aggression first commenced, in point of fact, against the other contracting party. In the second, the ally engages generally to coöperate in hostilities against a specified power, or against any power with whom the other party may be engaged in war. An alliance may also be both offensive and defensive. § 14. Dis ral alliance of limited succour and subsidy. General alliances are to be distinguished from treaties tinction be of limited succor and subsidy. Where one State stiputween gene- lates to furnish to another a limited succor of troops, and treaties ships of war, money, or provisions, without any promise looking to an eventual engagement in general hostilities, such a treaty does not necessarily render the party furnishing this limited succor, the enemy of the opposite bellige rent. It only becomes such, so far as respects the auxiliary forces thus supplied; in all other respects it remains neutral. Such for example, have long been the accustomed relations of the confederated Cantons of Switzerland with the other European powers.1 alliance. 15. Casus Grotius, and the other text writers, hold that the fœderis of a defensive casus fœderis of a defensive alliance does not apply to the case of a war manifestly unjust, that is, to a war of aggression on the part of the power claiming the benefit of the alliance. And it is even said to be a tacit condition annexed to every treaty made in time of peace, stipulating to afford succors in time of war, that the stipulation is applicable only to a just war. To promise assistance in an unjust war would be an obligation to commit injustice, and no such contract is valid. But, it is added, this tacit restriction in the terms of a general alliance can be applied only to a manifest case of unjust aggression on the part of the other contracting party, and cannot be used as a pretext to elude the performance of a positive and unequivocal engagement, without justly exposing the ally to the imputation of bad faith. In doubtful cases, the presumption ought rather to be in favor of our confederate, and of the justice of his quarrel. 1 Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii. ch. 6, §§ 79-82. 2 Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac. lib. ii. cap. 15, § 13; cap. 25, § 4. Bynkershoek, Quæst. Jur. Pub. lib. i. cap. 9. Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. ii. ch. 12, § 168; liv. iii. ch. 6, §§ 86-96. The application of these general principles must depend upon the nature and terms of the particular guaranties contained in the treaty in question. This will best be illustrated by specific examples. Great Bri Holland. Thus, the States-General of Holland were engaged, previously to the war of 1756, between France and between Great Britain, in three different guaranties and defensive tain and treaties with the latter power. The first was the original defensive alliance, forming the basis of all the subsequent compacts between the two countries, concluded at Westminster in 1678. In the preamble to this treaty, the preservation of each other's dominions was stated as the cause of making it; and it stipulated a mutual guaranty of all they already enjoyed, or might thereafter acquire by treaties of peace, "in Europe only." They further guaranteed all treaties which were at that time made, or might thereafter conjointly be made, with any other power. They stipulated also to defend and preserve each other in the possession of all towns and fortresses which did at that time belong, or should in future belong, to either of them; and, that for this purpose when either nation was attacked or molested, the other should immediately succor it with a certain number of troops and ships, and should be obliged to break with the aggressor in two months after the party that was already at war should require it; and that they should then act conjointly, with all their forces, to bring the common enemy to a reasonable accommodation. The second defensive alliance then subsisting between Great Britain and Holland was that stipulated by the treaties of barrier and succession, of 1709 and 1713, by which the Dutch barrier on the side of Flanders was guaranteed on the one part, and the Protestant succession to the British crown, on the other; and it was mutually stipulated, that, in case either party should be attacked, the other should furnish, at the requisition of the injured party, certain specified succors; and if the danger should be such as to require a greater force, the other ally should be obliged to augment his succors, and ultimately to act with all his power in open war against the aggressor. The third and last defensive alliance between the same powers, was the treaty concluded at the Hague in 1717, to which France was also a party. The object of this treaty was declared to be the preservation of each other reciprocally, and the possession of their dominions, as established by the treaty of Utrecht. The contracting parties stipulated to defend all and each of the articles of the said treaty, as far as they relate to the contracting parties respectively, or each of them in particular; and they guarantee all the kingdoms, provinces, states, rights, and advantages, which each of the parties at the signing of that treaty possessed, confining this guarantee to Europe only. The succors stipulated by this treaty were similar to those above mentioned; first, interposition of good offices, then a certain number of forces, and lastly, declaration of war. This treaty was renewed by the quadruple alliance of 1718, and by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748. It was alleged on the part of the British court, that the StatesGeneral had refused to comply with the terms of these treaties, although Minorca, a possession in Europe which had been secured to Great Britain by the treaty of Utrecht, was attacked by France. Two answers were given by the Dutch government to the demand of the stipulated succors :— 1. That Great Britain was the aggressor in the war; and that, unless she had been first attacked by France, the casus fœderis did not arise. 2. That admitting that France was the aggressor in Furope, yet it was only in consequence of the hostilities previously commenced in America, which were expressly excepted from the terms of the guarantees. To the first of these objections it was irresistibly replied by the elder Lord Liverpool, that although the treaties which contained these guarantees were called defensive treaties only, yet the words of them, and particularly that of 1678, which was the basis of all the rest, by no means expressed the point clearly in the sense of the objection, since they guaranteed "all the rights and possessions" of both parties, against "all kings, princes, republics, and states;" so that if either should "be attacked or molested by hostile act, or open, war, or in any other manner disturbed in the possession of his states, territories, rights, immunities, and freedom of commerce," it was then declared what should be done in defence of these objects of the guarantee, by the ally who was not at war, but it was nowhere mentioned as necessary that the attack of these should be the first injury or attack. "Nor," continues Lord Liverpool, "doth this loose manner of expression appear to have been an omission or inaccuracy. They who framed these guarantees certainly chose to leave this question, without any further explanation, to that good faith which must ultimately decide upon all contracts between sovereign States. It is not presumed that they hereby meant, that either party should be obliged to support every act of violence or injustice which his ally might be prompted to commit through views of interest or ambition; but, on the other hand, they were cautious of affording too frequent opportunities to pretend that the case of the guarantees did not exist, and of eluding thereby the principal intention of the alliance; both these inconveniences were equally to be avoided; and they wisely thought fit to guard against the latter, no less than the former. They knew that in every war between civilized nations, each party endeavors to throw upon the other the odium and guilt of the first act of provocation and aggression; and that the worst of causes was never without its excuse. They foresaw that this alone would unavoidably give sufficient occasion to endless cavils and disputes, whenever the infidelity of an ally inclined him to avail himself of them. To have confined, therefore, the case of the guarantee by a more minute description of it, and under closer restrictions of form, would have subjected to still greater uncertainty a point which, from the nature of the thing itself, was already too liable to doubt:- they were sensible that the cases would be infinitely various; that the motives to selfdefence, though just, might not always be apparent; that an artful enemy might disguise the most alarming preparations; and that an injured nation might be necessitated to commit even a preventive hostility, before the danger which caused it could be publicly known. Upon such considerations, these negotiators wisely thought proper to give the greatest latitude to this question, and to leave it open to a fair and liberal construction, such as might be expected from friends, whose interests these treaties were supposed to have forever united." 1 1 Discourse on the Conduct of the Government of Great Britain in respect to Neutral Nations. By Charles, Earl of Liverpool. 1st ed. 1757. His lordship's answer to the next objection, that the hostilities commenced by France in Europe were only in consequence of hostilities previously commenced in America, seems equally satisfactory, and will serve to illustrate the good faith by which these contracts ought to be interpreted. "If the reasoning on which this objection is founded was admitted, it would alone be sufficient to destroy the effects of every guarantee, and to extinguish that confidence which nations mutually place in each other, on the faith of defensive alliances; it points out to the enemy a certain method of avoiding the inconvenience of such an alliance; it shows him where he ought to begin his attack. Let only the first effort be made upon some place not included in the guarantee, and, after that, he may pursue his views against its very object, without any apprehension of the consequence. Let France first attack some little spot belonging to Holland, in America, and her barrier would be no longer guaranteed. To argue in this manner is to trifle with the most solemn engagements. The proper object of guarantees is the preservation of some particular country to some particular power. The treaties above mentioned promise the defence of the dominions of each party in Europe, simply and absolutely, whenever they are attacked or molested. If, in the present war, the first attack was made out of Europe, it is manifest that long ago an attack hath been made in Europe; and that is, beyond a doubt, the case of these guarantees. "Let us try, however, if we cannot discover what hath once been the opinion of Holland upon a point of this nature. It hath already been observed that the defensive alliance between England and Holland, of 1678, is but a copy of the first twelve articles of the French Treaty of 1662. Soon after Holland had concluded this last alliance with France, she became engaged in a war with England. The attack then began, as in the present case, out of Europe, on the coast of Guinea; and the cause of the war was also the same, a disputed right to certain possessions out of the bounds of Europe, some in Africa, and others in the East Indies. Hostilities having continued for some time in those parts, they afterwards commenced also in Europe. Immediately upon this, Holland declared that the case of that guarantee did exist, and demanded the succors which were stipulated. I need not produce the memorials of their ministers to |