investigation here. Approximately 900 were used by protestants on interstate traffic. It is unknown how many were used by other shippers on interstate traffic.

The evidence shows that respondent's revenues are generally below fully allocated costs for the traffic covered by the suspended tariff provisions regardless of whether the costs of grain doors are included. The ratios of revenue to variable costs are generally above 100 percent when grain door costs are excluded, and vary, with some above 100 percent and some below, when grain door costs are included.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Respondent has the burden of proving the justness and reasonableness of the proposed cancellations. It advances three contentions. First, it is asserted that sections 1(4) and 1(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act, and the relevant interpretations of those sections, do not impose a duty on respondent to furnish grain doors without charge for the traffic involved in this proceeding. Second, respondent contends that the proposed cancellations are justified by the fact that the involved traffic is only marginally profitable. Finally, it is maintained that the interests of protestants are very limited in this proceeding. Protestants argue for the existence of a duty to furnish grain doors in these circumstances. Protestants also assert either that the profitability of the involved traffic is irrelevant in this case, or that respondent's showing of low profitability is inadequate. The contentions will be considered in turn.

Respondent's first argument is unpersuasive. Section 1(4) of the act makes it the duty of every common carrier subject to part I to provide and furnish transportation upon reasonable request. "Transportation" is defined by section 1(3)(a) to include “all instrumentalities and facilities of shipment." Further, section 1(11) makes it the duty of every carrier to furnish safe and adequate car service. Boxcars are inadequate to transport the bulk commodities involved in this proceeding unless grain doors are installed to prevent leakage, and it was found in Consignees' Obligation to Unload Rail Cars, 340 I.C.C. 405 (1972), that grain doors are integral parts of the railcar. It, therefore, follows that a carrier which supplies boxcars to transport the bulk commodities involved here must also furnish grain doors.

The principle established by Commission precedent is that carriers have a duty to furnish cars suitable for safe transportation of

the traffic which they hold themselves out to carry. See Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Denver & S. L. R. Co., 85 I.C.C. 545 (1923), St. Louis Merchants' Exc. v. Alton R. Co., 232 I.C.C. 230, 233 (1939), and Sioux City Term. Ry. Switching, 241 I.C.C. 53, 67 (1940). The Commission has not limited the application of this principle to grain and grain products, as suggested by respondent, and we see no reason why the principle should be so limited. For example, in Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Denver & S. L. R. Co., supra, the Commission found the cancellation of a long-established tariff provision for inner doors in boxcars carrying coal to be an unreasonable practice. We, therefore, find that respondent is obligated to furnish grain doors, as authorized by the tariff provisions under investigation in this proceeding.

Respondent argues that the revenue-to-cost ratios for the involved traffic justify the proposed cancellations. We disagree. Having concluded that respondent is obligated to continue furnishing grain doors pursuant to the tariff provisions under investigation here, we do not reach the issue of the justness and reasonableness of the line-haul rates. The principle was expressed by the Commission in Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Denver & S. L. R. Co., supra;

"[t]he contention of defendants that the rates of transportation may not be adequate does not relieve them of the responsibility of maintaining reasonable practices with respect to furnishing safe and suitable equipment for the transportation of coal." 85 I.C.C. at 547.

Finally, we find that respondent's contentions concerning the extent of protestants' interest in this proceeding are unpersuasive. Respondent is essentially arguing that protestants' direct interest in this proceeding is limited, and that this fact justifies cancellation of the furnishing of grain doors. We do not accept this argument. Respondent's cancellations would have a substantial effect on the operations of these protestants. The fact that respondent does not consider this effect of great consequence does not alter the nature of its common carrier obligation under the Interstate Commerce Act. We find that cancellation of the tariff provisions under investigation in this proceeding would violate section 1(4) of the act, and would be an unreasonable practice in violation of section 1(6) of the act.

We further find that this decision is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

It is ordered:

Respondent shall cancel the schedules described in the order entered in this proceeding by division 2 of the Commission on May 20, 1977, on or before 15 days from the service date of this report and order, upon not less than 1 day's notice to this Commission and to the general public by filing and posting in the manner prescribed by the Commission under section 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act. This proceeding is discontinued.

NOTICE: By this report and order, this proceeding is rendered administratively final pursuant to section 17 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended and within the meaning of section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act.

355 I.C.C.