Constantine of Greece had reaped the reward of treachery, Nicholas of Montenegro and Peter of Serbia shared with him the pains, though not dishonour, of exile. Bethmann-Hollweg, Von Jagow, Zimmerman and Von Tirpitz had followed each other into German retirement while Berchtold and Tisza had disappeared from Austrian control; Asquith and Grey in Britain had followed Delcassé and Viviani of France, while Bryan and Dumba and Bernstorff had faded from the American foot-lights. In the Armies of the world death had called Kitchener and Von Moltke, retirement had come to Grand Duke Nicholas of Russia, the Archduke Friedrich and Von Hotzendorff of Austria, Joffre and Nivelle, Von Kluck, Von Hausen, Von Heeringen and Von Haesler, Smith-Dorrien, Nixon and Murray, French and Cadorna. The military situation seemed a menacing one to the Allies but with more favourable conditions promised when the power of the United States was realized. Territories respectively occupied or captured by the rival groups of Powers were as follows at the close of 1917:

The Inter

An Allied step of great importance in 1917 was the Allied Confer- movement toward closer international control of war ences and policy and better co-operation in methods. The ConSupreme ference system of 1916 was improved and enlarged. War Council. Mr. Lloyd George, the British Premier, and Lord Milner, M. Briand, the French Premier, with M. Lyautey, Minister of War, and M. Thomas, Minister of Munitions, were at Rome on Jan. 5 and held a War Council with the Italian Government about the situation of General Sarrail at Salonika, the Greek King and the Army of the Orient. Other Conferences or Councils of Premiers, statesmen and generals followed at Petrograd on Jan. 29, at Calais on Feb. 26, at St. Jean de Maurienne, Savoy, on May 5, at Paris on May 6 and again on July 25. Every effort at unity of action-short of the single command and direction which had done so much for the Teutons-was made and, toward the close of the year, there developed a movement for co-ordinating the higher commands of the French, British, Italian and future American armies at the front under one supreme strategical head. F. H. Simonds, in one of his able articles in the New York Tribune, urged this policy early in November and some of the British papers took it up as a part of the French press already had done. Unity of command and concentration of the whole vast battle-line in one single front, against an enemy front under the general control of the German high command, was the proposal. The opposite view was expressed by the London Globe of Nov. 7: "No one who knows either Italy or France could advocate the denudation of the Italian front at the

order of a French generalissimo, or the imperilling of Paris by the despatch of French troops to the Carso on the command of the Italian commander. What would be our feelings were Haig under Cadorna and the latter commanded the uncovering of the Channel ports in order to develop his offensive against Trieste."

Obviously this kind of distrust still was a difficulty in the way as it had during three years past been an obstacle in the path to victory. The Entente was apparently groping in the dark for a Ludendorff of organization or for a new Kitchener who could lead nations as well as armies, and this desire the Italian defeat further intensified. Field Marshal Haig, Generals Pétain, Nivelle and Foch, General Jan Christian Smuts, were all suggested as possible heads under some new arrangement. Meanwhile, the British Government had been maturing a scheme for closer co-ordinated action and at the Conferences in Rome and Paris and, finally, at Rapallo, near Genoa, on Nov. 9, the subject was discussed, a draft eventually approved and submitted to the General Staffs, accepted by France and Italy and tentatively approved by President Wilson. The important and conclusive gathering had been at Rapallo where the British Premier, the French Premier (M. Painlevé), the Italian Premier (Sig. Orlando), Generals Foch, Sir W. Robertson, Sir H. H. Wilson and J. C. Smuts were present with several other Ministers and many officials. An Inter-Allied General Staff was created with Generals Cadorna, Foch and Wilson as members.* The agreement of eight clauses arrived at between the three Governments concerned was in the following terms:

(1) With a view to the better co-ordination of military action on the Western front a Supreme War Council shall be created composed of the Prime Minister and a member of the Government of each of the Great Powers whose armies are fighting on that front; the extension of the scope of the Council to the other fronts is reserved for discussion with the other Great Powers.

(2) The Supreme War Council has for its mission to watch over the general conduct of the War; to prepare recommendations for the decision of the Governments and to keep itself informed of their execution and to report thereon to the respective Governments.

(3) The General Staffs and the Military Commands of the armies of each Power charged with the conduct of military operations remain responsible to their respective Governments.

(4) The general war plans drawn up by the competent military authorities are submitted to the Supreme War Council, which, under the high authority of the Governments, ensures their concordance, and submits, if need be, any necessary changes.

(5) Each Power delegates to the Supreme War Council one permanent military representative whose exclusive function is to act as technical adviser to the Council. (6) The military representatives receive from the Governments and the competent military authorities of their country all the proposals, information, and documents relating to the conduct of the War.

(7) The military representatives watch day by day the situation of the forces and the means of all kinds of which the Allied armies and the enemy armies dispose.

(8) The Supreme War Council meets normally at Versailles, where the permanent military representatives and their staffs are established. They may meet at other places as may be agreed upon, according to circumstances. The meetings of the Supreme War Council will take place at least once a month.

Speaking at Paris on Nov. 12, to the Allies in general and about the new proposals in particular, the British Premier made a someNOTE.-In December, General Weygand succeeded General Foch as the French representative.

what startling and very blunt speech. He first pointed out that on land and sea the Allies had superiority and the advantage in numbers, weight of men and material, economic and financial resources, and, beyond and above all, in the justice of their cause. "This, combined with superiority, ought ere now to have ensured victory for the Allies; at least it ought to have carried them much further along the road to victory than the point which they have yet reached." He paid tribute to defeated but gallant Italy and fevered Russia, stricken through no fault of her own, and declared that the blame for slowness in world-success did not lie with Allied armies or navies:

No! The fault has not been with the armies; it has been entirely due to the absence of real unity in the war direction of the Allied countries. We have all felt the need of it. We have talked about it. We have passed endless resolutions resolving it. But it has never yet been achieved. In this important matter we have never passed from rhetoric into reality, from speech into strategy. In spite of all the resolutions there has been no authority responsible for co-ordinating the conduct of the War on all fronts, and, in the absence of that central authority, each country was left to its own devices. We have gone on talking of the Eastern front and the Western front and the Italian front and the Salonika front and the Egyptian front and the Mesopotamia front, forgetting that there is but one front with many flanks, that with these colossal armies the battlefield is continental.

Such unity as was evolved at War Conferences was, he declared, make-believe, a stitching together of plans instead of a strategic direction of armies. Had unity in this respect been achieved the victories of the armies would by this time have ended the War. He analyzed the mistakes of the Allies as to Serbia, Roumania and Italy, and based his policy upon the fact that the War, as a whole, was a blockade of two Great Powers. Finally, he declared that for many months and years he had been urging a War Council and some central direction, but in vain: "Personally I had made up my mind that unless some change were effected I could no longer remain responsible for a war direction doomed to disaster for lack of unity." The Council was thus established and it commenced work at once; it was at first composed of the three Premiers and one other Cabinet member from each country-Britain, France and Italy. It was hoped that the United States would come in later, and perhaps, Russia. Summarizing the official terms quoted above the general object of the Council was to continuously survey, the field of operations as a whole, to co-ordinate the plans prepared by the different General Staffs and, if necessary, to make proposals for the better conduct of the War.

Meantime, an American Special Mission had reached England on Nov. 7 to represent the United States in a Conference with the British authorities. Edward M. House, the President's personal adviser and confidential envoy on some preceding missions, was the Republic's chief representative and was accompanied by Admiral W. S. Benson, Chief of Naval Operations; General Tasker H. Bliss, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; Oscar T. Crosby, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; Vance C. McCormick, Chairman of the War Trade Board; Bainbridge Colby, U. S. Shipping Board; and others. The British Premier and the War Cabinet, Mr. Balfour, many other

Government members, and the chief British army, navy and war officials were in attendance at the opening meeting on Nov. 19. Mr. Lloyd George, in his address, described man-power at the Front, and shipping, as of special and equal urgency. He wanted to know when the first million of men would come from the United States and whether the promised 6,000,000 tons of shipping for 1918 would be realized. He then described the Aeroplane situation and demands and the urgency of increased American food production; he promised a tighter blockade of the Central Powers. Admiral Benson replied with information as to what the United States had done already in training men, making munitions, building fleets, economizing food and manufacturing aircraft. It was shortly afterwards announced that the American Mission would attend an Inter-Allied War Council in Paris.

In the Commons on Nov. 19 the British Premier defended his Paris speech as necessary to destroy dangerous complacency and illusions, stated that the Allied Council plan had been first proposed by Lord Kitchener in January, 1915, and pointed out that with this War Council there would be the right to press matters to a conclusion-such as recent suspicions about the Italian front, which were dealt with too late. Upon the point of Politicians vs. Generals, so fatal in other wars, the speaker was explicit in declaring that the whole campaign of the year had been carried out by the advice of soldiers and only upon their advice. As to the rest: "There are two fears-two things that can defeat us--the submarine menace and a lack of unity. Of the Submarine I have no longer any fear. We are on its track. The only other thing is lack of unity. Unity is the only sure way to victory-a victory that will bring peace and healing to a world which is bleeding to death." A great Inter-Allied War Conference followed and was opened at Paris on Nov. 29, 1917. It was composed of representatives of all the Allies except China and included representatives of 15 nations -France, Great Britain, United States, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Serbia, Roumania, Greece, Portugal, Montenegro, Brazil, Čuba, Russia, and Siam.

M. Clémenceau presided and briefly welcomed the delegates; and M. Pichon outlined the methods of deliberation; various Sections were then constituted to deal with finance, imports, munitions, aviation, food, transportation and blockade; each was presided over by the French Minister whose Department was involved and diplomatic, military and naval questions were similarly handled. The importance of the meeting was indicated by the fact that the British delegation, including officials and clerks, numbered 143 persons. Co-incident to, and inter-acting with, the Conference were sittings of the Supreme War Council at Versailles-as to which Mr. Lloyd George told Le Petit Parisien (Dec. 1) that: "We are endeavouring at the present to realize unity of direction and control, and the real and total concentration of our collective efforts." For the moment the one-time centre and seat of autocracy and artistic luxury under Louis XIV, the gorgeous home of the most splendour-loving Sovereign who ever sent armies to battle and embodied in his own day the

passions of conquest and power, was the centre of a democratic alliance of nations fighting another autocrat of quite another personal type but with very similar aims and ambitions.

No detailed statement was officially issued as to the Conference meetings but it was announced on Dec. 4 by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs that agreements had been concluded upon the basis of "a complete understanding and close solidarity among the Allies" for the solution of the War questions in which they had a common interest: "The financial needs of each of them, the requirements of their armament, their transport, their food, have been subjects of profound study. The creation of a Supreme Inter-Allied Naval Committee was determined upon. Military unity of action has been placed in the way of certain realization by the Inter-Allied General Staff, which is at work upon an organized programme of all military questions. In a diplomatic point of view, entire accord resulted from the discussions.' Other general statements were made as the Conference continued its sittings over a period of 30 days and as the various Committees or Sections deliberated and decided upon the vast task of co-ordination which lay before them. At the close of the year Col. E. M. House, the U. S. representative, issued at Washington a summary of proceedings in which the most important items were as follows:

1. The pooling of Allied resources, with special reference to those of the United States was settled so as to guarantee full equipment of the fighting countries and forces. 2. The Allies, considering that the means of Maritime transportation at their disposal should be utilized in common for the pursuit of the War, decided to create an Inter-Allied organization for the co-ordination of their operations and establishment of a common programme kept up to date.

3. Full and detailed Conferences were held of the British, French, United States and Italian representatives upon Blockade matters and a complete understanding was obtained of the principles upon which these countries would act.

4. A comprehensive and accurate estimate was obtained of the food in the possession of the Allied nations and of the amounts that must be supplied by North America during the year ending Oct. 1, 1918.

On Dec. 14 the appointment of an Inter-allied Naval War Committee was announced as composed of the Minister of Marine and Chief of Naval Staff (or flag officers to represent them) of each country. Admiral Benson reported at Washington that its object was: "To ensure the closest touch and co-operation between the Allied fleets. The task of the Council will be to watch over the general conduct of the naval war and to ensure co-ordination of effort at sea as well as the development of all scientific operations connected with the conduct of the War." The question of an Allied Generalissimo was shelved for the moment-greatly to the disappointment of the French who thought an Allied War Staff should, logically, involve an Allied War Chief.

The Germans and the

The Kaiser continued to dominate Germany during this year; his will, whether interpreted, explained, Kaiser in 1917; modified or influenced by succeeding Chancellors, such National as Bethmann-Hollweg, Michaelis or Von Hertling, was Character and Opinions. the arbiter of fate and the final source of national action and policy. The country could not properly be judged apart from his personality; neither could he be judged apart