Through all the South, during the late contest, it was New England policy and a New England adininistration, that was afflicting the country with a tariff policy beyond all endurance, while on the other side of the Alleghany, even the act of 1828 itself, the very sublimated essence of oppression according to Southern opinions, was pronounced to be one of those blessings, for which the West was indebted to the generous South.' With large investments in manufacturing establishments and many and various interests connected with and dependent on them, it is not to be expected that New England, any more than other portions of the country, will now consent to any measure, destructive or highly dangerous. The duty of the Government, at the present moment, would seem to be to preserve, not to destroy; to maintain the position which it has assumed; and for one, I shall feel it an indispensable obligation to hold it steady, as far as in my power, to that degree of protection which it has undertaken to bestow. No more of the tariff. Professing to be provoked by what he chose to consider a charge made by me against South Carolina, the honorable member, Mr President, has taken up a new crusade against New England. Leaving altogether the subject of the public lands, in which his success, perhaps, had been neither distinguished nor satisfactory, and letting go, also, of the topic of the tariff, he sallied forth in a general assault, on the opinions, politics, and parties of New England, as they have been exhibited in the last thirty years. This is natural. The narrow policy' of the public lands had proved a legal settlement in South Carolina, and was not to be removed. The accursed policy' of the tariff, also, had established the fact of its birth and parentage in the same State. No wonder therefore, the gentleman wished to carry the war, as he expressed it, into the enemy's country. Prudently willing to quit these subjects, he was doubtless desirous of fastening on others, which could not be transferred south of Mason and Dixon's line. The politics of New England became his theme. What has he done? Has he maintained his own charges? Has he sustained himself, in his attack on the Government, and on the history of the North in the matter of the public lands? Oh, no, but he has carried the war into the enemy's country!' Carried the war into the enemy's country! Yes, and what sort of a war has he made of it? He has stretched a dragnet over the whole surface of perished pamphlets, indiscreet sermons, frothy paragraphs, and fuming popular addresses; over whatever the pulpit, in its moments of alarm, the press in its heats, and parties in their extravagance, have severally thrown off, in times of general excitement. and violence. He has thus swept together a mass of such things, as but that they are now old, the public health would have required him rather to leave in their state. of dispersion. For a good long hour or two, we had the unbroken pleasure of listening to the hoa concentrated energy of passion,' an attitude of open resistance to the laws of the Union is advised. Open resistance to the laws, then, is the constitutional remedy, the conservative power of the State, which the South Carolina doctrines teach for the redress of political evils, real or imaginary. And its authors further say, that, appealing with confidence to the Constitution itself to justify their opinions, they cannot consent to try their accuracy by the courts of justice. In one sense, indeed, sir, this is assuming an attitude of open resistance in favor of liberty. But what sort of liberty? The liberty of establishing their own opinions, in defiance of the opinions of all others; the liberty of judging and of deciding exclusively themselves, in a matter in which others have as much right to judge and decide as they; the liberty of placing their own opinions above the judgment of all others, above the laws, and above the Constitution. This is their liberty, and this is the fair result of the proposition contended for by the honorable gentleman. Or it may be more properly said, it is identical with it, rather than a result from it. In the same publication we find the following: Previously to our Revolution, when the arm of oppression was stretched over New England, where did our northern brethren meet with a braver sympathy than that which sprung from the bosom of Carolinians. We had no extortion, no oppression, no collision with the King's ministers, no navigation interests springing up, in envious rivalry of England.' This seems extraordinary lan guage. South Carolina no collision with the King's ministers, in 1775! no extortion! no oppression! But, sir, it is also most significant language. Does any man doubt the purpose for which it was penned? Can any one fail to see that it was designed to raise in the reader's mind the question, whether, at this time — that is to say, in 1828 South Carolina has any collision with the King's ministers, any oppression or extortion to fear from England? Whether, in short, England is not as naturally the friend of South Carolina as New England, with her navigation interests springing up in envious rivalry of England? And now, sir, what I have first to say on this subject is, that at no time, and under no circumstances, has New England, or any State in New England, or any respectable body of persons in New England or any public man of standing in New England, put forth such a doctrine as this Carolina doctrine. New England has studied the Constitution in other schools, and under other teachers. She looks upon it with other regards, and deems more highly and reverently, both of its just authority, and its utility and excellence. The history of her legislative proceedings may be traced the ephemeral effusions of temporary bodies, called together by the excitement of the occasion, may be hunted up they have been hunted up. The opinions and votes of her public men, in and out of Congress may be explored - it will be in vain. The Carolina doctrine can derive from her neither countenance nor support. She rejects it now; she always did reject it; 1 and till she loses her senses, she always will reject it. The honorable member has referred to expressions, on the subject of the embargo law, made in this place, by an honorable and venerable gentleman, (Mr Hillhouse,) now favoring us with his presence. He quotes that distinguished Senator as saying, that in his judgment the embargo law was unconstitutional, and that, therefore, in his opinion,the people were not bound to obey it. That, sir, is perfectly constitutional lauguage. An unconstitutional law is not binding; but then it does not rest with a resolution or a law of a State Legislature to decide whether an Act of Congress be, or be not constitutional. An unconstitutional act of Congress would not bind the people of this district, although they have no legislature to interfere in their behalf; and, on the other hand, a constitutional law of Congress does bind the citizens of every state, although al their Legislatures should undertake to annul it, by act or resolution. Let us follow up this New England opposition to the embargo laws; let us trace it, till we discern the principle, which controlled and governed New England, throughout the whole course of that opposition. We shall then see what similarity there is between the New England school of constitutional opinions, and this modern Carolina school. The gentleman, I think, read a petition from some single individual, addressed to the Legislature of Massachusetts, asserting the Carolina doctrine - that is, the right of State interference to ar rest the laws of the Union. The fate of that petition shows the sentiment of the Legislature. It met no favor. The opinions of Massachusetts were otherwise. They had been expressed, in 1798, in answer to the resolutions of Virginia, and she did not depart from them, nor bend them to the times. Misgoverned, wronged, oppressed as she felt herself to be, she still held fast her integrity to the Union. The gentleman labors to prove that she disliked the em bargo, as much as South Carolina dislikes the tariff, and expressed her dislike as strongly. Be it so; but did she propose the Carolina remedy? did she threaten to interfere, by State authority, to annul the laws of the Union? The very case required by the gentleman, to justify State interference had then arisen. Massachusetts believed this law to be 6 a deliberate, palpable, and dongerous exercise of a power, not granted by the Constitution." Deliberate it was, for it was long continued; palpable she thought it, as no words in the Constitution gave the power, and only a construction, in her opinion most violent, raised it; dangerous it was, since it threatened utter ruin to her most important interests. Thousands of families, and hundreds of thousands of individuals, were beggared by it. While she saw and felt all this, she saw and felt also, that as a measure of national policy, it was perfectly futile; that the country was no way benefited by that which caused so much individual distress; that it was efficient only for the production of evil, and all that evil inflicted on ourselves. In such a case, under such circumstances, how did Massachusetts demean herself? She remonstrated, she memorialized, she addressed herself to the General Government, not exactly with the concentrated energy of passion,' but with her own strong sense, and the energy of sober conviction. But she did not interpose the arm of her own power to arrest the law, and break the embargo. Far from it. Her principles bound her to two things; and she followed her principles, lead where they might. First, to submit to every constitutional law of Congress, and secondly, if the constitutional validity of the law be doubted, to refer that question to the decision of the proper tribunals. The first principle is vain and ineffectual without the second. A majority of us in New England believed the embargo law unconstitutional; but the great question was, and always will be, in such cases, who is to decide this; Who is to judge between the People and the Government? And, it is quite plain, that the Constitution of the United States confers on the Government itself, to be exercised by its appropriate Department, this power of deciding ultimately and conclusively, upon the just extent of its own authority. if this had not been done, we should not have advanced a single step beyond the old Confedera tion. upon that the question, after all, must be decided by the Judicial tribunals of the United States. Before those tribunals, therefore, they brought the question. Under the provisions of the law, they had given bonds, to millions in amount, and which were alleged to be forfeited. They suffered the bonds to be sued, and thus raised the question. In the old fashioned way of settling disputes, they went to law. The case came to hearing, and solemn argument. The established tribunals pronounced the law constitutional and New England acquiesced. Is not this the exact opposite of the doctrine of the gentleman from South Carolina? According to him, instead of referring to the judicial tribunals, we should have broken up the embargo, by laws of our own; we should have repealed it, quoad New England; for we had a strong, palpable, and oppressive case. We believed the embargo unconstitutional; but still, that was matter of opinion, and who was to decide it? We thought it a clear case ; but, nevertheless, we did not take the law into our own hands, because we did not wish to bring about a revolution, nor to break up the Union; for I maintain, that, between submission to the decision of the constituted tribunals, and revolution, or disunion, there is no middle ground-there is no ambiguous condition, half allegiance and half rebellion. There is no treason made easy. And, sir, how futile, how very futile it is, to admit the right of State interference, and then attempt to save it from the character of un lawful resistance, by adding terms of qualification to the causes and occasions, leaving all these qualifications, like the case itself, in the discretion of the State Governments. It must be a clear case, it is said; a deliberate case; a palpable case; a dangerous case. But then the State is still left at liberty to decide for herself, what is clear, what is deliberate, what is palpable, what is dangerous. Do adjectives and epithets avail anything? The human mind is so constituted, - that the merits of both sides of a controversy appear very clear, and very palpable, to those who respectively espouse them; and both sides usually grow clearer, as the controversy advances. South Carolina sees unconstitutionality in the Tariff; she sees oppression there also; and she sees danger. Pennsylvania, with a vision not less sharp, looks at the same Tariff, and sees no such thing in it she sees it all constitutional, all useful, all safe. The faith of South Carolina is strengthened by opposition, and she now not only sees, but Resolves, that the Tariff is palpably unconstitutional, oppressive, and dangerous; but Pennsylvania, not to be behind her neighbors, and equally willing to strengthen her own faith by a confident asseveration, Resolves also, and gives to every warm affirmative of South Carolina, a plain, downright, Pennsylvania negative. South Carolina, to show the strength and unity of her opinion, brings her assembly to a unanimity, within seven votes; Pennsylvania, not to be out done in this respect more than others, reduces her dissentient fraction to five votes. Again I ask the gentleman, what is to be done? Are these States both right? Is he bound to consider them both right? If not, which is the wrong? or rather, which has the best right to decide? And if he, and if I, are not to know what the Constitution means, and what it is, till those two State legislatures, and the twenty two others, shall agree in its construction, what have we sworn to, when we have sworn to maintain it? I was forcibly struck with one reflection, as the gentleman went on in his speech. He quoted Mr Madison's resolutions to prove that a State may interfere, in a case of deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of a power not granted. The honorable member supposes the tariff law to be such an exercise of power; and that, consequently, a case has arisen, in which the State may, if it see fit, interfere by its own law. Now it so happens, nevertheless, that Mr Madison himself deems this same Tariff law quite constitutional. Instead of a clear and palpable violation, it is, in his judgment, no violation at all. So that, while they use his authority for a hypothetical case, they reject it in the very case before them. All this, shows the inherent futility- I had almost used a stronger word conceding this power of interference to the States, and then attempting to secure it from abuse by imposing qualifications, of which the States themselves are to judge. One of two things is true; either the laws of the Union of |