on the ability of the officers and of the quickness with which they were able to take the lead. It was too much to expect, however, that all the officers, and still more all the provincial functionaries, thrown for the first time on their own resources, should have been able to take the initiative at the right moment. The government at Petrograd ought, of course, to have given them proper instructions, but this it could not do, for it lacked authority to carry them out, and instead of dominating the situation was overpowered by it. With the single exception of Kerensky, who has great personal influence, the government is practically non-existent, and it is because of its failure to assert itself that the military and the political situations are so closely intermingled.

What is the ministerial situation? To have a clear idea one must go back more than three months. The Russian revolution, as I said in my former article, was made by the workmen and the garrison of Petrograd, and in the first hours it crystallized itself around the Duma, which was supposed to be composed of representatives from all the nation. It was the president of the Duma, Rodzianko, who sent the decisive telegrams to the Czar and communicated with the different commanders; the Duma organized the provisional government. It was therefore natural to expect that the Duma would play an important part in the general reorganization. If it had energy enough to start a government, it would surely have enough to carry it on. But it did not. While the government was still in its very first stages the Duma seemed to melt away and disappear. No one ever even mentioned its name-it had committed a sort of political harakírí. It was like the male bees, who die as soon as their task of fecundation is accomplished. This is an important point, on which I dwell because it explains all the rest. I have often asked influential leaders of the Duma, such as Goutchkoff, the reason of this strange self-effacement. The answer was usually the same: its members, not having been elected by universal suffrage, could not properly constitute the first revolutionary

assembly. This answer struck me as doing more honor to their high-mindedness than to their political sense. In the midst of a sudden and far-reaching crisis it is not the place of leaders to quibble over whether or not they have full right to their power; while they are searching their consciences others, less scrupulous, push into their places. Leaders of a revolution are always more or less usurpers; it is impossible that it should be otherwise. The proof that the Duma, no matter how it was elected, stood for authority in the eyes of the people is that the garrison of Petrograd went at once to the Tauris palace, where the Duma was sitting, and solemnly professed allegiance to it. The leaders of the Duma, being somewhat theoretical and utopian in their views, were surprised and carried away by the suddenness and strength of the movement; they had not the energy to grasp the helm at the proper moment; it slipped from them, and other hands seized it at once.

This political suicide had two consequences:

1. The Duma, by its abdication, left the ground clear for the Soviet, which thus became all-powerful.

2. The government which had been started by the Duma was therefore deprived of its support and obliged to make terms with the Soviet and yield to its exactions.

The Soviet has been for some time the real master of the situation. How was it recruited, and how have its members been chosen? It is not easy to get any very definite answer, even from those most directly interested. I have often tried to find out, as I have often tried to be present at one of its meetings, but I have always met with vague phrases and a politely disguised refusal. Delegates to the Soviet are apparently anxious to surround their election and deliberations with a certain mystery. In theory the workmen in the factories of Petrograd have one delegate for every thousand of their number; the soldiers, one from every company of about two hundred and fifty men. Who made these rules? Are the elections regularly and honestly conducted? All that is very obscure.

When a successful revolution is in full

swing nobody bothers about the right of its leaders to be where they are energetic and audacious men prove that they have a right to rule by ruling. It is the doctrine expressed by the proverb that "possession is nine points of the law."

The first election of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates brought together an assembly of more than twenty-five hundred members, with full legislative powers. It was hard to get any hall large enough to hold them, and now they rarely meet at all. But that assembly elected a central committee of about eighty members, which in its turn chose an executive committee, with subcommittees to study particular subjects.

It is impossible not to be struck by the fact that this all-powerful council does not represent the whole of Russia, but only Petrograd, its capital, and in this capital it is far from representing the whole of the population, as it only consists of two classes-workmen and soldiers. Leaving the aristocracy out of the question, there is no representation for the merchants, the professional men, nor for all the many grades of the middle and lower classes, unless they are actual workmen or in the army. All the rest are left without any means of declaring their will; it is as if they did not exist. The mere mention of this is enough to show the injustice of such a legislative body and the abuses to which it is open. These abuses are already so evident that steps have been taken to remedy them, but so far without much success. A great assemblage of Soviets from all over Russia was held at Petrograd, which widened the geographical base of the Council, so to speak, but it still represented two classes only. It was natural that those who were left out should have held reunions of their own, and during the last two months there have been several of these; one made up of peasants, another of officers from the front, etc., which multiplication of congresses, with no corelation, instead of helping matters has made the situation even more complicated.

If one keeps these facts in mind it is easy to see the difficulties of the new government. From the first days the mod

erate element in the ministry, led by Goutchkoff, Secretary for War and the Navy, Milioukoff, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Konovaloff, one of the party leaders of the Duma, were mistrusted and opposed by that body, especially when it was a question of the foreign policy of Russia in her relations with her Allies, or of military problems, such as the maintaining of discipline in the armies.

In the Soviet itself the more moderate members were perpetually bullied and terrorized by the bolcheviki or maximalists, aided by Lenine and his acolytes when they came back, by way of Germany, to carry on their wretched propaganda. These men are all downright and avowed anarchists, and besides advocating peace on any terms they include in their programme the abolition of individual ownership and the confiscation of all private property. As the government did not assert itself against the Soviet, this criminal propaganda was allowed to spread openly, with disastrous results.

It must be remembered that when the torrent of the revolution swept away autocracy it also carried with it the whole system of police and even of judicial administration. The police and their agents, who had played an important part under the old régime, were all sent to the front, and their places filled by an improvised force made up of militia and volunteers-in fact of amateurs.

The garrison of Petrograd also, especially in the beginning, could not be safely counted upon. The barracks were crowded with troops who, conscious that they had made the revolution, were not inclined to obey their officers. The khakiclad mass, left to its own devices, was swayed now this way and now that by all sorts of contradictory influences; the men listened with open mouths and cloudy brains to the demagogues who harangued them, each proclaiming a different infallible doctrine, and in the end were ready to side with the new government or against it, according to the last speaker or their mood at the moment.

The German agents found this sunshine for their haymaking. When Lenine was on his way back from Geneva he was

allowed to travel across Germany, and was treated with great consideration in the hope that when he reached Petrograd he would work for the German cause. Whether he did so intentionally is not yet clear, but he could not have served Germany better than by the active propaganda which was carried on in the different barracks, and even among regiments at the front-the men were urged to desert and to disobey their leaders, and as a direct result the garrison of Cronstadt, a few miles from the capital, rose in open revolt against the provisional

government.

While these efforts were being made to overthrow all military discipline another and still more insidious propaganda was carried on among the civil population, who were assured that it was only the selfishness and greed of England and France which stood in the way of peace. In public meetings fiery orators protested against the French and English "bourgeois" who, in order to add to their territory and enrich themselves at the expense of the conquered, were sending working men to slaughter everywhere. It was at this moment that the famous formula of "Peace without annexation or indemnity" was first heard. It at once caught the popular fancy, so much so that at the front in Asia Minor, more than two thousand kilometres from Petrograd, numbers of soldiers asked me why the French and English obstinately opposed a peace which seemed to the Russians just and reasonable. I did not have much trouble in showing them how much hypocrisy and equivocation was comcomprised in the formula which so impressed them. I told them that Germany, having plunged the world into war at her own time and for her own ends, after three years' bloody struggle now found it going against her; she therefore had a lively desire to patch up an inconclusive peace which would leave things as they were before, and for that reason she was trying to sow dissension between the Russians, the French, and the English. I also told them there was no question of annexing foreign territory against the wish of the inhabitants, and that when France demanded Alsace-Lorraine she was only asking for the return of what had been

stolen from her. That if any one was guilty of wanting to annex territory it was Germany, who longed to extend her empire at the expense of France, of Russia, and of Belgium, and that they were playing her game by listening to empty phrases instead of pushing the war to a victorious conclusion. When I had explained this to them the men understood and said I was right--but the explanation was very necessary.

The leaders of the revolution shrank instinctively from trying to govern by means of force, preferring to reason and argue with their opponents rather than risk coming to blows. Haunted by the memory of the French Revolution-for every Russian reads the history and memoirs of that time greedily-they were afraid that if they once started to repress sedition forcibly they would not be able to stop-and it must be said that this great revolution counts few victims and has shed little blood. It is impossible not to respect such scrupulousness, but unfortunately it lost valuable time. No important question was settled; it was all waiting and groping. Toward the beginning of June, however, the government finally decided to put an end to the open scandal of the insurrection at Cronstadt. Two new Socialist members of the Ministry went there and presented a real ultimatum, demanding absolute surrender, in default of which vigorous measures of repression would be adopted at once. The Cronstadt insurgents yielded, or at least professed to do so, but when the maximalists and anarchists tried to overthrow the government on the 18th of July last, they were helped by sailors and marines from the garrison of Cronstadt.

In May there was an important change in the ministry: Goutchkoff-resigned, to be soon followed by Konovaleff. They had all represented moderate groups in the Duma and were replaced by Socialists taken from the bosom of the Soviet. This infusion of new blood had become absolutely necessary, as the government, weakened by the loss of three able members and without any real backing from the Duma, could not hold its own with the Soviet save by making frequent concessions. After the serious outbreak of July 18 there was still another change

in the ministry: Prince Lwoii, the president of the Council of Ministers, resigned and was succeeded by Kerensky, who thus became the head of the revolutionary party in name, as he had been for several months in fact. Among the men who have been forced into leadership by the irresistible pressure of events since the war began, none is more interesting or better worth study than Kerensky. On the 11th of March, 1917, as one regiment after another went over to the side of the revolutionaries, they marched to the Tauris palace, where the Duma was sitting. While Rodzianko, its president, was deliberating with his friends as to how the troops should be received, a young man ran out bareheaded from the council chamber into the bitter cold to meet the soldiers, and threw himself into their arms. It was Kerensky, a Socialist deputy, who by this action pledged himself as one of the leaders of the revolution. When the provisional government was formed he was first made Minister of Justice, and I sometimes went to see him early in the morning at the office of his ministry in Ekaterinskaia Street. Nothing could be more simple than his surroundings, his dress, or his manner, nor more striking than his appearance.

His face lacks symmetry and is careworn and anxious; his movements are quick and nervous, his look full of energy and determination; he evidently has a temperament not to be daunted by difficulty or danger, and which does not shrink from sudden and bold decisions. But the most remarkable of all his gifts is his extraordinary personal charm; it is as if a subtle fluid, emanating from his will, envelops those who come into contact with him, be they few or many. Proportion, moderation, and balance have no place in such a nature, but it is through his defects as well as his qualities that Kerensky has so great a hold on the souls of his countrymen.

Each time I saw him he assured me that he has full faith in the outcome of the revolution, saying:

"Tell your friends in France, England, and America not to lose faith in us, what ever happens; the old régime has left us a crushing inheritance, but we shall win through."

No task can be too heavy, no responsibility too great for him; his fiery nature carries him into the thickest of the fight, as his generosity makes him eager to pour all that is in him in defense of a just cause. He has shown this lately by his magnificent rush to all the fronts to restore order and discipline in the armies, to rally their broken ranks, to arouse their fighting spirit, and to make them fit to hold back and then to attack the enemy. During all this campaign, surely one of the greatest and most arduous ever undertaken by mortal, Kerensky has spared neither his mind nor his body. He has thrown himself into his mighty task with a mighty soul. Thanks to him all the group of armies formerly commanded by General Brussiloff were rendered capable of a vigorous offensive; they pushed back the German troops, made a considerable advance, and took almost forty thousand prisoners.

While these splendid results were being attained at the front, as ill luck would have it, the agents of Lenine, a handful of scoundrels and traitors, succeeded in fomenting a serious insurrection in Petrograd and in dragging part of the garrison with them; there was firing in the streets again, both of rifles and mitrailleuses.

Finally the party of order and decency got the upper hand. The government decided at last to take strong measures; the followers of Lenine were arrested and convicted of having taken German pay; his newspaper, the Pravda, a corrupting influence, was suspended and he himself fled. Kerensky had left the army in the Carpathians to hurry back to Petrograd, and while he was there a most unfortunate incident happened at that front. The Austrians and Germans, who had been surprised and driven back, brought up strong reinforcements and counter-attacked energetically. It appears that one of the Russian regiments ordered to the first line to hold back the German advance, failed to carry out the order. Instead of going forward the men stopped to discuss and palaver, and in the meantime a breach was made in the sector of attack, obliging the regiments right and. left to fall back. This weakness gave the enemy a victory which, it is to be hoped, will not be of any great importance.

Incidents like these show the enormous difficulties which confront Kerensky, and as if they are not enough, he has also to deal with the grave questions of local autonomies; yesterday Finland sought independence; to-day it is the Ukraine; to-morrow it may be the Caucasus. The government wished to put off considering these demands until the meeting of the Constitutional Assembly, but Finland and the Ukraine would not hear of it, and have made known their terms, which are radical. They say to themselves, no doubt, that the weakness of the provisional government gives them a chance to push their claims which may not come again, and, although one may regret their selfishness, under the circumstances they cannot be ignored. Not content with having gained autonomy, part of the population of Finland now wishes to insist that all Russian troops now on its territory shall be withdrawn. It is most important that the government should make a formal and categorical refusal. The Finlanders do not seem to take into consideration the self-evident fact that, were the Russian troops once out of Finland, it would be child's play for the enemy, who now controls the Baltic, to occupy the most important military positions in a country where German influence is always powerful, and thus succeed in flanking the Russian armies and the capital.

On the whole the conditions in the armies, although they certainly cannot yet be called good, have become better in the last two months. They are, however, deeply affected by the political situation, which is very uncertain, subject to sudden changes and complications, while that in its turn is dominated by the economic situation, which is very bad. This is the most important and alarming point of all, to which I would call the attention of thoughtful Americans.

The United States, with a promptness and energy which do them the greatest credit, have undertaken to save Russia, both financially and industrially, and if they succeed they will have deserved well of humanity. It would be a grave injustice to hold the present provisional government responsible for the present economic crisis, for it is not to blame.

Here again the former régime left a deplorable inheritance. Economic disorganization, wretched administration of the railways, slackening or cessation of the principal industries-all these were at their height last winter, weeks before the revolution broke out. It seems certain that some of those who surrounded the Czarina, Protopopoff in particular, had the criminal intention of allowing these conditions to go from bad to worse in order to have an excuse for making a separate peace.

The revolution only added another to the many causes of disintegration which existed already, but it was a serious one. Unfortunately, all the workmen in factories, all the petty officials interpreted the new freedom as giving them an immediate right to wages or salaries three, four, and even five times as large as what they had been getting, and this in exchange for less work. Pillage is the only word which fitly describes the onslaught made on the pay-rolls of the manufacturers, as well as on the budget of the state. The immediate and natural consequence was a great rise in the cost of living. Political economy is logical and far-reaching. If salaries are suddenly doubled or trebled, the manufacturer must increase his prices in proportion; this increase is already alarming, and there is no relief in sight.

As prices rose the value of the paper currency went correspondingly down. In theory the value of a rouble is a little more than an American half-dollar, but now it is worth scarcely more than twenty-five cents, and its purchasing power is appreciably less. It is my impression that in Petrograd, and many other places in Russia, a rouble will only buy what one could get in France even now for half a franc, or about ten American cents. Money having thus lost much of its value, the peasant farmer, for instance, hesitates to exchange his produce, which he knows is worth a certain amount, for roubles with which he cannot buy what he needs. The rouble is undergoing a depreciation comparable in some degree to that of the assignats in the French Revolution.

But the gravest economic question of all is that of transportation. Before the