissory notes made by said Matteson in his lifetime, and which were alleged to be the property of the said national bank.

barred by the general statute of limitations of the state.

It is scarcely necessary to say that, as respects the first of these inquiries, we must find an answer in the provisions of the Constitution and statutes of Minnesota as interpreted and construed by the supreme court of that state.

The state Constitution and statutory provisions bearing upon the question involved are the following:

Const. art. 6, "§ 7. There shall be established in each organized county in the state a probate court, which shall be a court of record, and be held at such time and places as may be prescribed by law. A probate court shall have jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons and persons under guardianship, but no other jurisdiction, except as prescribed by this Constitution."

Gen. Stat. 1894:

"Sec. 4523. The probate court at the time of granting letters testamentary or of administration shall make an order allowing to the executor or administrator a reasonable time, not exceeding one year and six months, for the settlement of the estate.

"Sec. 4524. The probate court may, upon good cause shown by the executor or administrator, extend the time for the settlement of the estate not exceeding one year at a time, unless in the judgment of the court a longer time be necessary."

"Sec. 4527. When there is not sufficient) personal estate in the hands of the executor or administrator to pay all the debts and legacies and the allowance to the widow and minor children, the probate court may, on petition of the executor or administrator, order the sale of the real estate, or so much thereof as may be necessary to pay the same."

Section 4471 provides that real estate shall descend subject to the debts of the intestate.

No defense was interposed as respected the execution of the notes or the ownership of the same by the bank. It was admitted that the Security Trust Company had been, on September 3, 1895, duly appointed by the probate court of Ramsey county, Minnesota, administrator of the estate of said Matteson. The defendant, however, alleged in its answer that, as the action was not brought until after the time limited by the order of the probate court for the filing, examination, and allowance of claims against Matteson's estate, nor until after the examination and allowance of the administrator's final account, under the laws of the state of Minnesota, the official existence of the defendant company as administrator had ceased, and therefore no action could be maintained against it, and also that the right to a judg-ministered the executor or administrator ment on the notes in suit was, by the laws of Minnesota, forever barred, although they were owned by a nonresident of the state, and a recovery was sought in a Federal

court.

Two inquiries are presented to us: First, whether, by virtue of the state statutes, the estate of Matteson had been so fully settled and administered, before the present action was brought, as to operate as a discharge of the administration, and as a bar to a right of the plaintiff to recover against the estate in the state courts; and, second, if the first question must be affirmatively answered, whether, notwithstanding such a condition of the statutory law of the state, an action can be successfully maintained by a citizen of another state in the circuit court of the United States on a cause of action not

"Sec. 4638. Every executor or adminis trator shall render his account of his administration within the time allowed him for the settlement of the estate, and at such other time as he is required by the court, until the estate is wholly settled.

"Sec. 4639. When the estate is fully ad

shall petition the probate court for an order fixing a time and place in which it will examine, settle, and allow the final account of the executor or administrator, and for the assignment of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto by law. The final account shall be filed in the probate court at the time of filing said petition.

"Sec. 4640. Upon the filing of said petition the court shall make an order fixing a time and place for hearing of the same. Said order shall be published according to law.

"Sec. 4641. On hearing such petition, the probate court shall examine every executor and administrator upon oath as to the truth and correctness of his account before the same is allowed; but such examination may be omitted when no objection is made to the

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allowance of the account and there is no rea- |istrator. All claims shall be itemized, and son to doubt the justness and correctness verified by the claimant; his agent or attor thereof; and the heirs, legatees, and devi- ney, stating the amount due, that the same sees may be examined on oath upon any is just and true, that no payments have matter relating to the account of any execu- been made thereon which are not credited, tor or administrator whenever the correct- and that there are no offsets to the same to ness thereof is called in question. If from the knowledge of affiant. If the claim be such examination the account is found just not due, or be contingent, when presented, and correct the probate court shall allow the particulars of such claim must be statand settle the same, and upon satisfactory ed. The probate court may require satisevidence shall determine the rights of the factory vouchers or proofs to be produced in persons to the residue of said estate, and, support of any claim." anless partition is asked for and directed as hereinafter provided, make a decree accordingly, and assigning said residue to the persons thereto entitled by law.

"Sec. 4642. In such decree the court shall hame the persons and the proportion of parts to which each is entitled, and if real estate, give a description as near as may be of the land to which each is entitled; and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same; and a certified copy of any decree of distribution of real estate may be recorded in the office of the register of deeds in every county in this state in which are situated any of the lands described in such decree; and such register of deeds shall enter in his reception book the name of the deceased as grantor, and the names of the heirs, legatees, or devisees, as grantees, and shall make in such reception book so many separate grantor and grantee entries for such decree as there are persons taking real estate in such county under said decree."

"Sec. 4514. No action at law for the recovery of money only shall be brought in any of the courts of this state against any executor, administrator, or guardian upon any claim or demand which may be presented to the probate court, except as provided in this Code. No claim against a decedent shall be a charge against or lien upon his estate unless presented to the probate court as herein provided within five years after the death of such decedent: Provided, That this provision shall not be construed as affecting any lien existing at the date of such death: Provided, further, That said provision shall not be construed as affecting the right of a creditor to recover from the next of kin, legatee, or devisee to the extent of assets received. This provision shall be applicable to the estate of persons who died prior as well as to those who may die after adoption of this Code."

"Sec. 4517. Upon the allowance or disallowance of any claim the court shall make its order allowing or disallowing the same.

The order shall contain the date of allowance and the amount allowed, the amount

disallowed, and be attached to the claim with the offsets, if any."

"Sec. 4522. In case of appeal from the allowance or disallowance of any claim in whole or in part, the district court shall certify to the probate court the decision or judgment rendered therein."

Section 4665 provides for an appeal to the district court.

Section 4668 provides for serving notice of appeal.

"Sec. 4509. At the time of granting letters testamentary or of administration, the court shall make an order limiting the time in which creditors may present claims against the deceased for examination and allowance, which shall not be less than six months nor more than one year from the date of such order; said order shall fix the time or times and place in which the court will examine and adjust claims and demands of all persons against deceased. No claim or demand shall be received after expiration of the time so limited, unless for good cause shown, the court may, in its discretion, receive, hear, and allow such claim upon notice to the executor or administrator, but no claim shall be received or allowed unless presented within one year and six months from the time when notice of the order is given, as provided in the next Section 4676. In case of a reversal or section, and before final settlement, and the modification of the order appealed from the allowance or disallowance of any claim shall district court makes such order as the prohave the same force and effect as a judg-bate court should have made, and certifies ment for or against the estate.

"Sec. 4510. The order prescribed in section one hundred and two shall be published according to law, and shall be notice to all creditors and persons interested.

"Sec. 4511. All claims arising upon contracts, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, must be presented to the probate court within the time limited in said order, and any claim not so presented is barred forever; such claim or demand may be pleaded as an offset or counterclaim to an action brought by the executor or admin

Section 4672 provides that the district court shall try the case as if originally commenced in that court.

Section 4673 provides that pleadings shall be made up as in civil actions, and the is-6 sues of fact tried as in other actions.

its judgment to the probate court.

"Sec. 4730. The probate court may, at any time, correct, modify, or amend its rec

ords to conform with the facts in the same manner as a district court."

State ex rel. Lindekugel v. Sibley County Probate Ct. 33 Minn. 94, 22 N. W. 10, was an application to the district court for a writ of prohibition to the probate court, the latter court having granted a petition to set aside a sale of real estate confirmed by the probate court, and it was held by the su

2

preme court of the state that there was no
jurisdiction in the probate court, saying:
"The want of jurisdiction in this case is
still further emphasized by the fact that the
administration has been closed by the allow
ance of the administrator's accounts and his
discharge, and there is no attempt to reopen
it. So long as it remains closed the probate
court has no more jurisdiction over the es-
tate, or the property belonging to it, or
which once belonged to it, than if there had
never been any administration, and there
was no attempt to institute one. The ju
risdiction of the court has been fully ex-
hausted, and it can do nothing further un-
less it is restored in the manner pointed out
by the statute."

the estate of a deceased person until after the estate is fully administered. It contemplates but one decree of distribution, by which the entire residue of the estate shall be assigned to those entitled to it, specifying the proportion or part to which each is entitled. Gen. Stat. §§ 4639-4642. Read in the light of the statute, and of the admis sions of the answer, we think the complaint would fairly admit of being construed as alleging that all this had been duly done, and that the proportion of the estate assigned to plaintiff was an undivided fifth. If this was the state of facts, the jurisdiction of the probate court over the property had ended. The effect of a decree of distribution is to transfer the In State ex rel. Dana v. Ramsey County title to the personalty and the right of pos Probate Ct. 40 Minn. 296, 41 N. W. 1033, session of the realty from the personal rep where, upon an application for the final resentative to the distributees, devisees, or settlement of his accounts by the adminis- heirs. The property then ceases to be the trator of an estate and for a final discharge, estate of the deceased person, and becomes the probate court made an order allowing the individual property of the distributees, the account and discharging the administrator, such order was held by the supreme court to be a final order discharging the administration of the estate, and that, as a final decree discharging the administration, it operated to discharge the lien of creditors upon real estate which might have been previously sold to pay debts. The opinion of the court was thus expressed:

"The object of the application on the part of the acting administrator was to submit his final account and close the administration. The order made was evidently so intended, and must be construed as a final or der discharging the administration of the estate. The parties had their remedy by appeal, but the order could not be attacked collaterally or treated as void, so as to warrant subsequent proceedings to reach the real estate, as if the administration was still in progress and the estate still unset

tled.

"The omission of the land from the inventory. and the subsequent discovery of the real estate of the deceased which was not reduced to assets by the administrator or distributed to the heirs. do not operate to revive the administration and open the judgment or warrant further proceedings. The land descended to the heirs, subject to the claims of administration upon it. The effect of a decree assigning the real estate to the heirs is simply to discharge it from the administration, and, of course, the final discharge of the administration must discharge the lien of the creditors."

In Schmidt v. Stark, 61 Minn. 91, 63 N. W. 255. it was held that where the estate of a deceased person has been fully administered, and a decree of distribution has been made, assigning the residue of the estate in the hands of the personal representative to the parties entitled thereto, the jurisdiction of the probate court is ended; and, if the personal representative does not deliver the property to the distributees, they may bring an action against him in the district court. It was said, per Mitchell, J.:

"The Probate Code neither authorizes nor provides for an assignment of any part of

If such an ac

with the full right of control and posses-
sion, and with the right of action for it
against the personal representative, if he
does not deliver it to them.
tion is necessary, resort must be had to
some other forum, for the probate court
has no further jurisdiction. Hurley v. Ham-
ilton, 37 Minn. 160, 33 N. W. 912."

State ex rel. Matteson v. Ramsey County Probate Ct. 84 Minn. 289, 87 N. W. 783, is the last expression of the supreme court of Minnesota on this subject to which we have been referred. The syllabus, prepared by the court, is as follows:

"1. The Probate Code of this state makes no provision for the formal discharge of an administrator, but the necessary legal effect of an order of the probate court allowing the final account of the administrator and its final decree of distribution, assigning the whole of the estate to the heirs and distributees, is to remove the estate of the deceased from the jurisdiction of the court, and to render the office of administrator, which depends upon such jurisdiction, functus officio. 2. After the estate has been so settled and assigned, and while the final decree of distribution remains unreversed and unmodified, the probate court has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition to issue a citation to the administrator requiring him to further account for the property belonging to the estate which is in his possession, or came into his possession."

The facts and law of the case were then stated in the opinion of the court:

"Sumner W. Matteson, a resident of the county of Ramsey, having real and personal property therein, died intestate on July 22, 1895. The Security Trust Company was duly appointed by the probate court of such county, on September 3, 1895, administrator of his estate, and it duly qualified as such, and duly filed in such court an inventory of such estate. The probate court, on the same day, by its order, which was duly published, limited the time for presentinga claims against the estate to six months from the date of the order. All claims against the estate presented to the court within the

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on motion, or reversed on appeal. A clear illustration of this proposition is found in the decision of this court in the case of Hurley v. Hamilton, 37 Minn. 160, 33 N. W. 912, holding that the probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the partition of the real estate of a decedent among the heirs and devisees after the administration was closed, and the land assigned to them in common by a final decree of distribution, for the reason that, when such decree was entered, the property passed out of the control of the court, and it had no further jurisdiction."

The court then proceeded to cite and approve previous decisions, and particularly the language of Mitchell, J., in the case of Schmidt v. Stark, 61 Minn. 91, 63 N. W. 255, hereinbefore quoted. Other observations were made by the court pertinent to the case before us, as follows:

"Lastly, it is urged by the relator that the administrator still has certain stocks in his possession belonging to the estate, and that it may also have after-discovered personal property of the intestate which it has not disclosed to anyone. There is no basis for this assumption in the admitted facts, except that the trust company holds certain stocks as collateral to secure its individual debt against the intestate. But, were it otherwise, the fact still remains that all such stocks and after-discovered property, if any, passed by the decree to the heirs and distributees, for it assigns to them, not only the property therein specifically described, but also all other estate of the deceased in the state of Minnesota. It follows that the probate court rightly declined to issue the citation."

Some criticism is made, in the brief of the defendant in error, of the decision of the supreme court of Minnesota in this case; that the issue was feigned and an imposition upon the supreme court, and that the purpose of the decision was to forestall the decision of this court.

If, indeed, the judgment of the supreme court in that case were relied on as adjudg ing a case which had already passed into judgment in the circuit court of the United States, we might readily agree, as urged by the defendant in error, that the decision of the supreme court of Minnesota "should receive little, if any, weight, by this court in the consideration of this case." But that decision is cited and relied on by the plaintiff in error, not as an adjudication of the facts in controversy here, but as an inter

"It is, however, urged by counsel for the relator that the removal of the property (that is, the estate) from the jurisdiction of the probate court in nowise affects the continuance in office of the administrator of an estate. To hold otherwise, it is claimed, would be a devesting of the probate court of all authority to execute its decree of distribution, leaving the administrator in possession of the estate, and the heirs and distributees remediless. It necessarily follows from the concession of counsel, although not intended by him, that the office of administrator becomes functus officio when the estate is removed, as the result of the decree of distribution, from the jurisdiction of the court, for the office of administrator springs out of and depends for its continued exist-pretation of the statutes of the state. Cases ence upon the jurisdiction of the court over may be found of decisions made by a the estate. As well might it be claimed that state supreme court, even in exposition of the branch of a tree can live and put forth state statutes, after the institution of litigaits leaves and blossoms after its roots are tion in a Federal court, wherein this court dead, as to claim that the office of adminis- has refused to follow such a decision, if in trator can survive the jurisdiction of the it the state court has departed from its precourt over the estate of which administra-vious decisions, which were in force and retion was granted. It is not necessary for lied upon by the Federal suitor. Burgess the probate court, if it could do so, to re- v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 33, 27 L. ed. 365, 2 tain jurisdiction to enforce its final decree Sup. Ct. Rep. 10; Carroll County v. Smith, of distribution; the remedy of the distribu- 111 U. S. 556, 28 L. ed. 517, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. tees in case their respective shares of the 539. residue of the estate are withheld from them by the administrator is an action in the district court against him or against him and his bondsmen. Schmidt v. Stark, 61 Minn. 91, 63 N. W. 255.

"It is further urged on behalf of the relator that neither the probate court nor the administrator considered that the allowance of the final account and the entry of the decree of distribution ended the jurisdiction of the court, for it afterwards, on the petition of the administrator, amended such decree. It is immaterial what they considered, for the view of either as to the effect of the decree could not change its legal result. The decree was corrected, not in the exercise of any jurisdiction over the estate, but by virtue of the power of the court to amend its records to conform with the facts; that is, to make the records speak truly as to the past official acts of the court. Gen. Stat. 1894, 4730.

Here, however, the supreme court of Minnesota, in its last opinion, did not depart from or modify its previous decisions on the subject. On the contrary, it based its reasoning and conclusions upon its fre-* quent previous decisions.

Nor are we permitted on the record in that case to impute to the parties therein an attempt to mislead the court or to improperly invoke its jurisdiction. The case seems to have gone before the probate court, the district court, and the supreme court, in the usual course of procedure, and the decision finally rendered by the supreme court must be received by us as a valid exposition of the law.

The conclusion to which we are brought, by an examination of the statutes of the state of Minnesota and of the decisions of the courts of that state in construing and applying them, is, that had a suit against an administrator of an estate been brought