CASES IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. WHEELER V. EARLE. [5 CUSHING, 31.] CLAUSE IN LEASE RESERVING RIGHT OF RE-ENTRY if the lessee shall "neg. lect or fail to perform and observe any or either of the covenants" contained therein, applies to a breach of a negative covenant not to "occupy or in any manner suffer the buildings, etc., to be occupied for any unlawful purpose." SUBTENANT'S OCCUPANCY FOR UNLAWFUL PURPOSE IS BREACH OF LESSEE'S COVENANT not to occupy or suffer the premises to be occupied for such purpose, and gives the original lessor a right of re-entry under a lease reserving such right for a breach of any of the lessee's covenants, for such covenant runs with the land. WRIT of entry. The tenant claimed under a lease from Benja min Wheeler, deceased. The demandants claimed as devisees of Wheeler, and by virtue of an entry upon the premises for a breach of a covenant in the tenant's lease. The terms of the covenant and of the clause in the lease reserving the right of re-entry for covenant broken are sufficiently stated in the opinion. Evidence was introduced tending to show that a subtenant of a part of the premises, under the tenant, had occupied the same for the unlawful purpose of selling liquor without a license. The court ruled that the evidence established such a use as constituted a breach of the lessee's covenant, that a breach thereof gave a right of re-entry, and that the tenant must be presumed to have known of the unlawful use by his subtenant. The tenant insisted upon proof of an unlawful use of the premises at the time of re-entry. Verdict for the demandants by consent, subject to the opinion of this court upon the sufficiency of the evidence on this point, and upon the correctness of the foregoing rulings. C. G. Loring and E. D. Sohier, for the tenant. E. Blake, for the demandants. By Court, DEWEY, J. Does the clause in this lease, authorizing a re-entry by the lessor, to repossess himself of the premises, apply to the breach of the covenant, "that the lessee will not occupy, or in any manner suffer the buildings now on the premises, or which may hereafter be erected thereon, to be occupied, for dwelling-houses, or for any unlawful purposes whatsoever"? This of course depends upon the construction to be given to the indenture. The language is very broad; the lessee stipulates, "if he shall neglect or fail to perform and observe any or either of the covenants herein contained, which on his part are to be performed," then the lessor may lawfully enter, etc. Although the conditions upon which the lessee took his lease may be such as materially to affect the value of his leasehold interest, and subject it to the contingency of an early termination, yet if such are its plain and obvious terms, the lessee must abide by the stipulations of the lease. Several reported cases were cited by the counsel for the defendant, for the purpose of sustaining the position that the condition annexed to the lease of a right of re-entry does not embrace the covenant herein before recited. The cases of Doe v. Godwin, 4 Mau. & Sel. 265; and Doe v. Marchetti, 1 Barn. & Adol. 715, 721, are clearly distinguishable from the present. The case of Doe v. Stevens, 3 Id. 299, is more analogous. That was the case of a lease reserving a right of entry by the lessor, "if the lessee shall do or cause to be done any act, matter, or thing, contrary to and in breach of the covenants of this lease," and it was held by the court that the condition as to re-entry did not apply to a breach of the covenant "to repair," the omission to repair not being an act done contrary to the provisions of the lease. This decision may be supported upon the principle of restricting forfeitures of leasehold interests to the precise letter of the condition; whether it be in accordance with its spirit may be more doubtful. It rests upon the principle that the right of re-entry in that case was confined "to acts and things done," and not to cases of omissions to do certain things, contrary to the stipulations of the covenant by the lessee. On the other haud, the case of Doe v. Jepson, Id. 402, seems very much to weaken the force of the decision in the case of Doe v. Stevens. Upon looking at the terms of this lease, we perceive no ground |