[317] to the other relief, a demand for the return of of the wharfage already paid. Constitution of the United States, in violation of sec. 1979, R. S., does not embrace an action of trespass on the case in which the plaintiff seeks a recov ery of damages against a tax collector in Virginia, who, having rejected a tender of tax-receivable coupons, issued under the Act of March 30, 1871, seeks a seizure and sale of personal property of the to collect the tax for which they were tendered by plaintiff. The remedy to restrain by injunction taxes In the case of national banks, the assessment and collection of taxes illegally assessed under the authority of state laws, in violation of Acts of Congress, are habitually restrained by the preventive remedy of injunction; and the jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States in those cases is regarded as in the highest degree beneficial and necessary to prevent the agencies of the Goverment of the United States from being hindered and embarrassed in the perform ance of their functions by state legislation. The exercise of that jnrisdiction, and by means of that remedy, in such cases is to vindicate the supremacy of the Constitution, and to maintain the integrity of the powers and rights which it confers and secures; and that jurisdiction is vested in the Courts of the United States because the cases embraced in it are necessarily cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Where the rights in jeopardy are those of private citizens, and are of those classes which the Constitution of the United States either confers or has taken under its protection, and no adequate remedy for their enforcement is provided by the forms and proceedings purely legal, the same necessity invokes and justifies, in cases to which its remedies can be applied, that jurisdiction in equity vested by the Constitution of the United States, and which can not be affected by the legislation of the States. In the present case the jurisdiction in equity to grant the relief prayed for by injunction, and the propriety of its exercise, are alike in disputable. The decree of the Circuit Court is accordingly affirmed. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 317-323.) Tares; remedy for violation of contract of Virginia to receive coupons in payment of-trespass does not lie under sec. 629, R. S., against collector. *1. The 16th clause of sec, 629, R. S., authorizing suits, without reference to the sum or value in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to be brought in the Circuit Courts of the United States to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the *Head notes by Mr. Justice MATTHEWS. Argued Mar. 20, 23, 24, 25, 1885. Decided Apr. 20, 1885. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia. The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. See, also, the case of Poindexter v. Greenhow, ante, 185, and the dissenting opinion, post 207. Messrs. William L. Royall, Daniel H. Chamberlain, Wm. M. Evarts, Wager Swayne and Wm. B. Hornblower, for plaintiff in error. Messrs. F. S. Blair, Atty-Gen. of Virginia, A. H. Garland, R. T. Merrick, J. Ambler Smith and S. B. Witt, for defend. ant in error. Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiff in error brought his action, in the Circuit Court of the United States, against the defendant, on May 7, 1883. His cause of action is set forth in the declaration as follows: "Samuel S. Carter, plaintiff, complains of Samuel C. Greenhow, defendant, of a plea of trespass on the case, for that the said plaintiff is a citizen of the State of Virginia and a resident of the City of Richmond in said State. That the plaintiff owns property in said city, and that he was lawfully assessed on said property by the officers of the State of Virginia whose duty it was under the laws of Virginia to make such assessment, with taxes to be paid to the State of Virque and leviable for, on and after the first day ginia for the year 1882, and that said taxes were of December, 1882. That the defendant, Samuel C. Greenhow, is the treasurer of the City of Richmond in the State of Virginia, and that the laws of Virginia make it his duty to collect all taxes due to the State of Virginia by residents of said city on property situated and being in said city. That on the 3d day of May, 1883, the plaintiff was indebted to the said State of Virginia on account of the taxes so assessed upon his property as aforesaid for the year 1882, and that on said last named date he tendered to the defendant, in payment of his said taxes, coupons cut from bonds issued by the State of Virginia, under the provisions of the Act of the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, approved March 28, 1879, entitled 'An Act to Provide a Plan of Settlement of the Public Debt,' which coupons, together with a small amount of lawful money [318]) The sixteenth clause of section 629, Rev. Stats., defining the original jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States, gives to them cognizance, without reference to the sum or value in controversy, or the citizenship of the parties, "Of all suits authorized by law to be brought by any person to redress the deprivation, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law providing for equal rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States." R. S. Section 1979, Rev. Stats., provides that "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States, or other person within the jurisdiction thereof, to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.' of the United States, tendered at the same time, | filed and sustained, and judgment rendered acamounted exactly to the sum so due by the cordingly for the defendant. To reverse that plaintiff for taxes as aforesaid, and which cou-judgment the present writ of error is prosepons were due and past maturity, in payment cuted. [319] of his said taxes so due as aforesaid. That by the terms of the Act of the General Assembly under which said coupons were issued, the said coupons are receivable in payment of all taxes due to the State of Virginia, and that each of said coupons bore upon its face the contract of the State of Virginia that it should be received in payment of taxes due to said State. That the defendant refused to receive the said coupons and money in payment of the taxes so due by the plaintiff. That after said tender the said defendant unlawfully entered into and upon the plaintiff's premises and place of business and levied upon and seized the plaintiff's property and carried the same away to sell the same in payment of plaintiff's taxes. That plaintiff was Similar jurisdiction is conferred upon Disalways ready and willing to deliver to the de-trict Courts by the twelfth clause of section 563, fendant in payment of said taxes, up to the moment when the defendant so levied upon his said property, the said coupons and money, and he many times offered to do so, but the defend. ant always refused to receive the same. That the plaintiff has the right, under the Constitution of the United States, to pay his said taxes to the said defendant in the said coupons and money, and that this right is secured to him by the Constitution of the United States. That when the defendant refused to receive the said coupons and money in payment of the taxes so due as aforesaid by the plaintiff, he did so under color of and by the command of an Act of the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, approved January 26, 1882, entitled 'An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Collection of the Revenue, to Support Government, Maintain the Public Schools, and to Pay Interest on the Public Debt,' which Act forbids collectors of taxes due to said State to receive in payment thereof anything except gold, silver, United States treasury notes, and national bank currency: and that when he so levied upon the plaintiff's property he did so by virtue of and under the command of the 18th section of an Act of the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, approved April 1, 1879, which Act is chapter sixty of the laws published by authority of the General Assembly of the State of Virginia for the special session of 1879, and by virtue of and under the command of other statutes enacted by the General Assembly of the (320) State of Virginia. That the said two last mentioned Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, and the other mentioned statutes of said State, commanding the defendant to levy so as aforesaid upon the property of the plaintiff, are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore void; that in refusing to receive the said coupons and money in payment of said taxes, and in levying on and seizing the plaintiff's property for said taxes, after the plaintiff had tendered the same in payment thereof, the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured to him by the Constitution of the United States, under color of statutes enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, to the damage of the plaintiff two hundred dollars ($200), and therefore he brings this suit." To this declaration a general demurrer was These three provisions constituted the first section of the Act of April 20, 1871, entitled "An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Four [321] teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for Other Purposes." 17 Stat. at L., 13. In that section, the language conferring jurisdiction in the courts was as follows: Such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several District or Circuit Courts of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of the Act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled "An Act to Protect All Persons in the United States in Their Civil Rights, and to Furnish the Means of Their Vindication," and the other remedial laws of the United States which are in their nature applicable in such cases. The second section of the Act here referred to, of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. at L., 27, provided "That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory, to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this Act, or to different punishment, pains or penalties on account of such person having, at any time, been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court,' The question presented in this record is [322] [323] whether the facts stated in the plaintiff's dec- | any person, would subject the latter to an ac The acts charged against the defendant are, that he refused to receive from the plaintiff the coupons tendered in payment of taxes, and thereafter proceeded to levy upon and take his property for the purpose of collecting such taxes in money. The rights alleged to be violated are the right to pay taxes in coupons instead of in money, and, after a tender of coupons, the immunity from further proceeding to collect such taxes as though they were delinquent. These rights the plaintiff derives from the contract with the State, contained in the Act of March 28, 1879, and the bonds and coupons issued under its authority. The judgment of the Circuit Court is accordingly affirmed. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. Justices Miller, Bradley and Gray. See SAMUEL C. GREENHOW, Treasurer of the (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 323, 324.) *This case falls within the decision in Carter v. Greenhow (ante, 202). [No. 941.] APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the Unit ginia. ed States for the Eastern District of Vir the opinion of the court. See, also, the preced- Messrs. William L. Royall, Daniel L. Mr. F. S. Blair, Atty-Gen. of Virginia, for Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opin How and in what sense are these rights se- this right. It might be difficult to enumerate the several descriptions of rights secured to individuals by the Constitution, the deprivation of which, by citizen of Virginia, praying that the defendant, the Circuit Court for want of jurisdiction, the dered in Carter v. Greenhow [ante, 202], and is Revised Statutes referred to. *Head note by Mr. Justice MATTHEWS. [32 [32 (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 325–330.) Contract right of coupon holder under Act of Virginia of March 30, 1871-bill calling for decree declaring merely an abstract right does not lie. *The contract right of a coupon holder under the Virginia Act of March 30, 1871, whereby his coupons are receivable in payment of taxes, can be exercised only by a taxpayer; and a bill in equity for an injunction to restrain tax collectors from refusing to receive them, when tendered in payment of taxes, will not lie in behalf of a coupon holder who does not allege himself to be also a taxpayer. Such a bill calls for a decree declaring merely an abstract right, and does not show any breach of the contract, or other ground of relief. [No. 1278.] Argued Mar. 26, 27,1885. Decided Apr. 20,1885. PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the UnitAed States for the Eastern District of Virginia. The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. See, also, the case of Poindexter v. Greenhow, ante, 185, and the dissenting opinion, post, 207. Messrs. F. S. Blair, Atty-Gen. of Virginia, Walter R. Staples and A. H. Garland, for appellants. Messrs. Richard L. Maury, Wager Swayne and Daniel H. Chamberlain, for appellee. Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court: The appellee, who was complainant below, a citizen of New York, filed his bill in equity, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia, against Morton Marye, described as Auditor of the Commonwealth of Virginia; Samuel C. Greenhow, Treasurer of the City of Richmond; A. L. Hill, Treasurer of the City of Norfolk, and V. G. Dunnington, Treasurer of the City of Lynchburg; R. B. Munford, Commissioner of Revenue for the City of Richmond; Charles W. Price, for the City of Lynchburg, and Charles D. Langley, for the City of Norfolk, all citizens of Virginia. The complainant avers in his bill that he is the owner of overdue coupons to the amount of $28,010, cut from bonds of the State of Virginia issued under the Act of March 30, 1871, *Head note by Mr. Justice MATTHEWS. which coupons are receivable, by the terms of that Act, in payment, at and after maturity, for all taxes, debts and demands due the State. A list of these coupons, described by the numbers and amounts of the bonds, is exhibited with the bill. He claims that these coupons constitute a contract with the State, by which it agreed to pay the amount of cach to the holder at maturity; and, second, in case of default, that the holder should have the right to assign debtor of the State, with the quality of being or transfer the same to any taxpayer or other received for taxes and other demands due the State, and with the guaranty that the State would receive them specifically in payment pro tanto for any such taxes and demands, and that they should be accepted by any of her tax collectors from any of her taxpayers or debtors in discharge and payment of such taxes or other dues. The defendants to the bill, it is alleged, are officers of the State, charged severally with the collection of certain taxes and license fees and other dues to the State; and it is charged that, in pursuance of certain statutes passed since the Act of March 30, 1871, and the issue of the bonds and coupons under it, they are forbidden to receive these and similar coupons in payment of taxes and other dues to the State, which statutes, it is averred, impair the obligation of the contract between the State and the holder of its coupons, and are accordingly in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and are null and void; but that, nevertheless, the defendants, as officers of the State, as is publicly known, habitually refuse to accept coupons when tendered by taxpayers, in payment of taxes and other dues to the State, with the collection of which they are severally charged, and the General Assembly of Virginia has also passed statutes repealing all laws which provided any remedy for the enforcement of the right to have them so received. The bill then proceeds as follows: [326] "And your petitioner furthermore shows that, confiding in his right to a specific performance of said contract, and in his title to equitable relief, should the same be denied, he hath made arrangements with sundry taxpayers of Virginia to use his above coupons in payment of their taxes and license taxes now due, by which arrangement, if the said coupons can be used without delay or difficulty, he will receive nearly par therefor, and thus be able to have his coupons collected. But, unless they are so accepted in payment when tendered, the [327] said taxpayers will not use them at all, because they are compelled to pay their taxes forthwith under heavy penalties, and to obtain their licenses immediately, or cease from business, so that, if the collectors of these taxes continue to refuse to accept these coupons, and so render necessary an appeal to the courts, and a separate action by each taxpayer upon each tender, such refusal will be tantamount to an utter destruction of the rights of your petitioner, because delays will thus occur which the taxpay ers cannot submit to for the above named rea sons and others, and thus your petitioner will be deprived of the benefit of the arrangements he has made, as well as of all opportunity of having his coupons so used at any time save in small amounts and at rare intervals." [328] The prayer for relief is as follows: "In tender consideration whereof, and inasmuch as your petitioner is without adequate relief save in a court of equity, wherein such matters are properly cognizable, and inasmuch as he will suffer great and irreparable loss and damage, exceeding $500 in amount, unless relief is afforded him immediately, and the above named officers are required to perform specifically the contract aforesaid, and receive his said coupons in payment of all or any of the dues and taxes above named immediately upon their being tendered therefor by any taxpayer or applicant for a license, and to avoid a multiplicity of suits and prevent an obstruction of justice, he prays that Mortor Marye, Auditor of Virginia, Samuel C. Greenhow, A. L. Hill, and V. G. Dunnington, Treasurers of the Cities of Richmond, Norfolk and Lynchburg, respectively, and R. B. Munford, Charles D. Langley and Charles W. Price, Commissioners of the Revenue for said cities, respectively, be made parties defendant hereto, with apt words to charge them, and may be required on oath to answer fully the allegations hereof. "And that the said defendants, their assistants, clerks and agents, be required and compelled to specifically perform the said coupon contract according to its legal tenor and effect, and to accept your orator's said coupons, or any of them, from any taxpayer presenting them or any of them in payment of his taxes, license taxes, or other dues, and to receipt therefor, or certify the payment and deposit thereof, in cases of applications for license, in precisely the same form and with precisely the same force and effect as they would do if said tender, payment, or deposit were made in money. And that your honors will decree said coupons to be genuine, legal coupons, legally receivable for ail taxes, debts and demands due the State of Virginia, and especially for all license taxes or assessments by whatever name the same may be called. And to the end that your orator may have full relief in the premises, he also prays that a preliminary restraining order and injunction may be issued without delay, enjoining and restraining the said defendants, their assistants, clerks and agents, and each and every one of them, from refusing to accept any of the coupons named in the Exhibit A herewith, in full payment pro tanto of the taxes, license taxes, or other dues, due by any taxpayer to the State who may tender the same in payment thereof, and enjoining and restraining them from refusing to execute and deliver forthwith to such taxpayer his tax bill, duly receipted, or to an applicant for a license, a certificate that the amount of coupons tendered by such applicant has been deposited with him in payment of the tax or deposit required or assessed for said license, and from refusing, immediately upon the presentation of such certificate, to grant and issue the license applied for to such applicant, all in the same manner, and to have precisely the same force and effect as if said payments were made in coin or currency." There is also a prayer for general relief. There was a final decree on bill, answer, replication and proofs, granting the injunction as prayed for, and the defendants appealed. This bill is without precedent, and should have been dismissed. It is a clear case, as stated, of damnum absque injuria. So far as the contract with the complainant was that the State should pay to him his coupons at maturity, there is, no doubt, a breach; but he asks no relief as to that, for there is no remedy by suit to compel the State to pay its debts. So far as the contract was to receive the coupons of the com. plainant in payment of taxes and other dues to [329] the State, there is no breach, for he does not allege that any of them have been tendered by any taxpayer or debtor to the State in payment of taxes or other dues; nor that there has been a refusal on the part of any tax collector, or other officer of the State charged with the col lection and receipt of taxes and dues to the State to receive them in payment therefor. Personally the complainant has no right to offer them for such purpose, for he owes no taxes or other debt to the State. There is nothing shown in the bill by which he is prevented from transferring them to others who would have the legal right to use them in that way, except that, being discredited for such uses by the previous refusals of the officers of the State to receive other but similar coupons, the complainant can find no one willing to purchase them from him at a reasonable price for such purposes. This damage is not actionable, because it is not a direct and legal consequence of a breach of the contract, and is not distinguishable from the damage any creditor might suffer from the known inability or unwillingnes of his debtors to perform their obligations. Such discredit might, and often does, result in the bankruptcy and financial ruin of the creditor, but no action lies to recover damages for the consequential loss, which the law does not connect with the default, as cause and effect. To enable the complainant to avail himself of the benefit of his contract with the State, to receive his coupous in payment of taxes, he must first assign them to some one who has taxes to pay, as he has not; but when he does so, by the assignment, he has lost his interest in the contract and his right to demand its performance, all right to which he has transferred with the coupons. It is only when in the hands of taxpayers or or other debtors that the coupons are receivable in payment of taxes and debts due to the State. The bill as framed, therefore, calls for a declaration of an abstract character, that the contract set out requiring coupons to be received in payment of taxes and debts due to the State is valid; that the statutes of the General Assembly of Virginia impairing its obligations are contrary to the Constitution of the United States, and therefore void; and that it is the legal duty of the collecting officers of the State to receive them when offered in payment of such taxes and debts. But no court sits to determine questions of law in thesi. There must be a litigation upon actual transactions between real parties, growing out of a controversy affecting legal or equitable rights as to person or property. All questions of law arising in such cases are judicially determinable. The present is not a case of that description. The decree of the Circuit Court is accordingly reversed and the cause is remanded, with directions to dismiss the bill; and it is so ordered. True Copy. Test: James H. McKinney, Clerk, Sup. Court U. S. |