SEARCH OF TRUTH.

HE story of Diogenes going about with a lantern in the day-time in quest of an honest man, or as

his namesake, the biographer of the philosophers, has it, in quest of a MAN,* may not unaptly symbolise the case of a mind endeavouring to find out Truth amid the labyrinth of prevailing opinions; all bearing the name, yet masking the most opposite or heterogeneous principles: -an inquisition, therefore, neither superfluous through the lapse of ages, nor to be quelled by a self-complacency that would interpret the non-acceptance of its own conclusions into a symptom of mental or moral distemperature.

TRUTH of whatever kind is only fact or reality. But in a multitude of instances mankind are much fonder of fiction than of reality; all false sentiments being so many fictions or fancies in place of facts. One reason may be, that there is often considerable difficulty in arriving at facts, but little or none in taking up with some vague or apparent resemblances. It is with great beauty that Plato speaks of truth as Tò ov, that which is, in contradistinction to what he stigmatises as rò dogaσróv, or that which consists in opinion: though in the application of these expressions the founder of the Academy proceeds on views somewhat remote from modern speculation, except as concerned with the curiosities * λύχνον μεθ' ἡμέραν ἅψας, ἄνθρωπόν, φησι, ζητῶ.—Diog. Laërt. vi. 2.

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of a vanished or a transcendental phase of philosophy; limiting the rò v to those eternal archetypes or ideas which he supposed to reside immutably, yet as distinct essences, in the Divine Reason; while all outward things, and the notions of them, are but shadows or fantastic mockeries. To the knowledge of external objects therefore, as perpetually changing, and subject to dissolution, he refused the name of truth or science, employing the epithet dogaoтóv, expressive of such knowledge as unreal, or dependent on appearance.*

THERE are multitudes of truths which are worthless in themselves, and merit attention merely as stepping-stones, or as a ladder conducting to something ulterior. When that is attained, the ladder may be dispensed with. The time will perhaps arrive when the topics which have served the infancy of reason, and the facts which may be compared to the scaffolding of an edifice, being laid aside, the essence of truth, in every department, will be so condensed and simplified, as to come within the reach of the most limited capacity. This would still leave boundless scope for disquisition and varieties of view; as hitherto problems and perplexities have multiplied faster than solutions or discoveries; and that too in proportion to the amount of civilization and culture. The nations most advanced in the career of intelligence and refinement, have always been the most speculative and curious. It was so with the oriental nations most famed in the history of thought, among whom so many sects and philosophies sprang up. It was so with the most polished state of classical antiquity, the subtle and meditative Athenians. It has been so in Western Europe since the revival of letters, and especially since the breaking down of the old landmarks of opinion by the French revolution. It is so at present with individuals, in relation to each other. The larger their comprehension and sagacity, the greater commonly is the number of points * Phædo, passim.

on which fancy or reflection can lead them to differ; for it is in the nature of a developed mind to stretch its contemplations into remoter tracts, while every mind has its original or acquired peculiarities.

THE greater part of current opinions are entertained by the majority without evidence, intellectual or experimental; being transmitted from one to another as an heir-loom, and differing in fact little from what may be called stereotyped views of things. Most persons who hold truth, do so on the same principles that determine others in the adoption or retention of error; namely, education, fancy, connexions, interest, or the like; and the truths which they profess they are incapable of proving to be truths, however susceptible of demonstration. The consequence often is, that many are willing enough to look at both sides of a question within certain precincts, but once touch their own sentiments or faction, and their seeming impartiality vanishes.

If there is any one attribute common to man which is engrafted on his original nature, and entirely the growth of circumstances, that attribute is prejudice. To meet a person altogether exempt from its influence, may be pronounced, if not impossible, at least one of the most difficult things in the world. It is not easy to say whether prejudice resides most in mansions or in cottages; in courts or in camps; among the clergy or the laity; philosophers or the vulgar; authors or their readers. The forms which it assumes vary with each individual understanding, being almost as numerous as the several opinions of mankind; and what seems remarkable, those whom it most sways are generally least conscious of its operation. The weakness, in each of its Protean shapes sufficiently ignoble, in none appears more so than when contrasted with its opposite, fairly enough defined by the admirable Mede, in relation to his own learned and ingenious, though often fanciful lucubrations. "If I have

hit upon any truth," says he in a letter to Mr. Hartlib, "it is wholly to be attributed to my indifferency in such searches, to embrace whatsoever I should find, without any regard whether it were for the advantage of one side or other"a memorable remark of that distinguished man in extenuation of his own abilities, which appear to have been as much shrouded from their possessor as they were conspicuous to others. The observation may remind one of a saying of Sir Isaac Newton's, that if he had made any discoveries above the rest of mankind, it was owing to nothing but industry and patient thought: a circumstance, by the way, which would alone suffice to show that excellence such as Newton's, though matchless in its kind, by no means indicates the highest order of genius. In general, men have so little patient or independent thought, that they are like travellers over a plain covered with snow, who if there be no track are bewildered, but if they find one, are too happy to slide into the footsteps already provided.

MANY persons have patience in affliction, who have little or none in the pursuit of truth. Yet in the latter case it is more beneficial, being productive of positive advantage, while in the former the advantage is chiefly negative.

Ir were easier to imagine than portray the extent to which the progress of truth is not only impeded, but often supplanted for a time by that of error, in consequence of the precipitance and passion of men, and the multiplicity and haste in which works are now published. Harvey is said to have spent eight years in maturing his discovery respecting the circulation of the blood, before he communicated it to the world. A genuine search after Truth, whose dwelling is beyond the haunts and perturbations of the multitude, is a very quiet, unostentatious thing.

The goddess herself has not sufficient charms to captivate the vulgar, but must be veiled in mystery, or

invested with adventitious ornaments or attractions, to strike the popular fancy. An unsophisticated mind loves Truth for her very simplicity, and contemns alike the arts of the sophist and the empiric.

Her praises are sounded by many who are at best but her partial votaries; among whom I fear that Dr. Johnson, admirable above most for high moral self-reliance and integrity, was one; who would denounce the slightest deviation from fact in a statement of distance or time or other insignificant minutiæ, but who felt little scrupulosity in the colouring of a controverted question, or in bearing down the force of evidence to achieve a momentary triumph in debate.

WITH allowance for exceptions, to be explained on their own grounds respectively, I can hardly believe that a person who is unfair in argumentation will be honest in practical affairs, under circumstances of temptation. If it were not that ignorance, like age, has its privileges, and can play strange tricks, and that man, instead of being defined a thinking animal, might more properly be termed an unthinking one, it would be difficult to avoid the suspicion that the way in which some, claiming to be champions of truth, can argue, implies, as it assuredly tends to produce, an utter corruption of moral principle. There is nothing in a course of dissipation, or religious negligence, that so blunts all perception of right and wrong, as the bigotry which will not open its eyes to evidence, and the sophistry that defends what reason has pronounced untenable.

They whose pretensions should involve the largest infusion of justice and charity, are too often distempered partizans, whose reflective faculty, if at all awake, perambulates a well-trodden circle, beyond which she seldom strays but to nap at the house of Intolerance or Incapacity. Better arrive at error by an honest process, than at truth by a dishonest one.