2. PERSON IS LIABLE FOR KILLING DOG ON OWNER'S PREMISES, after the owner has driven the dog away, so that there is no longer any danger of his biting him at that time. Id.

See CORPORATIONS, 10; TRESPASS, 6, 7.

APPEALS.

See EQUITY, 12; GUARDIAN AND WARD, 1; INJUNCTIONS; MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 9; PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 10, 17, 18, 21-24; WRITS OF AS

BISTANCE.

ARBITRATION AND AWARD.

1. FACT THAT ARBITRATOR WAS REQUESTED BY ONE OF THE PARTIES TO EXAMINE WITNESSES, and that he did ask questions of the witnesses, and read to the other arbitrators a paper that was not evidence, and was objected to at the time, is not sufficient of itself to sustain a bill to set aside the award on the ground of corruption and partiality in one of the arbitrators. Butler v. Boyles, 697.

2. ARBITRATORS MAY, BEFORE AWARD IS MADE UP AND DELIVERED, KEEP THE CASE OPEN for consideration or further proof and investigation, but after they have made up and delivered their award, their power is at an end; they can not recall the case and reinstate it before them. Id.

See JUDGMENTS, 18.

ARREST.

See EXECUTIONS, 4, 5; INDEMNITY; PLEADING AND PRACTIOR, 4.

ASSAULT.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 6, 32.

ASSENT.

See DEEDS, 3, 5; TRUST DEEDS, 6.

ASSESSMENTS.

See COVENANTS, 1, 2.

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.

1. STATUTES REGULATING TRANSFERS FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS EMBRACE WITHIN THEIR PURVIEW an assignment, created by power of attorney, to collect money and pay it to creditors. Watson v. Bagaley, 595.

2. ATTORNEY IN FACT OF ASSIGNEE FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS may make a deed, although the assignment conveys no authority on the assignes to appoint an attorney. Blight v. Schenck, 478.

See EXECUTIONS, 22; TRUST Deeds, 6.

ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACTS.

1. INSTRUMENT IS ASSIGNABLE which, though very inartificially drawn, purports to give a mortgage on the defendant's half of a saw-mill to secure the payment of a certain sum of money payable in lumber; but the commonlaw action of debt can not be maintained on the instrument. Knighton v. Tufli, 174.

2. ASSIGNMENT OF MONEY MAY BE EFFECTED BY POWER OF ATTORNEY to
collect and distribute the same to creditors. Watson v. Bagaley, 595.
3. DRAFT DOES NOT OPERATE AS AN ASSIGNMENT UNTIL ACCEPTED, although
drawn for a specific sum and against funds of the drawer in the hands of
the drawee. The delivery of such draft unaccepted is, therefore, in-
operative as a gift in view of death; and the draft can not be enforced
against the personal representatives of the drawer. Harris v. Clark, 352.
See COVENANTS, 1; Judgments, 21; Landlord and Tenant, 1, 2, 5; MORT-
GAGES, 9-13.

ASSISTANCE.

See WRITS OF ASSISTANCE.

ASSUMPSIT.

1. COUNT FOR MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED LIES ON SPECIAL CONTRACT if nothing remains to be done but to pay a stipulated sum of money. Hence, such a count is good on a note given as collateral security for a debt which remains unpaid, if the note is due. Tebbetts v. Pickering, 48. See PAYMENT, 5; Usage, 1.

ATTESTATION.

See WILLS, 5-7.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

ATTORNEY AT LAW, IN THE ABSENCE OF FRAUD OR NEGLIGENCE, is not liable for failure to turn over money collected to his client, until demanded so to do. Krause v. Dorrance, 496.

See JUDGMENTS, 6.

ATTORNEY IN FACT.

See ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS, 2.

AUDITORS.

See GUARDIAN AND WARD, 1.

AWARD.

See ARBITRATION AND AWARD.

BAGGAGE.

See COMMON CARRIERS, 3-7.

BAILMENTS.

1. EITHER BAILEE OR BAILOR MAY MAINTAIN AN ACTION against a carrier to whom the goods have been delivered for transportation, for the loss of the property. Elkins v. B. & M. R. R. Co., 184.

2 SHARES OF Corporate Stock may be Pledged, and although their owner transfers them absolutely in form, yet if the intention of the parties is that the transferee shall hold them only as security for money lent, and that the owner may redeem them at any time (even after the loan falls

due) before the lender has exercised his power of sale, the transaction is
a pledge, not a mortgage. Wilson v. Little, 307.

8. PLEDGEE CAN NOT SELL THE PAWN without demanding payment of the
debt and giving notice to the pledgor of the time and place of sale. Id.
CONSENT THAT PLEDGEE MAY SELL without giving notice does not relieve
him from the necessity of demanding payment of the debt before he sells.
Id.

8. ACTION FOR SELLING STOCKS PLEDGED for a debt, without having first de-
manded payment of the debt, may be maintained without making tender
of the sum due. Id.

& MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN ACTION FOR WRONGFULLY SELLING PLEDGE,
discussed in a case where there had been negotiation between pledgor
and pledgee of stocks for a payment of the debt and a return of similar
stocks to those which the pledgee had received and sold, pending which,
such stocks had risen in value; and held, that the pledgor was enti-
tled, under such circumstances, to recover the highest value down to
the time when the negotiations were broken off. Id.

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY.

1. DISCHARGE IN INSOLVENCY AFTER PRIOR INSOLVENCY IS INVALID, under
the Massachusetts statute, without the written assent of three fourths
of the creditors, unless the estate pays fifty per cent. of the debts. Teb-
betts v. Pickering, 48.

2. DISCHARGE IN INSOLVENCY DOES NOT AFFECT NOTE TO CITIZEN OF AN-
OTHER STATE who was such when the note was made and until the dis-
charge. Id.

3. PROMISE BY BANKRUPT AFTER DISCHARGE TO PAY DISCHARGED Debt "as
soon as he got able," and to pay "all his honest debts as fast as he could,"
except certain ones in the city, will not revive such debt. Yoxtheimer v.
Keyser, 555.

4. DISCHARGE UNDER UNITED STATES BANKRUPT ACT IS NO BAR TO ACTION
ON JUDGMENT against the bankrupt recovered after the filing of the
petition in an action commenced before the filing. Woodbury v. Perkins,
51.

BANKS AND BANKING.

1. NOTICE TO AN Officer of a BANK CAN NOT AFFECT BANK when in regard
to a matter not pertaining to his duties. Consequently, notice to some
of the officers of a bank for collection, of the residence of an indorser, does
not prevent the bank from excusing want of notice of non-payment at
the indorser's residence by the ignorance of the officers charged with the
duty of collecting notes. Goodloe v. Godley, 159.

2 BANKING ASSOCIATION FORBIDDEN TO ISSUE BILLS OR NOTES, UNLESS PAY-
ABLE ON DEMAND and without interest, can not give its notes, payable on
time and bearing interest, to a creditor by way of evidence of or secur-
ity for its indebtedness; such prohibition will not be limited by construc-
tion to paper intended for circulation. Leavitt v. Palmer, 333.

See NEGOTIABLE Instruments, 13-17; TRUST DEEDS, 4.

BILLS AND NOTES.

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

BILLS OF EXCEPTION.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 29.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
See AGENCY, 9, 10.

BILLS OF PARTICULARS.

See PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 19, 20.

BONA FIDE PURCHASERS.

1. PROTECTION OF PURCHASER FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION STANDS ON THIS: that he has bona fide acquired the legal title and paid the purchase money before notice of the plaintiff's equity. If he has acquired the legal title but has not paid the purchase money before notice, his plea fails. If he has paid the purchase money and receives notice of plaintiff's equity before acquiring the legal title, he can not defeat that equity by procuring the legal title. Bush v. Bush, 675.

2. PURCHASER OF PERSONAL PROPERTY ACQUIRES NO BETTER TITLE, in general, than that of his vendor. McMahon v. Sloan, 601.

3. ACTS OF OWNERSHIP BY POSSESSOR OF CHATTEL, INCONSISTENT WITH AN.
OTHER'S OWNERSHIP, must be brought to the knowledge of the true owner
to divest him of title. Id.

See DEEDS, 7, 10, 11; EQUITY, 2, 3; ESTOPPEL, 3; JUDGMENTS, 6; NEGOTIA-
BLE INSTRUMENTS, 2.

BONDS.

See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 8, 17-21; GUARDIAN AND WARD, 2, 3;
MARRIED WOMEN, 7, 15; MORTGAGES, 2; PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 22–24;
SURETYSHIP, 5; Vendor and Vendee, 6, 7.

BOUNDARIES.

See ADVERSE POSSESSION, 2; POSSESSION, 3, 5; PUBLIC LANDS, 1.

BROKERS.

See FACTORS.

BURDEN OF PROOF.

See DEEDS, 10; MARRIED WOMEN, 6; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 6, 7; Trust
AND TRUSTEES, 3; WILLS, 14.

See COMMON CARRIERS.

CASE.

In ACTION ON THE CASE ALMOST EVERYTHING MAY BE GIVEN IN EVI DENCE under the general issue, and evidence of former recovery is properly received in such action. Jones v. Weathersbee, 653.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 10; PROCESS.

AN DRO. VOL. LI-51

CAVEAT EMPTOR.

See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 2, 12; FRAUD, 4.

CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT.
See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 1.

CERTIORARI.

See JUDGMENTS, 10, 11.

CHANGE OF VENUE.

See PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 6.

CHECKS.

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 6–8.

CHILD EN VENTRE SA MERE.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 4-8.

CITATIONS.

See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 7.

COLLATERAL SECURITY.

See Assumpsit; Banks and Banking, 2; NegOTIABLE-INSTRUMENTS, 3, 4; PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 5.

COLLISIONS.

See COMMON CARRIERS, 2.

COMMON CARRIERS.

L. BY COMMON Law, a Carrier of Goods is REGARDED AS AN INSURER, and is held accountable for any damage or loss to them, unless from inevitable accident, which is the same thing with the act of God, or of the public enemy; but the party may limit this common-law liability by express stipulation in his contract. Whitesides v. Thurlkill, 128.

& Loss BY COLLISION COMES WITHIN EXCEPTION OF "DANGERS OF THE RIVER," if the loss arose without any fault on the defendant's part, or that of the hands upon his boat; but if they had been guilty of negligence, or might have prevented the loss by the exercise of reasonable skill and diligence, then the defendant would be liable. Id.

& PROPRIETORS OF STAGE-COACHES CARRYING PASSENGERS WITH THEIR BAGGAGE are responsible in all respects as common carriers so far as regards the baggage. Bomar v. Maxwell, 682.

BAGGAGE INCLUDES SUCH ARTICLES OF NECESSITY OR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE as are usually carried by passengers for their personal use; it does not include medicines, handcuffs, a watch, etc., nor money, except just sufficient to pay traveling expenses. Id.

& RAILROAD COMPANY IS RESPONSIBLE FOr Baggage DELIVERED TO AGENT OF ANOTHER LINE on whose road it is running, by one taking passage at a station, where such agent has been in the habit of receiving baggage for such company, and it has no agent of its own present at the station. Jordan v. Fall River R. R. Co., 44.

4. MONEY CARRIED IN PASSENGER'S TRUNK IS PART OF BAGGAGE for which a passenger carrier is responsible, if intended bona fide for traveling ex