[189] The material part of the specification forming part of the letters patent is as follows: The object of my invention is to cause a glove to fit closely to the hand and wrist of the wearer without the use of buttons or other fastenings; and I attain this object by extending a spring, A, entirely around the split portion B of the glove, in the manner plainly shown in Figure 1 of the accompanying drawing, so that when released the ends a a of the said spring shall overlap, as shown in Figure 2, and thus close the glove upon the wrist. The spring is entirely concealed within the [188] material of the glove, and may be secured to the latter in any suitable manner; but I prefer to simply stitch it in place, as indicated by the dotted lines x in Figure 1. The spring may also be variously shaped; but I prefer to construct it of a single piece of wire, bent to the form shown, as I have ascertained by experiment that a spring of this form is most suitable for the purpose, while it possesses the further advantage of presenting no sharp or abrupt ends, which would be apt to force their way through the material of the glove. The edge view, Figure 3, shows the method of bending the spring to conform to the shape of the hand of the wearer of the glove. I am aware that springs have been combined with the wristlets of gloves, but they have always extended entirely around the latter, thus rendering it impossible to fold the glove, which was consequently clumsy and inconvient to carry in the pocket. This objection, it will be evident, is entirely overcome by my ininvention. I claim: The combination, substantially as described, of a spring, A, with the split portion, B, of a glove, for the purpose specified." The drawings referred to are annexed. Judge Wheeler holding the circuit court, in deciding the case, stated the grounds of his action in dismissing the bill, in an opinion contained in the transcript, as follows: 'The orator has a patent, No. 155,077, dated September 15, 1874, for an improvement in glove fastenings, consisting of the combination of a spring inserted in the material of the glove, and extending around the edges of the slit, which permits drawing the wrist of the glove over the hand, and adjusted so as to spring open by the insertion of the hand and to close automatically and overlap itself, and cause the edges of the slit to overlap each other when the glove is on. The defendants deny infringement. They make and sell for use springs for gloves to be inserted into the material, and with arms extending along each edge of the slit, jointed at the apex, working together like the blade and handle of a jackknife. The only question is, whether the use [190] of such springs is an infringement. The plaintiff stated in the specification of his patent that springs had been combined before with the wrists of gloves, but of a different form. So his patent is not and could not be maintained as a patent for the combination of springs in every form with the wrists of gloves to close them. It proposes to be and is a patent of his style of spring combined with the wrists of gloves for that purpose. The question is, whether the defendants' spring is substantially like his. His is a spring throughout, and pulls constantly upon the parts of the material until they come together and overlap. The defendants' has stiff arms, and pulls the parts together only when closed far enough to have the spring on one arm operate in the opposite direction upon the cam-shaped end of the other, and it pulls the edges apart until the arms are at right angles to each other when opened far enough to cause the spring to act the other way on the cam. When so opened it will not close itself as the orator's will, but has as much tendency to remain open as it has to remain closed after being closed. It is said by an expert called by the orator that if the edge of the cam, which throws the arms apart, was removed, the spring would become more like the orator's in its operation; but he probably failed to notice that the spring operates on the same edge of the cam, although on different sides of its pivot, both in opening and closing the spring; and that if this edge was removed the spring would not move arms together or either way at all. The form of the defendants' spring is different from the orator's; its mode of operation is different, and the result of its operation is somewhat different. It cannot be said to be the same as the orator's, or to be substantially like the orator's. Each got the idea of closing the wrists of gloves by means of springs from others; the orator carries out the idea in his mode and the defendants in theirs, and as neither has control of anything but the particular mode, neither can justly say that the other uses his mode." For these reasons, which we cannot restate in | simple to the purchasers "against the claim [198] JOHN DOE, ex dem. State of ALABAMA and ex dem. JOHN SWANN and JOHN A. BILLUPS, Trustees, etc., Piff. in Err. [199] VANCE C. LARMORE. all their interest to Larmore, who is now in The name of the Wills' Valley Railroad Com- pletion of the road. 2. The completion of the road within the time Submitted Dec. 17, 1885. Decided Jan. 4, 1886. The claim of the plaintiff is, that as the lands in question were not fully earned when the IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the sale was made under which Larmore holds Alabama. The history and facts of the case sufficiently Mr. Samuel F. Rice, for plaintiff in error. error. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: This case cannot be distinguished in principle from St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Company v. McGee, 115 U. S. 469 [ante, 446], decided at the present Term. The suit was ejectment to recover the possession of certain tracts of land granted June 3, 1856, by an Act of Congress to the State of Alabama to aid in building a railroad "from Gadsden to connect with the Georgia and Tennessee and Tennessee line of railroad through Chattanooga, Wills, and Lookout Valleys." 11 Stat. at L. 17, chap. 41. Sections 3 and 4 of this Act are identical with sections 4 and 5 of the Act involved in McGee's Case; and they provided that if the road was not completed in ten years all unsold land should revert to the United States. On the 30th of January, 1858, the Legislature of Alabama by a joint resolution transferred this grant to the Wills' Valley Railroad Company, "to be used and applied by said company upon the terms, conditions, and under restrictions in said Act of Congress contained." Sess. Laws Ala. 1857-8, p. 431. On the 29th of June, 1860, the lands involved in this suit were certified to the State by the Commissioner of the General Land-Office under the grant; and on the 20th of February, 1861, they were sold by the company to Larmore, the defendant, and certain other persons, who paid the purchase money and entered into possession. The proceeds of the sale were used in building the road, and, on the 7th of June, 1866, the company conveyed the lands in fece 598 the ten years fixed by the Act of 1856, these As the judgment below sustained Larmore's True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. JAMES B. GRANT, Governor, WILLIAM (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 207-213.) Admission of State-property of Territory 1. Unless otherwise declared by Congress, the tl- [200] [207] 2. Lands conveyed to a Territory "its successors | Act to Locate the Seat of Government of the and assigns forever," and duly accepted as the site for its capitol, pass to the State when admitted, al- Territory of Colorado, approved the 9th day though the Territory may not have occupied them, of December, A. D. 1867, so as to vest the title there being no condition requiring the erection of to the same absolutely and in fee simple in said buildings thereon within any specified time. 3. The question whether the grantor has been de- Territory, for the purpose of erecting a capitol prived of his property without due process of law and other public buildings thereon only: to is within the Jurisdiction of this court. have and to hold the same, together with all [No. 588.] and singular the appurtenances and privileges appertaining; and all the estate, right, title, in Argued Dec. 14, 15, 1885. Decided Jan. 4, 1886. thereunto belonging or in any wise thereunto APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado. The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. See, also, the report of the opinion of this court dismissing a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Colorado in a suit between these parties involving the subject matter of this suit. Brown v. Colorado, Bk. 27, 132; 5 Colo. 496. Messrs. James H. Brown, G. C. Bartels and J. H. Blood, for appellant. Messrs. Thornton H. Thomas and Theodore H. Thomas, Atty-Gen. of Colorado, for appellees. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court: terest and claim whatever of the said party of the first part, either in law or equity, to the only proper use, benefit and behoof of the said party of the second part, its successors and assigns forever. And the said party of the first part, the aforesaid parcel of land unto the said party of the second part, its successors and assigns, against the claim or claims of all and every person whatsoever, he, the said Henry C. Brown, does and will warrant and forever defend by these presents." Contemporaneously with the execution of the deed, the Legislative Assembly of the Territory adopted a memorial to Congress, asking, for reasons therein stated, a liberal appropriation for the erection of suitable capitol buildings for This is an appeal from the final decree of the the use of the Territory. By an Act of the TerCircuit Court of the United States for the Dis-ritorial Legislature, approved February 9, 1872, trict of Colorado, dismissing, upon demurrer to the bill, a suit in equity instituted in that court by Henry C. Brown against James B. Grant, Governor, William H. Meyers, LieutenantGovernor, Melvin Edwards, Secretary of State, and D. F. Urmy, Attorney-General of the State of Colorado, and against certain other persons constituting a board of managers for the erection of the capitol building for that State. The case made by the bill is substantially as follows: By the third section of an Act of the Council and House of Representatives of the Territory of Colorado, entitled "An Act to Locate the Seat of Government of the Territory of Colorado," approved December 9, 1867, it was, among other things, provided that "Sec. 3. The persons appointed, as aforesaid, in section 2 of this Act, shall, within sixty days after the date of their appointment, proceed to select a site for the capitol of said Territory, within the said City of Denver, which site shall contain not less than ten acres of land; and if [208] the site so selected shall be conveyed to the Territory of Colorado by the person or persons holding the title thereto, without charge to said Territory, and so as to vest the title to the same, absolutely and in fee simple, in said Territory, the site so selected shall be and remain the property of said Territory, for the purpose of erecting a capitol and other public buildings thereon.' On the 11th of January, 1868, the plaintiff, by deed duly acknowledged, conveyed to the Territory a tract of ten acres of land, part of a larger tract owned by him in the immediate vicinity of Denver. The consideration is stated to be $1,000 paid to the grantor by the Territory, but the land was, in fact, donated by him in the belief that the erection thereon of the capitol and other public buildings would enhance the value of his adjoining lands. The deed contains the following recitals: "The said land being so conveyed to said Territory in pursuance of the Act entitled 'An it was directed that proposals be received for the erection of a capitol building, and that it [209] "be erected upon the ground heretofore donated to the Territory for that purpose by Henry C. Brown." On the same day another memorial to Congress was adopted, asking an appropriation of $100,000, collected from internal revenue taxes within the Territory, for the purpose of assisting in the erection of a capitol building at the seat of government of the Territory. Thereafter on 13th of February, 1874, another Act was passed providing for the appointment of capitol commissioners, with authority to have the custody of and expend in the improvement of the capitol grounds, and in the erection of capitol buildings thereon, money appropriated or donated for that purpose; to sell all lands and lots donated for capitol purposes, except capitol site, the money so raised to be used in the erection of a capitol building or buildings, to be completed, paid for and delivered to the Territory on or before January 1, 1876. The bill alleges that the Territory of Colorado did on or about the first day of August, 1876, "depart this life," and on the same day, "by proclamation of U. S. Grant, the then Presi dent of the United States of America, the State of Colorado was admitted into the Union," the "said Territory never having during its life occupied or made use of said tract of land donated to it by your orator, either for the purpose of erecting capitol or other public buildings thereon, or for any other purpose whatsoever." The Constitution adopted by the people of Colorado under the Enabling Act of Congress provided that the General Assembly should not change or locate the seat of government of the State, but at its first session, subsequent to the year 1880, should submit the question of its permanent location to the popular vote at a general election, until which vote no expenditure for capitol buildings should be made. The same Constitution provided "that all property, real and personal, belonging to the Territory of shall be vested in and become the property of On the 9th of May, 1879, the plaintiff took [210] possession of the ten acre tract and constructed around it a substantial board fence. At the same time he executed and put on record a deed revoking and annulling his conveyance of 1868. The reason assigned in that deed for its execution is, that "neither the said Territory nor its successor, the State of Colorado, has ever accepted the said conveyance or located or erected a capitol or other public buildings on said tract of land as in and by said deed (of 1863) provided." Colorado at the adoption of this Constitution | Territory for that purpose by Henry C. Brown," The bill alleges that plaintiff has been in complete possession of said land ever since May 9, 1879; that, at the general election, in 1881, the seat of government was located, by a popular vote, at Denver; and that her officers of state and board of managers for the erection of state capitol buildings at Denver are about to take and, unless restrained, will take possession of said ten acre tract for the purpose of erecting said buildings thereon. He prays that they be enjoined from disturbing his possession of the premises until he shall receive just compensation therefor. A demurrer to the bill having been sustained, upon the ground that it did not set forth a cause of action, the suit was dismissed. As all the parties to this suit are cititzens of the State of Colorado the circuit court was without jurisdiction, unless the suit is one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. It is not clear upon what precise ground the plaintiff contends that the suit belongs to that class. We suppose his claim to be that when the Territory became a State, the property he had given to the former became his again, and that the provision in the Constitution of the State, "that all property, real and per[211] sonal, belonging to the Territory of Colorado" at the adoption of that instrument "shall be vested in and become the property of the State of Colorado," deprived him of his property without due process of law; that is, it was thereby taken from him, for public use, without just compensation being first made, or in some legal mode secured, to him. Assuming that the suit, upon that basis, arises under the Constitution of the United States, it is difficult to conceive of one in which the question has merit. Before the execution of the deed of January 11, 1868, the Territorial Legislature had located the seat of government at Denver. It was there when the appellant's gift was made. The gift had direct reference to the Territorial enactment authorizing commissioners to accept a conveyance of not less than ten acres of land, without charge to the Territory, and so as to vest in it an absolute fee-simple title. The title was so conveyed by Brown to the Territory, "its successors and assigns forever," for "the purpose of erecting a capitol and other public buildings thereon only.' The deed was duly accepted; for, if the Act under the authority of which the land was obtained, and the execution and registration of the deed, are not complete proof of such acceptance, surely the Act of 1872,requiring the capitol building to be erected "upon the ground (t)heretofore donated to the But the appellant contends that he made this gift upon the implied condition that the Territory, not the State, should erect the public buildings in question. Apart from the fact that the terms of the deed are inconsistent with such a condition, the supposition cannot be indulged for a moment that the plaintiff did not look forward to the time when the Territory would become one of the States of the Union; an event which would necessarily tend to accomplish the very object that he had, as he avows, in making the donation, viz.: to increase the value of other lands owned by him, of which the ten acres in question formed a part. The reference in the deeds of 1868 and 1879 to the successors of the Territory is persuasive evidence of the fact that the plaintiff contemplated the organization of its people as a State. Now that the State proposes to construct capitol buildings on the land donated for that very purpose, the plaintiff asks the intervention of a court of equity to prevent her agents from entering upon the premises until he receives compensation for what was in law a donation to the public as an organized body, whether under a territorial government or as a State. He is not entitled to such aid. The suggestion, that the clause of the Constitution providing that the State is the owner of all the property which the Territory held upon its becoming a State deprived him of his property, is not entitled to serious consideration. Unless otherwise declared by Congress, the title to every species of property owned by a Territory passes to the State upon its admission into the Union. The provision in the State Constitution to that effect was only declaratory of what was the law. Judgment affirmed. James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. 8. [167] JOSEPH A. SMITH, Appt. and Piff. in Err., | the relative rank of Commodore," upon certain [168] 0. WILLIAM C. WHITNEY, Secretary of the Navy, ET AL. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 167-186.) Writ of prohibition to naval court-martial jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia-discretion-jurisdiction of this court-parties-practice-jurisdiction of naval court-martial, of naval officer serving as a chief of bureau and paymaster-general. 1. A final judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia on a petition for a writ of prohibition to the Secretary of the Navy, and a court-martial convened by his order to try a public officer for offenses punishable with dismissal, may be reviewed by this court, if the salary of which such officer might thereby be deprived exceeds $5,000. 2. Whether the court below should grant or refuse a writ of prohibition is not a matter of discretion where the court whose action is sought to be prohibited is clearly without jurisdiction, and the defendant objected to its jurisdiction at the outset and is without other remedy; and a refusal to grant it, where all the proceedings appear of record, may be reviewed on error y this court. } 3. If an officer of the navy, while serving by ap pointment of the President as chief of a bureau and paymaster-general in the navy department, makes contracts or payments in violation of law, to promote the interests of contractors, he may lawfully be tried and convicted of scandalous conduct tending to the destruction of good morals and to the dishonor of the naval service, by a court-martial composed of naval officers; and a writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent such trial and conviction. 4. Where a court-martial ha jurisdiction of the subject matter of the principal charge, the addition of another charge, varying in form but for the same or similar acts, affords no ground for issuing a writ of prohibition. 5. A naval court-martial may, at any time before its dissolution by the Secretary of the Navy, be reconvened by him to reconsider its proceedings. 6. A writ of prohibition cannot be made to serve the purpose of a writ of error, or certiorari. 7. Upon an application for a writ of prohibition to a naval court-martial, the Secretary of the Navy should not be joined as a party defendant. 8. It seems that proceedings upon a petition for a writ of prohibition must be considered as on the common-law side of a court having both commonlaw and equity powers. 9. Whether the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia has power in any case to issue a writ of prohibition to a court-martial is not decided. [No. 1145.] Argued Dec. 11, 1885. Decided Jan. 4, 1886. APPEAL from and in error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Messrs. Jeff. Chandler and Eppa Hunton, for appellant and plaintiff in error. Mr. William A. Maury, Asst. Atty-Gen., for appellees and defendants in error. Mr Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court: This was a petition, filed September 21, 1885, praying the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to issue a writ of prohibition to the Secretary of the Navy, and to a general courtmartial of naval officers convened by his order of June 25, 1885, to try the petitioner, a pay inspector in the navy, and, by appointment of the President, confirmed by the Senate of the date of June 27, 1882, "Chief of the Bureau of Provisions and Clothing and PaymasterGeneral in the Department of the Navy, with 116 U. S. U. S., Book 29 charges and specifications, a copy of which was made part of the petition. The first of those charges was "" scandalous conduct tending to the destruction of good morals," under which were fourteen specifications, alleging that "the said Joseph A. Smith, then being a pay inspector in the United States Navy, and having been theretofore, as such officer of the navy, duly appointed Chief of the Bureau of Provisions and Clothing, with the title of Paymaster-General in the Department of the Navy," and being responsible for the proper and reputable administration thereof, and it being his duty to protect the interests of the government in the making of contracts [169] for supplies for the navy, did various acts which were set forth in different forms and with much detail, but the substance of which was that he enlarged existing contracts so as to include at the contract price additional supplies not required by the necessities of the service, without consulting the Secretary of the Navy or the sureties on the contractor's bond or giving any opportunity for competition, and when the market was falling extended the time of delivery of supplies contracted for, thereby necessitating the acceptance of supplies of an inferior quality; falsified a copy of a contract, and thereby enabled the contractor to obtain Payment at a place other than that required by the contract; and by directions and instructions to pay officers caused to be paid claims which had been refused by other pay officers and which, as he knew, had been declared illegal by the accounting officials of the Treasury; and by so causing pay officers to pay these claims, and to pay them out of appropriations for years other than those in which the contracts were made, greatly embarrassed those officers in the performance of their duties; and thereby willfully and knowingly, in disregard of his duties and responsibilities as chief of bureau, subordinated the interests of the government to those of the contractors, in violation of law and "to the great scandal and disgrace of the service and the injury of the United States." The second charge was "culpable inefficiency in the performance of duty," under which were four specifications, alleging that he failed in his duty in not obliging contractors to comply with the terms of their contracts, and in allowing deliveries to be made after the time for delivery had expired; and also in purchasing more supplies than the current needs of the navy required, and in purchasing unfit supplies, and in not affording due opportunity for competition. In the application for a writ of prohibition, the petitioner alleged that immediately upon the organization of the court-martial he objected that it had no jurisdiction of him or of the charges and specifications against him, or of the subject-matter contained in them, or any part thereof; but the court-martial overruled all his objections to its jurisdiction, and proceeded to hear evidence on the charges, and to try him thereon. He further alleged that none of the charges or specifications in any degree arose out of or were involved in any case arising in the land or naval forces of the United States, or in the militia; but all, as appeared on their face, pertained exclusively to duties re38 601 [170] |