Southern
Whigs.

some other states the Antimasons joined with the National Republicans, giving them a strength in the rural districts they had never had before. All together Harrison and Webster received in the northern states a popular vote decidedly larger than that cast in 1832 for Clay and Wirt, gaining, as compared with them, New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana, and part of Maryland, and losing only Rhode Island and Connecticut.

The opposition to Van Buren was not confined to the supporters of Harrison and Webster. In nine of the eleven states south of the Potomac, the opposition candidate was Judge White of Tennessee. In these states, in 1832, Clay had received 20,000 votes; Judge White received 145,000, carrying Georgia and Tennessee. This represented a new falling away from the Democratic party. This element consisted of men who, first one and then another, had ceased, between 1832 and 1836, to support Jackson. Some had left because they considered that his proclamation on nullification contained sentiments inimical to the rights of the states. Among these was John Tyler and a large faction of the pure Jeffersonian democracy. Others of the same element abandoned Jackson after the removal of the deposits and other acts of executive power, claiming that the President was preparing the way for a despotism by the executive. Many of the wealthier planters were alarmed at the financial aspects of the attack on the Bank, and were equally opposed to the bullionist policy of Benton. They desired a credit currency on a sound basis. Many, while uneasy at these things, had supported Jackson, confident in his personal honesty of purpose, but they left the party now that Van Buren took his place. In general these southern adherents of Judge White belonged to the more conservative and wealthier classes; they regarded themselves as the custodians of the pure traditions of the past, and they breathed with relief when they shook themselves free from the party contaminated by the spoils system and political organization.

Carolina.

Still a third element of opposition were the nullifiers of South South Carolina, who rejected Van Buren and would not accept Judge White, and so again threw away the vote of the state, this time on Willie P. Mangum of North Carolina. That Van Buren was successful, although by the narrow Results. margin of 25,000 in the popular vote and 46 in the electoral college,' was a strong testimonial to the popularity of Democratic doctrines, and a final gratification to Jackson, who could now retire with the consciousness of having completely triumphed over his enemies. Nor had his successes been due to a temporizing or passive policy. He had boldly grappled with the real problems before the country; he had applied to each such remedy as to his simple practical mind seemed likely to be efficacious, and had worked for its application, often against the advice of his closest friends and in the face of the overwhelming opposition of the people's representatives in Congress; and in every case, even to his personal vindication by the expunging resolution, his judgment had finally been indorsed by the people. He retired triumphant, leaving in his place a man of his own choice, who gave, as his highest qualification for the office, the fact that he was the representative of Jackson's policies, and whose retention of Jackson's cabinet was an earnest of his intentions.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

The references given at the close of the last three chapters continue to be of use. In addition, the following historical accounts are of value: Foster, J. W., A Century of American Diplomacy, 272-280. Roosevelt, T., Benton, ch. VII. Shepard, E. M., Van Buren, ch. VII.

1 One state, Virginia, which voted for Van Buren for President, refused to vote for Johnson for Vice President. As a result, no one received a majority of the electoral votes for Vice President, and Johnson was elected to this office by the Senate.

The crisis of 1837.

Proposed remedies.

CHAPTER XV

THE VAN BUREN ADMINISTRATION

SCARCELY had Jackson withdrawn to the "Hermitage," his country home in Tennessee, and left the government in the hands of his lieutenants, when prosperity, which had been at high-water mark throughout his administration, ebbed like the tide in the Bay of Fundy. From one end of the country to the other disaster spread: prices dropped, demand for commodities declined, banks closed their doors, and mills shut down. The crisis of 1819 had not been so acute, nor was that of 1873 so extensive. A great amount of specie had, before the year 1837, been driven from the country by the abundance of paper money. With the first halt in prosperity the banks were forced to suspend specie payment, and thereupon the value of their paper money fell. The majority of the business men of the country were engaged in undertakings far beyond their resources; with the disturbance of credit they went into bankruptcy, or were hopelessly involved where bankruptcy was not an authorized procedure. Everywhere was financial ruin, and this was often accompanied by actual personal distress, particularly in the manufacturing regions. Petitions poured in, asking the administration to come to the relief of the country; riots seemed to threaten the maintenance of order, and Van Buren so far yielded to the popular unrest as to call an extra session of Congress for September.

When Congress met, the leaders of the opposition naturally united in laying the blame for the crisis upon the shoulders of the Democratic party. Clay believed that the failure to

THE ADMINISTRATION POLICY

235

recharter the United States Bank, the disturbance caused by the removal of the deposits, and the Specie Circular had been responsible; that the remedy should be the immediate reestablishment of the Bank. Van Buren found the cause of the crisis, not in the policy of the national government, but in that of the states. He pointed out that banking capital had been allowed to increase between 1834 and 1836 from $200,000,000 to $251,000,000, bank notes in circulation from $95,000,000 to $140,000,000, and loans and discounts from $324,000,000 to $457,000,000, and that states, banks, and merchants were heavily indebted to Europe; that this unusual and unsound distention of credit had but brought its natural result. Calhoun so strongly espoused this view that he broke with the opposition, with whom he had been cooperating since the compromise of 1833, and gave fairly consistent support to the administration. He looked upon the Specie Circular as a wise measure, because it pricked the bubble of inflation and brought land speculation down to the basis of real values. There is little doubt now that the crisis of 1837 was a natural economic reaction from the fever of speculation that preceded. The Specie Circular may have hastened the disaster, by exhibiting the deficiency of real capital, but it could not have been long delayed, as a similar crisis was taking place in Europe; if the American government had not made its call for gold and thereby revealed the barrenness of the banks, the European bankers would soon have done so. If a well-established national bank had been in existence, to exercise a wise regulative influence, it might have rendered the crisis less severe, but it is difficult to see how the establishment of a bank in 1837 could have much relieved the situation.

The administration policy was dictated by a portion of Administrathe party, and was based upon Van Buren's analysis of the tion policy causes of the crisis. The carnival of paper money had added many adherents to the bullionist element, represented by

Subtreasury plan.

Benton and Jackson. This faction was particularly strengthened by a local movement in New York. Here a portion of the party had revolted against the dominant Albany Regency, claiming that this clique was becoming as much of an aristocracy as that of the Federalists before them; that it was time for a new distribution of the spoils. This revolting faction, from an episode of their campaign, acquired the name of "Loco-Focos." Just before the election of 1836 they were reunited with the party. Their most important political belief was the fallibility of all credit currency and the unique efficacy of hard money-gold and silver. In their fusion with the party they carried this idea with them, and the President became the advocate of this their leading principle. It was not, therefore, without justice that the name Loco-Focos came to be applied to the whole Democratic party, although it was so used by their opponents chiefly to recall certain socialistic ideas of the faction, which tended to discredit it in the eyes of the conservative.

With this backing, Van Buren boldly supported the Specie Circular, and in fact extended it to receipts for the postal service. He recommended that Congress adopt, as a permanent policy, the requirement that all receipts of the government be in gold and silver. The newer portion of his scheme related to the care and disbursement of this money when once collected. He pointed out that two methods had been employed by the government in the past: one, the use of a national bank from 1791 to 1811 and from 1816 to 1836; the other, the use of state banks. Both of these plans, he thought, had proved unsatisfactory. He recommended, therefore, that the government take care of its own money by the establishment of branches of the treasury in cities where the major portion of its business was conducted. The receiving officers would be responsible until they placed it in these subtreasuries, and payments would be made out of the money thus collected and stored. By the administra