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along the

coasts and

bays and

rivers.

nity, there can be none as to the sense entertained by this eminent civilian respecting the right and the duty of the neutral sovereign to make restitution where his territory is violated. Extent of When the maritime war commenced in Europe, in jurisdiction 1793, the American government, which had determined to remain neutral, found it necessary to define the exwithin the tent of the line of territorial protection claimed by the United States on their coasts, for the purpose of giving effect to their neutral rights and duties. It was stated on this occasion, that governments and writers on public law had been much divided in opinion as to the distance from the seacoast within which a neutral nation might reasonably claim a right to prohibit the exercise of hostilities. The character of the coast of the United States, remarkable in considerable parts of it for admitting no vessel of size to pass near the shore, it was thought would entitle them in reason to as broad a margin of protected navigation as any nation whatever. The government, however, did not propose, at that time, and without amicable communications with the foreign powers interested in that navigation, to fix on the distance to which they might ultimately insist on the right of protection. President Washington gave instructions to the executive officers to consider it as restrained, for the present, to the distance of one sea league, or three geographical miles, from the sea-shores. This distance, it was supposed, could admit of no opposition, being recognized by treaties between the United States, and some of the powers with whom they were connected in commercial intercourse, and not being more extensive than was claimed by any of them on their own coasts. As to the bays and rivers, they had always been considered as por tions of the territory, both under the laws of the former colonial government and of the present union, and their immunity from belligerent operations was sanctioned by the general law and usage of nations. The 25th article of the treaty of 1794, between Great Britain and the United States, stipulated that "neither of the said parties shall permit the ships or goods belonging to the citizens or subjects of the other, to be taken within cannon shot of the coast, nor in any of the bays, ports, or rivers, of their territories, by ships of war, or others, having commissions from any prince, republic, or State whatever. But in case it should so happen, the party whose territorial rights shall thus have been

violated, shall use his utmost endeavors to obtain from the offending party full and ample satisfaction for the vessel or vessels so taken, whether the same be vessels of war or merchant vessels." Previously to this treaty with Great Britain, the United States were bound by treaties with three of the belligerent nations, (France, Prussia, and Holland,) to protect and defend, "by all the means in their power," the vessels and effects of those nations in their ports or waters, or on the seas near their shores, and to recover and restore the same to the right owner when taken from them. But they were not bound to make compensation if all the means in their power were used, and failed in their effect. Though they had, when the war commenced, no similar treaty with Great Britain, it was the President's opinion that they should apply to that nation the same rule which, under this article, was to govern the others abovementioned; and even extend it to captures made on the high seas, and brought into the American ports, if made by vessels which had been armed within them. In the constitutional arrangement of the different authorities of the American Federal Union, doubts were at first entertained whether it belonged to the executive government, or the judiciary department, to perform the duty of inquiring into captures made within the neutral territory, or by armed vessels originally equipped or the force of which had been augmented within the same, and of making restitution to the injured party. But it has been long since settled that this duty appropriately belongs to the federal tribunals, acting as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.'

§ 13. Limi

the neutral

It has been judicially determined that this peculiar jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of captures made tations of in violation of the neutral immunity, will be exercised jurisdiction only for the purpose of restoring the specific property, cases of illewhen voluntarily brought within the territory, and does gal capture. not extend to the infliction of vindictive damages, as in ordinary

to restore in

1 Mr. Jefferson's Letter to M. Genet, Nov. 8, 1793. Waite's State Papers, vol. vi. p. 195. Opinion of the Attorney-General on the capture of the British ship Grange, May 14, 1793. Ibid. vol. i. p. 75. Mr. Jefferson's Letter to Mr. Hammond, Sept. 5, 1793. Waite's State Papers, vol. i. p. 165.

Reports, vol. iv. p. 65, Note a.

Wheaton's

cases of maritime injuries. And it seems to be doubtful whether this jurisdiction will be exercised where the property has been once carried infra præsidia of the captor's country, and there regularly condemned in a competent court of prize. However this may be in cases where the property has come into the hands of a bona fide purchaser, without notice of the unlawfulness of the capture, it has been determined that the neutral court of admiralty will restore it to the original owner, where it is found in the hands of the captor himself, claiming under the sentence of condemnation. But the illegal equipment will not affect the validity of a capture, made after the cruise to which the outfit had been applied, is actually terminated.1

of asylum in neutral ports de

pendent on

of the neu

§14. Right An opinion is expressed by some text writers, that belligerent cruisers, not only are entitled to seek an asylum and hospitality in neutral ports, but have a the consent right to bring in and sell their prizes within those ports. tral State. But there seems to be nothing in the established principles of public law which can prevent the neutral State from withholding the exercise of this privilege impartially from all the belligerent powers; or even from granting it to one of them, and refusing it to others, where stipulated by treaties existing previous to the war. The usage of nations, as testified in their marine ordinances, sufficiently shows that this is a rightful exercise of the sovereign authority which every State possesses, to regulate the police of its own sea-ports, and to preserve the public peace within its own territory. But the absence of a positive prohibition implies a permission to enter the neutral ports for these purposes.2

§ 15. Neu

tiality, in

Vattel states that the impartiality, which a neutral tral impar- nation ought to observe between the belligerent parties, what it con- consists of two points. 1. To give no assistance where there is no previous stipulation to give it; nor voluntarily to furnish troops, arms, ammunition, or any thing of direct

sists.

1 Wheaton's Rep. vol. v. p. 385. The Amistad de Rues, vol. viii. p. 108. La Nereyda, vol. ix. p. 658. The Fanny, vol. vii. p. 519. The Arrogante Barcelones. Ibid. p. 283. The Santissima Trinidad.

2 Bynkershoek, Quæss. Jur. Pub. lib. i. cap. 15. Vattel, liv. iii. ch. 7, § 132. Valin, Comm. sur l'Ordonn. de la Marine, tom. ii. p. 272.

use in war. "I do not say to give assistance equally, but to give no assistance: for it would be absurd that a State should assist at the same time two enemies. And besides, it would be impos sible to do it with equality: the same things, the like number of troops, the like quantity of arms, of munitions, &c., furnished under different circumstances, are no longer equivalent succors. 2. In whatever does not relate to the war, the neutral must not refuse to one of the parties, merely because he is at war with the other, what she grants to that other."1

§ 16. Arm

enlisting

the neutral

gerent, un

These principles were appealed to by the American government, when its neutrality was attempted to be ing and equipping violated on the commencement of the European war, in vessels, and 1793, by arming and equipping vessels, and enlisting men within men within the ports of the United States, by the territory, by respective belligerent powers, to cruise against each either belliother. It was stated that if the neutral power might lawful. not, consistently with its neutrality, furnish men to either party for their aid in war, as little could either enrol them in the neutral territory. The authority both of Wolfius and Vattel was appealed to in order to show, that the levying of troops is an exclusive prerogative of sovereignty, which no foreign power can lawfully exercise within the territory of another State, without its express permission. The testimony of these and other writers on the law and usage of nations was sufficient to show, that the United States, in prohibiting all the belligerent powers from equipping, arming, and manning vessels of war in their ports, had exercised a right and a duty with justice and moderation. By their treaties with several of the belligerent powers, treaties forming part of the law of the land, they had established a state of peace with them. But without appealing to treaties, they were at peace with them all by the law of nature; for, by the natural law, man is at peace with man, till some aggression is committed, which by the same law authorizes one to destroy another, as his enemy. For the citizens of the United States, then, to commit murders and depredations on the members of other nations, or to combine to do it, appeared to the American

1 Droit des Gens, liv. iii. ch. 7, § 104.

government as much against the laws of the land as to murder or rob, or combine to murder or rob, their own citizens; and as much to require punishment, if done within their limits, where they had a territorial jurisdiction, or, on the high seas, where they had a personal jurisdiction, that is to say, one which reached their own citizens only; this being an appropriate part of each nation, on an element where each has a common jurisdiction.1

§ 17. Pro

forced by

The same principles were afterwards incorporated hibition en- in a law of Congress passed in 1794, and revised and municipal reenacted in 1818, by which it is declared to be a misstatutes. demeanor for any person, within the jurisdiction of the United States, to augment the force of any armed vessel, belonging to one foreign power at war with another power, with whom they are at peace; or to prepare any military expedition against the territories of any foreign nation with whom they are at peace; or to hire or enlist troops or seamen for foreign military or naval service; or to be concerned in fitting out any vessel, to cruise or commit hostilities in foreign service, against a nation at peace with them: and the vessel, in this latter case, is made subject to forfeiture. The President is also authorized to employ force to compel any foreign vessel to depart, which by the law of nations or treaties ought not to remain within the United States, and to employ generally the public force in enforcing the duties of neutrality prescribed by the law.2

Act.

The example of America was soon followed by Great Foreign Enlistment Britain, in the act of Parliament 59 Geo. III. ch. 69, entitled, "An act to prevent the Enlisting or Engagement of His Majesty's Subjects to serve in foreign Service, and the Fitting out or Equipping in His Majesty's Dominions Vessels for warlike purposes, without His Majesty's License." The previous statutes, 9 and 29 Geo. II., enacted for the purpose of preventing the formation of Jacobite armies in France and Spain, annexed capital punishment as for a felony, to the offence of entering the service of a foreign State. The 59 Geo. III. ch. 69,

1 Mr. Jefferson's Letter to M. Genet, June 17, 1793. American State Papers, vol. i. p. 155.

2 Kent's Comm. on American Law, vol. i. p. 123. 5th ed.

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