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soit pas un fait irrégulier et même illégal. Un pareil convoi ne peut dans tous les cas, exempter de la visite. Mais si le neutre se joint en pleine mer à un on à plusieurs navires de guerre belligérants et navigue de conserve avec ces navires sans prétendre à aucune protection de leur part dans la seule espérance de pouvoir échapper pacifiquement et par la fuite à la visite, à la faveur d'une rencontre et d'un combat possible entre les seuls belligérants, c'est là de sa part une ruse innocente qui ne peut lui être imputée à délit, et qui ne peut pas, à elle seule, entrainer la confiscation. C'était là précisément le cas des navires Américains, dont l'action était d'ailleurs excusable par le désir qu'ils avaient d'échapper a rigueurs extraordinaires des décrets de Napoleon, sur le blocus continental." Diplomatie de la Mer, tom. ii. p. 245, 2ème ed.

Hautefeuille thus refers to the transaction:

"Le gouvernement Américain réclama vivement contre la saisie des navires de ses sujets. L'affaire ne fut terminée que le 28 Mars, 1830. La convention qui intervint entre les parties et par laquelle le Danemark s'engagea à payer une indemnité, aux propriétaires Americains, présente ce caractère remarquable que le gouvernement Danois ne s'est pas départi de sa prétention et stipule que cette indemnité ne pouvait pas être considerée comme un précédent ni servir de régle à l'avenir.

"Le gouvernement Américain fut représenté dans cette négotiation par un diplomate dont j'ai souvent cité les opinions, par Wheaton. Ce publiciste parait convenir que le fait reproché à ses compatriotes les soumettait à une présomption légale, qui a pu motiver leur arrestation; mais il soutient que cette présomption devait céder devant la preuve de leur nationalité. D'ailleurs, ils avaient été saisis au retour, en vertu d'un édit rendu depuis que le délit reproché était consómmé, et qui leur était inconnu." Droits des Nations Neutres, tom. iv. p. 115.]

CHAPTER IV.

TREATY OF PEACE.

1. Power

peace de

the munici

tion.

THE power of concluding peace, like that of declaring war, depends upon the municipal constitution of the of making State. These authorities are generally associated. In pendent on unlimited monarchies, both reside in the sovereign; and pal constitueven in limited or constitutional monarchies, each may be vested in the crown. Such is the British Constitution, at least in form; but it is well known, that in its practical administration, the real power of making war actually resides in the Parliament, without whose approbation it cannot be carried on, and which body has consequently the power of compelling the crown to make peace, by withholding the supplies necessary to prosecute hostilities. The American Constitution vests the power of declaring war in the two houses of Congress, with the assent of the President. By the forms of the Constitution, the President has the exclusive power of making treaties of peace, which, when ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate, become the supreme law of the land, and have the effect of repealing the declaration of war and all other laws of Congress, and of the several States which stand in the way of their stipulations. But the Congress may at any time compel the President to make peace, by refusing the means of carrying on war. In France the King has, by the express terms of the constitutional charter, power to declare war, to make treaties of peace, of alliance, and of commerce; but the real power of making both peace and war resides in the Chambers, which have the authority of granting or refusing the means of prosecuting hostilities. (a)

(a) [By the French Constitution of January 14, 1852, the President had the power of declaring war, making treaties of peace, of alliance and of commerce, and he had solely the initiative of all laws. The projets of laws were prepared

of making

ed in its ex

tent.

§2. Power The power of making treaties of peace, like that of treaties of making other treaties with foreign States, is, or may be, peace limit- limited in its extent by the national constitution. We have already seen that a general authority to make treaties of peace necessarily implies a power to stipulate the conditions of peace; and among these may properly be involved the cession of the public territory and other property, as well as of private property included in the eminent domain. If, then, there be no limitation, expressed in the fundamental laws of the State, or necessarily implied from the distribution of its constitutional authorities, on the treaty-making power in this respect, it necessarily extends to the alienation of public and private property, when deemed necessary for the national safety or policy.1

The duty of making compensation to individuals, whose private property is thus sacrificed to the general welfare, is inculcated by public jurists, as correlative to the sovereign right of alienating those things which are included in the eminent domain; but this duty must have its limits. No government can be supposed to be able, consistently with the welfare of the whole community, to assume the burden of losses produced by conquest, or the violent dismemberment of the State. Where, then, the cession of territory is the result of coercion and conquest, forming a case of imperious necessity beyond the power of the State to control, it does not impose any obligation upon the government to indemnify those who may suffer a loss of property by the cession.2

by the Council of State and discussed by them, in the name of the government, before the Corps Législatif and the Senate. The Corps Législatif discussed and voted the projets of laws and the taxes, and no law could be promulgated, without being submitted to the Senate. By the Senatus-Consulte of November 7, 1852, on the reestablishment of the imperial dignity, in the person of the Emperor, Napoleon III., the Constitution was maintained in all matters, in which it was not specially altered; and by a Senatus-Consulte of December 23, 1852, it was expressly provided that treaties of commerce, made by virtue of the 6th article of the Constitution should have the force of law, in modifying the existing tariffs. Annuaire des Deux Mondes, 1851-2, p. 952. Ibid. 1852-3, pp. 887, 891.]

I Vide ante, Pt. III. ch. 2, § 7, p. 329.

2 Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac. lib. iii. cap. 20, § 7. Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. i. ch. 20, § 244; liv. iv. ch. 2, § 12. Kent's Comment. on American Law,

vol. i. p. 178, 5th ed.

The fundamental laws of most free governments limit the treaty-making power, in respect to the dismemberment of the State, either by an express prohibition, or by necessary implication from the nature of the constitution. Thus, even under the constitution of the old French monarchy, the States-General of the kingdom declared that Francis I. had no power to dismember the kingdom, as was attempted by the Treaty of Madrid, concluded by that monarch; and that not merely upon the ground that he was a prisoner, but that the assent of the nation, represented in the States-General, was essential to the validity of the treaty. The cession of the province of Burgundy was therefore annulled, as contrary to the fundamental laws of the kingdom; and the provincial States of that duchy, according to Mezeray, declared, that "never having been other than subjects of the crown of France, they would die in that allegiance; and if abandoned by the king, they would take up arms, and maintain by force their independence, rather than pass under a foreign dominion." But when the ancient feudal constitution of France was gradually abolished by the disuse of the States-General, and the absolute monarchy became firmly established under Richelieu and Louis XIV., the authority of ceding portions of the public territory, as the price of peace, passed into the hands of the king, in whom all the other powers of government were concentrated. The different constitutions established in France, subsequently to the Revolution of 1789, limited this authority in the hands of the executive in various degrees. The provision in the Constitution of 1795, by which the recently conquered countries on the left bank of the Rhine were annexed to the French territory, became an insuperable obstacle to the conclusion of peace in the conferences at Lisle. By the Constitutional Charter of 1830, the king is invested with the power of making peace, without any limitation of this authority, other than that which is implied in the general distribution of the constitutional powers of the government. Still it is believed that, according to the general understanding of French public jurists, the assent of the Chambers, clothed with the forms of a legislative act, is considered essential to the ultimate validity of a treaty ceding any portion of the national territory. The extent and limits of the territory being defined by the municipal laws, the treaty-making power is not considered sufficient to repeal those laws.

In Great Britain, the treaty-making power, as a branch of the regal prerogative, has in theory no limits; but it is practically limited by the general controlling authority of Parliament; whose approbation is necessary to carry into effect a treaty, by which the existing territorial arrangements of the empire are altered.

In confederated governments, the extent of the treaty-making power, in this respect, must depend upon the nature of the confederation. If the union consists of a system of confederated States, each retaining its own sovereignty complete and unimpaired, it is evident that the federal head, even if invested with the general power of making treaties of peace for the confederacy, cannot lawfully alienate the whole or any portion of the territory of any member of the union, without the express assent of that member. Such was the theory of the ancient Germanic Constitution; the dismemberment of its territory was contrary to the fundamental laws and maxims of the empire; and such is believed to be the actual constitution of the present Germanic Confederation. This theory of the public law of Germany has often been compelled to yield in practice to imperious necessity; such as that which forced the cession to France of the territories belonging to the States of the empire, on the left bank of the Rhine, by the Treaty of Luneville, in 1800. Even in the case of a supreme federal government, or composite State, like that of the United States of America, it may, perhaps, be doubted how far the mere general treaty-making power, vested in the federal head, necessarily carries with it that of alienating the territory of any member of the union without its consent.

§3. Effects of a treaty of peace.

The effect of a treaty of peace is to put an end to the war, and to abolish the subject of it. It is an agree ment to waive all discussion concerning the respective rights and claims of the parties, and to bury in oblivion the original causes of the war. It forbids the revival of the same war by resuming hostilities for the original cause which first kindled' it, or for whatever may have occurred in the course of it. But the reciprocal stipulation of perpetual peace and amity between the parties does not imply that they are never again to make war against each other for any cause whatever. The peace relates to the war which it terminates; and is perpetual, in the

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