COMPROMISE TARIFF OF 1833

207

woolens. In all cases where the duty exceeded twenty per cent, however, one tenth of this excess was to be removed every two years until 1840; on January 1, 1842, one half of the remaining excess was to be taken off, and on July 1, the other half. The result would be, on July 1, 1842, a uniform horizontal tariff of twenty per cent as Hayne proposed in his resolution.

act.

While Congress thus offered an olive branch with one The force hand, it at the same time condemned nullification by passing, on March 1, a force bill giving the President powers adequate for dealing with the situation. In South Carolina the convention came together again and, declaring itself satisfied with the new tariff, withdrew its nullifying resolution, March 15, 1833. On March 18 it nullified the force bill, a proceeding quite harmless, as the President now had no occasion for acting under it.

As regards protection, the tariff of 1833 was distinctly Effect of the a compromise. Clay claimed that he had really proved him- compromise. self the savior of protection, for the new Congress, elected in the fall of 1832, would have reduced the tariff very considerably; now, bound by the compromise measure, the tariff would remain fairly protective until 1842, and then a new bill could be drawn up. Calhoun claimed that by adopting the compromise measure Congress had bound itself to the view that protection was justifiable only as a temporary measure; that the time for its abandonment was fixed in the bill, and that in the future the tariff would be levied on the horizontal basis. The question of the right of nullification also remained technically open. Calhoun claimed that it had proved entirely successful; that by it South Carolina had obtained redress that it could have found in no other way. The general impression in the country at large was decidedly different. The repudiation of the doctrine by all the states that expressed themselves on the subject, and particularly the emphatic tone of the President's proclama

tion, backed up as it was by acts, and supported by the passage of the force bill, 32 to 1 in the Senate and 110 to 40 in the House, impressed upon all the fact that the Union could and would enforce its laws. As a matter of fact nullification was not again tried. Politically the nullification controversy cleared the situation in many ways, particularly by showing the difference between the state rights views of Jackson, who believed in leaving much public business to the control of the states, but who, nevertheless, looked upon the Union as permanent; and the position of those who by state rights meant that the Union had no sovereign powers. The unqualified Union doctrine, set forth in Jackson's proclamation, alarmed many who disapproved of South Carolina's action, but were fearful of a consolidated general government. Many conservative southern thinkers began to act independently of the Democratic party, which its leaders had made so emphatically the party of the Union. The crisis caused by the tariff system was thus passed, but not without a decided shock to the nation, and permanent political results.

Sources.

Historical accounts.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

American History Leaflets, no. 30. Calhoun, J. C., Works, I, 1-107 (Disquisition on Government); IV, 164–212 (Speech on the Tariff); VI, 1-208 (Papers on Nullification). Congressional Debates, 20th Cong., 1 sess., 2382-2406 (Speech of McDuffie on the tariff, perhaps the best exposition of South Carolina's views); 21st Cong., I sess., 43-92 (Speeches of Webster and Hayne, which are also to be found in Macdonald, W., Select Documents, nos. 47-49, 53, 55, and 56; and many other places). For Jackson's Proclamation, see Richardson, Messages, II, 640-666. For documents see H. V. Ames, State Documents.

In addition to the general accounts mentioned at the close of the last chapter: Holst, von, Calhoun, ch. IV. Houston, D. F., Nullification in South Carolina. Lodge, H. C., Webster, chs. VI,

VII. McLaughlin, A. C., Lewis Cass, 139–149. Schafer, W. A., Sectionalism and Representation in South Carolina (Am. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1900, vol. I), 384-400. Stanwood, E., American Tariff Controversies, chs. VIII, IX. Sumner, W. G., A. Jackson, ch. VII, ch. VIII, sec. 7. Taussig, F. W., Tariff History, 74112. Turner, F. J., New West, 314-333.

The bank question.

The currency.

CHAPTER XIII

JACKSON AND THE BANK

WHILE Jackson and his party emerged from the nullification struggle distinctly pledged to support the Union, they were not committed either for or against a protective tariff. In fact the compromise took the tariff out of politics for ten years, and political issues had to be sought elsewhere. The main issue had already been formulated before the tariff compromise had been arranged. Few persons in the older states imagined in 1828 that the existence of the National Bank would by 1832 become the leading question of party division, but it was a question that the frontier was determined to press, and with the will the frontier had the power.

A frontier community is always in search of capital, for opportunities to expend it are innumerable and accumulation has not yet begun. It was to answer this demand that Adams and Clay proposed to have the national government undertake internal improvements, and that Jackson wished to give to the western states the public land. These plans had little practical result until the distribution bill of 1836, and western states and individuals were supplying themselves as they could by borrowing. Throughout the frontier the bulk of the inhabitants were debtors, and the most enterprising owed the largest sums; there was a general community of interest, and a tendency to look at all questions from the debtor rather than the creditor point of view. This showed itself particularly with regard to the currency. There was a demand for an abundant supply of money; there was less interest in its stability. The people wanted to get money

easily to pay their debts; they did not feel keenly the neces-
sity of paying in money worth one hundred cents on the
dollar. The states were forbidden by the Constitution to
emit bills of credit, and thus the financial expedients resorted
to differed from those of the Shays's Rebellion period, though
the situation was in many respects similar. It was dis-
covered that the states could charter banks, and that these
banks could emit bills of credit and thus partly satisfy the
demand. As creditors refused to accept such bills at their
face value, it was thought desirable to make them legal tender,
and thus compel their acceptance somewhat as Rhode Is-
land had done in 1786. Kentucky took such action, where-
upon the state supreme court declared the act void on the
ground that it violated the United States Constitution, which
prohibits a state from making "anything but gold and silver
Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts." This decision was
at once attacked by the "Relief" party, and in 1825, by a
vote of 38,000 to 22,000, a legislature was elected pledged
to erect a new supreme court. The next year saw a reaction,
and the matter was not forced, but the strength of the de-
mand for an easy currency was made evident.
The sup-
porters of state banks, which were thus refused the indorse-
ment which their states were anxious to give them, were
naturally opposed to the United States Bank, whose notes
were freely accepted by creditors both public and private.
They believed that if this giant, privileged corporation,
were once removed, they would be able to furnish a cur-
rency satisfactory to creditor and debtor alike. They
disliked the strict and inflexible rules by which its branches
regulated their relations with the state banks, thus keep-
ing business up to a standard which public opinion believed
too high. The frontier wished to set its own business
standards.

To those who opposed the National Bank as a competitor of the state banks were added those who feared it as a great

The Bank nopoly.

and mo