held not sufficient to describe the property stolen as "sixty dollars in bank bills, current money, of the value of sixty dollars," or "bank bills, being current money of the state of New York, of the value of sixty dollars." The court said: "In an indictment for stealing bank notes, it is not necessary to set out the instruments verbatim. They may be described in a general manner as a bank note; nor is it necessary to state the value of each note; but the number must be stated, and then it is sufficient to state the value in the aggregate. In respect to number, the indictment should be certain:" Low v. The People, 2 Park. Cr. 37.

Where the indictment charged the defendant with stealing "divers bank notes amounting in the whole to the sum of five hundred dollars and of the value of five hundred dollars,” the court held that such an allegation was insufficient: State of Minnesota v. Hinckley, 4 Minn. 345; Stewart. Commonwealth, 4 Serg. & R. 194; State v. Dowell, 3 Gill & J. 310; State v. Murphy, 6 Ala. 845; People v. Jackson, 8 Pa. St. 637; State v. Stimson, 4 Zab. 9. And see Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 2 Pick. 143; State v. Smith, 33 Ind. 159; State v. Longbottom, 11 Humph. 39; Martinez v. State, 41 Tex. 164; Ridgeway v. State, Id. 231; People v. Bogart, 36 Cal. 245. But in McKane v. State, 11 Ind. 195, "sixty dollars of the current gold coin of the United States" was held enough, the court assuming the highly improbable fact that the indictment intended to charge the prisoner with the stealing of sixty pieces of gold coin of the value of sixty dollars, or sixty pieces of gold coin of the value of one dollar each. In Virginia, too, but under a special statute, the opposite rule prevails, and an indictment for the larceny of "divers notes of the national currency of the United States," stating the value, is sufficient: Dull v. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt. 965. It does not seem to be necessary to par. ticularly describe any particular note which has been the subject of larceny. In Rex v. Johnson, 3 Mau. & Sel. 540, the indictment charged the prisoner with embezzling "divers, to wit, nine bank notes for the payment of divers sums of money amounting in the whole to a certain sum of money, to wit, the sum of nine pounds of lawful money of Great Britain and of the value of nine pounds of like lawful money." There was no description of any particu. lar note whatever, but the court held the indictment sufficient.

VALUE OF THE COIN OR BILLS SHOULD BE STATED.-In an indictment for stealing money, the value of the pieces stolen should be stated, at least in the aggregate: Commonwealth v. Smith, 1 Mass. 245. This is conformable to the general rule of criminal pleading that an indictment for larceny must state the value of the articles alleged to have been stolen. The reason for requir ing this allegation is that a distinction may be made between the offenses of grand and petit larceny, partly to fix the jurisdiction of courts and partly to determine the extent of the punishment. The aggregate or collective value of the pieces is sufficient for this purpose, and is therefore all that need be alleged. The separate value of each piece need not be, and usually is not, stated. Thus the following allegations in indictments, so far as value is concerned, were held good: "One twenty-dollar bank note on the State Bank of North Carolina, of the value of twenty dollars:" State v. Rout, 3 Hawks, 618; "ten promissory notes called bank notes, issued by the Chickopee Bank for the payment of divers sums of money, amounting in the whole to the sum of fifty dollars, and of the value of fifty dollars:" People v. Jackson, 8 Barb. 637; "fifteen twenty-dollar pieces, and twenty-five ten-dollar pieces, and ten five-dollar pieces, of the gold coin of the United States of the value of five hundred and fifty dollars:" People v. Green, 15 Cal. 512; and see People v. Vice, 21 Id. 344, where a like description seems to have been con

ceded to be good. And this seems to be the general doctrine: Bell v. State, 41 Ga. 589.

And while it is not necessary to state the value of each bill or coin stolen, yet if the value of each is stated, and also the number, it seems the aggregate amount need not be alleged, the statement of the separate value of each and the number being sufficient. Thus the description, "thirteen bills against the Hartford Bank, each for the payment and of the value of ten dollars, issued by such bank, being an incorporated bank," was held sufficiently certain: Salisbury v. State, 6 Conn. 101; State v. Mahanna, 48 N. H. 377; State v. Thomason, 71 N. C. 146; State v. Fulford, Phill. L. 563. In California it was held to be a sufficient allegation of value to allege that the property stolen was a given number of "twenty-dollar gold pieces:" People v. Green, 15 Cal. 512. But in Texas the opposite view is taken: Boyle v. State, 37 Tex. 359. Less particularity is required in regard to allegations of value in Indiana and Georgia. Where an indictment was found for stealing a bank note of the State Bank of Ohio, for the payment of ten dollars-the value not being stated-it was held not necessary that the note should be described with greater particularity: Crawford v. State, 2 Cart. 132; and see to same effect, Engleman v. State, 2 Id. 91; Bulloch v. State, 10 Ga. 46. And in Virginia no value whatever need be stated. But this is under their code, which greatly relaxes the general rule: Adams v. Commonwealth, 23 Gratt. 949.

KIND OF BILLS OR SPECIES OF COIN SHOULD BE SPECIFIED.-Where the jury can, they should describe the bills so that they can be identified; the name of the bank by which issued should be set out, and their denomination given, though less definite descriptions are sometimes allowed; and in the case of larceny of coin, the species should be set out by its appropriate name. In Leftwich v. The Commonwealth, 20 Gratt. 716, the indictment described the money as "ninety dollars in United States currency." The court held the description insufficient, and said: "United States currency' may be gold or silver, or treasury notes, or bank notes. Proof that any of these subjects were obtained by the false pretense alleged would be perfectly consistent with the indictment; which, therefore, is too vague. It ought to show what kind of United States currency was obtained." The same position was taken by the court in Mississippi. The indictment charged the prisoner with stealing "$150 in United States currency." It was held void for uncertainty, after verdict, and judgment was arrested: Merrill v. State of Mississippi, 45 Miss. 651; Crocker v. The State, 47 Ala. 53. In these cases there was insufficient description, from failure of an attempt to describe the bills or notes. In Tennessee, a defective description arose from an opposite cause. In the indictment the articles stolen were described: "One five and one two dollar greenback bill, United States currency, national bank bills, and money." It was held bad, for being indefinite and uncertain: Lewis v. State, 3 Heisk. 333. In Iowa, North Carolina, and South Carolina the rule is somewhat relaxed, and "one hundred and eighty dollars in bank notes, usually known and described as greenbacks," was held a sufficient description: The State v. Hackenberry, 30 Iowa, 504; State v. Fulford, Phill. L. 563; State v. Evans, 15 Rich. 31. And in Ohio and Louisiana, by force of their statutes, it is sufficient to describe the subject of the larceny as so many dollars, or so many dollars in money, without further particularization: McDivit v. State, 20 Ohio St. 231; State v. Walker, 22 La. Ann. 425; State v. Shonhausen, 26 Id. 421; State v. Green, 27 [d. 598; State v. Carro, 26 Id. 377; and see Merwin v. People, 26 Mich. 298; Grant v. State, 55 Ala. 201; Jones v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush, 356 McEntee v. The State, 24 Wis. 43.

In People v. Ball, 14 Cal. 101, the defendant was indicted for larceny, and the property was described as "three thousand dollars lawful money of the United States." The court said: "This description is not sufficient. In an indictment for larceny, money should be described as so many pieces of the current gold or silver coin of the country of a particular denomination, according to the facts. The species of coin must be specified:' Arch. Cr. Pr. & PL 61; Whart. Cr. L. 132." In the case of The State v. Longbottom, 11 Humph. 39, the supreme court of Tennessee decided that an indictment charging the defendant with stealing "ten thousand dollars good and lawful money of the state of Tennessee," was bad for want of description: People v. Bogart, 36 Cal. 245; Ridgeway v. The State, 41 Tex. 231; Lavarre v. The State, 1 Tex. App. 685.

DESCRIPTION OF COIN OR BILLS WHERE THE DETAILS ARE UNKNOWN. It often happens that persons suffering from a theft are unable particularly to describe the stolen coin or bank bills. Then within limits not well defined the grand jury may transfer to the indictment such a description as the witness can furnish, and allege that the further particulars are to them unknown. Thus it has been adjudged good to say "sundry gold coins current as money in this commonwealth, of the aggregate value of twenty-nine dollars, but a more particular description of which the jurors can not give, as they have no means of knowledge:" 2 Bish. Cr. Pr., sec. 705; Brown v. People, 29 Mich. 232; Hamilton v. State, 60 Ind. 193; Commonwealth v. Grimes, 10 Gray, 470; Lavarre v. The State, 1 Tex. App. 685; Ware v. The State, 2 Id. 547; People v. Bogart, 36 Cal. 245; Cook v. State, 4 Tex. App. 265; Dubois v. The State, 50 Ala. 139; State v. Taunt, 16 Minn. 109; Hart v. State, 55 Ind. 599; Commonwealth v. Sawtelle, 11 Cush. 142.

HAM V. BOODY.

[20 NEW HAMPSHIRE, 411.]

CONTRACT WITH FEME COVERT IS BINDING ON OPPOSITE PARTY where she has paid the consideration or performed her part of the agreement. HUSBAND MAY JOIN WIFE AS CO-PLAINTIFF in an action on a contract made by her.

AGENT'S AUTHORITY TO MAKE A DEMAND IS ESTABLISHED by the principal founding a suit on the demand.

AUTHORITY OF Agent to MAKE DEMAND CAN BE QUESTIONED only at the time demand is made.

ASSUMPSIT. Mrs. Ham agreed with defendant to deliver, and did deliver to him, two sheep, her property, and he agreed to deliver to her therefor four sheep on the expiration of four years. At the end of four years Mrs. Ham sent to Mary Watson, asking her to obtain the sheep and sell them. She demanded them, but defendant said the time had not expired, and would not for a year. At the end of a year she again demanded the sheep; was refused, and demanded a second time through one Tasker. Defendant objected to the authority of either Mary Watson or Tasker to demand the sheep, but submitted a propo

sition to keep them another year, or to pay for the sheep at nine shillings a head. The offer was declined. It appeared that the two sheep had been given to Mrs. Ham, and that her husband had said they were hers, and that he never had and never would have anything to do with them. He never assumed any ownership of or control over them. Verdict for plaintiff; defendant appealed.

James Bell, for the defendant.

Hale and Wiggins, for the plaintiff.

By Court, GILCHRIST, J. It is unnecessary to settle, in this case, whether, where personal chattels become the property of a woman during coverture, and the husband, upon the ground that they have been given to her, refuses to exercise any control over them, and expressly authorizes her to dispose of them as she sees fit, she may, as a general rule, dispose of them as a feme sole, and make valid contracts relating to them, which may be enforced against all the parties.

The defendant in this case actually received the property of the wife, and, without disturbance from any source, retained the possession, and enjoyed the use of it to the full extent of the stipulation which she assumed to make in that respect. In short, he has received the entire consideration for the promise and undertaking which he made to deliver the four sheep at the time specified. It would be manifestly unjust that he should now be permitted to set up, as a valid defense, that the wife had no power to make the contract of which he has enjoyed the benefit. Nor does the law admit of such a defense," for it has been decided that if a contract be made with the wife on good consideration, during the marriage, the husband may, if he please, take advantage of it and recover in an action on it, in which action he may join his wife as a co-plaintiff." And where the wife had, in pursuance of her undertaking, cured a wound, the two were permitted to join in an action for the stipulated reward: Brashford v. Buckingham, Cro. Jac. 77; Smith on Contracts, 221.

When Mary Watson made the first demand upon the defendant for the sheep, he did not question her authority to do so; but upon her second application he objected that if he complied with the requisition, Ham might call on him again. But he did not appear to insist upon this exception, and submitted a proposition to keep the sheep four years more; and when Tasker called on him, he did not object his want of authority, or express any

doubt on that head, but pleaded the inconvenience of a present compliance with the demand, and submitted further propositions.

It was held, in Payne v. Smith, 12 N. H. 34, that where a party served with a demand through an agent, does not at the time except to his authority to act as such, then a subsequent commencement of a suit by the party in whose behalf the agent assumed to act, claiming under such demand, is prima facie evidence at least that the agent acted with authority.

The demand required in this case is designed for the benefit of the party charged thereby, and to protect him against surprise, and to enable him to acquit himself of his obligation with safety and convenience. These objects would fail, if he had not a right to require some reasonable evidence of the authority of the agent, making the demand, at the time he is served with it. But it is no part of the agent's duty to urge this evidence unsolicited upon his notice. He is entitled to it only upon request. And that request must be persisted in: that is, it must not be followed or attended by such acts and sayings as afford reasonable ground for supposing that it is waived, or that the doubts that occasioned it have been allayed; otherwise, it will be taken to have been waived. Now, although the authority of the agent was, upon one of the several occasions mentioned in the case, called in question, yet even then the objection was tacitly abandoned by the defendant, who almost recognized that authority by submitting a proposition for keeping the property another term.

The commencement of this suit, therefore, by the present plaintiffs, is a ratification of the act which they prove as the preliminary to the action; and the objection taken by the defendant, that the evidence was not competent to prove the authority of Mrs. Watson and of Tasker, is fully answered. The same evidence exists of the authority of the wife to write the letter, to which, likewise, objection was interposed.

These several objections must, therefore, be overruled, and there must be judgment on the verdict.

JOINDER OF HUSBAND AND WIFE IN AN ACTION on contract made by her for ■ good consideration is incidentally discussed in note to Boozier v. Addison, 46 Am Dec. 48.

RATIFICATION OF a Demand Made by one purporting to act for another may be made by the latter by adopting the action founded upon such de mand: Town of Grafton v. Follansbee, 41 Am. Dec. 736.