There are two species of neutrality recognized by 2. Differinternational law. These are, 1st. Natural, or perfect ent species neutrality; and 2d. Imperfect, qualified, or conventional ity. neutrality.

1. Natural, or perfect neutrality, is that which every § 3. Perfect sovereign State has a right, independent of positive neutrality. compact, to observe in respect to the wars in which other States may be engaged.

The right of every independent State to remain at peace, whilst other States are engaged in war, is an incontestable attribute of sovereignty. It is, however, obviously impossible, that neutral hations should be wholly unaffected by the existence of war between those communities with whom they continue to maintain their accustomed relations of friendship and commerce. The rights of neutrality are connected with correspondent duties. Among these duties is that of impartiality between the contending parties. The neutral is the common friend of both parties, and consequently is not at liberty to favor one party to the detriment of the other.' Bynkershoek states it to be "the duty of neutrals to be every way careful not to interfere in the war, and to do equal and exact justice to both parties. Bello se non interponant," that is to say, "as to what relates to the war, let them not prefer one party to the other, and this is the only proper conduct for neutrals. A neutral has nothing to do with the justice or injustice of the war; it is not for him to sit as judge between his friends, who are at war with each other, and to grant or refuse more or less to the one or the other, as he thinks that their cause is more or less just or unjust. If I am a neutral, I ought not to be useful to the one, in order that I may hurt the other." 2

lib. i. cap. 9. De Statu belli inter non hostes. We shall hereafter see that this definition is merely applicable to that species of neutrality which is not modified by special compact.

1 Bynkershoek, Quæst. Jur. Pub. lib. i. cap. 9. Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii. ch. 7, §§ 103-110.

2 "Horum officium est, omni modo cavere, ne se bello interponant, et his quàm illis partibus sint vel æquiores vel iniquiores. . . Bello se non interponant, hoc est, in causâ belli alterum alteri ne perferant, et eo solo recte defunguntur, qui neutrarum partium sunt. . . . Si recte judico, belli justitia

These, Bynkershoek adds, are "the duties applicable to the condition of those powers who are not bound by any alliance. but are in a state of perfect neutrality. These I merely call friends, in order to distinguish them from confederates and allies." 1

fect neu

§ 4. Imper- 2. Imperfect, qualified, or conventional neutrality, is trality. that which is modified by special compact.

The public law of Europe affords several examples of this species of neutrality.

Confedera

Neutrality 1. Thus the political independence of the confede of the Swiss rated Cantons of Switzerland, which had so long existed tion. in fact, was first formally recognized by the Germanic Empire, of which they originally constituted an integral portion, at the peace of Westphalia, in 1648. The Swiss Cantons had observed a prudent neutrality during the thirty years war, and from this period to the war of the French Revolution, their neu trality had been, with some slight exceptions, respected by the bordering States. But this neutrality was qualified by the special compact existing between the Confederation, or the separate Cantons and foreign States, forming treaties of alliance or capitulations for the enlistment of Swiss troops in the service. of those States. The policy of respecting the neutrality of Switzerland was mutually felt by the two great monarchies of France and Austria, during their long contest for supre macy under the houses of Bourbon and Hapsburg. Such is the peculiar geographical position of Switzerland, between Ger many, France, and Italy, among the stupendous mountain chains from which flow the great rivers, the Danube, the Rhine, the Rhone, and the Po, that if the passage through the Swiss terri tories were open to the Austrian armies, they might communi cate freely from the valley of the Danube to the valley of the

vel injustitia nihil quicquam pertinet ad communem amicum; ejus non est, inter utrumque amicum, sibi invicem hostem, sedere judicem, et ex causâ æquiore vel iniquiore huic illive plus nimisve tribuere vel negare. Si medius sim, alteri non possum prodesse, ut alteri noceam." Bynkershoek, Quæst. Jur. Pub. lib. i.

cap. ix.

1 "Exposui compendio quod mihi videtur de officio eorum, qui ex fœdere nihil quicquam debent, sed perfectè sunt neutrarum partium. Hos simpliciter Amicos appellavi, ut à Fœderatis et Sociis distinguerem." Bynkershoek, Quæst. Jur. Pub. lib. i. cap. 9.

Po, and thus menace the frontier of France from Basle to Nice. To guard against this impending danger, France must be fortified along the whole of this frontier; whilst, on the other hand, if the passes of the Swiss Alps are shut against her enemy, she may concentrate all her forces upon the Rhine; since all history shows that the attempts of the Imperialists to penetrate into the southern provinces of France by the Var have ever failed, owing to the remoteness and difficulty of the scene of operations. The advantages to be derived by France from the permanent neutrality of Switzerland are therefore manifest. Nor is this neutrality less essential to the security of Austria. Let Switzerland once become a lawful battle ground for the bordering States, and the French armies would be sure to anticipate its occupation by the Austrians. The two great Austrian armies operating, whether for offence or defence, the one in Swabia, the other in Italy, being separated by the massive rampart of the Alps, would have no means of communicating with each other; whilst the French forces, advancing from the Lake of Constance on the one side, and the great chain of the Alps on the other, might attack either the flank of the Austrian army in Swabia or the rear of its army in Italy.1

During the wars of the French Revolution the neutrality of Switzerland was alternately violated by both the great contending parties, and her once peaceful valleys became the bloody scene of hostilities between the French, Austrian, and Russian armies. The expulsion of the allied forces, and the subsequent withdrawal of the French army of occupation, were followed by violent internal dissensions which were finally composed by the mediation of Bonaparte as First Consul of the French Republic, in 1803. A treaty of alliance was simultaneously concluded between the Republic and the Helvetic Confederation. According to the stipulations of this treaty, the neutrality of Switzerland was recognized by France, whilst the Confederation stipulated not to grant a passage through its territories to the armies of France, and to oppose such passage by force of arms in case of its being attempted. The Confederation also engaged to permit the enlisting of eight thousand Swiss troops for the service of France, in addition to the sixteen thousand troops to be furnished

1 Thiers, Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire, tom. i. liv. 3, p. 182.

according to the capitulation signed on the same day with the treaty. It was, at the same time, expressly declared that its alliance being merely defensive, should not, in any respect, be construed to prejudice the neutrality of Switzerland.1

When the allied armies advanced to invade the French territory, in 1813, the Austrian corps under Prince Schwartzenberg passed through the territory of Switzerland, and crossed the Rhine at three different places, at Basle, Lauffenberg, and Shaffhausen, without opposition on the part of the federal troops. The perpetual neutrality of Switzerland was, nevertheless, recognized by the final act of the Congress of Vienna, March 20th, 1815:2 but on the return of Napoleon from the island of Elba, the allied powers invited the Confederation to accede to the general coalition against France. In the official note delivered by their ministers to the Diet at Zurich, on the 6th of May, 1815, it was stated, that although the allied powers expected that Switzerland would not hesitate to unite with them in accomplishing the common object of alliance, which was to prevent the reëstablishment of the usurped revolutionary authority in France, yet they were far from proposing to Switzerland the development of a military force disproportioned to her resources and to the usages of her people. They respected the military system of a nation, which, uninfluenced by the spirit of ambition, armed for the single purpose of defending its independence and its tranquillity. The allied powers well knew the importance attached by Switzerland to the maintenance of the principle of her neutrality; and it was not with the purpose of violating this principle, but with the view of accelerating the epoch when it might become applicable in an advantageous and permanent manner, that they proposed to the Confederation to assume an attitude and to adopt energetic measures, proportioned to the extraordinary circumstances of the moment without at the same time forming a rule for the future.3

In the answer of the Diet to this note, dated the 12th May, 1815, it was declared, that the relations which Switzerland maintained with the allied powers, and with them only, could leave

'Schoell, Histoire des Traités de Paix, tom. ii. ch. 33, p. 339.

2 Wheaton's Hist. Law of Nations, p. 493.

3 Martens, Nouveau Recueil, tom. ii. p. 166.

no doubt as to her views and intentions. She would persist in them with that constancy and fidelity which had at all times distinguished the Swiss character. Twenty-two small republics, united together for their security and the maintenance of their independence, must seek for their national strength in the principle of their Confederation. This resulted inevitably from the nature of things, the geographical position, the constitution, and the character of the Swiss people. A consequence of this principle was the neutrality of Switzerland, recognized as the basis of its future relations with all other States. It followed from the same principle, that the most efficacious participation of Switzerland in the great struggle which was about to take place, must necessarily consist in the defence of her frontiers. In adopting this course, she did not separate herself from the common cause of the allied powers, which thus became her own national cause. The defence of a frontier fifty leagues in length, serving as a point d'appui for the movements of two armies, was in itself a cooperation not only real, but also of the highest importance. More than thirty thousand men had already been levied for this purpose. Determined to maintain this development of her forces, Switzerland had a right to expect from the favorable disposition of the allied powers, that, so long as she did not claim their assistance, their armies would respect the integrity of her territory. Assurances to this effect on their part were absolutely necessary in order to tranquilize the Swiss people, and engage them to support with fortitude the burthen of an armament so considerable.1

On the 20th of May, 1815, a convention was concluded at Zurich, to regulate the accession of Switzerland to the general alliance between Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia; by which the allied powers stipulated, that, in case of urgency, where the common interest rendered necessary a temporary passage across any part of the Swiss territory, recourse should be had to the authority of the Diet for that purpose. The left wing of the allied army accordingly passed the Rhine between Basle and Rheinfelden, and entered France through the territory of Switzerland.2

1 Martens, tom. ii.

p. 170.

2 Ibid.