not warrant. Opinion of the Court, per ANDREWS, Ch. J. [Vol. 152. The learned counsel for the city contends that the clause in section 14, article 8, of the Constitution, immediately following the one already quoted, sustains the construction that the prior clause was intended to operate upon existing statutes. The clause now referred to reads as follows: "No such payments shall be made for any inmate of such institutions who is not received and retained therein pursuant to rules established by the state board of charities." We entertain no doubt that this prohibition operated presently, that is to say, that from the time rules should be established by the state board regulating the reception and retention by charitable institutions, no payments would be justified for the care, support and maintenance of inmates received or retained in contravention of the rules of the board. The clause last quoted seems to have been primarily framed with reference to the more usual practice of per capita payments for each inmate of charitable institutions. But the cases where the payments were to be made in gross are also within the spirit and intention of the constitutional inhibition, and the judicial armory is furnished with adequate weapons for compelling a compliance with, or preventing an evasion of this inhibition. We have, for the reasons stated, reached the conclusion that the existing system of statutory law for the sustentation of charities administered by private incorporated institutions, did not fall with the taking effect of the new Constitution. But we are of opinion that, notwithstanding this conclusion, the relator cannot maintain this proceeding. It must be conceded, upon the construction we have given to the constitutional provisions, that the act of 1877 remained in force after January 1, 1895. The duty of the comptroller to make the payments under the law continued after that time, and he refused to comply with the requirements made upon him by the execu tive committee of the home. The home continued to make monthly requisitions until May 1, 1896, and then instituted this proceeding to compel the payment to it of the sum of $156,269.55, being fifteen per cent of the excise moneys received by the comptroller from January 1, 1895. It is N. Y. Rep.] Opinion of the Court, per ANDREWS, Ch. J. not claimed, nor can it be pretended upon the facts, that an equivalent sum or any large proportion of such amount was expended by the home in the care and maintenance of inmates during the period mentioned. It is very probable that this was for lack of means to prosecute its charitable work by reason of the refusal of the comptroller to make the payments required. But it remains, nevertheless, true that the relator now seeks, by mandamus, to compel the payment into its treasury of a very large sum of public money, authorized to be paid to it for current support of inmates of the institution during the period when the fund accrued, although to a great extent it ceased its operations and did not, except to a limited extent, perform the service which was the consideration of the payment to be made out of the public funds. It is entirely plain that it was the intention of the act of 1877 to provide public aid for current expenses only, and that it was not intended to provide a fund for the uses of the home in future years, or an endowment for its support. It may be admitted that the comptroller, in refusing to comply with the requisitions made upon him, violated his duty, but the real question here is whether the court will compel the payment of public moneys to a private corporation under an appropriation made for a special and limited public purpose, where the application to such purpose has become impossible and the consideration for the appropriation has failed. We think not. If the relator has a claim for any amount it cannot be enforced in this proceeding. (See Shepherd's Fold v. Mayor, etc., 96 N. Y. 137.) The order of the Appellate Division should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs. All concur. In the Matter of the Application of CHARLES E. Bryant, Respondent, for a Writ of Mandamus, e. GEORGE W. PALMER, as Comptroller of the City of Brooklyn, Appellant. Matter of Jonx J. MooG, Respondent, . SAME, Appellant. Matter of CHARLES GOEDEL, Respondent, e. SAME, Appellant. 1. NATIONAL GUARD-ARMORERS AND JANITORS OF ARMORIES. Armorers and janitors of armories of the National Guard, appointed under the provisions of the Military Code, are in the military, and not in the civil, service of the state. RIES. 2. CONSTITUTION, ART. 11, § 3- MAINTENANCE OF MILITIA - ARMOThe provision of the Constitution of 1894 (Art. 11, § 3), that “it shall be the duty of the legislature at each session to make sufficient appropriations for the maintenance" of the militia, was not intended to make the entire maintenance of the militia payable out of the state treasury, and does not have the effect of prohibiting the enactment of general laws imposing upon localities the expense of maintaining armories within their jurisdiction. 3. COMPENSATION OF ARMORERS AND JANITORS A COUNTY CHARGE. The provision of section 179 of the Military Code, as amended by chapter 853, Laws of 1896, declaring that the compensation of employees in armories, including armorers and janitors, shall be a county charge upon the county in which the armory is situated, is not repugnant to the Constitution. Matter of Goedel v. Palmer, 15 App. Div. 86, affirmed. (Submitted March 26, 1897; decided April 20, 1897.) APPEALS by the comptroller of the city of Brooklyn from orders of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, entered March 17, 1897, reversing the orders of the Special Term in three cases, and directing the issue of peremptory writs of mandamus requiring the comptroller to pay the relators their wages as armorers and janitor of armories in the city of Brooklyn. The questions involved are similar and the appeals were argued together. The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. Alfred E. Mudge and Joseph A. Burr, for appellant. By the ratification of the amended Constitution in 1894, the entire expense of maintaining the National Guard was made a gen N. Y. Rep.] Opinion of the Court, per BARTLETT, J. eral state charge. (Const. N. Y. art. 11, § 3; L. 1893, ch. 559, § 177; L. 1896, ch. 853, § 177; People v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 485; Settle v. Van Evrea, 49 N. Y. 280; People v. Fancher, 50 N. Y. 288; People ex rel. v. Wemple, 125 N. Y. 485.) Edward M. Grout, Stillman F. Kneeland and William W. Ladd, Jr., for respondents. The relators are in the military and not in the civil service of the state. (L. 1896, ch. 853, §§ 176, 177, 260, 261; In re Flint, L. R. [15 Q. B. Div.] 488.) The laws which make the city (as successor to the county) liable for the relators' pay are constitutional. (L. 1893, ch. 559; L. 1896, ch. 853; L. 1862, ch. 477, § 120, 126, 127, 169; L. 1870, chap. 80, $ 120, 121, 124, 125; L. 1883, ch. 299, 60, 61, 64; Coutant v. People, 11 Wend. 513; Clark v. People, 26 Wend. 602; People v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 496; People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 37; In re Keymer, 148 N. Y. 224; People ex rel. v. Roberts, 148 N. Y. 369; Cooley's Const. Lim. [6th ed.] 69; People ex rel. v. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375; G. E. R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 3 Abb. [N. C.] 443; People ex rel. v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; People ex rel. v. Murray, 149 N. Y. 367; Woodhull v. Mayor, etc., 150 N. Y. 450.) BARTLETT, J. The relators have been refused payment of their wages on the ground that the county of Kings, by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution of 1894, is no longer liable therefor, and that the claims must be paid out of the state treasury. (Constitution, art. XI, § 3.) The facts are not disputed. Relator Goedel is the janitor of Troop C. The armory occupied by Troop C is the property of the state, but since 1875 has been in the possession of the county of Kings for military uses. Relator Moog is the armorer of the Third Battery and the relator Bryant holds a like position in the Twenty-third Regiment. The Third Battery armory is owned by the county of Kings, and the Twenty-third Regiment armory is the property of the Opinion of the Court, per BARTLETT, J. [Vol. 152. state of New York. The Special Term held that the relators were in the military, and not the civil service, but that their wages were payable by the state and not the county of Kings. The Appellate Division affirmed the former position and reversed as to the latter. The appellant on this appeal does not argue that the relators are not in the military service. We are of opinion that the court below has properly decided this point. The single question is presented whether section 179 of the Military Code, as amended in 1896 (Laws 1896, ch. 853, vol. 1, p. 774), is in violation of art. XI, section 3, of the Constitution, which reads as follows, viz.: "The militia shall be organized and divided into such land and naval, and active and reserve forces, as the legislature may deem proper, provided, however, that there shall be maintained at all times a force of not less than ten thousand enlisted men, fully uniformed, armed, equipped, disciplined and ready for active service. And it shall be the duty of the legislature at each session to make sufficient appropriations for the maintenance thereof." Section 179 of the Military Code, as amended in 1896, provides that the persons appointed under the provisions of the two preceding sections shall receive certain compensation, which is to be certified by the commanding officer, and “shall be paid semi-monthly upon the certificate of such officer, and shall be a county charge upon the county in which such armory or arsenal is situated, and shall be levied, collected and paid in the same manner as other county charges are levied, collected and paid." The two preceding sections referred to in section 179 deal with the appointment of armorers, janitors, engineers and laborers. As the law stood before the Constitution of 1894 (Ch. 559, Laws of 1893, § 177) the wages of these appointees were a county charge. The appellant contends that while it was the policy of the |