Opinion of the court. one was, from that of savings banks-such as he said there are many of which simply take money from depositors, agreeing to pay to them a fixed rate of interest per annum; a rate for which the corporation is bound, no matter how little gain it may itself make; and for no more than which it is bound, however great its own gains may be; any surplus above the interest agreed to be paid to depositor, not belonging to him but to the corporation. Mr. H. J. Tilden, contra, argued that what the depositor got here was really the interest which was paid by borrowers on money put by him into the bank, and that calling that interest a "dividend” did not less make it "interest.” The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court. A distinction is expressly recognized in the act of Congress between interest and dividends, and the Circuit Court decided that the payments to the depositors were for dividends. The question is whether this decision was correct. We think it was. The depositors contracted not for a rate of interest to be paid upon their deposits, but for a share of the profits of the business in which their money was, by agreement, to be employed. It is true that the profits of the company were principally to be derived from interest upon loans made, but they were none the less on that account profits. The interest received for the loan of each deposit was not kept by itself, and paid to the depositors after deducting a charge to cover expenses, but all was placed in a common fund, and when the net result of the business was ascertained, that was divided among the several contributors according to the value of their contributions. Such a division clearly produces a dividend according to the common understanding of that term. The parties themselves so understood it, for they gave it that name in the contracts, executed when the depositors made their deposits. They stipulated for the payment of dividends and not interest. JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY. Statement of the case. HOUSE ET AL. v. MULLEN. 1. A bill was filed by two parties, one of whom showed good cause for equitable relief, but the other of whom did not show what interest he had in the subject-matter of litigation, or that he had any. The bill was demurred to on several grounds, one being the want of such showing (which by settled equity rule is a good ground of demurrer), and another ground being that the bill showed that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, was stale, &c.; an allegation about the bill not true in fact, it showing the reverse, and this ground of demurrer therefore failing. The court below "dismissed" the bill generally; and in this state the record was of course capable of being pleaded in bar to a new suit on the merits. This court being of opinion that the only defect in the bill was that it did not show interest in both the parties while it did show cause for equitable relief in one, refused to affirm the decree below, as it would have done had the dismissal been without prejudice, or because a party who showed no interest was a complainant. On the contrary, to prevent what might be great injustice in case of another suit on the merits, by the record being used in the way above mentioned, the court reversed the decree and remanded the case with directions to allow the complainant to amend his bill within a reasonable time, or failing to do this to dismiss it without prejudice. 2. When a bill by a widow, claiming real estate, alleges that certain persons named, being several in number, all claim through a deed made by her during coverture, which deed the bill alleges was void for want of her free consent in making it, no demurrer lies to the bill on the ground that the defendants were improperly joined, inasmuch as they had separate and distinct interests which could not be joined in one suit. APPEAL from the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. On the 27th of November, 1871, Eliza House filed a bill in chancery, in the court below, against Andrew Mullen and twenty-one others. The bill set forth that on the 16th of March, 1838, the said Eliza being then a married woman, a conveyance was made by one Lawrence to a certain Gibson, for the consideration of $2700, of the half or undivided moiety of lot No. 22, in the town of Selma, Alabama; that by mistake this was recorded as a conveyance of the half of the undivided moiety of said lot; that by the terms of the conveyance the Statement of the case. trustee was to hold the property in trust for the benefit of her the said Eliza during her natural life, after which he was to convey in fee simple to such child or children as she might have living at her death. The bill further alleged that Gibson died in 1841, and Reuben House, the husband of the complainant, in 1868; that from the date of the deed from Lawrence to Gibson, the complainant lived on the premises, or received the rents and profits, until 1846; that during this time her husband and herself removed from Alabama to Florida; that the defendants were now in possession of the lot or parts of the same, claiming the whole of it as owners, and asserting title under a deed which they alleged to have been made by the complainant and her husband in 1846 to one Walker, which deed the complainant alleged that she did not sign and seal as her voluntary act and deed, freely and without compulsion of her said husband. The bill prayed for the appointment of a trustee in place of Gibson, who was dead. It also prayed for a partition with the defendants, for an account of rents and profits, and for such other and further relief as to equity belonged. Before anything further was done, the complainant obtained leave to file an amended bill, and an entire new bill was accordingly filed by her and Mary Hunter, and Charles Hunter, husband of the said Mary. What interest Mr. and Mrs. Hunter had in the matter, or how either was related to anybody concerned in it, was nowhere stated. As for the rest, the same matters were alleged in the new bill as in the old. To this new bill the defendants demurred. The grounds of demurrer set forth were 1. That if the complainants had any rights as shown by the bill, they were separate and distinct, and could not be joined in this suit. 2. That the bill did not show any interest of Mary aud Charles Hunter in the subject-matter of the litigation. 3. That the defendants were improperly joined, inasmuch as they had separate and distinct interests which could not be joined in one suit. Argument for the appellants. 4. And that the claim was stale, and barred by the statute of limitations and by the long acquiescence of the complainants in the possession of the defendants as shown by the bill. The decree ran thus: "This cause coming on, &c., it is considered by the court that the said demurrer of the defendants. . . be sustained. It is, therefore, adjudged and decreed that the said bill of complaint of Eliza House, Mary Hunter, and Charles Hunter, be and the same is hereby dismissed out of this court." The reader will observe that the dismissal was general and absolute; not one for error or defect of parties or without prejudice. From this decree the complainants appealed. Mr. W. W. Boyce, for the appellants: The second ground of demurrer, and to which we will first advert, was that no interest was specifically stated to exist in Mr. and Mrs. Hunter. But Mrs. Hunter was plainly the daughter of Mrs. House. The fact was inferable from the allegations of both bills, that the trust was for Mrs. House for life and for her child afterwards; from the patent fact that the child was a party in interest and necessary; and from the amended bill in which she was brought in. The omission to state in terms the relationship was evidently one merely accidental, which should not have been visited with the heavy penalty of such a dismissal as was made—an absolute one-but if with any dismissal at all with but one giving leave to amend. But there was no ground for any sort of dismissal. The fact of heirship being shown as above it is, as a matter inferable, the first ground of demurrer falls away. Mrs. House and Mrs. Hunter had the same title; the former being equitable tenant for life and the latter tenant in remainder. The husband was rightly added for form. The third ground of demurrer is bad, because all the defendants are alleged to be in possession under a deed made Opinion of the court. by the complainant, Mrs. House, which was executed under duress. As for the fourth ground, the statute of limitations, &c., the bill was filed in November, 1871. Mr. House, the husband, it is alleged in the bill and admitted by the demurrer, died only in 1868. Till 1868 the complainaut, Mrs. House, was under disabilities. Every ground of demurrer, therefore, was bad. No opposing counsel. Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. The fourth ground of demurrer-that the bill shows that the claim was stale, barred by the statute, &c.-is sufficiently answered by the averment of the bill that the plaintiff, Eliza House, was a feme covert from the time she parted with the possession until the year 1868, the bill being filed in 1871. The third ground-that the defendants are improperly joined is equally indefensible, as the bill shows that defendants all claim through a deed from her, which deed she alleged to be void for want of her free consent in making it. If the case should come to a hearing the contest must turn upon the validity of this deed, in which all the defendants have a common interest. Besides, she asks to have her half divided or partitioned off to her. To obtain that she is not obliged to file a separate bill against each of the twenty-two defendants, if she is entitled to a half of the whole lot on partition. The two first causes of demurrer may be treated together. The bill is fatally defective in joining Mary Hunter and her husdand, Charles Hunter, as plaintiffs, and making no allegation or averment of any interest whatever which they have in the matter. It is suggested by counsel for appellants that Mary Hunter is the child of Eliza House, and that the statement of this fact is omitted by a mere accident. But we have no evi. dence that Mary Hunter is the child of Eliza House, except |