GERMANY INCREASING STRENGTH OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY 862.00/2509 Telegram The Chargé in Germany (Gordon) to the Secretary of State BERLIN, September 15, 1930-10 a. m. [Received 11:25 a. m.] 105. Election results up to 5 o'clock this morning constituting substantially complete returns give following approximate results in round figures: 35,000,000 votes cast by eligible electorate of 43,000,000. Approximate popular votes: Social Democrats National Socialists (Hitler, Fascist) Center and Bavarian Peoples Party combined Communist 8, 600, 000 6, 400, 000 4, 600, 000 2, 500, 000 1, 600, 000 1,300,000 The foregoing translated into Reichstag seats gives, respectively: Forty-two seats are divided 143, 107, 87, 76, 41, 26, 23, 22. among six additional small groups. Popular interest in election was keen as evidenced by fact that the largest percentage of electorate (approximately 82 percent) since formation of republic went to polls. As a result Reichstag deputies will be increased from 491 to 573. [Paraphrase.] The first strong impression from the election is that the predominant factors were disgust and recklessness. The enormous gains made by the Hitler supporters and the Communists indicate this. The Hitler vote, which in 1928 was 800,000, reached 6,400,000 yesterday resulting in an increase in Reichstag seats from 12 to 107. This is especially significant and is an indication that a multitude of voters are so disgusted at the failure of both the coalition of moderate parties and the Social Democrats to run the government machinery smoothly and to relieve the economic depression that they are ready to try anything else for a change, even giving their support to a party whose leaders and promises are irresponsible. [End paraphrase.] GORDON 862.00/2518 No. 486 The Chargé in Germany (Gordon) to the Secretary of State BERLIN, September 17, 1930. [Received September 29.] SIR: In amplification of my telegram No. 105 of September 15, I have the honor to report further as follows: The last returns which had not been received at the moment of sending that telegram are now to hand; they increase the number of Reichstag seats given in my said telegram by two, so that they now number 575. There may be some negligible modification of the classification of seats given in my telegram-e. g. the People's Party may gain a couple of seats at the expense of the State Party-and the exact allocation of the 48 seats divided among the six "splinter" parties will not be definitely settled for some days; but for all practical purposes, including the possible combinations capable of carrying on the business of government, the Department may refer to the figures of my yesterday's telegram.. Although, as has already been reported to the Department, the gain of the extremists had been definitely expected, and its very certain prospect was one of the main reasons on various occasions prior to July 18 for refraining from causing a dissolution of the Reichstag, even when the Government was in a decided minority, the extent of this gain was a tremendous surprise to everyone, including probably to the National Socialists themselves. The most unfortunate feature thereof, in my opinion, is the grounds or rather lack of groundson which this party was able to make a successful appeal to such an enormous number of citizens. The Department is, of course, aware of the general complexion of this party but it may not be amiss again to emphasize the extraordinarily confused, self-contradictory and opportunist character of their campaign. Any constructive element in their so-called program is difficult to discern, even by inference; when seeking to win votes from the Communists the National Socialist orators declared that, as their social theories were similar, they appealed to them to vote for a Communist form of government directed by Germans rather than the same thing under the guidance of Moscow; when invading Nationalist territory, the party spokesman emphasized their adherence to the principle of private ownership of property. Throughout the land their program consisted of asseverations that all the country's evils flowed from Semitism, international banks, the Young Plan, the Treaty of Versailles and all other international treaties with any provisions which might be considered objectionable from a chauvinistic point of view, the remedy being repudiation pure and simple of any such written obligations, and a march on Berlin, for the purpose of establishing a reactionary dictatorship with, however, not even a suggestion as to the alternative measures contemplated for remedying the conditions complained of. As I intimated in the concluding paragraph of the telegram under reference, a large percentage of the six million four hundred thousand citizens who voted the National Socialist ticket would seem to have been impelled thereto by a feeling of disgust for the prolonged failure of both the moderate middle parties and of the Social Democrats to operate the parliamentary machinery of the Government with smoothness or efficiency, which in turn led to the fear that any approach to such efficiency would only be effected as a result of further sacrifices and hardships on their part. Various governmental combinations having been powerless to ameliorate their individual lots, they appear to have felt that any change meant everything to gain and nothing to lose, even though they could not see clearly how such gain could be brought about. I have no doubt but that a considerable number of individuals of whom one might expect sounder mental processes and whom one would be surprised to find having voted the National Socialist ticket, did so from the foregoing motives. If this analysis be correct, it is doubly unfortunate that the more intelligent citizens who were induced to vote the National Socialist ticket could not see further than this and realize that in thus voting they were taking the surest steps to increase the difficulties of government, to further impair foreign confidence-especially in financial circles-in the stability of German republican institutions and, in general, to intensify the economic and financial evils of which they complain. However, they apparently thought neither of this nor of anything else of that nature. When over six million voters follow a party which promises "freedom and bread" without any indication as to how either is going to be provided, certainly the least that can be said is that such voters are in a very reckless frame of mind. It is most probable, likewise, that a large part of the National Socialist votes came from citizens who only recently attained voting age and who represent a generation that has no personal knowledge of the horrors and hardships of war, but only the thought that the debt which it left behind will bear on them throughout their lifetime. To such a class repudiation pure and simple has an undeniably superficial attraction. On the other hand, however, it is not unreasonable to hope that if strong leaders with a strong program could be evolved from the present welter a large part of those who, as indicated above, have recklessly voted the National Socialist ticket would be glad to return to safer and saner ground, and it is also to be hoped that the young element to which I have alluded may become more balanced with increasing maturity. To sum up: there is no doubt that last Sunday's vote was another overpowering example of Germany's lack of political education and wisdom and a body-blow to the republican form of government, and it is a clear indication of the, in my opinion, dangerous mentality at present possessed by a large proportion of the population. However, there have been so many occasions in the past ten years when republican institutions have been brought to a precarious pass and the country's course of conduct has been fraught with danger from both a domestic and foreign point of view, that even these latest ominous developments may still be appraised with less alarm than if they constituted an entirely new phenomenon. The body-blow is not necessarily a knock-out blow, but the fact remains that some thirteen odd million Germans have by their votes declared their hostility to the present republican form of government. The danger is clearly there, and cannot lightly be overlooked or explained away as some elements-including certain official circles--seem to be evincing a not unnatural tendency to do; but yet a way remains open for all sincere supporters of the Republic to make common cause against this danger. If at such a juncture as this they fail to sink their personal and doctrinal differences, then indeed a serious situation will present itself. Respectfully yours, GEORGE A. GORDON 882.00/2530 The Chargé in Germany (Gordon) to the Secretary of State No. 494 BERLIN, September 19, 1930. [Received October 4.] SIR: I have the honor to report that on the morning after the elections an individual called at the Embassy stating that he was a member of the National Socialist Party-which for the sake of brevity will henceforth be referred to by its local appellation of "Nazi”—and that as the aims and objects of this party were so evidently and persistently misrepresented and misunderstood abroad, he wished to know whether a delegation from this party might call at the Embassy and explain what these aims and objects really were. I replied that if some such representative wished to call upon me informally I would receive him and listen to what he had to say. In consequence, this afternoon Herr Schickedanz, the Berlin representative of the Voelkische Beobachter, the official Nazi organ published in Munich, came to see me. Mr. Schickedanz began by saying he regretted that almost without exception the foreign press, as far as it had come to his attention, had been propagating erroneous impressions concerning the Nazis. It seemed to be commonly assumed abroad that his party was hand in glove with the communists or that it represented a danger of a very similar nature. On the contrary, he was convinced that, had it not been for the campaign waged by his party, the communists would have had some 30 or 40 seats more in the Reichstag than they did secure. Far from his party having appropriated catchwords and political arguments from the communists, it was the latter who, alarmed by the success of the Nazi campaign, had tried towards the end of the campaign to do just the converse. To express his idea another way, it was only the fact that his party had gone before the mass of voters suffering from the prevalent economic misery and distress and had presented to them in a convincing manner its ideas as to how to remedy the situation, that had prevented a tremendous wave of communistic sentiment from sweeping the country. The fundamental element in the situation, which had recently come to a head with last Sunday's elections, was the tremendous economic depression and distress prevailing in Germany. He felt that this distress was likewise far from truly appreciated in foreign countries-in some cases perhaps deliberately, and in others on account of misinformation. It was starting from this point of view that the Nazi Party had been conceived and organized and it was along lines growing out of this original conception that its campaign had up to now been conducted. In its opinion, this deep-seated distress and misery could be traced back directly to the enforced "tribute" with which Germany had been burdened by the Treaty of Versailles. In the view of the Nazis the treaty was intolerably unfair, not only as to the imposition of tribute—a word which my interlocutor repeatedly used-but also as regards the declaration of German war-guilt. With such a false basis it was inevitable that economic trouble would develop, and the present situation was only a logical result of this treaty. He admitted that economic depression at present was worldwide, but thought that it bore more specifically and more hardly on Germany for the reasons stated. The present Brüning government, in its effort to ameliorate the financial situation, which was part and parcel of the iniquitous chain of events above referred to, had tried to resort to measures which imposed further financial sacrifices and burdens. But unemployment was constantly increasing; it was far greater than was indicated by the present official figures of about three million because it was a conservative estimate that for every two individuals receiving unemployment aid there was one who, while not in constant and active employment, was trying to struggle along without any official unemployment dole; so that this coming winter one could certainly count |